116TH CONGRESS *1st Session* | SENATE | REPORT 116-XX

(U) REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ON

RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION

VOLUME 5: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES

CONTENTS

I. (U) FINDINGS v
II. (U) METHODOLOGY 1
A. (U) The Committee's Authority and Focus 1
1. (U) The Committee's Power to Investigate 1
2. (U) The Committee's Counterintelligence Focus 4
B. (U) A Bipartisan Investigation 5
C. (U) Legal Issues Encountered 7
1. (U) Executive Privilege 8
2. (U) A Claimed Transition Privilege 9
3. (U) Obstruction, Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Joint Defense Agreement 14
4. (U) Fifth Amendment and Immunity 17
5. (U) Extraterritoriality 20
6. (U) Committee Access to Electronic Communications Data 21
7. (U) Other Issues: First Amendment and Spousal Privilege 23
8. (U) Transcript Review 23
D. (U) Working With and Around the Executive Branch 24
1. (U) DOJ, FBI, and SCO 24
2. (U) Access to and Use of Classified Materials in the Report 26
III. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS 27
A. (U) Paul Manafort 27
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 27
2. (U) Limitations on the Committee's Investigation 30
3. (U) Background on Manafort's Foreign Activities 32
4. (U) Manafort's Activities from 2014 until Joining the Trump Campaign 47
5. (U) Manafort's Activities While Serving on the Trump Campaign 53
6. (U) Manafort's Activities For the Remainder of the Campaign 92
7. (U) Manafort's Activities After the Election 96
8. (U) Manafort's Associates' Ties to Russian Intelligence Services 137
B. (U) Hack and Leak 170
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 170
2. (U) Limitations on the Committee's Investigation 173
3. (U) Background on GRU Hacking Activities 174
4. (U) The GRU Plans and Executes the Theft of Sensitive Political Documents 178
5. (U) Russia "Weaponizes" Stolen Information with Fake Personas 182
6. (U) Russia and WikiLeaks Coordinate On Interference in the U.S. Election 199
7. (U) Efforts to Capitalize on WikiLeaks, Gain Advance Information on Releases 221
C. (U) The Agalarovs and the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting 259
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 259
2. (U) Background on the Agalarovs 261

3. (U) Origins of the Trump-Agalarov Relationship 268
4. (U) The Trump-Agalarov Relationship During the 2016 Presidential Campaign 311
5. (U) The June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting 322
6. (U) Subsequent Events and Communications 373
7. (U) Artem Klyushin, Konstantin Rykov, and Associates 395

D. (U) Trump Tower Moscow 407
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 407
2. (U) Past Efforts to Conduct a Real Estate Deal in Russia with Felix Sater 408
3. (U) Trump Tower Moscow Projects During the 2016 Presidential Campaign 419
4. (U) Efforts to Mislead the Public and Congress about Trump Tower Moscow 461

E. (U) George Papadopoulos 464
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 464
2. (U) Limitations on the Committee's Investigation 467
3. (U) Joseph Mifsud and Other Central Figures 468
4. (U) Papadopoulos Engages with Foreign Governments, Inflating Campaign Role 470
5. (U) Counterintelligence Concerns about Papadopoulos's Interactions 524

F. (U) Carter Page 527
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 527
2. (U) Background on Page and Limitations on the Committee's Investigation 528
3. (U) Page and U.S. and Russian Intelligence Services 530
4. (U) Page and the Trump Campaign 533
5. (U) Page Returns to Russia, December 2016 555
6. (U) Page During the Transition 557
7. (U) Page in the "Steele Dossier" 558

G. (U) Trump's Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel 560
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 560
2. (U) The Mayflower Speech 561

H. (U) Maria Butina and Alexander Torshin 568
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 568
2. (U) Background on Maria Butina and Alexander Torshin 570
3. (U) Torshin and Butina Establish Relations with the NRA 580
4. (U) Torshin and Butina Leverage NRA Relationships 586
5. (U) Torshin and Butina Pursue Political Contacts with Russian Approval 608
6. (U) 2016 NRA Convention and Efforts to Pursue Contact with Trump 614
7. (U) Efforts to Establish a U.S.-Russia Communications Channel 625
8. (U) After the Election and the 2017 National Prayer Breakfast 630

