



Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Washington, D.C. 20535

January 29, 2020

MR. WILLIAM F MARSHALL
 JUDICIAL WATCH
 SUITE 800
 425 THIRD STREET, SOUTHWEST
 WASHINGTON, DC 20024

FOIPA Request No.: 1391365-000
 Civil Action No.: 18-cv-154
 Subject: Communications between Peter Strzok and
 Lisa Page (February 1, 2015 – Present)

Dear Mr. Marshall:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings with indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552		Section 552a
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1)
_____	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2)
_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3)
_____	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)		<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7)

500 pages of potentially responsive records were reviewed.
 181 pages are being released in whole or in part.
 20 pages are being withheld in full per exemptions.
 180 pages are being withheld duplicate.
 30 pages are being withheld referral/consult.
 89 pages were determined to be non-records/non-responsive to the FOIA request.

Below you will also find additional informational paragraphs about your request. Where applicable, check boxes are used to provide you with more information about the processing of your request. Please read each item carefully.

- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].
- This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.

- ¶ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.
- ¶ In accordance with standard FBI practice and pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552/552a (b)(7)(E)/(j)(2)], this response neither confirms nor denies the existence of your subject's name on any watch lists.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Sixth Floor, 441 G Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following website: <https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Assistant United States Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request.

You may direct any further inquiries to the attorney representing the Government in this matter.

- ¶ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

In response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of Bates Stamped documents, FBI(18-cv-154)-9036 through FBI(18-cv-154)-9535. The enclosed documents represent the twentieth interim release of information responsive to your request.

The FBI conducted email searches for any email communication between Peter Strzok and Lisa Page. This search located both official government records and non-record personal communications between these two individuals.

The FBI reviewed 500 pages of these emails. While conducting this review, the FBI individually analyzed the emails to determine whether they pertained to official government business constituting records under the FOIA or whether they consisted of purely personal communications between the two individuals. As a result of the FBI's review, it determined 89 pages were non-record, personal communications not subject to the FOIA; and 411 pages consisted of responsive FBI records.

As previously indicated, document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning another agency (ies). We are consulting with the other agency (ies) and are awaiting their response. Our office has processed all other information currently in our possession. The FBI will correspond with you regarding those documents when the consultation is completed.

To minimize costs to both you and the FBI, duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
 DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
 FOIA Request No.:1391365-000 Civil
 Action No.: 18-cv-154

Total Withheld Page(s) = 319

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(18-cv-154)-9036	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9037
FBI(18-cv-154)-9038	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9039 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9046	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-2961 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-2963
FBI(18-cv-154)-9047 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9051	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9052 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9056
FBI(18-cv-154)-9057	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9058
FBI(18-cv-154)-9059 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9063	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9064 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9068
FBI(18-cv-154)-9069 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9073	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9074 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9078
FBI(18-cv-154)-9082	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9086	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9088 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9089	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9090 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9091
FBI(18-cv-154)-9092 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9094	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9095 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9096	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9097 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9098
FBI(18-cv-154)-9099 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9106	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9107 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9114
FBI(18-cv-154)-9115	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-9116	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9117 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9118	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9119 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9120
FBI(18-cv-154)-9124 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9126	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-2973 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-2975
FBI(18-cv-154)-9127 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9128	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9129 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9130
FBI(18-cv-154)-9129 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9130	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-9131	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9132 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9133
FBI(18-cv-154)-9132 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9133	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-9134 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9137	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9138 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9141
FBI(18-cv-154)-9142 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9149	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-2293 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-2998
FBI(18-cv-154)-9150 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9170	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9171 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9175

FBI(18-cv-154)-9175	b5-1, 2, 3
FBI(18-cv-154)-9176	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9177 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9178	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9179 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9180
FBI(18-cv-154)-9181	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9182 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9187	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9188 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9193
FBI(18-cv-154)-9193	b5-1, 2, 3
FBI(18-cv-154)-9199 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9200	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9197 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9198
FBI(18-cv-154)-9201	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9202
FBI(18-cv-154)-9203 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9204	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9205 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9206
FBI(18-cv-154)-9205 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9206	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-9209	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9211 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9212	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9213 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9214
FBI(18-cv-154)-9215 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9217	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9218 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9220
FBI(18-cv-154)-9224 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9228	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9229 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9233
FBI(18-cv-154)-9234 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9235	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9236 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9237
FBI(18-cv-154)-9238 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9239	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9240 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9241	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9242 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9243
FBI(18-cv-154)-9244 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9250	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9251 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9257
FBI(18-cv-154)-9258	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9259
FBI(18-cv-154)-9260 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9263	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9264 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9267	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9268 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9271
FBI(18-cv-154)-9272 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9274	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9276 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9280	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9281 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9285
FBI(18-cv-154)-9288	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9289 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9306	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3024 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3027
FBI(18-cv-154)-9308	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9310 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9314	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9315 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9316	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9317 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9318
FBI(18-cv-154)-9319 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9320	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3033 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3035
FBI(18-cv-154)-9321 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9324	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3042 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3043
FBI(18-cv-154)-9325	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request

FBI(18-cv-154)-9328	b6-1; b7C-1
FBI(18-cv-154)-9329	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3046
FBI(18-cv-154)-9334 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9338	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3052 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3053
FBI(18-cv-154)-9339 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9340	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3054 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3055
FBI(18-cv-154)-9341	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9344 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9346	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9349 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9350	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9347 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9348
FBI(18-cv-154)-9351 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9363	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9364	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9375
FBI(18-cv-154)-9365	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1,6
FBI(18-cv-154)-9366	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1
FBI(18-cv-154)-9367	b7E-1
FBI(18-cv-154)-9368 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9373	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-9374	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9375	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1,2,6
FBI(18-cv-154)-9376	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1,6
FBI(18-cv-154)-9377 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9379	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9380 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9386	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9387 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9393
FBI(18-cv-154)-9394 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9401	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9402	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1,6
FBI(18-cv-154)-9403 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9405	b7E-1
FBI(18-cv-154)-9406 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9407	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3121 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3122
FBI(18-cv-154)-9408 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9409	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-9410 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9411
FBI(18-cv-154)-9410 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9411	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1,6
FBI(18-cv-154)-9412	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9413 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9414	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1,6
FBI(18-cv-154)-9415	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1
FBI(18-cv-154)-9416 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9417	b7E-1
FBI(18-cv-154)-9418 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9421	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9422 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9423	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9461 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9468	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9469	b6-1; b7C-1; b7E-1,6
FBI(18-cv-154)-9470 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9481	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request

FBI(18-cv-154)-9487	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9493	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9494 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9497	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-9504 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9512	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-9513 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9514	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9515 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9518	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-9519	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9523	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-9524 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9526	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3181 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3184
FBI(18-cv-154)-9529 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9531	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3178 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3180
FBI(18-cv-154)-9532 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-9535	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-3194 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-3198

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2016 6:37 PM
To: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: MYE data update

b6 -1
b7C -1

We continue to work with OTD this afternoon. [REDACTED]

b5 -1

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The discussion of the classified email remains accurate.

Pete

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 8:35 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump | Mother Jones

<http://m.motherjones.com/politics/2016/10/veteran-spy-gave-fbi-info-alleging-russian-operation-cultivate-donald-trump>

A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump

Has the bureau investigated this material?

Carlo Allegri/ZUMA • Oct. 31, 2016 7:52 PM



On Friday, FBI Director James Comey set off a political blast when he informed congressional leaders that the bureau had stumbled across emails that might be pertinent to its completed inquiry into Hillary Clinton's handling of emails when she was secretary of state. The Clinton campaign and others criticized Comey for intervening in a presidential campaign by breaking with Justice Department tradition and revealing information about an investigation—information that was vague and perhaps ultimately irrelevant—so close to Election Day. On Sunday, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid upped the ante. He sent Comey a fiery letter saying the FBI chief may have broken the law and pointed to a potentially greater controversy: "In my communications with you and other top officials in the national security community, it

has become clear that you possess explosive information about close ties and coordination between Donald Trump, his top advisors, and the Russian government... The public has a right to know this information."

Reid's missive set off a burst of speculation on Twitter and elsewhere. What was he referring to regarding the Republican presidential nominee? At the end of August, Reid had written to Comey and demanded an investigation of the "connections between the Russian government and Donald Trump's presidential campaign," and in that letter he indirectly referred to Carter Page, an American businessman cited by Trump as one of his foreign policy advisers, who had financial ties to Russia and had recently visited Moscow. Last month, *Yahoo News* reported that US intelligence officials were probing the links between Page and senior Russian officials. (Page has called accusations against him "garbage.") On Monday, NBC News reported that the FBI has mounted a preliminary inquiry into the foreign business ties of Paul Manafort, Trump's former campaign chief. But Reid's recent note hinted at more than the Page or Manafort affairs. And a former senior intelligence officer for a Western country who specialized in Russian counterintelligence tells *Mother Jones* that in recent months he provided the bureau with memos, based on his recent interactions with Russian sources, contending the Russian government has for years tried to co-opt and assist Trump—and that the FBI requested more information from him.

"This is something of huge significance, way above party politics," the former intelligence officer says. "I think [Trump's] own party should be aware of this stuff as well."

Does this mean the FBI is investigating whether Russian intelligence has attempted to develop a secret relationship with Trump or cultivate him as an asset? Was the former intelligence officer and his material deemed credible or not? An FBI spokeswoman says, "Normally, we don't talk about whether we are investigating anything." But a senior US government official not involved in this case but familiar with the former spy tells *Mother Jones* that he has been a credible source with a proven record of providing reliable, sensitive, and important information to the US government.

In June, the former Western intelligence officer—who spent almost two decades on

Russian intelligence matters and who now works with a US firm that gathers information on Russia for corporate clients—was assigned the task of researching Trump's dealings in Russia and elsewhere, according to the former spy and his associates in this American firm. This was for an opposition research project originally financed by a Republican client critical of the celebrity mogul. (Before the former spy was retained, the project's financing switched to a client allied with Democrats.) "It started off as a fairly general inquiry," says the former spook, who asks not to be identified. But when he dug into Trump, he notes, he came across troubling information indicating connections between Trump and the Russian government. According to his sources, he says, "there was an established exchange of information between the Trump campaign and the Kremlin of mutual benefit."

This was, the former spy remarks, "an extraordinary situation." He regularly consults with US government agencies on Russian matters, and near the start of July on his own initiative—without the permission of the US company that hired him—he sent a report he had written for that firm to a contact at the FBI, according to the former intelligence officer and his American associates, who asked not to be identified. (He declines to identify the FBI contact.) The former spy says he concluded that the information he had collected on Trump was "sufficiently serious" to share with the FBI.

Mother Jones has reviewed that report and other memos this former spy wrote. The first memo, based on the former intelligence officer's conversations with Russian sources, noted, "Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance." It maintained that Trump "and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals." It claimed that Russian intelligence had "compromised" Trump during his visits to Moscow and could "blackmail him." It also reported that Russian intelligence had compiled a dossier on Hillary Clinton based on "bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and intercepted phone calls."

The former intelligence officer says the response from the FBI was "shock and horror." The FBI, after receiving the first memo, did not immediately request additional material, according to the former intelligence officer and his American associates. Yet in August,

they say, the FBI asked him for all information in his possession and for him to explain how the material had been gathered and to identify his sources. The former spy forwarded to the bureau several memos—some of which referred to members of Trump's inner circle. After that point, he continued to share information with the FBI. "It's quite clear there was or is a pretty substantial inquiry going on," he says.

"This is something of huge significance, way above party politics," the former intelligence officer comments. "I think [Trump's] own party should be aware of this stuff as well."

The Trump campaign did not respond to a request for comment regarding the memos. In the past, Trump has declared, "I have nothing to do with Russia."

The FBI is certainly investigating the hacks attributed to Russia that have hit American political targets, including the Democratic National Committee and John Podesta, the chairman of Clinton's presidential campaign. But there have been few public signs of whether that probe extends to examining possible contacts between the Russian government and Trump. (In recent weeks, reporters in Washington have pursued anonymous online reports that a computer server related to the Trump Organization engaged in a high level of activity with servers connected to Alfa Bank, the largest private bank in Russia. On Monday, a *Slate* investigation detailed the pattern of unusual server activity but concluded, "We don't yet know what this [Trump] server was for, but it deserves further explanation." In an email to *Mother Jones*, Hope Hicks, a Trump campaign spokeswoman, maintains, "The Trump Organization is not sending or receiving any communications from this email server. The Trump Organization has no communication or relationship with this entity or any Russian entity.")

According to several national security experts, there is widespread concern in the US intelligence community that Russian intelligence, via hacks, is aiming to undermine the presidential election—to embarrass the United States and delegitimize its democratic elections. And the hacks appear to have been designed to benefit Trump. In August, Democratic members of the House committee on oversight wrote Comey to ask the FBI to investigate "whether connections between Trump campaign officials and Russian interests may have contributed to these [cyber] attacks in order to interfere with the US. presidential election." In September, Sen. Dianne Feinstein and Rep. Adam Schiff,

the senior Democrats on, respectively, the Senate and House intelligence committees, issued a joint statement accusing Russia of underhanded meddling: "Based on briefings we have received, we have concluded that the Russian intelligence agencies are making a serious and concerted effort to influence the U.S. election. At the least, this effort is intended to sow doubt about the security of our election and may well be intended to influence the outcomes of the election." The Obama White House has declared Russia the culprit in the hacking capers, expressed outrage, and promised a "proportional" response.

There's no way to tell whether the FBI has confirmed or debunked any of the allegations contained in the former spy's memos. But a Russian intelligence attempt to co-opt or cultivate a presidential candidate would mark an even more serious operation than the hacking.

In the letter Reid sent to Comey on Sunday, he pointed out that months ago he had asked the FBI director to release information on Trump's possible Russia ties. Since then, according to a Reid spokesman, Reid has been briefed several times. The spokesman adds, "He is confident that he knows enough to be extremely alarmed."

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 8:38 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FBI's Comey opposed naming Russians, citing election timing: Source

<http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/31/fbis-comey-opposed-naming-russians-citing-election-timing-source.html>

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 9:00 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (RO) (FBI) [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:42 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
(OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -4, 6

----- Original message -----

From: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:41 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
(RO) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Sure does. First reference I'm ever aware of to our review network too.

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:36 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
(RO) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Hmm. Yes. Yes we did. Makes you wonder who dialed in...

----- Original message -----

From: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
[redacted] OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
(RO) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

I think [redacted]

b5 -1

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:31 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
[redacted] OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
[redacted] (RO) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Well, uh, gosh...

<http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/us/politics/hillary-clinton-huma-abedin-emails-fbi.html>

F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails

October 31, 2016

By MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT, MATT APUZZO and ADAM GOLDMAN

WASHINGTON — The F.B.I. on Monday began loading a trove of emails belonging to a top aide to Hillary Clinton into a special computer program that would allow bureau analysts to determine whether they contain classified information, law enforcement officials said.

The software should allow them to learn relatively quickly how many emails are copies

of messages they have already read as part of the investigation into the use of Mrs. Clinton's private server. The F.B.I. completed that investigation in July and, along with prosecutors, decided not to bring any charges against Mrs. Clinton or her aides.

"This is not a manpower issue," said one senior law enforcement official. "It's an issue of getting the emails into a program that can allow agents to look at them."

The Run-Up

The podcast that makes sense of the most delirious stretch of the 2016 campaign.

Whether they will be able to complete their review by Election Day is unclear, although investigators have been under intense pressure from officials in both parties to do so since Friday, when the F.B.I. director, James B. Comey, revealed the existence of the emails in an explosive letter to Congress.

[Document | Letter to Congress From F.B.I. Director on Clinton Email Case](#) In the letter, the F.B.I. director, James B. Comey, said that new emails had surfaced in a case unrelated to the closed investigation into whether Hillary Clinton or her aides had mishandled classified information, and that the messages "appear to be pertinent to the investigation."

The emails belong to Huma Abedin, a top adviser to Mrs. Clinton. Agents discovered them on a laptop seized by the F.B.I. that belongs to her estranged husband, Anthony Weiner, who is under investigation for exchanging illicit text messages with a 15-year-old girl.

While the hunt for classified information is the bureau's first priority, it is not the most significant issue for either Ms. Abedin or Mrs. Clinton. Investigators have already determined that Mrs. Clinton and her aides improperly sent classified information on her private email server. The Justice Department concluded, though, that it could not prove they did it intentionally, which would be a crime. Finding more classified information among Ms. Abedin's emails would not immediately change that conclusion.

What could cause problems for Ms. Abedin — and by extension Mrs. Clinton — is if the F.B.I. finds evidence that anyone tried to conceal these new emails from investigators.

Ms. Abedin has said she turned over all her emails to the F.B.I. months ago and does not know how emails ended up on Mr. Weiner's laptop. And officials have said there is no indication that Ms. Abedin or Ms. Clinton tried to conceal information from the authorities.

Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, said on Monday that the White House did not have an official position on Mr. Comey's decision to alert Congress. But Mr. Earnest came close to suggesting that President Obama saw Mr. Comey's decision as problematic. Mr. Earnest listed the many powers and authorities that federal law enforcement officials have to investigate for potential wrongdoing and then said, "It's important that those authorities are tempered by longstanding practice and norms that limit public discussion of facts that are collected in the context of those investigations."

Mr. Earnest added: "And there are a lot of good reasons for that. The president believes that it's important for those guidelines and norms to be followed."

Justice Department officials had told Mr. Comey that alerting Congress to the discovery of a new cache of emails would violate department rules and norms against both discussing a continuing investigation and taking any actions in the days before an election that might influence that election.

But Mr. Comey is a "man of integrity" whom the president does not believe is intentionally trying to influence the outcome of an election, Mr. Earnest said.

"He's in a tough spot," Mr. Earnest said.

The F.B.I. was granted a warrant on Sunday that allowed agents to begin searching the messages. While investigators found hundreds of thousands of emails on Mr. Weiner's computer, they are focusing on a small portion of the total. The review is being led by the same Washington-based team of agents that conducted the investigation of Mrs. Clinton's server.

As part of that inquiry, the agents built a system that allowed them to examine thousands of emails to see whether they contained sensitive national security information. When the agents identified potentially classified materials, they sent copies of the emails to other government agencies to determine their classification

The emails the F.B.I. is now searching could well be like scores already made public by the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act, including some of the additional ones uncovered by the bureau's investigation and turned over to the department this summer.

Among more than 30,000 emails released are at least 10 sent or received by Ms. Abedin that included information the State Department later deemed to be classified and were only made public with portions redacted.

Ms. Abedin, who also had an address on the Clinton server, communicated with Mrs. Clinton many times a day, often acting as a conduit for other members of her State Department team.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 9:06 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (RO) (FBI) [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:42 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
(OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -4, 6

----- Original message -----

From: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:41 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
(RO) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Sure does. First reference I'm ever aware of to our review network too.

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From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:36 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
(RO) (FBI) [redacted]
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b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

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From: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
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To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
(RO) (FBI) [redacted]
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b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

I think [redacted]

b5 -1

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:31 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
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b6 -1
b7C -1
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F.B.I. Begins Review of Clinton Aide's Emails

October 31, 2016

By **MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT, MATT APUZZO and ADAM GOLDMAN**

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Whether they will be able to complete their review by Election Day is unclear, although investigators have been under intense pressure from officials in both parties to do so since Friday, when the F.B.I. director, James B. Comey, revealed the existence of the emails in an explosive letter to Congress.

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The emails belong to Huma Abedin, a top adviser to Mrs. Clinton. Agents discovered them on a laptop seized by the F.B.I. that belongs to her estranged husband, Anthony Weiner, who is under investigation for exchanging illicit text messages with a 15-year-old girl.

While the hunt for classified information is the bureau's first priority, it is not the most significant issue for either Ms. Abedin or Mrs. Clinton. Investigators have already determined that Mrs. Clinton and her aides improperly sent classified information on her private email server. The Justice Department concluded, though, that it could not prove they did it intentionally, which would be a crime. Finding more classified information among Ms. Abedin's emails would not immediately change that conclusion.

What could cause problems for Ms. Abedin — and by extension Mrs. Clinton — is if the F.B.I. finds evidence that anyone tried to conceal these new emails from investigators.

Ms. Abedin has said she turned over all her emails to the F.B.I. months ago and does not know how emails ended up on Mr. Weiner's laptop. And officials have said there is no indication that Ms. Abedin or Ms. Clinton tried to conceal information from the authorities.

Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, said on Monday that the White House did not have an official position on Mr. Comey's decision to alert Congress. But Mr. Earnest came close to suggesting that President Obama saw Mr. Comey's decision as problematic. Mr. Earnest listed the many powers and authorities that federal law enforcement officials have to investigate for potential wrongdoing and then said, "It's important that those authorities are tempered by longstanding practice and norms that limit public discussion of facts that are collected in the context of those investigations."

Mr. Earnest added: "And there are a lot of good reasons for that. The president believes that it's important for those guidelines and norms to be followed."

Justice Department officials had told Mr. Comey that alerting Congress to the discovery of a new cache of emails would violate department rules and norms against both discussing a continuing investigation and taking any actions in the days before an election that might influence that election.

But Mr. Comey is a "man of integrity" whom the president does not believe is intentionally trying to influence the outcome of an election, Mr. Earnest said.

"He's in a tough spot," Mr. Earnest said.

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Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, October 31, 2016 9:41 PM
To: [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); Quinn, Richard P. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Mother Jones story

b6 -1
b7C -1

Thanks [redacted] please let me know if you have follow up on this.
Pete

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 9:33 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"; [redacted] (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)"; [redacted] "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)"; [redacted] "Quinn, Richard P. (DO) (FBI)"
[redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)"
Subject: Mother Jones story

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

<http://m.motherjones.com/politics/2016/10/veteran-spy-gave-fbi-info-alleging-russian-operation-cultivate-donald-trump>

MotherJones

A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump
Has the bureau investigated this material?

DAVID CORN OCT. 31, 2016 7:52 PM

The

On Friday, FBI Director James Comey set off a political blast when he informed congressional leaders that the bureau had stumbled across emails that might be pertinent to its completed inquiry into Hillary Clinton's handling of emails when she was secretary of state. The Clinton campaign and others criticized Comey for intervening in a presidential campaign by breaking with Justice Department tradition and revealing information about an investigation—information that was vague and perhaps ultimately irrelevant—so close to Election Day. On Sunday, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid upped the ante. He sent Comey a fiery letter saying the FBI chief may have broken the law and pointed to a potentially greater controversy: "In my communications with you and other top officials in the national security community, it has become clear that you possess explosive information about close ties and coordination between Donald Trump, his top advisors, and the Russian government...The public has a right to know this information."

David's message set off a burst of speculation on Twitter and elsewhere. What was he referring to?

news's massive set off a burst of speculation on Twitter and elsewhere. What was he referring to regarding the Republican presidential nominee? At the end of August, Reid had written to Comey and demanded an investigation of the "connections between the Russian government and Donald Trump's presidential campaign," and in that letter he indirectly referred to Carter Page, an American businessman cited by Trump as one of his foreign policy advisers, who had financial ties to Russia and had recently visited Moscow. Last month, Yahoo News reported that US intelligence officials were probing the links between Page and senior Russian officials. (Page has called accusations against him "garbage.") On Monday, NBC News reported that the FBI has mounted a preliminary inquiry into the foreign business ties of Paul Manafort, Trump's former campaign chief. But Reid's recent note hinted at more than the Page or Manafort affairs. And a former senior intelligence officer for a Western country who specialized in Russian counterintelligence tells Mother Jones that in recent months he provided the bureau with memos, based on his recent interactions with Russian sources, contending the Russian government has for years tried to co-opt and assist Trump—and that the FBI requested more information from him.

"This is something of huge significance, way above party politics," the former intelligence officer says. "I think [Trump's] own party should be aware of this stuff as well."