I. (U) Allegations, and Potential Misinformation, About Compromising Information .. 636
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 636
2. (U) Threat Posed by Russian Intelligence Services' Collection of Kompromat 639
3. (U) David Geovanis and Potential Counterintelligence Concerns 641
4. (U) Trump's Travel to Moscow in 1996 647
5. (U) Trump's Travel to Moscow in 2013 655

J. (U) Influence for Hire 663
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 663
2. (U) SCL and Cambridge Analytica 664
3. (U) Psy Group 679
4. (U) Colt Ventures and VizSense 694
K. (U) Transition 702
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 702
2. (U) Trump Transition Holds Meetings and Calls with Russian Officials 703
3. (U) Kirill Dmitriev Pursues Inroads to the Transition Team 718
4. (U) Robert Foresman 735
5. (U) Michael Flynn 752
L. (U) Other Incidents and Persons of Interest 777
1. (U) Peter W. Smith 777
2. (U) The Alfa Bank Server Story 787
3. (U) Changes to the RNC's Platform 792
4. (U) Russia's Efforts to Support Third Party Candidates 802
IV. (U) EXECUTIVE BRANCH INVESTIGATIONS 811
A. (U) The DNC Hack and FBI's Response 815
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 815
2. (U) FBI's Role Responding to Nation-State Cyber Attacks on Private Entities 816
3. (U) FBI's Role: The Victim-Driven Response 817
4. (U) Private Cybersecurity Vendors 819
5. (U) Summary of Events 821
6. (U) Detailed Timeline 822
7. (U) Conclusions 842
B. (U) The Steele Dossier: Its Origins and Handling 846
1. (U) Introduction and Findings 846
2. (U) Examining the Steele Dossier's Creation and Sourcing 853
3. (U) The Dossier's Origins 856
4. (U) Examining the Dossier's Sources and Tradecraft 865
5. (U) FBI's Handling of the Dossier 893
6. (U) Other Recipients of the Dossier 908
V. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS 931
VI. (U) ANNEX A 938
VII. (U) ANNEX B 939
VIII. (U) ANNEX C 940
Additional Views of Senators Risch, Rubio, Blunt, Cotton, Cornyn, and Sasse 941
Additional Views of Senators Heinrich, Feinstein, Wyden, Harris, and Bennet 943
Additional Views of Senator Wyden 949

I. (U) FINDINGS

(U) The Committee found that the Russian government engaged in an aggressive, multi-faceted effort to influence, or attempt to influence, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. Parts of this effort are outlined in the Committee's earlier volumes on election security, social media, the Obama Administration's response to the threat, and the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA).

(U) The fifth and final volume focuses on the counterintelligence threat, outlining a wide range of Russian efforts to influence the Trump Campaign and the 2016 election. In this volume the Committee lays out its findings in detail by looking at many aspects of the counterintelligence threat posed by the Russian influence operation. For example, the Committee examined Paul Manafort's connections to Russian influence actors and the FBI's treatment of reporting produced by Christopher Steele. While the Committee does not describe the final result as a complete picture, this volume provides the most comprehensive description to date of Russia's activities and the threat they posed. This volume presents this information in topical sections in order to address coherently and in detail the wide variety of Russian actions. The events explained in these sections in many cases overlap, and references in each section will direct the reader to those overlapping parts of the volume. Immediately below is a summary of key findings from several sections.

Paul Manafort

(U) Paul Manafort's connections to Russia and Ukraine began in approximately late 2004 with the start of his work for Oleg Deripaska and other Russia-aligned oligarchs in Ukraine. The Committee found that Deripaska conducts influence operations, frequently in countries where he has a significant economic interest. The Russian government coordinates with and directs Deripaska on many of his influence operations.

(U) From approximately 2004 to 2009, Manafort implemented these influence operations on behalf of Deripaska, including a broad, multi-million dollar political influence campaign directed at numerous countries of interest to Deripaska and the Russian government. Pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs with deep economic ties to Russia also paid Manafort tens of millions of dollars and formed strong ties with Manafort independent of Deripaska.

(U) Manafort hired and worked increasingly closely with a Russian national, Konstantin Kilimnik. Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer. Kilimnik became an integral part of Manafort's operations in Ukraine and Russia, serving as Manafort's primary liaison to Deripaska and eventually managing Manafort's office in Kyiv. Kilimnik and Manafort formed a close and lasting relationship that endured to the 2016 U.S. elections and beyond.

(U) Prior to joining the Trump Campaign in March 2016 and continuing throughout his time on the Campaign, Manafort directly and indirectly communicated with Kilimnik, Deripaska, and the pro-Russian oligarchs in Ukraine. On numerous occasions, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik. The Committee was unable to reliably determine why Manafort shared sensitive internal polling data or Campaign strategy with Kilimnik or with whom Kilimnik further shared that information. The Committee had limited insight into Kilimnik's communications with Manafort and into Kilimnik's communications with other individuals connected to Russian influence operations, all of whom used communications security practices. The Committee obtained some information suggesting Kilimnik may have been connected to the GRU's hack and leak operation targeting the 2016 U.S. election.

[redacted] Beginning while he was Campaign chairman and continuing until at least 2018, Manafort discussed with Kilimnik a peace plan for eastern Ukraine that benefited the Kremlin. [redacted]

[redacted] After the election, Manafort continued to coordinate with Russian persons, particularly Kilimnik and other individuals close to Deripaska, in an effort to undertake activities on their behalf. Manafort worked with Kilimnik starting in 2016 on narratives that sought to undermine evidence that Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. [redacted]

(U) The Committee found that Manafort's presence on the Campaign and proximity to Trump created opportunities for Russian intelligence services to exert influence over, and acquire confidential information on, the Trump Campaign. Taken as a whole, Manafort's high-level access and willingness to share information with individuals closely affiliated with the Russian intelligence services, particularly Kilimnik and associates of Oleg Deripaska, represented a grave counterintelligence threat.

Hack and Leak

(U) The Committee found that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian effort to hack computer networks and accounts affiliated with the Democratic Party and leak information damaging to Hillary Clinton and her campaign for president. Moscow's intent was to harm the Clinton Campaign, tarnish an expected Clinton presidential administration, help the Trump Campaign after Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee, and undermine the U.S. democratic process.

[redacted] WikiLeaks actively sought, and played, a key role in the Russian influence campaign and very likely knew it was assisting a Russian intelligence influence effort. The Committee found significant indications that [redacted] At the time of the first WikiLeaks releases, the U.S. Government had not yet declared WikiLeaks a hostile organization and many treated it as a journalistic entity.

(U) While the GRU and WikiLeaks were releasing hacked documents, the Trump Campaign sought to maximize the impact of those leaks to aid Trump's electoral prospects. Staff on the Trump Campaign sought advance notice about WikiLeaks releases, created messaging strategies to promote and share the materials in anticipation of and following their release, and encouraged further leaks. The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort. The Committee found no evidence that Campaign officials received an authoritative government notification that the hack was perpetrated by the Russian government before October 7, 2016, when the ODNI and DHS issued a joint statement to that effect. However, the Campaign was aware of the extensive media reporting and other private sector attribution of the hack to Russian actors prior to that point.

(U) Trump and senior Campaign officials sought to obtain advance information about WikiLeaks's planned releases through Roger Stone. At their direction, Stone took action to gain

inside knowledge for the Campaign and shared his purported knowledge directly with Trump and senior Campaign officials on multiple occasions. Trump and the Campaign believed that Stone had inside information and expressed satisfaction that Stone's information suggested more releases would be forthcoming. The Committee could not reliably determine the extent of authentic, non-public knowledge about WikiLeaks that Stone obtained and shared with the Campaign.

The Agalarovs and the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting

(U) The Committee found that the connection between Trump and the Agalarovs began in 2013 with planning for the Miss Universe Moscow pageant. Aras Agalarov is a prominent oligarch in Russia, and his son, Emin Agalarov, is a musician and businessman in Moscow. The connection evolved in 2014 and focused on an effort to build a Trump Tower in Moscow that never came to fruition. During that time communications further extended to Agalarov associates and family members and to Trump associates and family members. The relationship with the Agalarovs, which continued through the 2016 U.S. election, included business and personal communications, in person meetings, and gifts.