Does this mean the FBI is investigating whether Russian intelligence has attempted to develop a secret relationship with Trump or cultivate him as an asset? Was the former intelligence officer and his material deemed credible or not? An FBI spokeswoman says, "Normally, we don't talk about whether we are investigating anything." But a senior US government official not involved in this case but familiar with the former spy tells Mother Jones that he has been a credible source with a proven record of providing reliable, sensitive, and important information to the US government.

In June, the former Western intelligence officer—who spent almost two decades on Russian intelligence matters and who now works with a US firm that gathers information on Russia for corporate clients—was assigned the task of researching Trump's dealings in Russia and elsewhere, according to the former spy and his associates in this American firm. This was for an opposition research project originally financed by a Republican client critical of the celebrity mogul. (Before the former spy was retained, the project's financing switched to a client allied with Democrats.) "It started off as a fairly general inquiry," says the former spook, who asks not to be identified. But when he dug into Trump, he notes, he came across troubling information indicating connections between Trump and the Russian government. According to his sources, he says, "there was an established exchange of information between the Trump campaign and the Kremlin of mutual benefit."

This was, the former spy remarks, "an extraordinary situation." He regularly consults with US government agencies on Russian matters, and near the start of July on his own initiative—without the permission of the US company that hired him—he sent a report he had written for that firm to a contact at the FBI, according to the former intelligence officer and his American associates, who asked not to be identified. (He declines to identify the FBI contact.) The former spy says he concluded that the information he had collected on Trump was "sufficiently serious" to share with the FBI.

Mother Jones has reviewed that report and other memos this former spy wrote. The first memo, based on the former intelligence officer's conversations with Russian sources, noted, "Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance." It maintained that Trump "and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals." It claimed that Russian intelligence had "compromised" Trump during his visits to Moscow and could "blackmail him." It also reported that Russian intelligence had compiled a dossier on Hillary Clinton based on "bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and intercepted

phone calls."

The former intelligence officer says the response from the FBI was "shock and horror." The FBI, after receiving the first memo, did not immediately request additional material, according to the former intelligence officer and his American associates. Yet in August, they say, the FBI asked him for all information in his possession and for him to explain how the material had been gathered and to identify his sources. The former spy forwarded to the bureau several memos—some of which referred to members of Trump's inner circle. After that point, he continued to share information with the FBI. "It's quite clear there was or is a pretty substantial inquiry going on," he says.

"This is something of huge significance, way above party politics," the former intelligence officer comments. "I think [Trump's] own party should be aware of this stuff as well."

The Trump campaign did not respond to a request for comment regarding the memos. In the past, Trump has declared, "I have nothing to do with Russia."

The FBI is certainly investigating the hacks attributed to Russia that have hit American political targets, including the Democratic National Committee and John Podesta, the chairman of Clinton's presidential campaign. But there have been few public signs of whether that probe extends to examining possible contacts between the Russian government and Trump. (In recent weeks, reporters in Washington have pursued anonymous online reports that a computer server related to the Trump Organization engaged in a high level of activity with servers connected to Alfa Bank, the largest private bank in Russia. On Monday, a Slate investigation detailed the pattern of unusual server activity but concluded, "We don't yet know what this [Trump] server was for, but it deserves further explanation." In an email to Mother Jones, Hope Hicks, a Trump campaign spokeswoman, maintains, "The Trump Organization is not sending or receiving any communications from this email server. The Trump Organization has no communication or relationship with this entity or any Russian entity.")

According to several national security experts, there is widespread concern in the US intelligence community that Russian intelligence, via hacks, is aiming to undermine the presidential election—to embarrass the United States and delegitimize its democratic elections. And the hacks appear to have been designed to benefit Trump. In August, Democratic members of the House committee on oversight wrote Comey to ask the FBI to investigate "whether connections between Trump campaign officials and Russian interests may have contributed to these [cyber] attacks in order to interfere with the US presidential election." In September, Sen. Dianne Feinstein and Rep. Adam Schiff, the senior Democrats on, respectively, the Senate and House intelligence committees, issued a joint statement accusing Russia of underhanded meddling: "Based on briefings we have received, we have concluded that the Russian intelligence agencies are making a serious and concerted effort to influence the U.S. election. At the least, this effort is intended to sow doubt about the security of our election and may well be intended to influence the outcomes of the election." The Obama White House has declared Russia the culprit in the hacking capers, expressed outrage, and promised a "proportional" response.

There's no way to tell whether the FBI has confirmed or debunked any of the allegations contained in the former spy's memos. But a Russian intelligence attempt to co-opt or cultivate a presidential candidate would mark an even more serious operation than the hacking.

In the letter Reid sent to Comey on Sunday, he pointed out that months ago he had asked the FBI director to release information on Trump's possible Russia ties. Since then, according to a Reid spokesman, Reid has been briefed several times. The spokesman adds, "He is confident that he knows enough to be extremely alarmed."

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 9:42 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted]
Subject: RE: FBI Making Inquiry into Ex-Trump Campaign Manager's Foreign Ties - NBC News

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FYI -Slate has an article on the Trump server.

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 10/31/2016 8:42 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
Cc: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: FBI Making Inquiry Into Ex-Trump Campaign Manager's Foreign Ties - NBC News

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Wow, busy news night. Talked with [redacted] earlier, he said Ellen Nakashima had mentioned below to him...

b6 -3

<http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-making-inquiry-ex-trump-campaign-manager-s-foreign-ties-n675881>

FBI Making Inquiry Into Ex-Trump Campaign Manager's Foreign Ties

by Ken Dilanian, Cynthia McFadden, William M. Arkin and Tom Winter

The FBI has been conducting a preliminary inquiry into Donald Trump's former campaign manager Paul Manafort's foreign business connections, law enforcement and intelligence sources told NBC News Monday.

Word of the inquiry, which has not blossomed into a full-blown criminal investigation, comes just days after FBI Director James Comey's disclosure that his agency is examining a new batch of emails connected to an aide to Hillary Clinton.

And it comes a day after Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid criticized Comey's revelation and asserted that Comey possesses "explosive information about close ties and coordination between Donald Trump, his top advisors, and the Russian government."

The FBI did not comment. Manafort told NBC News "none of it is true ... There's no investigation going on by the FBI that I'm aware of." He said he had never had ties to Russian president Vladimir Putin, or had dealings with Putin and his government. He said any suggestion of such ties was "Democratic propaganda."

"This is all political propaganda, meant to deflect," he said.

NBC News reported in August that Manafort was a key player in multi-million-dollar business propositions with Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs — one of them a close Putin ally with alleged ties to organized crime — which foreign policy experts said raised questions about the pro-Russian bent of the Trump candidacy.

A few days later, amid other reporting on Manafort's Ukraine ties, Manafort was ousted from the campaign.

Rep. Adam Schiff of California, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, regularly receives sensitive briefings. Schiff said he could not discuss Reid's assertions, but he said, "Americans have every right to be concerned about what they see in terms of Trump advisors and their closeness with the Kremlin, Trump's policies vis-a-vis Russia, Trump's potential financial interest, all of those things ought to be of deep concern to voters."

He added, "Whether an investigation is appropriate depends on whether there's

evidence of criminal connections. Of course the intelligence community wants to know what foreign influence Russia may be looking to exert in the United States."

Manafort was paid millions of dollars — \$12.7 million in cash, according to The New York Times—representing a pro-Russian politician in the Ukraine.



Manafort's name in an alleged payment ledger. The Times

Trump has taken a series of pro-Russian positions that experts from both parties say are far outside the mainstream, and inexplicable from a political viewpoint. He continues to cast doubt on Russian involvement in election hacking, for example, despite the intelligence community's public assessment.

"The relationships that Trump's advisors have had with pro-Russian forces are deeply disturbing," David Kramer, a former senior State Department official in the George W. Bush administration and a former adviser to Marco Rubio's presidential campaign, told NBC News in August. "Trump's attitude on Russia is not in line with most Republican foreign-policy thinking. Trump has staked out views that are really on the fringe."

An FBI inquiry is a preliminary examination that falls short of a criminal investigation. But in this highly charged atmosphere, it has some arguing that Comey is applying a double standard.

"Any specifics of what the FBI or intelligence agencies may be looking at are not something that the bureau should be discussing publicly," Schiff said. "But here, where the director has discussed an investigation involving one candidate, it opens the director up to claims of bias if he doesn't discuss other potential investigations."

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2016 3:52 PM
To: [redacted] (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Media question

b6 -1
b7C -1

Hi [redacted]
[redacted]

b5 -1

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
Date: 11/01/2016 2:05 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)"
[redacted]
Cc: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: Media question

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Hello,

Politico asks why all of Huma's electronic devices, and devices she may have used, were not subpoenaed early on. Could you provide any guidance on how i should respond? [redacted]

[redacted]

b5 -1, 3
b6 -1
b7C -1

Thank you.

[redacted]

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2016 8:27 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd:

----- Original message -----

From: "Sweeney, William F. (NY) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/01/2016 7:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Coleman, Randall C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "McGarrity, Michael C. (NY) (FBI)"
[redacted]
Subject: RE:

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Rgr, thanks. Sounds good.

----- Original message -----

From: "Coleman, Randall C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/01/2016 7:41 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Sweeney, William F. (NY) (FBI)" [redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE:

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Mike, Bill and I discussed the matter and have a plan. I will discuss with Bill Priestap in the morning, easy fix.

Randy

----- Original message -----

From: "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/01/2016 6:36 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Sweeney, William F. (NY) (FBI)" [redacted] "Coleman, Randall C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[Redacted]
Subject:

Bill

I got your vm. I am happy to explore the option you mentioned re the PC angle. I'm on a plane for the next several hours but can touch base with you and Randy tomorrow.

MICHAEL B. STEINBACH

Executive Assistant Director

National Security Branch

Federal Bureau of Investigation

(C) [Redacted]
(C) [Redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, November 02, 2016 11:50 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Post
Attachments: post2.jpg

Fyi

----- Original message -----

From: "Sporre, Eric W. (CYD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/02/2016 11:48 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: FW: Post

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FYI

-----Original Message-----

From: Stranahan, Timothy M. (CE) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, November 02, 2016 11:36 AM
To: Sporre, Eric W. (CYD) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: Post

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Being socialized from the Podesta emails from WikiLeaks. Share with CD as appropriate. FYI



WikiLeaks

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[Shop](#)

From: *Peter Kadzik* <peterkadzik@gmail.com>

Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2015

Subject: Heads up

To: John Podesta <john.podesta@gmail.com>

There is a HJC oversight hearing today where the head of our Civil Division will testify. Likely to get questions on State Department emails. Another filing in the FOIA case went in last night or will go in this am that indicates it will be awhile (2016) before the State Department posts the emails.

FBI (18-cv-154)-9098

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, November 02, 2016 9:16 PM
To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Turmoil in the FBI - CNNPolitics.com

b6 -1
b7C -1

This was interesting

----- Original message -----

From: [REDACTED]
Date: 11/02/2016 9:14 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]
Subject: Turmoil in the FBI - CNNPolitics.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

<http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/02/politics/james-comey-fbi-reputation/index.html>

Turmoil in the FBI

Washington (CNN)

Among the casualties of the 2016 presidential campaign is the mystique of the FBI.


Behind the scenes over the past 15 months, infighting among some agents and officials has exposed some parts of the storied bureau to be buffeted by some of the same bitter divisions as the rest of American society.

This account is based on interviews with more than a dozen officials close to the matter who spoke anonymously because they've been ordered not to speak to the news media.

Tensions have built in particular over the handling of matters related to Hillary Clinton. Some of the sharpest divides have emerged between some agents in the FBI's New York field office, the bureau's largest and highest-profile, and officials at FBI headquarters in Washington and at the Justice Department.

Some rank-and-file agents interpreted cautious steps taken by the Justice Department

and FBI headquarters as being done for political reasons or to protect a powerful political figure. At headquarters, some have viewed the actions and complaints of some agents in the field as driven by the common desire of investigators to get a big case or, perhaps worst, because of partisan views.

 Nancy Pelosi: I think Comey 'made a mistake'

Nancy Pelosi: I think Comey 'made a mistake' 01:36

The tensions have multiplied since FBI Director James Comey made an unprecedented public announcement in July that there should be no charges against Clinton or her aides following a year-long probe.

That announcement -- without prior notice to his bosses at the Justice Department and, according to his critics, usurping the traditional role of prosecutors to review FBI recommendations in secret -- opened up sharp divides between Justice and FBI officials, and even within the Justice Department itself, where some officials have pushed for Attorney General Loretta Lynch to more forcefully assert her power over the FBI.

President Barack Obama in an interview published Wednesday noted the efforts to not appear to interfere with the work of the FBI.

"I've made a very deliberate effort to make sure that I don't look like I am meddling in what are supposed to be independent processes for making these assessments," he told NowThisNews.

An independent agency

Some of the tensions are built-in because of the FBI's unique position as part of the Justice Department but also projecting a large measure of independence. The FBI director's job has a 10-year tenure, spanning presidential administrations, while his bosses at the Justice Department are politically appointed and they leave when the

administration ends. Comey, in public speeches, often mentions reminders of abuses in the FBI's past under J. Edgar Hoover, who secretly kept files on lawmakers and presidents:

One official said the FBI is "resolute and confident that what we're doing -- though not palatable -- is the right thing and we are maintaining independence."

Much of the turmoil centers not only on the handling of the probe into Clinton's use of a private server while secretary of state, but also another case some FBI agents wanted to pursue into the Clinton Foundation and whether there was any impropriety in dealings with donors.

In both cases, some FBI investigators felt stymied by headquarters and Justice Department officials and they interpreted roadblocks as politically partisan.

It's in that tense environment that the latest developments emerged as agents were conducting the unrelated investigation of Anthony Weiner, the disgraced former congressman and estranged husband of Clinton's close adviser Huma Abedin.

The surprise discovery of thousands of emails belonging to Abedin on a computer belonging to Weiner brought matters to a boil.

The longer it took for officials at FBI headquarters and at the Justice Department to decide how to proceed with the matter, the more conspiracies spread among some agents that perhaps senior FBI officials were trying to cover up the matter.

Comey on Friday sent a letter to committee leaders in Congress with oversight of the FBI alerting them of the recently discovered documents and resulting investigation.

He acted in part, people close to him say, because he believed the news would eventually leak and the bureau would face an even bigger public backlash.

"It's the times we are living in," one senior law enforcement official said. "No one has emerged from this election unscathed."

The election may soon be over, but the impact on the FBI will take some time to assess.

'Politics is running rampant'

Veterans of the bureau think the controversy is a symptom of the bitter election year.

"Politics is running rampant," says former FBI Boston chief Rick DesLauriers, who oversaw the investigation into the Boston Marathon bombings. "Passions are high."

DesLauriers believes Comey has tried to ensure decisions are based on principle, not politics.

"He made a decision that angered Republicans in July and one that angered Democrats in October," said DesLauriers, who retired three years ago. "That's a pretty good indication he's nonpartisan."

To be sure, differences of opinion between FBI field offices and headquarters are a common occurrence on any number of cases. The hard-charging New York field office is often tussling with headquarters over management of cases, officials say.

But the Clinton probes are no ordinary cases.

"The FBI is an organization not comfortable operating in a political environment," another official said. "The intent was not to enter the political fray."

Soon after the FBI opened its investigation into the Clinton server in the summer of 2015, Comey decided it would be run from headquarters instead of New York, which is the jurisdiction where the Clinton server had been located.

That decision angered some in New York who thought it was headquarters' interference into their case.

Given the sensitivity of the case, Comey brought in a team of agents mostly from the Washington, D.C., field office, to pore through the thousands of emails.

He assigned the case to the counterintelligence section, which investigates cases of alleged mishandling of classified information. It gave the added advantage of being a section with a reputation for few media leaks and being close enough for Comey to get personal almost-daily updates.

"We're in the middle of one of the most vitriolic campaigns in American history, and we're investigating one of the candidates for president," the senior law enforcement official said. "We had to get this right."

That didn't quiet all of the complaints, particularly now that the behind-the-scenes tussles are spilling out into the public.

During the Clinton email server investigation, investigators and prosecutors debated whether to issue subpoenas to Clinton's aides, officials say. Leaders at the FBI and at the Justice Department thought it would be faster to come to voluntary agreements with aides. Subpoenas could cause delays, particularly if litigation is necessary, officials said. And the FBI and Justice Department wanted to try to complete the probe and get out of the way of the 2016 election.

Clinton Foundation in focus

The tensions built after agents in several field offices began looking into allegations of corruption related to the Clinton Foundation, the charity of Bill and Hillary Clinton and their daughter, Chelsea. The FBI, under long-standing policy, hasn't publicly acknowledged the existence of the investigation.

Some of the allegations made headlines with the May 2015 publication of the book "Clinton Cash" by conservative writer Peter Schweizer, alleging corrupt ties between the Clinton Foundation and big-money foreign donors.

It's not uncommon for FBI probes to begin as a result of or be fueled by published news articles or books.

Similar probes have been underway for well over a year into people associated with Donald Trump's campaign. These include a probe of Trump's former campaign chairman, Paul Manafort, and his ties to pro-Russian figures in Ukraine. The Trump-related probes, none of which have been officially acknowledged by the FBI, also were slowed in recent months because of Justice Department rules not to conduct overt steps that could affect the election. But officials say the cases were ongoing for well over a year before the election concerns became an issue

In the Clinton Foundation probe, at least one FBI field office also received notification of a possible suspicious bank transaction. The transaction involving a Clinton Foundation donor was flagged in what is known as a suspicious activity report, routine notices sent through the Treasury Department's financial enforcement arm.

By early this year, FBI agents from four field offices -- Los Angeles, Little Rock, Arkansas, Washington, D.C., and New York -- had open files on the Clinton Foundation and were seeking to get permission to formally conduct investigations of the Clinton Foundation.

In February, as CNN first reported, FBI criminal division leaders and lawyers met with the lawyers from the Justice Department's public integrity section to present what was known so far and to seek permission to conduct full-blown investigations, including the ability to subpoena records.

At that time, the Justice officials in the meeting advised FBI officials that there wasn't sufficient evidence to move forward and declined to give the authorization for overt investigative techniques. Some officials described a contentious meeting with strong disagreement on both sides.

Officials leading the meeting told the FBI that investigators hadn't turned up much more evidence beyond that contained in "Clinton Cash."

FBI lawyers at headquarters concurred with the Justice Department's view that agents be allowed to continue their work with the option to return if they found more evidence.

In July, Comey made his announcement to recommend no charges against Clinton.

At a Capitol Hill hearing days later, Comey told members of Congress that he was proud there had been no leaks of his decision.

But blowback from some current and former agents was immediate. As Comey made his rounds of visits to field offices around the country, he heard stinging criticism, particularly from retired agents.

At one meeting in Kansas City, Comey was confronted with stinging criticism of the probe. He pushed back, saying the career agents who knew the most of the case arrived at the conclusion that the case against Clinton wasn't even a close call.

FBI agents again pressed to take more overt steps in the Clinton Foundation probe, including possibly issuing subpoenas.

Justice Department officials again opposed such moves. They cited, again, a lack of evidence to warrant more investigative steps. And they expressed concerns that with the election close, any overt actions shouldn't be made until after Election Day.

"It's just a (message of) 'hold right now until after the elections -- no subpoenas issued, no interviews,'" one law enforcement official familiar with the July decision said.

Some FBI officials also viewed the existing cases in the four field offices to not have advanced much beyond the allegations in "Clinton Cash."

Officials at FBI headquarters decided the Clinton Foundation probe should be consolidated in New York. They ordered that agents in Los Angeles, Little Rock and Washington, D.C., turn over their files to the FBI New York office, which appeared to have the strongest case to make.

Agents were told to continue their work. But the order to the other field offices angered agents there.

In the Washington field office, a half-mile away from headquarters, agents were told they could continue to work on a probe of Virginia Gov. Terry McAuliffe, but would have to discontinue what they viewed as relevant connected work on the Clinton Foundation. McAuliffe is a close ally of the Clintons and previously headed the Clinton Foundation.

In New York, some agents working the Clinton Foundation case chafed at the decision that they had to sit and wait until after the election.

How will controversy shape the bureau?

Decades after the death of J. Edgar Hoover, who built the mystique of FBI agents as a special class of investigators, the bureau continues to nurture that image. The bureau lends its help to Hollywood, which churns out movies and television shows glamorizing the work of FBI agents.

In recent years, the bureau has sought to modernize, promoting more women to some higher ranks, and seeking to train new ranks of analysts alongside agents as a way to make clear that intelligence analysts should be treated as equals to gun-carrying agents. Struggles remain as Comey tries to change what is still an overwhelmingly white and male-dominated organization.

How much the recent controversy changes the FBI is to be seen.

James V. DeSarno, who spent 28 years in the bureau and rose to the level of assistant director, agrees that Comey's July announcement and Friday letter were unprecedented. But he says it doesn't signal how the FBI will run cases.

"I don't think he believes he's changed the rules," DeSarno said of Comey, "But I can see where other people may think he has."

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 10:06 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: weiner timeline
Attachments: weiner timeline.docx

- 09/26/2016 - NYO obtains SW for Weiner laptop
- 09/28/2016 - ADIC NY notes potential MYE-related material following weekly SAC SVTC
- 09/29/2016 - Conference call between NYO and MYE team
 - NYO notes processing is crashing system and not complete, but during troubleshooting observes material potentially related to MYE (clintonemail.com and state.gov domains) seen during course of review
 - No numbers/volume available
 - Discussion about ability to search for material determines such activity would be outside scope of warrant
 - Request to NYO to gather basic facts (numbers, domains, etc) based on their review
- Approx. 10/19/2016 - NYO completes carving
 - NYO observes SBU attachment
- 10/21/2016 - 6:00 PM DOJ/NSD advises MYE leadership that SDNY informed them of MYE-related media on Weiner media
- 10/25/2016 - DOJ-DD conversation re material
- 10/26/2016 - DOJ-MYE-NYO conference call
 - DD advised of results of call with MYE team conclusion material should be looked at; DD directs briefing to D
- 10/27/2016 - Briefing to D; D concurs with conducting investigation to obtain data
- 10/30/2016 - SW sworn out at SDNY
 - Copy of media obtained by MYE SAs, entered into evidence, and provided to OTD for processing

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 10:11 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

<http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/110th/>

Go to the "committee information" dropdown, select official alphabetical list...110th and 111th list
Energy and Commerce, and Judiciary

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Post-election mtg

Location: 4012

Start: Wednesday, November 09, 2016 10:00 AM

End: Wednesday, November 09, 2016 10:30 AM

Show Time As: Tentative

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Not yet responded

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Required Attendees: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI);
[redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); Page, Lisa
C. (OGC) (FBI)

b6 -1
b7C -1

Please do not forward mtg invite/invitees only

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Post-election mtg

Location: 4012

Start: Wednesday, November 09, 2016 10:00 AM

End: Wednesday, November 09, 2016 10:30 AM

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Accepted

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Required Attendees: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI);
[redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); Page, Lisa
C. (OGC) (FBI)

b6 -1
b7C -1

Please do not forward mtg invite/invitees only

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 8:43 PM
To: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1

[redacted] We may know earlier (the team - us and OTD) will be in by 6:00 to see overnight processing results, but it's hard to speculate on what's there

b5 -1

----- Original message -----

From: "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/03/2016 8:38 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Re: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

I think that will work. Let me confirm. So that would be late enough to provide enough info on how to proceed?

From: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, November 3, 2016 8:33 PM
To: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1

Would 11 AM work?

----- Original message -----

From: "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/03/2016 8:30 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[Redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted]

Subject: RE: Draft

What is a reasonable time for the investigative team to provide an update tomorrow?

----- Original message -----

From: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted]

Date: 11/3/16 8:04 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Rybicki,

James E. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted]

[Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"

Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

I actually think [Redacted] b5 -1, 2, 3

[Redacted] Thanks.

----- Original message -----

From: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted]

Date: 11/03/2016 6:43 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Rybicki,

James E. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B.

(OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted]

Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

All: Assuming we are able to soon finish our review, I recommend the statement read as follows:

[Large Redacted Block]

b5 -1, 2, 3

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:20 PM

To: Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)
[redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC)
(FBI) [redacted] Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)
[redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
(OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Subject: RE: Draft

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Lisa [redacted] ion, and I all reviewed, and our comments are in redline in Jim's email below. We have some concern that [redacted]

b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 4:15 PM

To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD)
(FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Steinbach,
Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)
[redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC)
(FBI) [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Subject: RE: Draft

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Slightly revised draft based on a conversation that I just had with Jim R. Also, all of this depends of course on the assumption that we don't find anything in the slack space. And adding Lisa this time (sorry).

[redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3



From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 3:04 PM

To: Priestan, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD)

(FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Steinbach,

Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)


[redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [redacted]

Subject: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

I decided to take a crack at a first draft of the email. Please let me know what you think.



Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 9:22 PM
To: Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1

Having read it a few more times, think it can wait until tomorrow

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/03/2016 9:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Maybe send thoughts to think about tonight/frame discussion but not edit until tomorrow?

----- Original message -----

From: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/03/2016 9:18 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Up to you, but I think we can knock out edits easily as soon as you get in...

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/03/2016 9:16 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Should we respond with comment tonight or hold for tomorrow? there are several immediate things that come to mind.

----- Original message -----

From: "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/03/2016 9:01 PM (GMT-05:00)

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page,
Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Subject: Re: Draft

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

ALTERNATE VERSION FOR DISCUSSION TOMORROW. Looks like the case update will be at 11am (Cyber DPI will be moved).

[Large redacted block]

b5 -1, 2, 3

From: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, November 3, 2016 6:43 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1

All: Assuming we are able to soon finish our review, I recommend the statement read as follows:

[Large redacted block]

b5 -1, 2, 3

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:20 PM

To: Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)

[redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC)

(FBI) [redacted] Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)

[redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]

(OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]

Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Lisa [redacted] Jon, and I all reviewed, and our comments are in redline in Jim's email below. We have some concern that [redacted]

b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -6

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 4:15 PM

To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD)

(FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Steinbach,

Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)

[redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC)

(FBI) [redacted]

Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Slightly revised draft based on a conversation that I just had with Jim R. Also, all of this depends of course on the assumption that we don't find anything in the slack space. And adding Lisa this time (sorry).

[redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3



From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 3:04 PM

To: Priestan, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)

(FBI); (OGC) (FBI); Strzok, Peter P. (CD)

(FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Steinbach,

Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)


(FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)

Subject: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

I decided to take a crack at a first draft of the email. Please let me know what you think.



Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 6:28 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI);
Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1

Ok. I cancelled my 830, so we can use my office. Or Brueggers. Or Paul.

----- Original message -----

From: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/04/2016 6:19 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C.
(CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

I'll try to join you guys early; I normally do drop off so will depend on [redacted] schedule this morning.

----- Original message -----

From: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/03/2016 9:24 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C.
(OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Pete: Let's provide one set of consolidated feedback to Jim R by 9 AM tomorrow.

Jim: Does that work for you?

Thanks,
Bill

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/03/2016 9:16 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C.
(OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Should we respond with comment tonight or hold for tomorrow? there are several immediate things that come to mind.

----- Original message -----

From: "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]

Date: 11/03/2016 9:01 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"

[redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"

[redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page,

Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)"

[redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"

Subject: Re: Draft

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

ALTERNATE VERSION FOR DISCUSSION TOMORROW. Looks like the case update will be at 11am (Cyber DPI will be moved).

[Large redacted block]

b5 -1, 2, 3

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 9:11 AM
To: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Based on results from overnight processing and the team's look beginning early this morning, it appears we may not be done today. In light of this [redacted] Nevertheless, see comments below.

b5 -1

From: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 8:07 AM
To: Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Point taken. I think it can be easily removed from this version.

b5 -1, 2, 3

[Large redacted area]

[Redacted]

From: Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 7:20 AM

To: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [Redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)

[Redacted] Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [Redacted] Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [Redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI) [Redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

[Redacted] Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI) [Redacted]

[Redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [Redacted]

Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[Redacted]

b5 -1

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted]

Date: 11/03/2016 9:06 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted]

[Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"

Subject: RE: Draft

[Redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

b5 -1

----- Original message -----

From: "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted]

Date: 11/03/2016 9:01 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"

[Redacted] [Redacted] (FBI)"

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[Redacted] Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)
 [Redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI) [Redacted] Page,
 Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) [Redacted] Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)"
 [Redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted]
 [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
 [Redacted]

Subject: Re: Draft

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
 DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

ALTERNATE VERSION FOR DISCUSSION TOMORROW. Looks like the case update will be at 11am (Cyber DPI will be moved).

[Large Redacted Block]

b5 -1, 2, 3

From: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)
 Sent: Thursday, November 3, 2016 5:43 PM
 To: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [Redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
 Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1

All: Assuming we are able to soon finish our review, I recommend the statement read as follows:

[Large Redacted Block]

b5 -1, 2, 3

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:20 PM

To: Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)

[redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC)

(FBI) [redacted] Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)

[redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]

(OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]

Subject: RE: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Lisa [redacted] Jon, and I all reviewed, and our comments are in redline in Jim's email below. We have some concern that [redacted]

b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 4:15 PM

To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD)

(FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Steinbach,

Michael B. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)

[redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC)

(FBI) [redacted]

Subject: RE: Draft


b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Slightly revised draft based on a conversation that I just had with Jim R. Also, all of this depends of course on the assumption that we don't find anything in the slack space. And adding Lisa this time (sorry).

[redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3



From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 3:04 PM

To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD)

(FBI); [redacted] Moffa, Jonathon C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Steinbach,

Michael B. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Sowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)


[redacted] Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); [redacted]

Subject: Draft

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

I decided to take a crack at a first draft of the email. Please let me know what you think.



Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Politico: Pro-Trump former FBI official says he's channeling agents' rage

Pro-Trump former FBI official says he's channeling agents' rage

By Louis Nelson
| 11/04/16 10:03 AM EDT

A former top FBI official who has claimed insight into the bureau's rank and file's outrage over the handling of an investigation into Hillary Clinton confirmed Thursday that he has been in touch with active agents after denying it in an interview published earlier in the day.

Jim Kallstrom, who headed the FBI's New York field office in the 1990s, has spent months citing anonymous sources within the bureau to warn that many there were upset by Director James Comey's decision to recommend against charges for Clinton related to her use of a personal email server during her tenure as secretary of state. Kallstrom, who has endorsed Donald Trump for president, has suggested in past interviews that he has spoken with active FBI agents, including some working on the Clinton investigation, which if true, would mean the agents broke bureau protocol to discuss a case.

"I know some of the agents," Kallstrom said in a past interview with Fox News host Megyn Kelly, who had asked him about the FBI's investigation into Clinton. "I know some of the supervisors and I know the senior staff. And they're P.O.'d, I mean, no question. This is like someone driving another nail in the coffin of the criminal justice system."

But according to a Daily Beast article published Thursday, Kallstrom first denied speaking at all to any active FBI agents and said his assessment of the mood of the bureau's rank and file was based exclusively on conversations with retired agents. But later in that same interview, he said that he did interact with active agents who had reached out to him.

Kallstrom stuck with that story Thursday night on Fox News's "The Kelly File," where he disputed the Daily Beast's assessment that he had claimed to have spoken with active FBI agents investigating Clinton.

"Well, they can write what they want. I never did claim I talked to the actual agents. I would never do that. I would never call up people that were investigating something and even put them on the spot. I wouldn't do that," Kallstrom said. "But I've talked to hundreds and hundreds of people in the FBI -- mostly retired people and some people that are currently on the job that are not directly involved, but, you know, it's a small organization. You know, they know what's going on."

"And the agents are furious. And I haven't walked anything back," he continued. "I didn't walk anything up that deserved to be walked back. So I don't know what they're talking about."

Kallstrom, a Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War, is the founder of the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation, which was the beneficiary of the fundraiser Trump held last January instead of attending a GOP primary debate in Iowa. According to the Daily Beast, Kallstrom's foundation has received at least three major gifts from the Manhattan billionaire, two of which came during the campaign, totaling over \$1.3 million.

Former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, who Kallstrom told the Daily Beast is "a very good friend" of his, has similarly claimed to have a pipeline of information coming from the FBI's rank and file, offering a similar assessment of its mood to the one Kallstrom has. A week ago, Giuliani teased "a couple of surprises" from the Trump campaign just days before Comey announced that the FBI is examining additional, potentially new evidence related to Clinton's email scandal. He declined to elaborate at the time what those surprises would be, but said they would be "enormously effective."

Jason Miller, the senior communications adviser to Trump's campaign, told the New York Times that Giuliani did not have advance notice of Comey's announcement.

"Rudy was just having fun," Miller said. "To keep the other side on their toes."

Read more: <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/jim-kallstrom-fbi-clinton-investigation-230731#ixzz4P3VvUub6>

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 6:21 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: The FBI looks like Trump's America - POLITICO

?

<http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/fbi-donald-trump-base-230755>

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 7:26 PM
To: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1

Dial-in info below, 10:00 tomorrow

----- Original message -----

From: SIOC [redacted]
Date: 11/04/2016 7:22 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: SIOC [redacted]
Subject: RE: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

DAD Strzok

Your unclassified conference call for 11/5/16 at 10am – 12pm ET was setup as requested. Instructions to gain access to the conference call are below. Please forward to all participants.

- Dial [redacted]
- When prompted to do so, please enter your pass code followed by the #sign. Your pass code is [redacted]
- If you need assistance, please call the SIOC's main number [redacted]

b7E -6

THE CONTENT OF THIS EMAIL IS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LES)
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Emergency Action Specialist [redacted]
 Strategic Information & Operation Center (SIOC)
 FBIHQ, Room [redacted]
 [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

THIS MESSAGE CAN BE PROVIDED TO OUTSIDE AGENCIES BECAUSE WE ARE NOW ROTATING CODES WHEN OUTSIDE AGENCIES WERE/ARE INVOLVED IN CONFERENCE CALLS.

-----Original Message-----

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 6:53 PM

To: SIOC [REDACTED]

Subject: Request for conference call bridge

b7E -6

Good evening SIOC. Would you please set up an unclassified conference call bridge for 12 parties for two hours from 10:00 AM-noon tomorrow, November 5th?

Thanks,
Pete

Peter P. Strzok II
Deputy Assistant Director, Branch I
Counterintelligence Division

[REDACTED] (O)
[REDACTED] (C)

b6 -1
b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 7:52 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Favor

Fyi....

----- Original message -----

From: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Date: 11/04/2016 7:43 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Favor

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Sounds good. I will get update at 6 am if not completed tonight. Not looking good for overnight completion as of 7 pm.

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]
Date: 11/04/2016 6:51 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: [REDACTED] (RO) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: Favor

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Hey pls give me a heads up if/when OTD finishes processing.

I have a conference call tomorrow at 10 and will need an update before then. You want to talk at 9?

Thanks.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 12:32 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: TSC issue

?

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/04/2016 11:03 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: TSC issue

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Hey Pete -

Sorry for the late message. I just learned that there is a 0930 Saturday meeting at TSC re: the issue discussed today. I think Sandy has convened it and I just hit him up in an attempt to provide a thorough summary of what transpired today from our perspective. Haven't heard back from him yet, but hope to avoid getting this spun up again. WFO is being asked to join tomorrow as well. If need be [redacted] will represent as well, but I'll update you when I have more.

Regards,

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -9

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 12:34 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Why We Should All Fear the Rot Inside the FBI - The Daily Beast

<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/11/05/why-we-should-all-fear-the-rot-inside-the-fbi.html>

Whatever the cause, it's clear that there is a cancer festering inside the nation's pre-eminent law enforcement agency, and it runs through New York.

The possibility that the director of the FBI is essentially at the mercy of a right-wing faction of his own agents, whose source of investigative material is an offshoot of Breitbart.com, which has direct connections to the Republican candidate, bodes ill for what the agency might do with its power, under either potential president.

Would the Breitbart wing of the FBI continue to hunt the new Democratic commander in chief based on the thin gruel ladled out by fever swamp websites? Or would it become the investigative sword wielded by the Republican president against his political enemies, Democrat and Republican, any of whom could face investigation if they displeased him and his fans?

Either way, the result would not be democracy. It would be authoritarian tyranny of a downright Putinesque kind.

Something is rotten inside the FBI. Americans have good reason to be afraid, and angry.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 7:46 AM
To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Why We Should All Fear the Rot Inside the FBI - The Daily Beast

b6 -1
b7C -1

Following on to Bill's NY Post email from last night:

<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/11/05/why-we-should-all-fear-the-rot-inside-the-fbi.html>

Whatever the cause, it's clear that there is a cancer festering inside the nation's pre-eminent law enforcement agency, and it runs through New York.

The possibility that the director of the FBI is essentially at the mercy of a right-wing faction of his own agents, whose source of investigative material is an offshoot of Breitbart.com, which has direct connections to the Republican candidate, bodes ill for what the agency might do with its power, under either potential president.

Would the Breitbart wing of the FBI continue to hunt the new Democratic commander in chief based on the thin gruel ladled out by fever swamp websites? Or would it become the investigative sword wielded by the Republican president against his political enemies, Democrat and Republican, any of whom could face investigation if they displeased him and his fans?

Either way, the result would not be democracy. It would be authoritarian tyranny of a downright Putinesque kind. Something is rotten inside the FBI. Americans have good reason to be afraid, and angry.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 9:30 AM
To: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1

[redacted]

b7E -4

[redacted] indexing just started and will take several hours to complete. The number we will need to review will be less than that but we cannot estimate by how much.

We think we will be in a good position at 1:00 to understand the data and have a sense of timing to complete. A significant variable is the time to index, as well as the occasional index failure/need to restart.

Our unscientific gut feel is we will be able to get through the material by this evening - everyone should be thinking it will not be this afternoon - with the chance we will need to work overnight to complete.

Based on this, do we want to push the conference call to 1?

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/04/2016 7:26 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Dial-in info below, 10:00 tomorrow

----- Original message -----

From: SIOC [redacted]
Date: 11/04/2016 7:22 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: SIOC [redacted]
Subject: RE: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

1/2/17 09:00:00

Your unclassified conference call for 11/5/16 at 10am – 12pm ET was setup as requested. Instructions to gain access to the conference call are below. Please forward to all participants.

- Dial [redacted]
- When prompted to do so, please enter your pass code followed by the #sign. Your pass code is [redacted]
- If you need assistance, please call the SIOC's main number, [redacted]

b7E -6

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Emergency Action Specialist [redacted]
 Strategic Information & Operation Center (SIOC)
 FBIHQ, Room [redacted]
 [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

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-----Original Message-----

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
 Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 6:53 PM
 To: SIOC [redacted]
 Subject: Request for conference call bridge

b7E -6

Good evening SIOC. Would you please set up an unclassified conference call bridge for 12 parties for two hours from 10:00 AM-noon tomorrow, November 5th?

Thanks,
Pete

Peter P. Strzok II
 Deputy Assistant Director, Branch I
 Counterintelligence Division

[redacted] (O)
 [redacted] (C)

b6 -1
b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 9:55 AM
To: Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1

Dial in remains the same, at bottom of this chain

----- Original message -----

From: "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 9:50 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Got it

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/5/16 9:30 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[redacted]
 [redacted] indexing just started and will take several hours to complete. The number we will need to review will be less than that but we cannot estimate by how much.

b7E -4

We think we will be in a good position at 1:00 to understand the data and have a sense of timing to complete. A significant variable is the time to index, as well as the occasional index failure/need to restart.

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Based on this, do we want to push the conference call to 1?

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
 Date: 11/04/2016 7:26 PM (GMT-05:00)
 To: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted];
 [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]; "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted];
 [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]; "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted];
 [redacted]; "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
 Subject: Fwd: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Dial-in info below, 10:00 tomorrow

----- Original message -----

From: SIOC [redacted]
 Date: 11/04/2016 7:22 PM (GMT-05:00)
 To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
 Cc: SIOC [redacted]
 Subject: RE: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

DAD Strzok,

Your unclassified conference call for 11/5/16 at 10am - 12pm ET was setup as requested. Instructions to gain access to the conference call are below. Please forward to all participants.

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- When prompted to do so, please enter your pass code followed by the #sign. Your pass code is [redacted]
- If you need assistance, please call the SIOC's main number [redacted]

b7E -6

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Emergency Action Specialist [redacted]
 Strategic Information & Operation Center (SIOC)
 FBIHQ, Room [redacted]
 [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[REDACTED]

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-----Original Message-----

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 6:53 PM

To: SIOC [REDACTED]

Subject: Request for conference call bridge

b7E -6

Good evening SIOC. Would you please set up an unclassified conference call bridge for 12 parties for two hours from 10:00 AM-noon tomorrow, November 5th?

Thanks,

Pete

Peter P. Strzok II

Deputy Assistant Director, Branch I

Counterintelligence Division

[REDACTED] (O)
[REDACTED] (C)

b6 -1

b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 9:59 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] OGC (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1

(- some)

Aspects of this feel very much like a 5 year old birthday party. I was told there would be cake.

----- Original message -----

From: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 9:50 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; [redacted] OGC (FBI); [redacted] Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[redacted] so my participation is doubtful. Sorry.

b6 -1

----- Original message -----

From: "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 9:39 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; [redacted] OGC (FBI); [redacted] Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Agree

...

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]

Date: 11/5/16 9:30 AM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"

[redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Rybicki, James

E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Baker,

James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)"

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Kortan,

Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)"

[redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]

Subject: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[redacted]
[redacted] indexing just started and will take several hours to complete. The number we will need to review will be less than that but we cannot estimate by how much.

b7E -4

We think we will be in a good position at 1:00 to understand the data and have a sense of timing to complete. A significant variable is the time to index, as well as the occasional index failure/need to restart.

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Based on this, do we want to push the conference call to 1?

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]

Date: 11/04/2016 7:26 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"

[redacted] "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Rybicki, James

E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Baker,

James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)"

[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Kortan,

Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)"

[redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]

Subject: Fwd: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Dial-in info below, 10:00 tomorrow

----- Original message -----

From: SIOC [redacted]

Date: 11/04/2016 7:22 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]

Cc: SIOC [redacted]

Subject: RE: Request for conference call bridge

DAD Strzok,

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Your unclassified conference call for 11/5/16 at 10am - 12pm ET was setup as requested. Instructions to gain access to the conference call are below. Please forward to all participants.

- Dial [redacted]
- When prompted to do so, please enter your pass code followed by the #sign. Your pass code is [redacted]
- If you need assistance, please call the SIOC's main number [redacted]

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Emergency Action Specialist [redacted]
 Strategic Information & Operation Center (SIOC)
 FBIHQ, Room [redacted]
 [redacted]

b6 -1
 b7C -1
 b7E -6

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-----Original Message-----

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
 Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 6:53 PM
 To: SIOC [redacted]
 Subject: Request for conference call bridge

b7E -6

Good evening SIOC. Would you please set up an unclassified conference call bridge for 12 parties for two hours from 10:00 AM-noon tomorrow, November 5th?

Thanks,
 Pete

Peter P. Strzok II
 Deputy Assistant Director, Branch I
 Counterintelligence Division

[redacted] (O)
 [redacted] (C)

b6 -1
 b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 8:46 PM
To: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)
Cc: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1

We may be finished with the initial review within the hour. Adding a bit of time to understand the data, we may be in a position to provide an update around 10. Is there interest in a call at 10 to go through what we have to sleep on it before the call tomorrow morning?

----- Original message -----

From: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 8:11 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Thanks Bill.

Your comments make sense. That said, you now have me thinking that [redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

What if we try [redacted]

----- Original message -----

From: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 5:14 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
 [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

OGC (FBI)

"Motta,

Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)

"Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)"

"Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)"

Cc: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)"

"Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"

Subject: RE: Drafting

Jim Baker:

I like the most recent version of the statement.

[Redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

[Redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

b6 -1

b7C -1

[Redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

No need to respond to my comments via email.

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Thank you,

Bill

From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)
 Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 2:14 PM
 To: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI);
 [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI);
 [redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] OGC)
 (FBI); [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Herring, Jason V.
 (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); [redacted]
 Cc: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI);
 [redacted]
 Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Folks,

Per our conversation, below is a straw man for discussion [redacted]
 [redacted] Note that my comments are in ALL CAPS and in bold italics.

b5 -1

Jim

October 5, 2016 (2:10PM)

[Large redacted block]

b5 -1, 2, 3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

----- Original message -----

From: "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [Redacted]"

Date: 11/05/2016 12:35 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Baker, James A. (OGC)

(FBI)" [Redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)"

[Redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Moffa,

Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)"

[Redacted] "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted]

Cc: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"

[Redacted]


Subject: Re: Drafting

Revised version based on input. We can discuss at the 1pm update call. Thanks!

October 5, 2016 (12:33PM)

[Redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6



From: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)
 Sent: Friday, November 4, 2016 5:21 PM
 To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)
 Cc: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)
 Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1

Current version.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)
 Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 3:47 PM
 To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)
 Cc: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); [redacted]
 Subject: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Those working on the drafting should meet in the ADD's conference room at 4pm.

Thanks,
Jim

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 9:21 PM
To: Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Mye update

b6 -1
b7C -1

Dial in for 10 below.

----- Original message -----

From: SIOC [redacted]
Date: 11/04/2016 7:22 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: SIOC [redacted]
Subject: RE: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

DAD Strzok.

Your unclassified conference call for 11/5/16 at 10am – 12pm ET was setup as requested. Instructions to gain access to the conference call are below. Please forward to all participants.

- Dial [redacted]
- When prompted to do so, please enter your pass code followed by the #sign. Your pass code is [redacted]
- If you need assistance, please call the SIOC's main number [redacted]

b7E -6

PLEASE NOTE: SIOC has a limited number of conference lines available each day. If your plans change, and you will not be using any or all of the requested lines, please let SIOC know as soon as you know so that we may release those lines to others who may be wanting to use them.

Emergency Action Specialist [redacted]
 Strategic Information & Operation Center (SIOC)
 FBIHQ, Room [redacted]
 [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

THIS MESSAGE CAN BE PROVIDED TO OUTSIDE AGENCIES BECAUSE WE ARE NOW ROTATING CODES WHEN OUTSIDE AGENCIES WERE/ARE INVOLVED IN CONFERENCE CALLS.

-----Original Message-----

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 6:53 PM

To: SIOC [REDACTED]

b7E -6

Subject: Request for conference call bridge

Good evening SIOC. Would you please set up an unclassified conference call bridge for 12 parties for two hours from 10:00 AM-noon tomorrow, November 5th?

Thanks,
Pete

Peter P. Strzok II
Deputy Assistant Director, Branch I
Counterintelligence Division

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (C)

b6 -1
b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Sunday, November 06, 2016 6:00 AM
To: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1

See dial in information below for 10:00 EDT conference call.

[redacted] ion, and I completed our review of all of the potential HRC work emails on the laptop. We found no previously unknown, potentially classified emails on the media. I'll circulate comments to Jim's 11:00pm draft separately.

b6 -1
b7C -1

We have a team coming in this morning to triple-check our methodology and conclusions, and we will have updated numbers for the 10.

----- Original message -----

From: SIOC [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 11:54 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: SIOC [redacted]
Subject: RE: Request for conference call bridge

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Your unclassified conference call has been set up as requested. Instructions to gain access to the conference call are as follows:

- * Dia [redacted]
- * When prompted to do so, please enter your pass code [redacted]
- * If you need assistance, please call the SIOC's main number [redacted]

b7E -6

THE CONTENT OF THIS EMAIL IS LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LES)
Forwarding this email or its contents to a non-government account is prohibited

Emergency Action Specialist [REDACTED]

Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC)

FBI Headquarters, Room [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

-----Original Message-----

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 11:46 PM

To: SIOC [REDACTED]

Subject: Request for conference call bridge

b7E -6

Good evening SIOC,

Would you please set up an unclassified call bridge for 12 parties for 12 hours tomorrow (Sunday 6th), from 9:00 AM to 9:00 PM?