(U) The Committee found that Aras Agalarov was personally involved in pushing for both the June 9, 2016 meeting between Natalia Veselnitskaya and senior members of the Campaign and for a second meeting following the election, also with Veselnitskaya, that did not take place. Agalarov likely did this on behalf of individuals affiliated with the Russian government, judging from his ties with Russian officials who have pursued a repeal of the U.S. sanctions under the Magnitsky Act.

(U) The Committee found evidence suggesting that it was the intent of the Campaign participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting, particularly Donald Trump Jr., to receive derogatory information that would be of benefit to the Campaign from a source known, at least by Trump Jr., to have connections to the Russian government. The Committee found no reliable evidence that information of benefit to the Campaign was transmitted at the meeting, or that then-candidate Trump had foreknowledge of the meeting. Participants on both sides of the meeting were ultimately disappointed with how it transpired.

(U) The information that Natalia Veselnitskaya, the Russian lawyer, offered during the June 9, 2016 meeting and planned to offer again at the follow up meeting requested by Aras Agalarov was part of a broader influence operation targeting the United States that was coordinated, at least in part, with elements of the Russian government. That Russian effort was focused on U.S. sanctions against Russia under the Magnitsky Act. The Committee assesses that some of the same information used by Veselnitskaya at the June 9, 2016 meeting was also used in an influence operation earlier in 2016 by individuals in Moscow who have ties to Russian intelligence and to Putin. The Committee found no evidence that the meeting participants from

the Campaign were aware of this Russian influence operation when accepting the meeting or participating in it.

(U) The Committee assesses that at least two participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting, Veselnitskaya and Rinat Akhmetshin, have significant connections to the Russian government, including the Russian intelligence services. The connections the Committee uncovered, particularly regarding Veselnitskaya, were far more extensive and concerning than what had been publicly known, and neither Veselnitskaya nor Akhmetshin were forthcoming with the Committee regarding those connections. Both Veselnitskaya and Akhmetshin may have sought, in some cases, to obfuscate the true intent of their work in the United States.

[redacted]

Trump Tower Moscow

(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle, Donald Trump and the Trump Organization pursued a business deal in Russia. Michael Cohen, then an executive vice president at the Trump Organization and personal attorney to Trump, primarily handled and advanced these efforts. In September 2015, Trump authorized Cohen to pursue a deal in Russia through Felix Sater, a longtime business associate of Trump. By early November 2015, Trump and a Russia-based developer signed a Letter of Intent laying out the main terms of a licensing deal that promised to provide the Trump Organization millions of dollars upon the signing of a deal, and hundreds of millions of dollars if the project advanced to completion.

(U) Cohen kept Trump updated on the progress of the deal. While these negotiations were ongoing, Trump made positive public comments about Putin in connection with his presidential campaign. Cohen and Sater sought to leverage Trump's comments, and subsequent comments about Trump by Putin, to advance the deal.

(U) Sater told Cohen about high-level outreach to Russian businessmen and officials that Sater claimed to have undertaken related to the deal. While Sater almost certainly inflated some of these claims, the Committee found that Sater did, in fact, have significant senior-level ties to a number of Russian businessmen and former government officials, and was in a position, through intermediaries, to reach individuals close to Putin.

(U) By the end of 2015, Cohen reached out to the Kremlin directly to solicit the Russian government's assistance. Cohen made contact in January 2016 with a Russian Presidential Administration aide to Dmitri Peskov, a senior Kremlin official and key advisor to Putin. Cohen discussed the project in detail and reported to Trump that he had done so. As a result of this direct outreach to the Russian Presidential Administration and Sater's separate efforts to conduct outreach to individuals in Russia, the Committee found that senior Russian government officials (including, almost certainly, President Vladimir Putin) were aware of the deal by January 2016.

(U) Cohen and Sater continued negotiations through the spring of 2016. Their conversations largely focused on efforts to travel to Russia to advance the deal, but the Committee found no evidence of other concrete steps to advance the deal during this time. On June 14, 2016, Cohen and Sater met in person in Trump Tower, and Cohen likely relayed that he would not be able to travel to Russia at that time. During the summer, attempts to advance the deal stopped.