Thanks,

Pete Strzok

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Sunday, November 06, 2016 6:00 AM
To: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)
Cc: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1

Based on finding no new potentially classified email on the media, I think [redacted]

b5 -1

[redacted] have cut and pasted here:

October 5, 2016 (2:10PM)

b5 -1, 2, 3

----- Original message -----

From: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 11:00 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[Redacted]
"Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Page, Lisa C.
(OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)"
[Redacted] OGC) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Moffa,
Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)"
[Redacted] "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted]
Cc: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"
[Redacted]
Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Folks,

Per our 1000pm conversation, below is a revised straw man for discussion. Again, [Redacted]
[Redacted] My comments are again in ALL CAPS and in
bold italics.

b5 -1

Jim

November 5, 2016 (1055 PM)

[Large Redacted Area]

b5 -1, 2, 3

----- Original message -----

From: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 8:11 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C.
(OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa,
Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"
[redacted]
Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Thanks Bill.

Your comments make sense. That said, you now have me thinking that [redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

What if we try: [redacted]

----- Original message -----

From: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/05/2016 5:14 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C.
(OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa,
Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"
[redacted]
Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Jim Baker:

I like the most recent version of the statement.

b5 -1, 2, 3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b5 -1
b6 -1
b7C -1

[Redacted]

b5 -1, 2, 3

No need to respond to my comments via email.

Thank you,

Bill

From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Sent: Saturday, November 05, 2016 2:14 PM

To: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [Redacted] Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)

[Redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [Redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

[Redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI) [Redacted] OGC

(FBI) [Redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [Redacted] Herring, Jason V.

(CD) (FBI) [Redacted] Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI) [Redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Cc: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)

Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Subject: RE: Drafting

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

DELIBERATIVE PROCESS

Folks,

Per our conversation, below is a straw man for discussion

b5 -1

Note that my comments are in ALL CAPS and in bold italics.

Jim

October 5, 2016 (2:10PM)

b5 -1, 2, 3

b5 -1, 2, 3




----- Original message -----

From: "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
 Date: 11/05/2016 12:35 PM (GMT-05:00)
 To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"
 [redacted]; Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]; "Baker, James A. (OGC)
 (FBI)" [redacted]; "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)"
 [redacted]; [redacted] OGC (FBI) [redacted]; "Moffa,
 Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)"
 [redacted]; "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
 Cc: "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)"
 [redacted]
 Subject: Re: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Revised version based on input. We can discuss at the 1pm update call. Thanks!

October 5, 2016 (12:33PM)



From: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)
 Sent: Friday, November 4, 2016 5:21 PM
 To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Anderson,
 Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] OGC (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Kortan, Michael
 P. (DO) (FBI)
 Cc: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)
 Subject: RE: Drafting

b6 -1
b7C -1

Current version:

-----Original Message-----

From: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)

Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 3:47 PM

To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Cc: Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Subject: Drafting

Those working on the drafting should meet in the ADO's conference room at 4pm.

Thanks,
Jim

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Sunday, November 06, 2016 1:39 PM
To: Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI); Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI); [redacted] OGC (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: From Wash Post-- Congress given access to emails?

b6 -1
b7C -1

They have not, to my knowledge

----- Original message -----

From: "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/06/2016 1:37 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "OGC (FBI)" [redacted]; "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: From Wash Post-- Congress given access to emails?

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FYI.....

-----Original Message-----

From: Zapotosky, Matt [redacted]
Sent: Sunday, November 06, 2016 1:26 PM
To: NPO <NPO@ic.fbi.gov>
Cc: [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Quinn, Richard P. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: Congress given access to emails?

b6 -1, 3
b7C -1
b7E -6

Hi,

Rep. Steve King just said at a rally that Congress has been given access to the 650,000 emails recovered in the Anthony Weiner case, some of which might be relevant to the Clinton email investigation. Is that true? If it is, why would Congress be given access to such materials?

Thanks,

Matt Zapotosky
The Washington Post
[redacted]

b6 -3

Sent from my iPhone

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, November 07, 2016 10:38 AM
To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: The real story behind the FBI's Hillary Clinton investigation - Washington Times

b6 -1
b7C -1

Bill - this is the article [REDACTED] mentioned

b6 -1
b7C -1

<http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/31/the-real-story-behind-the-fbis-hillary-clinton-inv/>

The real story behind the FBI's Clinton investigation

Despite criticism from both major parties, Comey has acted with honesty

By Ronald Kessler

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

Rarely has the FBI been so embroiled in public controversy. And never has so much misinformation about its workings been so prevalent.

At a recent luncheon meeting of the Washington chapter of the Society of Former FBI Agents, Michael Steinbach, the FBI's executive assistant director in charge of national security investigations, tried to straighten some of it out.

Mr. Steinbach told the 80 former FBI agents in attendance that while FBI Director James Comey made the final decision on the case, Mr. Steinbach himself supervised the FBI's investigation of Hillary Clinton's handling of her emails, according to John L.

FBI (18-cv-154)-9268

Martin, a former FBI agent who attended the lunch meeting.

About 25 FBI personnel worked on the case, Mr. Steinbach said. Contrary to what seems to be a given in some media circles, no rebellion of FBI agents has taken place because of Mr. Comey's decision not to prosecute the presidential candidate. In fact, according to Mr. Martin, Mr. Steinbach said all of those who worked on the case said they agreed with Mr. Comey's decision.

To be sure, many former agents disagree with the decision. But having written three books about the FBI, including one that led to the dismissal of William Sessions as FBI director over his abuses, I can tell you that all former agents never agree on anything.

Mr. Steinbach told the former agents at the meeting that he was disappointed that so many former agents have questioned the integrity of the FBI's investigation without firsthand knowledge either of the facts or the thinking behind the decision not to prosecute Mrs. Clinton.

Aside from the FBI agents and prosecutors who worked on the case, no one is in a better position to explain that decision than John Martin. After leaving the FBI, Mr. Martin became a Justice Department prosecutor. For 25 years he was in charge of prosecuting all the espionage laws, including Section 793(f) of the federal criminal code, the statute that is pertinent in the Clinton investigation. Among the 76 spies Mr. Martin prosecuted were John A. Walker Jr., Jonathan Pollard and Aldrich Ames.

During those years, Mr. Martin tells me, he never used Section 793(f) alone because, while that law makes it a felony to handle material relating to the national defense with "gross negligence," it is unlikely a jury would convict a defendant on that charge alone without a showing of criminal intent.

Thus, in the case of former CIA Director David Petraeus, besides charging him with a violation of Section 793(f), the Justice Department charged him with lying to the FBI, an indication of criminal intent. He agreed to a plea disposition.

Beyond the conspiracy theories about Mr. Comey's decision not to prosecute, critics have marshaled a burgeoning number of non sequiturs: The FBI should have recorded

its agents' interview of Mrs. Clinton. She should have been placed under oath. She should have been given a polygraph test. Mr. Comey should have recommended impaneling a grand jury so that subpoenas could have been issued for pertinent evidence. The fact that he gave limited immunity from prosecution to key Clinton aides means he was giving her a break. And Mr. Comey ignored the fact that Mrs. Clinton has lied repeatedly about her use of a private email server for sensitive government business to try to cover up her egregious conduct.

But except in unusual circumstances, the FBI does not record interviews unless a subject is in custody after an arrest. Lying to the FBI is a crime, so there is no need to place a subject under oath. The fact that Mrs. Clinton has lied repeatedly to the public is irrelevant in a criminal investigation. Only if she lied to the FBI during her interview could she be prosecuted. And polygraphs are voluntary. Mrs. Clinton, whose FBI interview was voluntary, never would have consented to taking a polygraph test.

By eliciting Mrs. Clinton's cooperation, Mr. Comey avoided the delays that her high-powered lawyers would have imposed if a grand jury had issued subpoenas. The fact that Mr. Comey gave limited immunity to aides demonstrates how determined he was to gather evidence to indict his target.

Finally, bad as it may look, whether FBI official Andrew McCabe became FBI deputy director months after his wife received Democrats' campaign contributions and ended her unsuccessful run for the Virginia state Senate is irrelevant. So is the fact that John Podesta, Mrs. Clinton's campaign chairman, had dinner with pals who included his longtime friend, Peter Kadzik, who is a Justice Department legislative affairs official.

Though everyone knows this isn't going to happen, now both Republicans and Democrats are calling for Mr. Comey to reveal exactly what the FBI found on a laptop shared by Mrs. Clinton's top aide Huma Abedin and her husband Anthony Weiner that led to his decision to restart the Clinton investigation. Obviously, if the FBI knew what is relevant in the newly discovered emails, there would have been no need to reopen the investigation. By its nature, that investigation will take time.

Once the new evidence was uncovered by his agents, Mr. Comey found himself in a difficult position. If he had kept quiet about the reopening of the investigation until

after the presidential election, he would have been accused by Republicans of covering up for Mrs. Clinton. By disclosing the new information before the election, he opened himself to being accused by Democrats of favoring Donald Trump.

As he did in laying out the evidence against Mrs. Clinton at a press conference and calling her actions "extremely careless," Mr. Comey chose the right course by being honest with the American people and updating them on the status of the FBI investigation so they could judge her conduct for themselves.

• *Ronald Kessler, a former Washington Post investigative reporter, is the author of "The Secrets of the FBI" and "The First Family Detail: Secret Service Agents Reveal the Hidden Lives of the Presidents."*

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Canceled: DOJ - FBI update

Location: Conf. Room 4017

Start: Tuesday, October 04, 2016 11:00 AM

End: Tuesday, October 04, 2016 12:00 PM

Recurrence: Weekly

Recurrence Pattern: Occurs every Tuesday from 11:00 AM to 12:00 PM effective 10/4/2016 until 11/16/2021.

Meeting Status: Not yet responded

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Required Attendees: Toscas, George (NSD) (JMD) [redacted] (NSD) (JMD);
[redacted] (NSD) (JMD); Laufman, David (NSD) (JMD);
[redacted] (NSD) (JMD); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

b6 -2
b7C -2

Importance: High

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, November 09, 2016 6:59 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Politico: Inside the Loss Clinton Saw Coming

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/hillary-clinton-loses-2016-election-214439?hpid=hp_top-story-clinton_110916

Inside the Loss Clinton Saw Coming

Publicly they seemed confident, but in private her team admitted her chances were 'always fragile.'

By Edward-Isaac Dove

November 09, 2016

"We have some news. It's not good."

Hillary Clinton's communications director Jennifer Palmieri filled the candidate in as the plane landed in Iowa, with campaign manager Robby Mook in the huddle. Jim Comey's letter had hit when they were still in the air, without wifi, and now they were all at once processing the news and a game plan and the worry the FBI director had delivered an "existential" hit to a campaign already more nervous than it had been letting on.

Clinton was sitting up in her private cabin, chatting with childhood friend Betsy Ebeling.

"You knew we weren't done," Palmieri told the boss.

"I knew there would be something," Clinton told them with a slight smile. "So here it is."

Here it was. Again. More emails, pretty much the only thing her campaign was about even before it started. And for Clinton, who sees her life as the story of battling back unhinged and unfair partisan attacks, this was the latest round of Them against Us.

Everything that Democrats and pretty much anyone else thought they understood about politics was proven wrong this year with a resounding exclamation mark Tuesday night. All along, this looked like a hard fight, but never a fight that she seemed to be losing, even on the darkest days on a campaign that never quite felt like it was winning, either.

Democrats and many others are now in crisis, wrapping their minds around the reality of a President Donald Trump. But the crisis is sharpest in Clinton campaign headquarters: not only do they feel like everything is about to go deeply, collapse-of-America wrong, but it's going to happen because she failed, and they failed her.

Clinton and her operatives went into the race predicting her biggest problems would be inevitability and her own failure to succeed a two-term president of her own party. But the mood of the country

and her age, trying to succeed a two-term president of her own party, but the mood of the country surprised them. They recognized that Sanders and Trump had correctly defined the problem—addressing anger about a rigged economy and government—and that Clinton already never authentically could. Worse still, her continuing email saga and extended revelations about the Clinton Foundation connections made any anti-establishment strategy completely impossible.

So instead of answering the question of how Clinton represented change, they tried to change the question to temperament, what kind of change people wanted, what kind of America they wanted to live in. It wasn't enough.

Using Trump as a foil and a focus, she hit on a voice and an argument for why she should actually be president that perhaps only she could have, and that she'd struggled for so long to find on her own. That wasn't enough, either.

Meanwhile, members of her staff harnessed all the money and support they could to out-organize, first in the primaries and then in the general, grinding out victories while her opponents had movements.

None of it was enough, though all of it should have been, and likely would have been for another candidate. She couldn't escape being the wrong candidate for the political moment.

Interviews over the closing weeks of the 2016 campaign with members of Clinton's innermost circle, close advisers and other aides reveal a deep frustration with their failure to make a dent, a consuming sense that their candidate's persecution paranoia might actually be right, and a devastating belief that they might never persuade Americans to vote for her.

"There was no way to generate momentum," one top adviser said.

Any positive story line from Clinton "was always fragile," admitted that adviser, and issues related to the emails inevitably stripped away any uptick in Clinton's favorable ratings.

"This has been a campaign that has thrived on moments," Mook said in an interview in his office, in the back corner of the Brooklyn headquarters a week before the election. "When voters see the candidates juxtaposed, we do better. When they're not juxtaposed, he normalizes. He becomes the Republican nominee, instead of Donald Trump."

This has been a campaign that has thrived on moments," Mook said. "When voters see the candidates juxtaposed, we do better. When they're not juxtaposed, he normalizes."

All along, Mook was dialing David Plouffe, the Obama 2008 campaign manager who was the person who could see the long game, who could mock the bed-wetters. Plouffe had pushed Clinton to hire Mook for the top job in 2015, and in the spring, when Clinton nearly lost Iowa, got creamed in New Hampshire and was so on edge about Sanders in Nevada that Mook could have gotten fired, Plouffe moved in to save him. He'd become Mook's campaign therapist.

The polling drop since the third debate was worse than the camp had been counting on, Mook worried, and with WikiLeaks every day dropping fresh chum in the water from campaign chairman John Podesta's email hack, nothing else was breaking through.

Monday night, a week out from Election Day and the FBI fallout still pulling points off their daily internal numbers, Plouffe called Mook back.

"Wouldn't you like to be back at that?" he joked about the problems breaking through before Comey.

They got used to things going wrong, as they had from the very beginning.

To several top aides, the best day of this whole campaign was a year ago, before the Sanders headache or the Trump threat really materialized, when the House of Representatives hauled Clinton and her emails in with the single aim of destroying her candidacy over Benghazi.

Republicans on the House Select Committee on Benghazi greeted the Clinton team that morning in 2015 with an October surprise: multiple thick, black binders of emails from their investigation of the Benghazi attack that had not been previously shared with anyone.

Clinton's former State Department chief of staff and counselor Cheryl Mills was already in the House committee's witness holding room, and she called Clinton at her Whitehaven home. "You need to get here now," Mills said.

Clinton campaign press secretary Brian Fallon, standing in the back of the committee room with Podesta, wanted to leak the news to the media that Clinton was about to get ambushed. Podesta told him to wait to see what top adviser Jake Sullivan and Mills could do in the hour they had before Clinton was sworn in.

As she sped through the years-old emails to prep her former boss, Mills watched on live television as Clinton's van left her mansion and made its way to the Hill. About 20 minutes later, the doors burst open and Clinton entered, flashbulbs popping behind her. She quietly took a seat next to Sullivan, who began walking her methodically through the binders, page by page, email by email. Clinton didn't have time to take notes, nodding along and signaling to Sullivan to move on when she had grasped the context of the emails.

They didn't make it through one full binder before Clinton had to go into the hearing room.

"Well, let's get this over with," she said as she stood and headed for the stand.

She delivered tirelessly, knocking back the Republicans one by one, complete with facial expressions that have launched GIFs that have been all over Democrats' Facebook and Twitter feeds ever since. She renewed her shaken team's faith that she was the leader they wanted to follow into what was already shaping up to be a dejecting primary battle.

"It reminded people of everything they like about her," said one of her senior advisers. "It's toughness, but also a calm, adult presence of someone you can actually see being president of the United States."

But two even more critical things happened that day: The inner circle for 2016 crystallized and has remained almost impenetrable since, with Sullivan, Mills, Podesta, Palmieri and Huma Abedin all invited back to Clinton's house in Washington afterward to celebrate with takeout food.

And it removed Benghazi from the list of attacks that could be credibly leveled against her in 2016.

All that was left were the emails. They never could escape the emails.

It's an amazing fact: from Mook on down, every senior member of Clinton's team showed up on the final day in the same role as on the day she launched. No one was fired. No one was layered, which is the standard kiss of death in Clintonworld. Top people signed on warning friends and family to brace for humiliating news stories about being sacked. Deep into the primaries, they were still making the same joke about problems on the horizon, "Don't worry about that—it'll be for the second team to come in and fix."

"She made a decision that this was her team," said Jim Margolis, the man behind many of the ads and most of the convention planning.

Clinton picked Mook, instead of promoting a campaign manager out of loyalty from her own inner circle. She persuaded Podesta, who had kept his distance in 2008 because he didn't get along with polarizing top strategist Mark Penn, to join as the guiding hand and the buffer for all the "friends of" who streamed in with advice and second-guessing.

But that didn't mean there weren't serious problems. Bill Clinton complained throughout that Mook was too focused on the ground game and not enough on driving a message-based campaign. Without a chief strategist in the mold of Penn or David Axelrod, the campaign was run by a committee of strong-willed aides, struggling to assert themselves in the same space. Longtime consultant Mandy Grunwald and Palmieri grappled at points over message control as Palmieri worked her way into the inner circle. Mook and strategist Joel Benenson barely spoke to each other for the month of April, battling over their roles.

Most weren't reading WikiLeaks, or the coverage of WikiLeaks—there are signs in the bathrooms in campaign headquarters warning against password phishing, and they're prohibited from signing onto the website from their computers at headquarters. But those who read the news coverage admitted it created an odd sense of hierarchy: You don't want to be in them, one aide explained, but you don't want to not be in them either.

The emails released by Wikileaks created an odd sense of hierarchy: You don't want to be in them, one aide explained, but you don't want to not be in them, either.

What the campaign considered the one big leak—that Clinton was considering retired Adm. Jim Stavridis for VP—happened after Clinton blurted it out herself in a meeting with a wider circle of consultants. People had never seen anything like the email everyone in the meeting got from Podesta after that.

The key on their end, aides agree, was learning not to surprise Clinton with bad news. Eight years ago, staffers either kept not realizing or not telling her that Obama was going to win. Maybe they were too busy knifing each other, blaming the losses on something that someone else did wrong. "She doesn't micromanage, but she wants to know what is going on, especially if things aren't working according to our plan," Benenson said.

The worst was New Hampshire, the moment when Brooklyn actually felt like the ground might be shifting under them and Sanders would run away with it. Mook told her she was going to lose. He told Bill Clinton too: by 20 points.

Deputy communications director Kristina Schake sent an intern to get a big supermarket layer cake to

try to lighten the mood.

"Dig in," Mook told the staff, digging into the pun, "because we're about to get layered."

The pressure Clinton felt to stop Trump was unnerving, her aides said.

"I've got to deliver tonight," she said in her final prep before the first debate ("the moment of maximum peril," one aide called it), awkwardly but strikingly for aides surprised by how scared she was feeling about being the last person to stop a person she genuinely thinks is unfit to serve.

She did deliver, in all three debates. And those wins gave Clinton such a boost in the polls that as October closed, confidence in her camp spilled more easily into the open. The Democratic nominee looked happy, almost as if she were enjoying it.

So when Comey shook up the campaign, 11 days before Election Day, to announce new information in the email probe, Clinton's team insisted on offense.

But they knew it changed the math, made Arizona slip just out of their fingers, destroyed any chance of a really big or clean win, even with that "Never mind!" letter from Comey on the final Sunday.

There were up times—Trump stand-in Phillippe Reines chasing Clinton around the room during debate prep after the Republican stalked her on stage in St. Louis, then grabbing her in a bear hug, both of them laughing. The "full hook!" shouts in their hold room in Las Vegas when Clinton delivered the line that Grunwald had come up with about how Trump had even once complained that the Emmys were "rigged" and when he Alec Baldwin'd a "Should've gotten it" into the microphone.

But those were the exceptions. "Best seven minutes of the last 15 months of my life," Palmieri had confided to people in Philadelphia on Sept. 13, as she watched President Barack Obama gleefully rip Trump, voicing the frustration they felt in Brooklyn about how differently Clinton and Trump were treated on the campaign. Two days before, she and everyone on the campaign and everywhere else had watched that video of Clinton collapsing, wondering what it would mean.

To the end, top aides remain convinced there's more to Trump's ties to Russia, debt held in Moscow that's kept him cowed. They finished with clear proof in their minds that Republicans, reporters, most of America were out to get Clinton—so much so, in their minds, that it enabled a threat to everything the country's supposed to be about glide into the White House without any real examination of his policies, his finances, his temperament or anything else.

On the Saturday before the election, Clinton's team released a seven-minute video, entitled "The Story of the Campaign," full of scenes of Clinton celebrating with aides, sleeping on Bill Clinton's shoulder as they flew through the night after losing New Hampshire.

There were outtakes from Clinton's announcement video. "I know you think I'm crazy. You're right," she laughs into the video camera.

"Watching that," one top aide said, "You'd think the campaign was so much fun."

Straub, Peter F. (CD) (FS)

From: Straub, Peter F. (CD) (FS)
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2016 07:04 AM
To: Straub, Jonathan C. (CD) (FS); [REDACTED] (DC) (FS); Page, Lisa D. (DC) (FS)
Subject: [REDACTED]

b6 -1
b7C -1

"Today's vote to elect Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States is a day after she treated 'Democracy R.I.P.' in expectation of a Clinton win."

'Yes We Did': Russia's establishment basks in Trump's victory

By David E. Sanger and Michael Crowley | November 8, 2016 12:07 PM



Russian President Vladimir Putin called to be happy on Donald Trump's election and to be proud. Vladimir Putin, president of Russia's media.
MOSCOW — A smiling change came over Moscow just hours after Donald Trump's surprise election. Suddenly, the Russian capital was a hotbed of festive support of the U.S. electoral process.

Throughout the campaign, Russia seemed to Trump as any other foreign country. According to the White House, Moscow also intervened as much as any other foreign country over the U.S. election. But the Kremlin's commitment — assessed that Hillary Clinton was going to win — had also wanted the U.S. election in very much and would to produce a legitimate result.

Now that their goal was in, and with Russia TV showing many Americans lining up to vote for Trump, they tried to change their own.
"This is a great day for American democracy," quipped pro-Kremlin ideologue Sergei Markov as he sat at the U.S. ambassador's residence in Moscow. "We have a vibrant American democracy."

Public gloating aside, the long-term chances of a Trump presidency for the Kremlin are unclear. The two countries share years of bad blood and a tangle of geopolitical grievances. A shortlist list includes the conflict in Syria, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, U.S. economic sanctions and a military buildup on both sides of Russia's border with NATO. In just one sign of severity, NATO warplanes intercepted Russian jets 10 times.

[Russian foreign policy analyst, former U.S. State Dept. analyst, and NATO official.]

Is a change of president going to make all that go away? Despite Trump's promise to seek warmer relations, the water connections and officials in Moscow need to be open.

"They're looking to the Kremlin now," said Andrei Martynov, editor in chief of Echo of Moscow. For he predicted that the pipeline could soon be. "We'll see what happens later."

Wednesday's celebration was also a show of force. Instead, there was a sign over the airport of a Hillary Clinton presidency that many Russians agreed would bring more of the same. A poster of American politician the pro-Kremlin crowd sent as "Krasnopolis."

For them, America's election of Trump was cause for a new level of...

"Today's vote to elect Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States is a day after she treated 'Democracy R.I.P.' in expectation of a Clinton win."

[Photo: TV's showing multi-billionaire Trump and others signing ahead of U.S. election]

Lawmakers at the Russian State Duma — an article by body composed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's United Russia party — had to be done before they found that democracy had been saved process.

"Tonight is the night of Trump for all Americans and the world," said Boris Chertokov, a member of an oppositionist faction of the Duma whose leader would protest. In a sharp contrast, City President Obama's 2008 slogan, he added. "This election marks the start of a new era. Trump: Yes we did."

As for the "no" part, Putin has reportedly denied that Russia was interfering with the U.S. election, although he has allowed his leaks of hacked Democratic Party emails benefited the public. (Kind of, the original Kremlin adviser, suggested Wednesday that Russia "may have helped" WikiLeaks, the anti-secrecy group that published the emails, but he did not specify how he'd know or what that meant.) Putin's denial didn't stop Russians from lining up with the idea that their leaders just might have swung the election of the leader of the free world.

It turns out that the United States has won the election in the United States. Russian media quoted Viktor Nazarov, governor of the Czech region, as telling a meeting:

"Judging by the results of the U.S. election, Donald Trump has won the U.S. election," pro-Kremlin activist Mikhail Laktionov said on Twitter, where the Russian-language hashtag "#russtayswithTrump" was gaining traction.

In a poll on the Euronews website, the radio station asked its viewers, "Did Putin have a hand in Trump's victory?" While 60 percent answered no on Wednesday night, 51 percent, nearly 6,000 people, responded "yes."

Putin did not explicitly make no mention of the election's legitimacy in his congratulatory message to Trump Wednesday, instead focusing on Trump's promising words during the campaign about restoring relations.

"We understand that this will not be an easy path," Putin said. And he should know, because the two sides of demands for stable conditions for restoring relations & discussing. He spoke earlier, Dmitry Peskov, defended a position that things would change right away, saying Putin had no plan to call Trump.

In other former republics of the Soviet Union, particularly those in conflict with Russia like Ukraine and the Baltics, there were expressions of skepticism in contrast to Moscow's delight.

Most of the rhetoric, and he doubted Trump would accede to all of Russia's demands — ending sanctions, compensating Moscow for the losses caused by them, recognizing the annexation of Crimea — that he did expect progress.

He nevertheless worried about Trump's personal leadership style, gleaned from watching "The Apprentice" as well as the campaign. "He is capable, Putin also is capable," Nazarov said. "He said he wants to have good relations. But maybe they're not that."

Nazarov also believes contributed to the report.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, November 10, 2016 7:52 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

You could share this with :| ...

<http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/10/politics/donald-trump-transition-drain-the-swamp/>

b6 -3

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 11, 2016 10:35 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: FYSA

Thanks

----- Original message -----

From: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [REDACTED]
Date: 11/11/2016 10:28 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]; "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"
[REDACTED]
Subject: FYSA

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Andy has not yet been able to make contact with [REDACTED] so he said you guys should probably plan to hold until at least Monday. Just wanted to let you know so that you can plan accordingly. Thanks.

b6 -3

Lisa

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 12:17 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FW:
Attachments: anonymous letter.pdf

Told them it was not authentic [redacted]

b5 -1

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 11:51 AM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted]
Subject: FW:

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

For your awareness- The NYT provided the attached document to us today in order to verify its authenticity. It is supposedly an affidavit in support of espionage charges against Donald John Trump. They received it in the mail today. They doubt it is an authentic document noting there are numerous inaccuracies. Wanted to provide it for your awareness.

From: Apuzzo, Matt [redacted]
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 11:30 AM
To: [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted]
Subject:

b6 -1, 3
b7C -1
b7E -6

We got this in the mail today. Any truth to it?
Matt

AFFIDAVIT FOR A CRIMINAL ARREST WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANTS

[REDACTED], having been duly sworn, hereby depose and state:

1. This affidavit is made in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant.
2. I am a Special Agent (SA) with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and have been employed for 18 years, currently assigned to the Washington Field Office. I have received extensive training in white collar crimes, financial crimes, money laundering, fraud, conspiracy, and counter-intelligence. I have worked in the counterintelligence field for approximately 15 years specifically on counter-intelligence matters involving Russia. As a result of my experience, in investigations and foreign counter-intelligence training, I have familiarity with the strategy, tactics, methods and techniques of Kremlin, KGB, and other Russian entities and their agents.
3. This affidavit is submitted in support of an application for a complaint and arrest warrant charging DONALD JOHN TRUMP with conspiracy to commit espionage, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 794(c), and for applications for two (2) search warrants to search the following locations:
 - a. The penthouse residence at Trump Tower, 725 5th Ave, New York, NY 10022
 - b. The residence at Mar-a-Lago Resort at 1100 S Ocean Blvd, Palm Beach, FL 33460
4. The information provided in this affidavit is based on my personal knowledge, information obtained from public records, information provided to me by other law enforcement agencies, and other sources indicated herein.
5. Based on the information, I have probable cause to believe DONALD JOHN TRUMP violated Title 18 Section 794 of the US Criminal Code by colluding with domestic and foreign officials to commit espionage, including but not limited to obtaining classified national security information.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2016 8:54 AM
To: Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] OGC (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Beers, Elizabeth R. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] OGC (FBI)
Subject: RE: Answering the mail

b6 -1
b7C -1

I'll be there, but a few minutes late

----- Original message -----

From: "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/14/2016 4:17 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: [redacted] OGC (FBI) [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Beers, Elizabeth R. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] OGC (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: Answering the mail

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Looks like we were overcome by events this afternoon.

Can we aim to get together tomorrow morning at 9:00 in room [redacted]

Lisa, I can just back brief you since I know you are otherwise occupied tomorrow morning...

Thanks all. Jason

From: Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 1:59 PM
To: [redacted] OGC (FBI) [redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Beers, Elizabeth R. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] OGC (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: Answering the mail

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Let's go ahead and get together for a few minutes this afternoon at 4:00 for whomever is available at that time. At least we can have a preliminary discussion. We can meet in my office, room [redacted]

Thanks. Jason

From: [redacted] OGC (FBI)
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 1:39 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Beers, Elizabeth R. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] OGC (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: Answering the mail

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

[redacted] - I should be in by 11. I'm available this afternoon except 3-4.

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 1:14 PM

To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
[redacted] Beers, Elizabeth R. (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Subject: RE: Answering the mail

I'm available until mid-day tomorrow

----- Original message -----

From: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/14/2016 1:11 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)"
[redacted] Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C.
(CD) (FBI) [redacted] Beers, Elizabeth R. (DO) (FBI)"
[redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Subject: RE: Answering the mail

I'm at a two-day CLE. I could meet tomorrow at noon, so long as people don't mind if I eat. Of course, feel free to meet without me too.

----- Original message -----

From: "Herring, Jason V. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/14/2016 1:08 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] "Beers, Elizabeth
R. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] (OGC) (FBI)"

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Cc: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Answering the mail

Team,

We've received a number of letters from Congress over the last few months with embedded questions re HRC we still have to answer. In addition, I've received a handful of phone calls over the last few days from our oversight committees who still have an interest in quickly getting answers to their outstanding questions. I'm optimistic once we answer the mail that we can move past this issue as the new Congress begins in January.

I would like to pull this team together as soon as possible to make a game plan for answering the mail. Would folks be available meet briefly either this afternoon (I realize that may be too soon) or tomorrow morning around 9:00?

Thanks, Jason

Jason V. Herring
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation
[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2016 11:47 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

Great

Secret Backdoor in Some U.S. Phones Sent Data to China, Analysts Say

By MATT APUZZO and MICHAEL S. SCHMIDTNOV. 15, 2016

WASHINGTON — For about \$50, you can get a smartphone with a high-definition display, fast data service and, according to security contractors, a secret feature: a backdoor that sends all your text messages to China every 72 hours.

Security contractors recently discovered preinstalled software in some Android phones that monitors where users go, whom they talk to and what they write in text messages. The American authorities say it is not clear whether this represents secretive data mining for advertising purposes or a Chinese government effort to collect intelligence.

International customers and users of disposable or prepaid phones are the people most affected by the software. But the scope is unclear. The Chinese company that wrote the software, Shanghai Adups Technology Company, says its code runs on more than 700 million phones, cars and other smart devices. One American phone manufacturer, BLU Products, said that 120,000 of its phones had been affected and that it had updated the software to eliminate the feature.

Kryptowire, the security firm that discovered the vulnerability, said the Adups software transmitted the full contents of text messages, contact lists, call logs, location information and other data to a Chinese server. The code comes preinstalled on phones and the surveillance is not disclosed to users, said Tom Karygiannis, a vice president of Kryptowire, which is based in Fairfax, Va. "Even if you wanted to, you wouldn't have known about it," he said.

Security experts frequently discover vulnerabilities in consumer electronics, but this case is exceptional. It was not a bug. Rather, Adups intentionally designed the software to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior, according to a document that Adups provided to explain the problem to BLU executives. That version of the software was not intended for American phones, the company said.

"This is a private company that made a mistake," said Lily Lim, a lawyer in Palo Alto, Calif., who represents Adups.

The episode shows how companies throughout the technology supply chain can compromise privacy, with or without the knowledge of manufacturers or customers. It also offers a look at one way that Chinese companies — and by extension the government — can monitor cellphone behavior. For many years, the Chinese government has used a variety of methods to filter and track internet use and monitor online conversations. It requires technology companies that operate in China to follow strict rules. Ms. Lim said Adups was not affiliated with the Chinese government.

At the heart of the issue is a special type of software, known as firmware, that tells phones how to operate. Adups provides the code that lets companies remotely update their firmware, an important function that is largely unseen by users. Normally, when a phone manufacturer updates its firmware, it tells customers what it is doing and whether it will use any personal information. Even if that is disclosed in long legal disclosures that customers routinely ignore, it is at least disclosed. That did not happen with the Adups software, Kryptowire said.

According to its website, Adups provides software to two of the largest cellphone manufacturers in the world, ZTE and Huawei. Both are based in China.

Samuel Ohev-Zion, the chief executive of the Florida-based BLU Products, said: "It was obviously something that we were not aware of. We moved very quickly to correct it."

He added that Adups had assured him that all of the information taken from BLU customers had been destroyed.

The software was written at the request of an unidentified Chinese manufacturer that wanted the ability to store call logs, text messages and other data, according to the Adups document. Adups said the Chinese company used the data for customer support.

Ms. Lim said the software was intended to help the Chinese client identify junk text messages and calls. She did not identify the company that requested it and said she did not know how many phones were affected. She said phone companies, not Adups, were responsible for disclosing privacy policies to users. "Adups was just there to provide functionality that the phone distributor asked for," she said.

Android phones run software that is developed by Google and distributed free for phone manufacturers to customize. A Google official said the company had told Adups to remove the surveillance ability from phones that run services like the Google Play store. That would not include devices in China, where hundreds of millions of people use Android phones but where Google does not operate because of censorship concerns.

Because Adups has not published a list of affected phones, it is not clear how users can determine whether their phones are vulnerable. "People who have some technical skills could," Mr. Karygiannis, the Kryptowire vice president, said. "But the average consumer? No."

Ms. Lim said she did not know how customers could determine whether they were affected.

Adups also provides what it calls "big data" services to help companies study their customers, "to know better about them, about what they like and what they use and where they come from and what they prefer to provide better service," according to its website.

Kryptowire discovered the problem through a combination of happenstance and curiosity. A researcher there bought an inexpensive phone, the BLU R1 HD, for a trip overseas. While setting up the phone, he noticed unusual network activity, Mr. Karygiannis said. Over the next week, analysts noticed that the phone was transmitting text messages to a server in Shanghai and was registered to Adups, according to a Kryptowire report.

Kryptowire took its findings to the United States government. It plans to make its report public as early as Tuesday.

Marsha Catron, a spokeswoman for the Department of Homeland Security, said the agency "was recently made aware of the concerns discovered by Kryptowire and is working with our public and private sector partners to identify appropriate mitigation strategies."

Kryptowire is a Homeland Security contractor but analyzed the BLU phone independent of that contract.

Mr. Ohev-Zion, the BLU chief executive, said he was confident that the problem had been resolved for his customers. "Today there is no BLU device that is collecting that information," he said.

Adam Goldman contributed reporting.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2016 1:02 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE:

Sure

----- Original message -----

From: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/15/2016 12:51 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted]
Subject: RE:

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Can I forward to dd to ask Randy/cyd if they had heard anything about this?

----- Original message -----

From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/15/2016 11:41 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)"
[redacted]
Subject:

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

You hear anything about this?
<http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/11/dnc-told-fbi-it-may-have-been-bugged>

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Accepted: Meet re
Location: FBIHQ 4012

Start: Monday, November 21, 2016 4:30 PM
End: Monday, November 21, 2016 5:30 PM

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Accepted

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Required Attendees: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

b7E -4

When: Nov 21, 2016 9:30:00 PM
Where: FBIHQ 4012

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Accepted; Meet re outline
Location: Pete's office

Start: Friday, November 18, 2016 1:00 PM
End: Friday, November 18, 2016 2:00 PM

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Accepted

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Required Attendees: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

When: Nov 18, 2016 6:00:00 PM
Where: Pete's office

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 18, 2016 2:43 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] (WF) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DOJ - 4 PETT Members Named

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -4, 13

Thanks

[redacted] Thx

----- Original message -----

From: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/18/2016 2:41 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: DOJ - 4 PETT Members Named

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FYSA.

----- Original message -----

From: "Grigg, Gervais C. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 11/18/2016 2:28 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "McCabe, Andrew G. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Castor, Andrew J. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Drolshagen, Rainer S. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] (TADD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Grigg, Gervais C. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Haley, Richard L. (FD) (FBI)" [redacted] (FD) (FBI)" [redacted] (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: DOJ - 4 PETT Members Named

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS//PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT
SENSITIVE INFORMATION

NO ACTION REQUIRED
FOR YOUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Sirs,

We have the first four (4) Initial President Elect Transition Team (PETT) names assigned to the DOJ.

1. Brian Benczkowski - Former DOJ
2. Greg Katsas - Former DOJ
3. Zina Bash - Former Supreme Court Clerk, Congressional Staffer
4. James Burnham - DC law firm of Jones Day

These four were introduced by AAG Lee Lofthus during the 1pm Executive Officer/Transition meeting today at DOJ who indicated additional names (up to possibly 10 total) are anticipated.

The four met with the AG and DAG today and have space at DOJ. They are anticipated to begin by receiving high level DOJ overviews and budget briefings next week followed by requests to meet with individual components over the next few weeks.

The PETT will publish their schedule to DOJ of which agencies they want to meet with and on what issues. Agencies should be prepared but contact may not be for days or weeks.

However, I spoke with AAG Lofthus who indicated the FBI should be ready which may telegraph an interest to meet with FBI as one of the first.

As we learn more about these individuals, get additional names and briefing/schedule requests we will advise.

G. (Gurvais) Clayton Grigg
Deputy Assistant Director

Presidential Transition Lead
FBI Director's Office
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED]

b6 -1
b7C -1

This communication is UNCLASSIFIED but may contain information that is Law Enforcement Sensitive and/or For Official Use Only. The contents of this communication are considered to be draft, deliberative, and pre-decisional in nature and are intended solely for the personal review of the captioned recipients.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2016 9:43 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Russian propaganda effort helped spread 'fake news' during election, experts say - The Washington Post

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/russian-propaganda-effort-helped-spread-fake-news-during-election-experts-say/2016/11/24/793903b6-8a40-4ca9-b712-716af66098fe_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_propaganda-8pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory

Russian propaganda effort helped spread 'fake news' during election, experts say

The flood of “fake news” this election season got support from a sophisticated Russian propaganda campaign that created and spread misleading articles online with the goal of punishing Democrat Hillary Clinton, helping Republican Donald Trump and undermining faith in American democracy, say independent researchers who tracked the operation.

Russia’s increasingly sophisticated propaganda machinery — including thousands of botnets, teams of paid human “trolls,” and networks of websites and social-media accounts — echoed and amplified right-wing sites across the Internet as they portrayed Clinton as a criminal hiding potentially fatal health problems and preparing to hand control of the nation to a shadowy cabal of global financiers. The effort also sought to heighten the appearance of international tensions and promote fear of looming hostilities with nuclear-armed Russia.

Two teams of independent researchers found that the Russians exploited American-made technology platforms to attack U.S. democracy at a particularly vulnerable moment, as an insurgent candidate harnessed a wide range of grievances to claim the White House. The sophistication of the Russian tactics may complicate efforts by [Facebook and Google](#) to crack down on “fake news,” as they have vowed to do after widespread complaints about the problem.

There is no way to know whether the Russian campaign proved decisive in electing Trump, but researchers portray it as part of a broadly effective strategy of sowing distrust in U.S. democracy and its leaders. The tactics included penetrating the computers of election officials in [several states](#) and releasing [troves of hacked emails](#) that embarrassed Clinton in the final months of her campaign.

“They want to essentially erode faith in the U.S. government or U.S. government interests,” said Clint Watts, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute who along with two other researchers has tracked Russian propaganda since 2014. “This was their standard mode during the Cold War. The problem is that this was hard to do before social media.”

How do fake news sites make money?

Play Video0:44

Washington Post reporter Caitlin Dewey talks about how fake news sites function and make money. (The Washington Post)

Watts’s report on this work, with colleagues Andrew Weisburd and J.M. Berger, appeared on the national security online magazine War on the Rocks this month under the headline [“Trilling for Trump: How Russia Is Trying to Destroy Our Democracy.”](#) Another group, called PropOrNot, a nonpartisan collection of researchers with foreign policy, military and technology backgrounds, planned to release its own findings Friday showing the startling reach and effectiveness of Russian propaganda campaigns.

The researchers used Internet analytics tools to trace the origins of particular tweets and mapped the connections among social-media accounts that consistently delivered synchronized messages. Identifying website codes sometimes revealed common

ownership. In other cases, exact phrases or sentences were echoed by sites and social-media accounts in rapid succession, signaling membership in connected networks controlled by a single entity.

PropOrNot's monitoring report, which was provided to The Washington Post in advance of its public release, identifies more than 200 websites as routine peddlers of Russian propaganda during the election season, with combined audiences of at least 15 million Americans. On Facebook, PropOrNot estimates that stories planted or promoted by the disinformation campaign were viewed more than 213 million times.

[Could better Internet security have prevented Trump's win?]

Some players in this online echo chamber were knowingly part of the propaganda campaign, the researchers concluded, while others were "useful idiots" — a term born of the Cold War to describe people or institutions that unknowingly assisted Soviet Union propaganda efforts.

How to spot fake news

Play Video 2:04

Consider these points before sharing an article on Facebook. It could be fake. (Monica Akhtar/The Washington Post)

The Russian campaign during this election season, researchers from both groups say, worked by harnessing the online world's fascination with "buzzy" content that is surprising and emotionally potent, and tracks with popular conspiracy theories about how secret forces dictate world events.

Some of these stories originated with RT and Sputnik, state-funded Russian information services that mimic the style and tone of independent news organizations yet sometimes include false and misleading stories in their reports, the researchers say. On other occasions, RT, Sputnik and other Russian sites used social-media accounts to amplify misleading stories already circulating online, causing news algorithms to identify them as "trending" topics that sometimes prompted coverage from mainstream American news organizations.

The speed and coordination of these efforts allowed Russian-backed phony news to outcompete traditional news organizations for audience. Some of the first and most alarming tweets after Clinton fell ill at a Sept. 11 memorial event in New York, for example, came from Russian botnets and trolls, researchers found. (She was treated for pneumonia and returned to the campaign trail a few days later.)

This followed a spate of other misleading stories in August about Clinton's supposedly troubled health. The Daily Beast debunked a particularly widely read piece in an article that reached 1,700 Facebook accounts and was read online more than 30,000 times. But the PropOrNot researchers found that the version supported by Russian propaganda reached 90,000 Facebook accounts and was read more than 8 million times. The researchers said the true Daily Beast story was like "shouting into a hurricane" of false stories supported by the Russians.

This propaganda machinery also helped push the phony story that an anti-Trump protester was paid thousands of dollars to participate in demonstrations, an allegation initially made by a self-described satirist and later repeated publicly by the Trump campaign. Researchers from both groups traced a variety of other false stories — fake reports of a coup launched at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and stories about how the United States was going to conduct a military attack and blame it on Russia — to Russian propaganda efforts.

[Facebook fake-news writer: 'I think Donald Trump is in the White House because of me']

The final weeks of the campaign featured a heavy dose of stories about supposed election irregularities, allegations of vote-rigging and the potential for Election Day violence should Clinton win, researchers said.

"The way that this propaganda apparatus supported Trump was equivalent to some massive amount of a media buy," said the executive director of PropOrNot, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid being targeted by Russia's legions of skilled hackers. "It was like Russia was running a super PAC for Trump's campaign. . . . It worked."

He and other researchers expressed concern that the U.S. government has few tools for detecting or combating foreign propaganda. They expressed hope that their research detailing the power of Russian propaganda would spur official action.

A former U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael A. McFaul, said he was struck by the overt support that RT and Sputnik expressed for Trump during the campaign, even using the #CrookedHillary hashtag pushed by the candidate.

McFaul said Russian propaganda typically is aimed at weakening opponents and critics. Trump's victory, though reportedly celebrated by Putin and his allies in Moscow, may have been an unexpected benefit of an operation that already had fueled division in the United States. "They don't try to win the argument," said McFaul, now director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. "It's to make everything seem relative. It's kind of an appeal to cynicism."

The Kremlin has repeatedly denied interfering in the U.S. election or hacking the accounts of election officials. "This is some sort of nonsense," Dmitry Peskov, press secretary for Putin, said last month when U.S. officials accused Russia of penetrating the computers of the Democratic National Committee and other political organizations.

The findings about the mechanics of Russian propaganda operations largely track previous research by the Rand Corp. and George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.

"They use our technologies and values against us to sow doubt," said Robert Ortung, a GWU professor who studies Russia. "It's starting to undermine our democratic system."

The [Rand report](#) — which dubbed Russian propaganda efforts a "firehose of falsehood" because of their speed, power and relentlessness — traced the country's current generation of online propaganda work to the 2008 incursion into neighboring Georgia, when Russia sought to blunt international criticism of its aggression by pushing alternative explanations online.

The same tactics, researchers said, helped Russia shape international opinions about its

The same tactics, researchers say, helped Russia shape international opinions about its 2014 annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in Syria, which started last year. Russian propaganda operations also worked to promote the “Brexit” departure of Britain from the European Union.

Another crucial moment, several researchers say, came in 2011 when the party of Russian President Vladimir Putin was accused of rigging elections, sparking protests that Putin blamed the Obama administration — and then-Secretary of State Clinton — for instigating.

Putin, a former KGB officer, announced his desire to “break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on the global information streams” during a 2013 visit to the broadcast center for RT, formerly known as Russia Today.

“For them, it’s actually a real war, an ideological war, this clash between two systems,” said Sufian Zhemukhov, a former Russian journalist conducting research at GWU. “In their minds, they’re just trying to do what the West does to Russia.”

RT broadcasts news reports worldwide in several languages, but the most effective way it reaches U.S. audiences is online.

Its English-language flagship YouTube channel, launched in 2007, has 1.85 million subscribers and has had a total of 1.8 billion views, making it more widely viewed than CNN’s YouTube channel, according to a George Washington University report this month.

Economy & Business Alerts

Breaking news about economic and business issues.

Though widely seen as a propaganda organ, the Russian site has gained credibility with some American conservatives. Trump sat for an interview with RT in September. His nominee for national security adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, traveled to Russia last year for a gala sponsored by the network. He later compared it to CNN.

The content from Russian sites has offered ready fodder for U.S.-based websites pushing far-right conservative messages. A former contractor for one, the Next News

Network, said he was instructed by the site's founder, Gary S. Franchi Jr., to weave together reports from traditional sources such as the Associated Press and the Los Angeles Times with ones from RT, Sputnik and others that provided articles that often spread explosively online.

"The readers are more likely to share the fake stories, and they're more profitable," said Dyan Bermeo, who said he helped assemble scripts and book guests for Next News Network before leaving because of a pay dispute and concerns that "fake news" was crowding out real news.

In just the past 90 days — a period that has included the closing weeks of the campaign, Election Day and its aftermath — the YouTube audience of Next News Network has jumped from a few hundred thousand views a day to a few million, according to analytics firm [Tubular Labs](#). In October alone, videos from Next News Network were viewed more than 56 million times.

Franchi said in an e-mail statement that Next News Network seeks "a global perspective" while providing commentary aimed at U.S. audiences, especially with regard to Russian military activity. "Understanding the threat of global war is the first step to preventing it," he said, "and we feel our coverage assisted in preventing a possible World War 3 scenario."

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 02, 2016 1:38 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: WSJ Devlin story
Attachments: WSJ Last Diplomat.docx

----- Original message -----

From: "Quinn, Richard P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 12/02/2016 1:35 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: WSJ Devlin story

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Pete,

As discussed,

Rich

Richard P. Quinn
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Media/Investigative Publicity

[redacted] (o)
[redacted] (m)

b6 -1
b7C -1

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
Date: 12/02/2016 12:01 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Quinn, Richard P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted]
[redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: WSJ Devlin story

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Adding an attachment with the story

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 02, 2016 11:32 AM
To: Quinn, Richard P. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI)
[redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: WSJ Devlin story

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

WSJ story is up.

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-last-diplomat-1480695454>

As Robin Raphel worked for the State Department in Pakistan, her brand of traditional diplomacy ran into the new realities of covert surveillance. The collision turned her life upside down

BY ADAM ENTOUS AND DEVLIN BARRETT

BEGINNINGS THE COMEBACK THE INVESTIGATION THE AFTERMATH

Just before 8 on the morning of Oct. 21, 2014, Robin Raphel climbed into her Ford Focus, put her purple briefcase on the passenger's seat and began the 20-minute drive from her house in Washington to her office at the State Department.

It was a routine Tuesday. The main event on her schedule was a staff meeting.

Raphel swiped her badge at the revolving security door and headed to her office where she placed her briefcase on the floor and sat down to check her email. Later, as she joined her colleagues in a conference room to discuss office schedules, her mobile phone, which she had left at her desk, began to ring. It was Slomin's Home Security.

When she didn't pick up, the operator called her daughter Alexandra, who raced to the house to check the doors and windows. When Raphel returned to her desk, the phone rang again. It was Alexandra, in a panic.

Burglars hadn't set off the alarm. It was the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Raphel grabbed her purse and ran out. She left behind her purple briefcase—one she had bought at the Kohsar Market in Islamabad—with a bag of carrots and a Rubbermaid container full of celery sticks inside.

As she pulled up to her yellow-brick house, Raphel saw agents going in and out the front door, walking across the oriental rugs she had trundled back from tours in South Asia. They boxed up her two computers, Alexandra's iPad and everything else electronic. In the basement, they opened the drawers of a mahogany file cabinet she had picked up during a posting in London. They pulled out a stack of files.

The agents, without saying a word, carried the boxes out to a white van.

Raphel, unsure of what was happening, paced in circles on her front porch.

Two FBI agents approached her, their faces stony. "Do you know any foreigners?" they asked.

Raphel's jaw dropped. She had served as a diplomat in six capitals on four continents. She had been an ambassador, and the State Department's assistant secretary for South Asian affairs. Knowing foreigners had been her job.

"Of course," she responded, "Tons . . . Hundreds."

Three weeks before the FBI raided her house, Raphel had touched down at Benazir Bhutto International Airport in Islamabad. The city was in an anxious, turbulent state. Antigovernment protesters had closed off so many streets that her driver had to take a roundabout route to the diplomatic quarter.

All summer, U.S. intelligence agencies had been intercepting rumors from Pakistani officials about a possible coup. Alarm bells were ringing in the State Department's office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Raphel worked, and went all the way to the White House. She had come to figure out what was really going on.

In her apartment at the embassy, she found a bottle of wine—a welcoming gift from U.S. Ambassador Richard Olson, who was thankful for her help in an uncertain time.

At a dinner party at the home of an American diplomat in Islamabad's elite E-7 sector, Raphel and a group of Pakistani politicians pulled their seats into a circle in the living room to discuss the rumors. One parliamentarian said he was bullish on the idea of the populist opposition leader Imran Khan taking power. A former Pakistan ambassador to Washington countered that Khan had moved too soon and predicted the sitting prime minister would survive.

With students at Damavand College in Tehran, 1971 With Arnold Raphel at cocktail party in Islamabad, 1975 Departing Seattle for Iran, 1967 High school graduation photo. With Arnold Raphel in Skardu, Pakistan





Before leaving, Raphael reported her findings to the ambassador. Pakistan was prone to coup talk, she knew, but she didn't believe the current conditions were right for an overthrow of the government. In the end, she was correct: The rumors had been overblown. Khan's followers would soon disperse, and Nawaz Sharif would remain prime minister. She had flown home considering her trip productive.

Over a four-decade career in the foreign service, whether in Islamabad, London, Pretoria, New Delhi or Tunis, Raphael had distinguished herself by building vast networks of contacts. She had spent as much time as she could outside the embassy, rubbing shoulders with politicians, military officers, journalists, aid workers and spies over teas, lunches and endless cocktail parties. Sources felt they could talk to her—that she understood them.

Nowhere was that more true than in Islamabad, where she had started her diplomatic career. "I could go to Robin and say, 'does this member of parliament matter?'" said Cameron Munter, who took over as U.S. ambassador to Pakistan in 2010. "She knew them all."

There was a downside to being trusted in a country that many of her colleagues in Washington loathed. Those who took a dimmer view of Pakistan, especially in intelligence circles, were suspicious of Raphael's close connections in Islamabad. They believed she had become too close to the Pakistanis and that she was being used.

In moments when the two countries were at odds, Raphael had consistently argued against pulling up the drawbridge. In conference calls with Washington, her co-workers said, she would always say: "Let's look at it from their point of view." As early as the mid-1990s, intelligence officers saw her as an obstacle to isolating Pakistan over its nuclear program.

"For better or worse, she got a reputation within the intelligence community as tilting towards the Pakistanis, and she could never escape that," said Bruce Riedel, a CIA veteran who served as deputy assistant secretary of Defense for the Near East and South Asia in the 1990s.

Unbeknownst to Raphael, as she had made her rounds in Islamabad in the fall of 2014, and spoke to contacts on the phone and on Skype, law-enforcement officials half a world away had been listening. Raphael's old-fashioned way of doing business—working outside the confines of the embassy compound—had run headlong into the realities of America's global surveillance web, on which the U.S. had increasingly come to depend.

Since receiving a tip from an intercepted communication months earlier, the FBI had obtained warrants to monitor Raphael's private accounts and to secretly search her home. They had transcribed information she had discussed with Pakistanis and taken it to intelligence officials, who had told them the topics were beyond her security clearance. The message, according to a former senior intelligence official, was that "Robin needs to shut up."

What they heard during her trip to Islamabad had been the final straw. Law enforcement officials said the people listening were convinced Raphael was a threat to national security.

The following account of the FBI investigation of Raphael is based on interviews with dozens of her co-workers, Pakistani contacts, intelligence officials, law enforcement officers and attorneys involved in the case.

PART I BEGINNINGS

When she landed in Tehran in 1970 to teach at a women's college, Robin Lynn Johnson was 23, a native of the small lumber town of Longview, Wash., whose curiosity about the world had grown from reading her father's collection of National Geographic magazines and historical novels. With blond hair, high cheekbones and a posture honed through years of ballet, she sometimes drew comparisons to the actress Candice Bergen.

There, she met Arnold Raphel, a political officer at the U.S. embassy. Arnold stood 6-foot-1, a full head taller than Robin. He wore aviator-style wire-rim glasses with conservative suits, giving him a perpetually serious look, though he was anything but. Wherever he went, a party seemed to erupt.

Tehran was in the throes of an oil boom and the young couple spent their nights dancing on the wraparound porch at the Naderi hotel, where the city's elite turned out in the latest Paris fashions. In 1972, when Robin was 25, she married Arnold on the grounds of the U.S. embassy, which, just eight years later, would be overrun by followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini.



Raphel's wedding to Arnold Raphel in Tehran in 1972.

Posted to Islamabad in 1975, the Raphels were prolific entertainers, former colleagues remembered. Over cocktails and private screenings of American movies flown in by the U.S. military, they began to unravel Pakistan's social and political dynamics. It was then that Raphel started to get a sense of what a confusing place Pakistan could be.

Islamabad wasn't an easy place for diplomats to operate, much less comprehend. Double talk reigned—to the point where even veterans of the game couldn't tell who was pulling the strings, or who was manipulating whom. Because most high-ranking officials there spoke English, many diplomats from both sides "made the mistake of thinking we're speaking the same language, when we are not," said Marc Grossman, who served in Islamabad with the Raphels in the 1970s. "Sometimes we live on entirely different planets."

When the Raphels returned to Washington in 1978, Robin wanted to have children. Arnold, who had a daughter whom he rarely saw from his first marriage, did not. They divorced in 1982.

Six years later, Arnold, who returned to Pakistan as the U.S. ambassador, was killed in a mysterious plane crash with then-Pakistani President Muhammad Zia al-Haq.

Though she married twice after Arnold and had two daughters, Raphael never changed her name. She told colleagues that this was how everyone knew her professionally. Because of Arnold's stature, the Raphael name carried huge prestige in Pakistan. One of Raphael's oldest friends said he thought she kept the name because "Arnie was the love of her life."

In 1993, President Bill Clinton, an acquaintance from her university days, tapped Raphael to serve as the nation's first assistant secretary of State for South Asian affairs. Eighteen years after she first arrived in Islamabad as the young wife of a diplomat, Raphael found herself at the center of the action.

During her first trip to Islamabad as assistant secretary, Raphael visited the Foreign Ministry, a whitewashed building surrounded by manicured lawns. There she met a woman named Malecha Lodhi, who had just been named Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S.



Malecha Lodhi

Lodhi met Raphael in 1993 after she was tapped to serve as Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S. for the first time. Raphael and Lodhi turned to each other, on and off, for information. In 2014, the FBI became suspicious of their relationship. Photo: Alex Wong/Getty Images

Raphael already knew *of* Lodhi—she was the founding editor of *The News*, a prominent English-language paper in Pakistan, where her front-page foreign policy columns had made her a star.

At her home in Islamabad, Lodhi fostered a salon-like atmosphere where politicians, intellectuals and journalists listened to music and debated the news long into the night. Pakistan's new prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, would sometimes make an appearance. Raphael's colleagues from the U.S. embassy, who attended some of these sessions, had concluded, based on the assembled guests, that Lodhi was a serious player.

Lodhi wasn't from one of the prominent families that typically produced the country's top leaders. She learned English from Irish nuns at a convent in Rawalpindi, where she grew up in an upper middle class home, the daughter of an oil company executive. She made her way to England, where she studied at the London School of Economics. Tim Carney, who served as Raphael's deputy, said he always knew where he could find Lodhi at parties—outside in the middle of a boisterous crowd, smoking Cartier cigarettes.

Lodhi was drawn to Raphael. She knew that Raphael's State Department title and her position as a friend of President Clinton would be useful to her in navigating Washington.

Raphel found Lodhi to be intelligent, ambitious and serious—if a bit reserved. She also recognized her as someone who would be a longtime influencer.

“Pakistan is a country of 200 million people. But its leadership is like a deck of cards,” said Husain Haqqani, the former Pakistani ambassador to Washington. “However you shuffle them, the same 52 people will show up in one hand or another. Robin understood that.”

Lodhi’s ambassadorial residence in Washington was a short walk from a Ritz-Carlton Hotel, where she liked to meet Raphel and other friends next to the lobby fireplace. Lodhi was 10 years younger than Raphel but the two women had a lot in common. Like Raphel, Lodhi was a single mother—she had married a Pakistani civil servant at 25 and divorced five years later. Both had strong opinions and didn’t hesitate to share them, and were climbing the rungs of power in a profession dominated by men.

In 1995, Congress took up the Brown Amendment, a piece of legislation that would begin to ease nuclear sanctions it had imposed on Pakistan. The two women joined forces in a monthslong lobbying campaign to support it.

For Lodhi, the bill’s passage helped build her credibility as a diplomat. Raphel considered the victory to be one of the signature accomplishments of her time as assistant secretary—but it also came at a price. The Brown Amendment, which President Clinton supported, had not been popular with some U.S. intelligence officials, who believed the U.S. should isolate Pakistan to pressure its leaders to end its nuclear program. Raphel took the brunt of the backlash.

Not long after the amendment passed, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott sent an aide to Raphel’s office with a disturbing message.

According to officials, the aide told Raphel U.S. spy agencies had intercepted communications in which Pakistani officials suggested that Raphel had revealed sensitive information to them about what the U.S. knew about Pakistan’s nuclear work. U.S. intelligence officials said the information was classified and the disclosure wasn’t authorized.

Raphel denied disclosing too much. She consulted with top officials at the State Department’s internal intelligence branch, who recommended she ask Diplomatic Security—the security and law enforcement arm of the State Department—to investigate the matter.

Diplomatic Security agents interviewed Raphel about the alleged disclosures. They found no evidence of wrongdoing and took no disciplinary action against her. But Raphel was rattled.

To provide “insurance” in case the allegations re-emerged, she later told friends, she took the relevant records, including papers marked as classified, and put them in her safe at the State Department.



Raphael, dressed for the Marine Ball in Islamabad, in 1975.

In 2003, Raphael took a posting in Baghdad, where she helped steer Iraq's postwar reconstruction in the teeth of a violent insurgency. She would don a head scarf and jump into local taxis to see Iraqi officials, or drive to meetings alone in her SUV.

"Robin was the type that did what she knew had to be done and asked for forgiveness later," said retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, one of her bosses in Iraq. "She lived on the edge but she never fell off."

After two years of working on Iraq, Raphael had seen the insurgency hollow out much of the work the U.S. had done. She decided it was time to leave the State Department.

On the day before her 2005 retirement ceremony—which was held in the State Department's Treaty Room—Raphael packed her books, mementos and photographs into boxes, along with the contents of her office safe, and took them home.

The next day, after the toasts and speeches had ended, Raphael had a plane to catch. She was due to appear at a conference in Dubai. She went to the basement and opened her mahogany file cabinet. She dumped the papers inside.

Raphael came from a generation of diplomats whose approach to the job had been honed in a different time. America's presence in the world was changing.

Since 9/11, security concerns abroad had forced diplomats in volatile parts of the world to spend more time cooped up in fortified embassies. The volume of "human intelligence" or "humint" they gathered by talking to contacts began to decline. In its place, policy makers in Washington turned to another form of information—the kind collected electronically and surreptitiously.

To monitor foreign governments around the world, the U.S. uses satellites and ground-based sensors implanted in local communications networks that sweep electronic communications and reroute them to the U.S. Most of this information, known as "signals intelligence," or "sigint," is funneled into a steel and glass building 25 miles north of the State Department in Fort Meade, Md., the headquarters of the National Security Agency.

The Urdu-speaking analysts who covered Pakistan at the NSA sat in cubicles and worked in shifts listening to audio files that stacked up in queues on their computer screens like emails. To help them follow the conversations on their headphones, sound waves bounced on their screens. The analysts tracked political, military and economic developments in Pakistan, just like the diplomats, but by targeting the email addresses and phone numbers of senior officials, many of whom were also Raphael's contacts. If they heard something of intelligence value, analysts wrote summaries that were compiled into signals-intelligence reports and disseminated to senior policy makers.



Raphel greeted Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Maleeha Lodhi stands on the stairs of the plane.

Making sense of these conversations wasn't easy, especially in Pakistan. U.S. analysts who covered the region often felt as if they had entered a hall of mirrors. The cryptic and deceptive nature of talk between Pakistani officials—who often knew they were being monitored—made it difficult to understand the context or judge the veracity of what they were saying.

Often, U.S. diplomats would read signals-intelligence reports and realize the Pakistanis were misreporting what Americans had told them, either because the messages were unclear, mistranslated or simply misunderstood—or because they were twisting them on purpose for professional or political reasons.

Among Pakistani diplomats, “The desire to tell your bosses what they want to hear is overwhelming,” said Haqqani, the former Pakistani ambassador.

As the NSA's techniques grew more sophisticated, and as the business of government increasingly shifted to email and mobile phones, the volume and quality of the intercepts grew. The information in these reports was so immediate and uninhibited—and often so salacious—senior officials could hardly wait to read them. In the four decades since Raphel joined the State Department, and especially during the Obama administration, officials say, the U.S. government's reliance on signals intelligence had grown to the point where it made up anywhere from 60% to 75% of the information coming in. And yet it was impossible to know how much of it was reliable.

“You always have to be careful because you’re listening to a conversation. You aren’t listening to testimony. You aren’t listening to a brief that’s fully thought out,” said former NSA Director Michael Hayden. “You are trying to determine truth from a conversation that is oblique, indirect and casual, often in a language not your own and in a culture that you do not share.”

In 2009, as the Obama administration stepped up its drone war in Pakistan’s tribal areas, a staging ground for militants to launch cross-border attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan and to plot against the West, the embassy’s clandestine function became the top priority.

Four years into her retirement, Raphel was working as a lobbyist in Washington. Settled at home, with three ill-fated marriages behind her, she had more free time to spend with her two college-age daughters, Alexandra and Anna, and to take long walks with friends along the towpath in Georgetown.

She enjoyed her down time but had grown tired of scaring up clients and tracking billable hours as a lobbyist.

In the spring of 2009, when she was 61, Raphel attended a cocktail party in Washington where she bumped into an old friend: Anne Patterson, the sitting U.S. ambassador to Pakistan. When the subject turned to Patterson’s work at the embassy, Patterson told Raphel she didn’t have enough people who really understood Pakistan’s complexities. Patterson often told aides that Islamabad was the “weirdest” place she had ever served.



Anne Patterson

Ambassador Patterson ran into Raphel at a dinner party in Washington in 2009 and asked her to join her team at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad. Patterson held up Raphel as a model to more junior foreign-service officers because of her long list of Pakistani contacts. Photo: Daniel Acker/Bloomberg News

Pakistan had also become a more dangerous place for diplomats. One year earlier, terrorists had detonated a dump truck full of explosives at the Marriott Hotel, killing more than 50 people and carving a 60-foot crater in the ground. Much of Patterson’s time as ambassador had been devoted to overseeing the CIA’s covert drone strikes on militant targets.

The State Department’s Diplomatic Security service, charged with protecting the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, had grown so concerned about terrorism that the compound was often put on lockdown. Fewer embassy workers ventured out and usually only then in U.S. armored vehicles. For security reasons, the State Department had begun to limit foreign-service officers in Islamabad to one-year tours, giving them

barely enough time to acclimate before shipping out. Many officials spent their time in a secure room reading signals-intelligence reports or working on their suntans by the pool.

Patterson knew Raphel wasn't one for the "Fortress America" style of diplomacy that had taken root after 9/11, in which monitoring for threats was the top priority. Patterson needed someone to help manage billions of dollars in U.S. aid money aimed at shoring up the country's new civilian-led government—someone who could open doors and who had deep connections within the country's power structure. She asked Raphel if she would consider coming back.

Raphel liked the idea of serving her country again and asked Patterson for time to think.

She called one of her oldest friends from the State Department, Beth Jones, to ask her advice. "Go for it," said Jones, who added that it sounded like an opportunity to do "things that really mattered." A few days later, Raphel accepted the job.

PART 2 THE COMEBACK

In August 2009, Raphel moved into a white, two-story stucco house on First Street in Islamabad's F-6 neighborhood.

Like every house on First Street, it was built in the 1960s, when Pakistan laid out its capital. It had a high security wall topped with shards of glass. Unlike most other houses, however, it also had bars on the windows.

What the house lacked in curb appeal, it made up for in proximity. The outdoor cafés of the Kohsar Market, where Pakistan's political class gathered in the evenings to trade conspiracy theories over fruit drinks and sandwiches, were a five-minute walk.

After settling in, Raphel went to a website that specialized in inexpensive, refurbished right-hand drive Japanese cars and purchased a silver Toyota—a kind that is ubiquitous in Pakistan. She figured it wouldn't stand out and that she could use it to roam the city freely.

Dressed in a long traditional Pakistani tunic known as a kameez, worn over a pair of loose, lightweight trousers, or shalwar, she would drive herself to party after party in Islamabad, something few of her embassy colleagues would ever do. One of her bosses referred to her as "the last of the Mohicans."

In the 1990s, when she was the State Department's assistant secretary for South Asian affairs, Raphel had been the one shaping U.S. policy on Pakistan. Now, her superiors in Washington, many of whom were much younger and didn't know the country as well as she did, were calling the shots.



Raphael in Tunisia in 1997.

In Islamabad, however, the power players had barely changed and she fell quickly back into the whirl. In the evenings, she would huddle with local journalists at café tables in the Kohsar Market. One day she would meet with Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the powerful army chief, to talk about aid projects, then fly to Lahore or Karachi to sit down with television talk-show hosts, bureaucrats and businessmen the next, all with a level of informality and directness that came from spending so many years in the country.

By the end of her last tour there, Raphael had become such a ubiquitous figure, and so widely trusted, that many Pakistani officials mistakenly believed she outranked the ambassador. “You weren’t talking to a U.S. diplomat,” explained Abid Hasan, a former World Bank official in Islamabad. “You were talking to Robin.”

In Islamabad, Raphael’s job was to focus on aid projects. But she also “delivered the mail,” as State Department officials say, for other diplomats who didn’t have her level of access. In that informal role, co-workers recalled, Raphael was sometimes asked to raise issues that went beyond her remit.

The NSA regularly swept up Pakistani communications “to, from or about” senior U.S. officials working in the country. Some American officials would appear in Pakistani intercepts as often as once a week. What Raphael didn’t realize was that her desire to engage with foreign officials, the very skill set her supervisors encouraged, had put a target on her back.

As Raphael settled into Islamabad, she was reunited with Maleeha Lodhi, and the two women fell back into their working friendship. Once again, Lodhi became one of Raphael’s best contacts, and Raphael in turn became one of Lodhi’s.

Lodhi was out of government. She had returned to the news business, writing a regular column and appearing as a commentator on Pakistani television. American officials said they had no doubt that Lodhi was more than an ordinary journalist, however.


In her six years in Washington as Pakistan’s ambassador, Lodhi had earned a reputation as a reliable source for what Pakistani officials were thinking, and in particular, as a trusted conduit for relaying messages to Pakistan’s senior military leadership in Rawalpindi, U.S. officials said. She was, in State Department parlance, an “influencer.” One reason U.S. officials trusted her: The NSA had long been monitoring her communications.

Pakistani officials with ties to Lodhi said the Americans exaggerated her influence. They said she was a journalist first, not a go-between. If she picked up something interesting in a conversation, she would occasionally share it with her Pakistani military contacts, but only if they reached out to her.

“Yes, she was in this game of information,” one of the officials said. “American diplomats would ask her, ‘What’s the thinking here?’ Others would ask, ‘What do you think the Americans will do next?’ ”

When Raphael and Lodhi met, Lodhi would take notes. Officials close to her said they were for her newspaper columns. The Americans said the notes were for reports she would send to government and military officials. Raphael, always concerned with maintaining informality, kept her notebook in her purse, and scribbled down information once she got back to her car.

Raphael’s boss was Richard Holbrooke, who had been named to a new role in the State Department—the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, or SRAP. Holbrooke encouraged his team of advisers to embrace “creative chaos,” work through informal channels and bypass government bureaucracy to get things accomplished.



Richard Holbrooke

A diplomatic troubleshooter who sought to forge a political solution to the war in Afghanistan, Holbrooke encouraged his advisers to work outside established diplomatic channels. Photo: Susan Walsh/Associated Press

U.S. intelligence officials had always chafed at the way the State Department handled sensitive information. They long suspected Pakistani diplomats in Washington tried to pry information out of the SRAP office, viewing it as more forthcoming than other departments—a charge SRAP officials deny. From the perspective of intelligence agencies, including the FBI, the very existence of the Holbrooke team, working outside regular channels, “was a disaster waiting to happen,” said one former law-enforcement official.

After Cameron Munter took over as the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan in 2010, the competing forces of intelligence and diplomacy began to collide. When Munter pushed the CIA to be more “judicious” in its drone strikes in the tribal areas, the CIA’s station chief responded by telling diplomats not to discuss the drone program even in private meetings with senior Pakistani officials. If asked, he told them, they should change the subject.

Senior diplomats in Islamabad knew this was impossible. The drone program came up all the time. There was no way to avoid the topic.

Raphel didn’t know the key details because her Top Secret clearance didn’t include access to the “compartment” that covered the covert program. When her Pakistani contacts complained about the strikes, Raphel told them what other diplomats would say—that the U.S. wouldn’t need to do so many if the Pakistani army did more to rein in militants in the tribal areas, according to people she spoke with.

She would argue drones caused less collateral damage than the alternatives: American ground troops, Pakistani artillery strikes or F-16 bombing runs.

The populist politician Imran Khan, the loudest advocate in Pakistan against the drone program, said he had two sit-downs with Raphel in which he protested the strikes and that Raphel came across as “sympathetic” to his concerns. “I actually didn’t know what her position was, but I thought that I could make her understand me,” he said.

In December 2010, Holbrooke died of a torn aorta. In his absence, hard-liners in Washington who saw Pakistan as the enemy worked to undo many of his team’s efforts, officials said.

The deaths of two Pakistanis at the hands of a CIA contractor inflamed tensions between the countries. Then, in May of 2011, U.S. commandos violated Pakistani airspace during a mission that killed Osama bin Laden, setting off a new furor.

With the CIA's influence growing larger, and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship crashing down around her, Raphael urged the State Department to keep working hard to maintain strong ties. "Everyone else wanted to take a hard line against the Pakistanis," Munter remembered. "She was saying, 'We want to salvage what we can because it is so important.' "

As she managed the U.S. aid program, Raphael spent little time in her embassy office. Sometimes she would leave her calendars and other papers on her desk instead of locking them away for the night. Marines who policed the embassy for security infractions cited her for these lapses. After three citations, Raphael received a reprimand from the State Department. Though it was a boilerplate letter many diplomats receive, and represented the lowest level of sanction the department could take, its language sounded ominous to outsiders. It went in her personnel file.

With Afghan Foreign Minister Amin Arsala, Kabul, 1993 Raphael after flight in training aircraft in Tunisia, 1998 With Pakistani interim Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi, Indian Ambassador Siddhartha Shankar Ray and Indian Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, Washington, 1993 Beside a fallen statue from Saddam Hussein's palace, Baghdad, 2004 With Nelson Mandela in Tunis, 1999





10

After the bin Laden raid, Raphel emerged as one of the few U.S. diplomats the Pakistanis were still eager to talk to. As Pakistanis scaled back contacts with American officials, “doors would still open for her,” said Mushahid Hussain Sayed, a prominent Pakistani senator.

As her tour in Islamabad was nearing its end, then-President Asif Ali Zardari invited Raphel to his residence for a private dinner, a signal he was ready to re-engage after the bin Laden raid. Munter, the ambassador, wasn’t invited.

After two years in Pakistan, the deterioration in relations made it harder to get aid projects done. Raphel was offered a new post in Washington as an adviser to Marc Grossman, who had replaced Holbrooke. Her new job was to collect political intelligence on Pakistan and help explain U.S. policy to officials there.

Before Raphel’s frequent trips to Islamabad, Grossman’s team would sit down with her to create a detailed itinerary of whom she would see and what she would tell them, her friend and diplomatic colleague Beth Jones recalled. Despite her past experience, Raphel had been excluded from the White House’s secret talks with the Afghan Taliban, and when high-level meetings took place at the Pakistan embassy, she wasn’t invited.

In Islamabad, the dynamics were different. Many Pakistanis still considered her to be the central player she was in the 1990s. Some of Raphel’s friends complained about the Obama administration’s approach to Pakistan. They thought Raphel was the one who should be formulating U.S. policy. The NSA picked up Lodhi and others criticizing Raphel’s superiors, officials said.

Though she scheduled her official meetings through the embassy and typically brought a note-taker, Raphel had fewer people to check in with and fewer constraints on her movements. She usually reported what she learned to a small number of senior State Department officials in informal emails that weren’t widely disseminated.

Some of the regular U.S. embassy diplomatic staffers, more isolated than ever, resented Raphel’s easy access. They seized on the old complaint that she was too quick to see things from Pakistan’s perspective. Over drinks at the American Bar at the embassy, said a senior official who worked there during Raphel’s final tour, “they badmouthed her. She was disrupting their comfort zone and they didn’t like it and they assumed she was doing something wrong.”

On Nov. 26, 2011, U.S. forces in Afghanistan accidentally attacked two Pakistani military checkpoints along the Afghan border, killing about two dozen Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan responded by blocking the Pentagon from using land routes to resupply U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan demanded an apology. The White House refused.

Raphel was exasperated. She couldn’t believe the U.S. would risk its relationship with Pakistan by failing to acknowledge what had clearly been a mistake. “We have to do this,” she would tell senior officials.

In January, in an email to her boss, Raphel wrote that in Pakistan, “The lack of a U.S. apology for the 24 dead still rankles very deeply.”

During her trips to Islamabad, Raphel was often more candid about her views with Pakistani officials, whom she felt comfortable confiding in, several of her colleagues said.

Raphel knew what intelligence analysts did at the NSA. She knew that when they swept up phone calls and emails from the Pakistanis she met with, they might see accounts of the things she had said. Some of

her co-workers say she should have realized that her private comments would be reported by the Pakistanis and potentially twisted. They figured she might get in trouble for this.

They didn't think anyone would accuse her of espionage.

PART 3 THE INVESTIGATION

As Raphael settled back into her house in Northwest Washington in 2011, spy fears at home had soared to heights not seen since the Cold War. After an Army intelligence analyst leaked thousands of classified diplomatic cables, the White House issued an executive order establishing a governmentwide program to deter and detect "insider threats."

President Barack Obama gave U.S. spy agencies and the FBI a one-year deadline to put the crackdown into motion.

By the time Edward Snowden leaked classified documents detailing the NSA's global operations in 2013, the pressure to catch government moles had increased exponentially, former FBI officials say. The bureau was eager to bring cases.

Hunting for spies and moles had long been one of the FBI's most secretive, time consuming, complex and unpopular assignments. Many of the bureau's counterintelligence agents worked out of a field office in Washington, in specially designed spy-proof rooms without internet access where they read the daily bounty of signals intelligence for anything that suggests an American shared classified information.

When analysts at the NSA heard chatter about classified information, they would send the FBI what is known as an "811 referral." Of the hundreds of these referrals the bureau receives in a year, its agents typically investigate one in five.

In February 2013, according to law-enforcement officials, the FBI received information that made its agents think Raphael might be a Pakistani mole.

The tip came in the form of intercepted communications that suggested Raphael had shared sensitive inside information without authorization. Two officials said this included information collected on wiretaps of Pakistani officials in the U.S.

Two FBI agents—a man and a woman—were assigned to investigate. Both were experienced in so-called "65 work," FBI-speak for espionage cases. One of the agents had past experience investigating alleged Pakistani spying. The other had done 65 work involving Israel.

Investigators began what they call "circling the target," which means examining the parts of Raphael's life they could explore without subpoenas or warrants. Sitting in their cubicles on the fourth floor of the FBI's Washington Field Office, a modern sandstone-colored building on the edge of Chinatown, the agents began to map her network of contacts and search for signs of disloyalty.

One of the first things they looked at was her "metadata"—the electronic traces of who she called or emailed, and also when and for how long. Her metadata showed she was in frequent contact with a host of Pakistan officials that didn't seem to match what the FBI believed was her rank and role.

The agents didn't talk to the State Department officials who oversaw Raphael's work. Instead, they approached the head of Diplomatic Security, Gregory Starr, to gain access to her personnel files and other records. Starr, in turn, kept State Department leaders who knew Raphael in the dark, worried about compromising the FBI investigation, State Department officials said.

State Department files showed she had been formally reprimanded for security infractions while working at the embassy in Islamabad. Over the course of her career, going back to 1977, she had been cited more than a dozen times. Raphael's colleagues said this was a minor issue, considering her decades on the job. To the FBI it was a red flag.

After months of circling the target, FBI supervisors decided it was time to delve deeper. To monitor Raphael's private conversations with Lodhi and other contacts on Skype, the FBI obtained a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—a decision approved at the highest levels of the FBI and the Justice Department.



Raphel last month at her home in Washington. *PHOTO: STEPHEN VOSS FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL*

The agents dug into her personal life. They probed her finances and looked at who was making college tuition payments for her daughters. The agents wanted to see if the Pakistanis might be covering her bills. They noticed when Raphel was a lobbyist, she had once registered as a “foreign agent” in order to lobby for Pakistan.

The FBI didn’t have a clear picture of where Raphel fit on the State Department organizational chart. She was a political adviser with the rank of ambassador but she wasn’t a key policy maker anymore. She seemed to have informal contacts with everyone who mattered in Islamabad—more, even, than the sitting ambassador and the CIA station chief.

The sheer quantity of Raphel’s communications on the thorniest issues of the day raised suspicions for the FBI agents who were reading the transcripts.

The agents investigating Raphel didn’t have extensive experience dealing with State Department diplomats. They had even less exposure to diplomats of Raphel’s generation. By the way she spoke, Raphel sometimes made it sound as if she was giving Lodhi and other Pakistani contacts extremely valuable information.

For months, the agents read emails, pored over records and listened to intercepts to try to learn whether Raphel was giving away U.S. secrets. While they didn’t find any smoking-gun evidence of wrongdoing, there was plenty of “smoke,” one former law-enforcement official said. The FBI decided it was time to up the ante.


In January 2014, the bureau obtained a court-issued “sneak and peek” warrant, allowing agents to secretly search Raphel’s northwest Washington home while she was away.

The FBI sent a special Evidence Response Team trained in surreptitious searches. Raphel’s home had an alarm system, which the FBI team bypassed. Once inside, agents searched the living room and the three bedrooms. From the kitchen, they descended the stairs into the basement where they found the mahogany file cabinet.

When the FBI agents looked inside, they discovered the 20-year-old classified documents from Raphel’s Diplomatic Security investigation—a group of papers officials would later refer to as “the nuclear file.”

The agents put everything back as they found it. At the least, they believed they had enough evidence to pursue charges against Raphel for the crime of mishandling classified information. The agents thought they could be dealing with a decades-old asset of the Pakistani government, and suspected Malecha Lodhi, who had been a figure in her life since the 1990s, was her point of contact.

In the same month the FBI searched Raphel’s house, James Comey, the new FBI director, visited a field office in Birmingham, Ala., where reporters asked him if the government was spying on people.



James Comey

Comey became the director of the FBI in September 2013. The Raphel investigation had already begun at that point, but Mr. Comey oversaw and approved key decisions to proceed further with the case. Earlier this year, speaking about the Clinton email investigation, Mr. Comey faulted the "security culture" of the State Department when it came to protecting classified information. Photo: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

He said no—with a caveat. "Well, not the average person... Now, if you're involved in one of the things I'm worried about, if you're trafficking drugs, if you're involved in violent crime, if you're a terrorist or spy, I would like to be spying on you because I need to know what you're doing," he said. "That's our business."

While the FBI agents conducted their own surveillance, the bureau approached the NSA for assistance in gathering foreign intercepts involving Raphel and emanating from Islamabad, law-enforcement officials say. They were looking for what they call "flags on the target."

The FBI's suspicions were piqued, the officials said, when in some intercepts, Pakistanis referred to Raphel as a "source," rather than by name. To the investigators, it sounded like spycraft.

The agents listening to the back-and-forth between Raphel and Lodhi and her other contacts were struck by what law-enforcement officials described as the "one-way" nature of the conversations. It seemed to the FBI as though Raphel did most of the talking and provided most of the information. One law-enforcement official said Raphel appeared in those discussions to be what cops sometimes call a "hip pocket source"—not a formal intelligence asset or informant, but a "friendly" who was willing to share the information she came across informally.

As the agents listened to the back-and-forth, they would check with U.S. intelligence officials to see if the topics which Raphel discussed with Lodhi—drones, coups and reconciliation talks with the Taliban—were classified. They were repeatedly told that yes, they were.

FBI officials could have raised concerns about Raphel's communications with her State Department superiors to get her to back off, but they didn't. They wanted to catch her in the act, officials said.

For the FBI, the tipping point was Raphel's trip to Islamabad where she looked into the coup rumors.

During her visit, Raphel was in regular phone contact with Lodhi, who invited her to come to her home library to talk privately over tea. Officials briefed on the investigation said the information they exchanged during the trip about the prospects of a coup was similar to what U.S. spy agencies were picking up—the same kind of information that intelligence officials were putting in the President's Daily Brief.

The agents at the FBI's Washington Field Office decided it was time to confront her.

As Raphael stood on the small porch of her house in Washington on Oct. 21, 2014, the FBI agents leading the raid asked her for the names of the Pakistanis she spoke to most.

Raphael mentioned the Pakistani ambassador to the U.S., Jalil Abbas Jilani. She told the agents she had known him for a long time and that he was her primary contact. She didn't mention Lodhi.

The agents, who had been monitoring her conversations for more than a year, thought she was being evasive, according to law-enforcement officials. They asked Raphael if she had any classified documents in her house. She said she didn't.

The agents were holding some documents during the conversation. The male agent flashed one of the pages. She could see that it bore classification markings.

Raphael's mind was spinning. She told the agents that she had taken the classified documents home in 2005 and forgotten about them.

The agents didn't think she offered a clear reason as to why she would have the authority to possess them.

As the conversation went on, the agents' questions became more aggressive. Raphael started to think about lawyers she knew.

Beth Jones heard from a mutual acquaintance that something bad was happening to Raphael. Jones called her office phone, but got no answer. She tried her mobile, and Raphael picked up right away. "What in the world is going on?" asked Jones.

Raphael told her FBI agents were going through all of her personal things, and that Alexandra was terrified. "I don't know what this is all about," Raphael said.

"It must be some horrific mistake," Jones said.

The agents saw Raphael talking on her cellphone on the porch. They asked her to hand it over.



PHOTO: STEPHEN VOSS FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Back at the State Department, as Raphael's co-workers watched, plainclothes investigators snapped pictures in her office and put adhesive seals on the doors. A few days later, they replaced the seals with a lock.

The only person in the State Department who really knew what was going on was Gregory Starr, who had been briefed by the FBI in early 2013. Starr informed Raphael's bosses about a "serious situation," and recommended that Raphael's Top Secret clearance be suspended.

Starr told David Wade, the chief of staff to Secretary of State John Kerry. According to Wade, Starr's description of the case made him think the evidence against Raphael was "unimpeachable" and that the State Department could do nothing to push back. Wade informed his boss.

The next morning, agents from Diplomatic Security knocked on Raphael's door. They took her State Department badge and BlackBerry. She was summoned to the State Department's human-resources department and told that her employment contract, which was about to expire, wouldn't be renewed.

Eight days later, on Oct. 30, FBI agents sent Raphael a list of personal items she would be allowed to take home. Among them: her purple briefcase, the bag of carrots and the Rubbermaid plastic container with celery sticks.

Prosecutors with the U.S. Attorney's office wouldn't tell her lawyers anything about the allegations. Everything, including the means by which the FBI obtained the evidence, was a national-security secret.

To keep the story out of the media, Raphael's bosses hadn't told her co-workers why she wouldn't be coming back to work. Yet on Nov. 21, a story about the espionage investigation appeared on the front page of the New York Times.

That evening, Richard Hoagland, a former ambassador who worked closely with Raphael in Pakistan and Washington, met her at Bar Dupont, a popular hangout on one of Washington's busiest traffic circles. Figuring the FBI was tailing her, Hoagland chose a table at the bar where the two of them would be easy to spot. "I wanted the FBI to see us together," he recalled.

The next day Hoagland posted a message on his Facebook page: "Robin's a friend of many years. We met last night for drinks. She said it's like falling into Kafka World. People, we are a democracy with rule of law. Let's remember every citizen is presumed innocent."

Beth Jones worked to keep Raphael's friends and colleagues informed. Jones figured the FBI was monitoring her office phone at the U.S. mission to the United Nations in New York, so she made her calls on Raphael's behalf from her cellphone while walking the streets of Manhattan.

As the drama unfolded, Alexandra was in the middle of planning her wedding. She talked about postponing it—concerned that her future in-laws would think their son was marrying the daughter of a spy.

In Islamabad, the allegations were the talk of the town. Pakistani businessman Rashid Khan pulled aside Richard Olson, the U.S. ambassador, to ask him about the case against Raphael.

“Rashid, I can’t talk about it,” Olson said.

On Nov. 7, Lodhi tapped out an email to Raphael—knowing full well the FBI would likely read it. “I just wanted you to know my thoughts and prayers are with you,” she wrote. “I can think of no one more loyal to her country than you. I am sure this is a huge mistake.”

“Thanks Maleeha,” Raphael replied cautiously five hours later. “I am in total shock of course. I know you appreciate my patriotism as I have appreciated and respected yours over the years. I am confident this will be resolved.”

After this exchange, Raphael decided to cut off communications with most of her Pakistani contacts. To keep her mind occupied, she attended seminars. At an event sponsored by the Atlantic Council, she ran into Munter, the former U.S. ambassador. Munter could see how distressed she was about the allegations and how adamantly she rebutted them.

“They’re screwing her,” he thought to himself.

PART 4 THE AFTERMATH

In the fall of 2014, the FBI began interviewing Raphael’s State Department superiors and co-workers to try to fill in the missing pieces of their investigation.

They asked Grossman why he employed her, why she traveled to Pakistan, who she met with while she was there, whether he would give her instructions on what to tell her Pakistani interlocutors during her visits and whether she reported back on her conversations.

“Yes, yes, yes, because that was her job,” Grossman told them, according to an official briefed on the investigation.

Grossman told the FBI he “trusted her to do and say the right things,” the official said.

In other interviews, the agents asked her colleagues about a series of “incidents” that seemed suspicious to the FBI. Officials briefed on the investigation said the “incidents” referred to specific communication intercepts in which Raphael discussed sensitive topics, such as coup rumors, with Lodhi and others. The FBI agents wanted to know if she was authorized to discuss these things.

State Department officials told them she may not have been specifically “instructed” to do so in every instance, but she was “authorized” to discuss anything related to U.S.-Pakistan relations if her contacts wanted to—and so long as she didn’t divulge classified information.

“Any dinner party in E-7 is going to include a discussion about what are the odds of a coup,” one of Raphael’s superiors told the agents. “It may look secret from Washington’s perspective but it’s actually pretty widely known in Pakistan.”

State Department officials said that when they spoke to the FBI agents, they had the feeling they were explaining the basics of how diplomats worked.

At times, Raphael’s colleagues pushed back—warning the FBI that their investigation risked “criminalizing diplomacy,” according to a former official who was briefed on the interviews.

In one interview, the agents asked James Dobbins, who served as SRAP from 2013 to 2014, whether it was OK for Raphel to talk to a Pakistani source about information that wasn't restricted at the time, but would later be deemed classified.

"If somebody tells you something in one conversation, you might write that up and it becomes classified," he said. "But that doesn't mean the next time you see them that you can't talk about what you'd already talked about."

Agents asked if she was authorized to discuss topics in the President's Daily Brief—the daily gathering of the U.S. intelligence agencies' most valuable information. State Department officials were baffled by the question, because she had no access to such a sensitive document. If she discussed similar information, they told the FBI, it came from her Pakistani contacts, not from reading U.S. intelligence reports.

Added together, the interviews undercut the notion that Raphel was working on behalf of Pakistan. Two senior law enforcement officials who were involved in the case said the bureau had misconstrued her conversations with Lodhi and others, and incorrectly identified her as a spy. The bureau had not fully understood Raphel's role within the State Department and her bosses' expectations of her. The critical distinction, many officials said, was in how differently the FBI and the State Department operate.

"It's cultural," the former official said. "The FBI is very structured about communications. Agents see things as binary—on or off, authorized or unauthorized, black and white. State has a bunch of informal communications channels. Things are gray. It's just the way State is."

In the meantime, the FBI had ignited a wider debate about how the State Department handles secrets. In 2016, several diplomats who worked closely with Raphel were questioned by the FBI for sending vaguely worded emails related to U.S. drone strikes that were found on Hillary Clinton's private email server when she was secretary of state. Some of Raphel's emails were included in the trove that was reviewed by the FBI during their now-closed investigation.

In July, FBI Director James Comey decried the "security culture" within the State Department as "generally lacking in the kind of care for classified information found elsewhere in the government."

State Department officials, in turn, said it was the FBI probe that damaged national security.

In the spring of 2015, a prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's Office handling the Raphel case notified Amy Jeffress, one of Raphel's attorneys, that the Justice Department was no longer investigating her client for espionage.

That was the good news. Yet the FBI still wanted her to be prosecuted for mishandling classified information—a charge that could result in jail time.

Alexandra got married on May 23, 2015, in a ceremony in Washington that was attended by more than 250 guests, including Jilani, the Pakistani ambassador, who sat at a table with several other Pakistani friends.

Alexandra had invited Lodhi, who had taken a post as Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations in New York. Lodhi sent word at the last minute that she had to attend a conference in Europe.

Raphel heard nothing for months from the FBI. She had already spent about \$100,000 on legal fees, which she paid by tapping into her savings, but the bills were piling up. Jones set up a legal-defense fund and 103 of Raphel's friends and colleagues, mostly from the State Department, donated nearly \$122,000.

Inside the Justice Department, prosecutors went back and forth on the merits of the case against Raphel, officials say. The most sensitive document the FBI recovered was 20 years old, and if she were charged, it could well have been routinely declassified while she awaited trial.

More importantly, the officials said, federal prosecutors tend to charge people with mishandling national secrets when they have reason to believe the suspect has in fact done worse—in part to avoid bringing spy charges that might result in having secrets aired in court.

On March 21, 2016, 17 months after the raid on her house, a U.S. prosecutor informed Jeffress the Justice Department had decided to decline prosecution.

Raphel called Jones to give her the news. "Can you believe it?" she said.

"We're having a celebratory dinner tomorrow night," Jones said. "Tell me who to invite."

As Raphel and her close friends sipped Champagne, officials at the FBI and Diplomatic Security tried to come to terms with the outcome.

A senior law-enforcement official said given another chance the bureau would follow the same path again. "Clearly she was not a spy," the official said. "But there was smoke. The FBI had to get to the bottom of it."

Another official said that even though no charges were ever filed against Raphel, investigators were partially satisfied by the outcome. To law enforcement and intelligence officials, the loss of her government job was justified by the discovery of the documents in her house and by the signals intelligence that showed her allegedly discussing topics that the FBI considered off limits, this official said.

Raphel's lawyer, Amy Jeffress, called it "deeply disturbing" that law enforcement officials "continue to make anonymous and self-serving allegations about her conduct," adding that "there was no evidence she ever provided classified information to anyone without authority."

State Department officials now say they feel guilty about what happened. They think the FBI went off half-cocked and boxed them in by overstating the facts of the case.

Gregory Starr and other State Department officials briefed on the investigation now suspect the FBI agents wrongly assumed the information Raphel was exchanging with Lodhi and others came from classified intelligence reports, rather than from her own conversations with her contacts, according to officials.

It was a mistake, they said, to assume U.S. spy agencies had a monopoly on information in a place like Pakistan, where “secret” U.S. efforts were openly discussed in parliament, at dinner parties and in the press.

Though the FBI probe of Raphel was dropped, Diplomatic Security has been reviewing the documents found in her basement to decide whether to cite her with a security violation. The outcome could clear the way for her to have her security clearance restored. They have yet to reach a verdict.

Over the past two years, diplomats in Pakistan and the U.S. have scaled back contacts, according to officials in both countries. U.S. diplomats say they are afraid of what the NSA and the FBI might hear about them.

“What happened to Raphel could happen to any of us,” said Ryan Crocker, one of the State Department’s most highly decorated career ambassadors. Given the empowerment of law enforcement after 9/11 and the U.S.’s growing reliance on signals intelligence in place of diplomatic reporting, he said, “we will know less and we will be less secure.”

“Look what happened to the one person who was out talking to people,” said Dan Feldman, Raphel’s former boss at State. “Does that not become a cautionary tale?”

Raphel returned to Islamabad this August. It was a personal trip. Ambassador Jilani had invited her to his son’s wedding.

To welcome her, and also to show Pakistani officials she was no longer an outcast, U.S. Ambassador David Hale hosted a dinner for Raphel in his residence. Several former ambassadors accepted the invitation, including Lodhi.



PHOTO: STEPHEN VOSS FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Raphel was honored by the gesture but wary of how the dinner might be perceived. She told the embassy she didn't want any cameras present.

Dinner was called at around 8 p.m., early by Pakistan standards. The guests moved into the adjoining dining room and took their seats around the table, where Raphel, wearing a Pakistani kurta over narrow trousers, was placed directly across from Hale.

Still relatively new to Pakistan, Hale had yet to establish deep connections with many of the guests in the room. Colleagues describe him as reserved, in many ways the opposite of Raphel. After Hale delivered a gracious toast, calling Raphel one of his mentors, Raphel thanked him, and thanked her old friends for their support. She didn't mention the FBI.

At around 10 p.m., also early by Pakistan standards, Hale left the party. He told his guests he had phone calls to make to Washington. Hale declined to comment about the dinner party, citing embassy protocol.

Before the guests dispersed, Lodhi pulled Raphel aside to talk. The FBI investigation had a chilling effect on their relationship, mutual friends say. Raphel knew that her voluminous conversations with Lodhi had helped to fuel the bureau's suspicions.

As they stood there together, apart from the other guests, Lodhi leaned in close to Raphel.

"I'm glad this is over," she said.

In March 2016, Raphel wrote a personal letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, urging the department to do more to protect diplomats who are trying to do their jobs. She has yet to receive a response. Officials said Kerry was awaiting the outcome of the internal review of the classified documents found in Raphel's house.

On Nov. 28, she attended a ceremony in the State Department's seventh-floor Treaty Room to mark Ambassador Olson's retirement.

More than 100 of Olson's colleagues, contacts and friends attended, including Beth Jones, Patterson and Ambassador Jilani, who had supported Raphel during the investigation.

After the speeches were given and the photographs taken, Kerry and Raphel pulled away from the crowd for a private chat. It was their first face-to-face since the FBI torpedoed her diplomatic career.

Diplomatic Security had yet to restore her security clearance. Some of her friends at the State Department said they believed the FBI opposed the idea.

Kerry and Raphel stood close together for only a couple of minutes. On the sidelines of the noisy gathering, Kerry leaned over and whispered into Raphel's ear: "I am sorry about what has happened to you."

-----Saeed Shah contributed to this article.

Write to Adam Entous at wsjcontact@wsj.com and Devlin Barrett at Devlin.Barrett@wsj.com

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 09, 2016 6:29 AM
To: Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: After a Cyberattack, Germany Fears Election Disruption - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1

----- Original message -----

From: Peter [REDACTED]
Date: 12/09/2016 11:21 AM (GMT+00:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]
Subject: After a Cyberattack, Germany Fears Election Disruption - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/world/europe/germany-russia-hacking.html?emc=edit_th_20161209&ni=today'sheadlines&nliid=71166045&r=0&referrer=

After a Cyberattack, Germany Fears Election Disruption

December 8, 2016

BERLIN — After hackers infiltrated the German Parliament's computer network in May 2015, it took nearly a year before the country's intelligence agency concluded that the attack was most likely the work of their Russian counterparts.

Last week, when 900,000 Germans lost access to internet and telephone services, it took a matter of hours before politicians began pointing fingers at Moscow.

Berlin is now concerned that Germany will become the next focus of Moscow's campaign to destabilize Western democracies as national elections approach next year.

Those fears intensified after the Obama administration accused the Russian government of attacking Democratic Party emails during the American presidential campaign.

The increasing dissemination of false news, disinformation and propaganda during the American campaign and before Italy's referendum last weekend has added a related layer of worry about the potential to corrupt public debate and democratic processes.

Hans-Georg Maassen, the head of Germany's domestic intelligence agency, warned in an interview on Thursday of "growing evidence for attempts to influence the federal election next year."

His agency has seen an increase in "aggressive cyberespionage" targeting German politicians, he said.

If the advent of the personal computer helped undermine a closed Soviet system that could not compete in an information age, then exploiting the vulnerabilities of the internet and social media may be Russia's revenge.

Intelligence and other officials can now point to a growing string of campaigns of disinformation, hacked computer networks and leaked emails fitting a pattern that traces a murky route back to Moscow.

The aim, they say, is to undercut liberal opponents of Moscow, destabilize political systems and undermine democratic processes across the European Union and in NATO member countries, while supporting anti-European forces.

"Based on the prevailing Russian strategy of hybrid influence and destabilization, which we have observed over time and for which we have facts, the government, officials and some political parties have become sensitized to this form of conflict," said Wilfried Jilge, an expert on Ukraine and Eastern Europe with the German Council on Foreign Relations.

"Such suspicions are the result of observation and experience over the past year and a half," Mr. Jilge said.

Many of the efforts seem intended to tilt elections in a direction preferred by Moscow or to undercut certain leaders.

That was presumably the motivation for hacking the Democratic National Committee

and leaking emails that embarrassed Hillary Clinton, who long had an antagonistic relationship with the Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin.

On the other hand, her challenger, the eventual winner, Donald J. Trump, was effusive in his praise for the Russian leader.

False news, also linked to Russia, was widely disseminated in Italy by opponents of the push by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi for constitutional changes. Many of those opponents are much closer to Moscow than to Mr. Renzi, who lost and has now resigned.

Germans have not been immune to such disinformation, either.

In January, a news article that said a 13-year-old Russian-German girl had been kidnapped and raped by migrants in Germany spread quickly on Russian-language news channels.

Outrage over a supposed cover-up of the abuse drew members of Germany's Russian-speaking minority into the streets across the country, shocking German politicians.

German police officials later proved that the events never took place. But the damage was already done, and the false report fed opposition to Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to open the doors to nearly a million refugees.

As for Moscow's motivations in Germany, Eberhard Schneider, a professor of political science at the University of Siegen, has observed Russia's propaganda tactics since the days of the Cold War:

Ms. Merkel, he noted, was one of the strongest supporters of the sanctions against Russia for its annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine. Mr. Putin has a strong incentive to undermine her.

"Germany is the most important power in the European Union," he said. "If you can harm Germany and prevent that Merkel has a good outcome in the next election, that is in his interest."

The disruption at Deutsche Telekom, which began on Nov. 27, set off a fresh round of alarm over potential Russian meddling and the vulnerability of Germany's computer networks, which could be disrupted or hacked during an election.

A day after the breach, Bruno Kahl, head of the Germany's foreign intelligence service, raised the prospect of evidence linking Russia to interference in the United States election campaign and warned that Germany could be next.

"It is known that cyberattacks take place which have no other purpose than to provoke political uncertainty," he told the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung.

"These attempts to interfere focus on Europe, and on Germany especially," Mr. Kahl said. "A kind of pressure is being exercised on public discourse and democracy here, which is unacceptable."

Investigations into the incident later blamed links to "criminal organizations," though neither Deutsche Telekom nor the government disclosed any concrete link to Moscow.

Observers like Mr. Jilge of the Council on Foreign Relations say that caution is prudent in assigning blame, but that suspicion of Moscow is warranted given the accumulating pattern.

"The fact that hackers appeared to have carried out this attack does not automatically mean that they are linked to Russia," he said of the Deutsche Telekom attack.

"But if we look at the target and the timing, and know that such influence and disinformation is part of the Russian approach, then it is not surprising that some would seek to address this issue," he said.

Asked about the Deutsche Telekom disruption, Ms. Merkel said she did not know who was responsible, but she also mentioned Russia.

"I will simply say, such cyberattacks, or hybrid conflicts as they are known in Russian doctrine, are now part of daily life and we must learn to cope with them. We must inform people a lot on this point," the chancellor told reporters last week.

"We cannot allow ourselves to be unsettled by this," Ms. Merkel said. "We must simply

know that this exists and learn to live with it.”

Both Deutsche Telekom and the government’s Office of Information Security said a strain of the Mirai malware, which seeks to embed itself in devices connected to the internet, appeared to have caused the disruption.

Mirai was the same malware used in an attack in the United States in October that brought down websites for Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Airbnb, SoundCloud and The New York Times, among others.

In Germany, the malware apparently succeeded only in knocking out the routers and disrupting internet connections.

“According to our analysis, the objective of the attack is to install malware on the routers to add them to a botnet — meaning they could be used as the remote-controlled infrastructure for future attacks,” Deutsche Telekom later said in a statement.

The company pledged to focus on improving its network security to render it better able to resist any form of attack.

The speed with which officials began to suspect Russia was a stark contrast to 2015, when hackers used a phishing tactic, using a fake email, to penetrate computers in Germany’s lower house of Parliament.

Only this past May did Mr. Maassen’s domestic intelligence agency confirm suspicions that Russian intelligence was behind the attack. Finally, in October, it issued a broad warning.

“German parties or politicians,” it cautioned, “could fall into the focus of Russian cyberespionage campaigns and operations.”

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 09, 2016 3:41 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Draft on-record response to The Intercept

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 12/09/2016 1:12 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: "Corsi, Dina M. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] Boone, Jennifer C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
[redacted] (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
(CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: FW: Draft on-record response to The Intercept

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FYI, below [redacted]

[redacted]
Chief of Staff
Counterintelligence Division
[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

From: [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 09, 2016 1:06 PM
To: [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Quinn, Richard P. (DO) (FBI)
[redacted] Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] (DO)
(FBI) [redacted] (DO) (FBI) [redacted]
(DO) (FBI) [redacted] (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]
[redacted] (CTD) (FBI) [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
[redacted] (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]
[redacted] (DI) (FBI) [redacted] (DO) (FBI)
[redacted] (DO) (CON) [redacted]
[redacted] (DO) (CON) [redacted]
Subject: Draft on-record response to The Intercept

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Good afternoon all. In addition to any requests [redacted]
[redacted]

b5 -1

[Redacted]

Please share within your divisions as appropriate, and respond with any edits or concerns by midday on Monday if possible.

b5 -1

[Large Redacted Area]

b5 -1

Thanks much,

[Redacted]

FBI Office of Public Affairs

[Redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 09, 2016 4:40 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Draft on-record response to The Intercept

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Date: 12/09/2016 4:36 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Draft on-record response to The Intercept

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

I don't, unfortunately. I just heard from [redacted] that even this proposed response is not going to go. DD has something on his desk, but I haven't seen...

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 09, 2016 3:55 PM
To: [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: Draft on-record response to The Intercept

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Thanks [redacted] Do you have other emails with background/general description of what is to be published?

----- Original message -----

From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI) [redacted]
Date: 12/09/2016 1:12 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Cc: "Corsi, Dina M. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Boone, Jennifer C. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
[redacted] (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] (CD) (FBI)"
[redacted] "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
(CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: FW: Draft on-record response to The Intercept

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FWI, below [redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

[redacted]
Chief of Staff
Counterintelligence Division
[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

----- [redacted] (CD) (FBI) -----

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

FROM: [redacted] (DO) (FBI)

Sent: Friday, December 09, 2016 1:06 PM

To: [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted] Quinn, Richard P. (DO) (FBI)

[redacted] Kortan, Michael P. (DO) (FBI); [redacted] (DO)

(FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI); [redacted]

(DO) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]

[redacted] (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CD) (FBI)

[redacted] (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]

[redacted] (DI) (FBI); [redacted] (DO) (FBI)

[redacted] (DO) (CON); [redacted]

[redacted] (DO) (CON); [redacted]

Subject: Draft on-record response to The Intercept

Good afternoon all. In addition to any requests [redacted]

b5 -1

[redacted]

[redacted] Please share within your divisions as appropriate, and respond with any edits or concerns by midday on Monday if possible.

b5 -1

[Large redacted block]

Thanks much,

[redacted]

FBI Office of Public Affairs

[redacted]

b6 -1
b7C -1

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 09, 2016 10:30 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Secret CIA assessment says Russia was trying to help Trump win White House -
The Washington Post

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-orders-review-of-russian-hacking-during-presidential-campaign/2016/12/09/31d6b300-be2a-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_russiahack-1215p%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.da5b43a66fea

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, December 10, 2016 7:53 PM
To: Priestap, E. W. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fwd: Trump, Mocking Claim That Russia Hacked Election, at Odds with G.O.P. - NYTimes.com

b6 -1
b7C -1

<http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/us/politics/trump-mocking-claim-that-russia-hacked-election-at-odds-with-gop.html>

Trump, Mocking Claim That Russia Hacked Election, at Odds with G.O.P.

December 10, 2016

WASHINGTON — An extraordinary breach has emerged between President-elect Donald J. Trump and the national security establishment, with Mr. Trump mocking American intelligence assessments that Russia interfered in the election on his behalf, and top Republicans vowing investigations into Kremlin activities.

Mr. Trump, in a statement issued by his transition team on Friday evening, expressed complete disbelief in the intelligence agencies' assessments.

"These are the same people that said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction," Mr. Trump's team said, adding that the election was over and that it was time to "move on."

Though Mr. Trump has wasted no time in antagonizing the agencies, he will have to rely on them for the sort of espionage activities and analysis that they spend more than \$70 billion a year to perform.

At this point in a transition, a president-elect is usually delving into intelligence he has never before seen and learning about C.I.A. and National Security Agency abilities. But Mr. Trump, who has taken intelligence briefings only sporadically, is questioning not only analytic conclusions, but also their underlying facts.

“To have the president-elect of the United States simply reject the fact-based narrative that the intelligence community puts together because it conflicts with his a priori assumptions — wow,” said Michael V. Hayden, who was the director of the N.S.A. and later the C.I.A. under President George W. Bush.

With the partisan emotions on both sides — Mr. Trump’s supporters see a plot to undermine his presidency, and Hillary Clinton’s supporters see a conspiracy to keep her from the presidency — the result is an environment in which even those basic facts become the basis for dispute.

Mr. Trump’s team lashed out at the agencies after The Washington Post reported that the C.I.A. believed that Russia had intervened to undercut Mrs. Clinton and lift Mr. Trump, and The New York Times reported that Russia had broken into Republican National Committee computer networks just as they had broken into Democratic ones, but had released documents only on the Democrats.

The president-elect finds himself in a bind after strenuously rejecting for months all assertions that Russia was working to help him, though he did at one point invite Russia to find thousands of Mrs. Clinton’s emails.

While there is no evidence that the Russian meddling affected the outcome of the election or the legitimacy of the vote, Mr. Trump and his aides want to shut the door on any such notion, including the idea that President Vladimir V. Putin schemed to put him in office.

Instead, Mr. Trump casts the issue as an unknowable mystery. “It could be Russia,” he recently told Time magazine. “And it could be China. And it could be some guy in his home in New Jersey.”

The Republicans who lead the congressional committees overseeing intelligence, the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security take the opposite view. They say

that Russia was behind the election meddling, but that the scope and intent of the operation need deep investigation, hearings and public reports.

One question they may want to explore is why the intelligence agencies believe that the Republican networks were compromised while the F.B.I., which leads domestic cyberinvestigations, has apparently told Republicans that it has not seen evidence of that breach. Senior officials say the intelligence agencies' conclusions are not being widely shared, even with law enforcement.

"We cannot allow foreign governments to interfere in our democracy," Representative Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican who is the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee and was considered by Mr. Trump for secretary of Homeland Security, said at the conservative Heritage Foundation. "When they do, we must respond forcefully, publicly and decisively."

He has promised hearings, saying the Russian activity was "a call to action," as has Senator John McCain of Arizona, one of the few senators left from the Cold War era, when the Republican Party made opposition to the Soviet Union — and later deep suspicion of Russia — the centerpiece of its foreign policy.

Representative Peter T. King, Republican of New York and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said there was little doubt that the Russian government was involved in hacking the D.N.C. "All of the intelligence analysts who looked at it came to the conclusion that the tradecraft was very similar to the Russians," he said.

Even one of Mr. Trump's most enthusiastic supporters, Representative Devin Nunes, a California Republican, said on Friday that he had no doubt about Russia's culpability. His complaint was with the intelligence agencies, which he said had "repeatedly" failed "to anticipate Putin's hostile actions," and with the Obama administration's lack of a punitive response.

Mr. Nunes, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said that the intelligence agencies had "ignored pleas by numerous Intelligence Committee members to take more forceful action against the Kremlin's aggression." He added that the Obama administration had "suddenly awoken to the threat."

Like many Republicans, Mr. Nunes is threading a needle. His statement puts him in opposition to the position taken by Mr. Trump and his incoming national security adviser, Michael Flynn, who has traveled to Russia as a private citizen for RT, the state-controlled news operation, and attended a dinner with Mr. Putin.

Mr. Nunes's contention that Mr. Obama was captivated by a desire to "reset" relations with Russia is also notable, because Mr. Trump has said he is trying to do the same — though he is avoiding that term, which was made popular by Mrs. Clinton in her failed effort as secretary of state in 2009.

A president must sort out how to evaluate the evidence presented to him each day in the Presidential Daily Brief.

Mr. Obama, for example, came to question the C.I.A.'s analytic skills after being briefed not long after the 2010 uprising in Tunisia.

Mr. Obama asked what the chance was that the street protests would spread to Egypt; he was told "less than 20 percent." Tahrir Square erupted within days.

Intelligence can get politicized, of course, and one of the running debates about the disastrously mistaken assessments of Iraq that Mr. Trump often cites is whether the intelligence itself was tainted or whether the Bush White House read it selectively to support its march to war in 2003.

But what is unfolding in the argument over the Russian hacking is more complex, because tracking the origin of cyberattacks is complicated. It is made all the harder by the fact that the C.I.A. and the N.S.A. do not want to reveal human sources or technical abilities, including American software implants in Russian computer networks.

This much is known: In mid-2015, a hacking group long associated with the F.S.B. — the successor to the old Soviet K.G.B. — got inside the Democratic National Committee's computer systems. The intelligence gathering appeared to be fairly routine, and it was unsurprising: The Chinese, for instance, penetrated Mr. Obama's and Mr. McCain's presidential campaign communications in 2008.

In the spring of 2016, a second group of Russian hackers, long associated with the G.R.U., a military intelligence agency, attacked the D.N.C. again, along with the private email accounts of prominent Washington figures like John D. Podesta, the chairman of Mrs. Clinton's campaign. Those emails were ultimately published — a step the Russians had never taken before in the United States, though the tactic has been used often in former Soviet states and elsewhere in Europe. That moved the issue from espionage to an “information operation” with a political motive.

One person who attended a classified briefing on the intelligence said that the investigators had explained that the malware used in the cyberattack on the D.N.C. matched tools previously used by hackers with proven ties to the Russian government. That sort of “pattern analysis” is common in cyberinvestigations, though it is not conclusive.

But the intelligence agencies had more: They had managed to identify the individuals from the G.R.U. who oversaw the hacking efforts. That may have come from intercepted conversations, spying efforts, or implants in computer systems that allow the tracking of emails and text messages.

In briefings to Mr. Obama and on Capitol Hill, intelligence agencies have said they now believe that what began as an effort to undermine the credibility of American elections morphed over time into a much more targeted effort to harm Mrs. Clinton, whom Mr. Putin has long accused of interfering in Russian parliamentary elections in 2011.

But to hedge their bets before the election, according to the briefings, the Russians also targeted the Republican National Committee, Republican operatives and prominent members of the Republican establishment, like former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

But few of those emails have ever surfaced, save for Mr. Powell's, which were critical of Mrs. Clinton's campaign for trying to draw him into a defense of her use of a private computer server.

A spokesman for the Republican National Committee, Sean Spicer, disputed the report in *The Times* that the intelligence community had concluded that the R.N.C. had been hacked.

"The RNC was not 'hacked,'" he said on Twitter. "The @nytimes was told and chose to ignore." On Friday night, before The Times published its report, the committee had refused to comment.

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 5:01 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Follow up

-----Original Message-----

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 5:00 PM
To: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow up

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Ha. I remarked I would take Gowdy or Schiff over Matt most days...

-----Original Message-----

From: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:47 PM
To: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow up

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

No - you were perfect. D thought it went well. They were off. I said to Matt, "You know we are on the same team, right?"

-----Original Message-----

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:08 PM
To: Rybicki, James E. (DO) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: Follow up

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Perhaps not unsurprisingly, that was harder than the Hill - would appreciate any feedback, particularly if I missed/misread any, "talk more/talk less/shut up!" cues...

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 9:31 AM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Meeting with Bruce Swartz

Just a friendly reminder - I can take on scheduling this if you'd like

-----Original Message-----

From: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG) [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, November 29, 2016 6:32 PM
To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
Cc: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: Re: Meeting with Bruce Swartz

b6 -1, 2
b7C -1, 2
b7E -6

Got it. I'll find a few dates/times for the week after and shoot them to you.

Bruce

On Nov 29, 2016, at 5:46 PM, Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted] wrote:

b6 -1
b7C -1
b7E -6

Unfortunately, it is. Have a flight later that night. Sorry about that.

----- Original message -----

From: "Ohr, Bruce (ODAG)" [redacted]
Date: 11/29/2016 3:57 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]
Subject: RE: Meeting with Bruce Swartz

b6 -1, 2
b7C -1, 2
b7E -6

Lisa -

No problem - is 6:30 (or later) that day too late? Otherwise we may be into the next week. I will ensure that the snacks are up to snuff. Thanks!

- Bruce

From: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, November 29, 2016 3:51 PM
To: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG) [redacted]; Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]
Subject: RE: Meeting with Bruce Swartz

b6 -1, 2
b7C -1, 2
b7E -6

Unfortunately, Pete is briefing HPSCI from 5-6:30 on Monday. Just about any other time that day would work. And we'd like to come to you (especially because Bruce S. always has good snacks.)

work. And we're happy to come to you (especially because Bruce S. always has good snacks...)

From: Ohr, Bruce (ODAG) [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, November 29, 2016 3:47 PM

To: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Page, Lisa C.

(OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Subject: Meeting with Bruce Swartz

b6 -1, 2
b7C -1, 2
b7E -6

Lisa, Peter -

Thanks again for taking the time to chat today. As I mentioned, I would like to set up a short meeting for us with Bruce Swartz. Would next Monday at 5:30 p.m. work? Also, is there any chance you guys could come over to our building? Thanks!

- Bruce

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Bruce and Bruce
Location: DOJ 2213

Start: Thursday, December 15, 2016 1:00 PM
End: Thursday, December 15, 2016 1:30 PM
Show Time As: Tentative

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Not yet responded

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Required Attendees: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Bruce and Bruce
Location: DOJ 2213

Start: Thursday, December 15, 2016 1:00 PM
End: Thursday, December 15, 2016 1:30 PM

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Accepted

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Required Attendees: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)