George Papadopoulos

(U) George Papadopoulos joined the Trump Campaign as part of a foreign policy advisory team created to blunt criticism that the Campaign lacked foreign policy advisors. Although Papadopoulos had limited—if any—influence on the Campaign's policies, he parlayed his association with the Trump Campaign to attempt to establish ties with foreign capitals as well as advance his personal goals of having increased influence in foreign energy circles. Despite efforts by certain individuals to remove him from the Campaign, Papadopoulos continued to assert his affiliation with the Campaign and remained in contact with senior staff such as Stephen Bannon and Michael Flynn.

(U) The Committee found George Papadopoulos used multiple avenues to pursue a face-to-face meeting between Trump and President Putin. Papadopoulos believed that he was operating with the approval—or at least not the explicit disapproval—of Campaign leadership, who he kept apprised of his efforts. Papadopoulos never successfully scheduled a meeting between Putin and Trump.

(U) The Committee further found that Papadopoulos's efforts introduced him to several individuals that raise counterintelligence concerns, due to their associations with individuals from hostile foreign governments as well as actions these individuals undertook. The Committee assesses that Papadopoulos was not a witting cooptee of the Russian intelligence services, but nonetheless presented a prime intelligence target and potential vector for malign Russian influence.

(U) The Committee found evidence that Papadopoulos likely learned about the Russian active measures campaign as early as April 2016 from Joseph Mifsud, a Maltese academic with longstanding Russia ties, well before any public awareness of the Russian effort. The Committee

further found Papadopoulos communicated the information he learned from Mifsud to at least two separate foreign governments. The Committee could not determine if Papadopoulos informed anyone on the Trump Campaign of the information, though the Committee finds it implausible that Papadopoulos did not do so.

Carter Page

(U) Carter Page was likely a subject of interest to Russian officials during the 2016 election, given that he was the only member of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisory team publicly identified as a Russia expert. Page had previously lived in Russia and had worked on Russia policy and energy issues. Russian intelligence officers had in previous years interacted with Page.

(U) The Committee found no evidence that Page made any substantive contribution to the Campaign or ever met Trump. Prior to Page being added to the Campaign's advisory committee, he indicated to senior Campaign officials that he was in contact with individuals who were close to the Kremlin and were interested in arranging a meeting between Trump and Putin. Page later repeated the suggestion of a Trump-Putin meeting to senior Campaign staff. The Committee was not able to corroborate Page's claimed contacts, and found no indication that the Campaign took action on Page's offers.

(U) In the summer of 2016, Page was invited to make two addresses in Russia, including an address during the commencement ceremonies at Moscow's New Economic School (NES). This invitation was extended because of the Russian sponsors' perception of his role in the Trump Campaign. Page returned to Moscow and NES in December 2016, after his role with the Campaign had ended, but while he was seeking a position with the new administration. During these visits, Page met briefly with a figure about whom the Intelligence Community has counterintelligence concerns, and the Committee was unable to obtain a complete picture from Page or his document production about his itinerary in Moscow. Page did not explain to the Committee, for example, how he spent the bulk of several days. Many allegations in the media regarding Page's activities in Russia in 2016 as well as almost all assertions about Page in the "Steele Dossier" remain unverified. In addition, Page's claims to the Campaign regarding his activities and influence in Moscow remain unsubstantiated.

Trump's Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel

(U) The Committee found no evidence that anyone associated with the Trump Campaign had any substantive private conversations with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the April 27, 2016, Trump speech held at the Mayflower Hotel. Although Kislyak did meet Trump and other senior officials associated with the Campaign, these short interactions consisted of general statements about improved relations with Russia. As the first major foreign policy

speech by the candidate, the event drew wide but typical attention, including by the Russian ambassador.

Maria Butina and Alexander Torshin

(U) Starting in 2013, and continuing over a several year period, Maria Butina, founder of a Russian gun rights organization who attended graduate school in the United States, and Alexander Torshin, a high ranking Russian banker, government official, and politician with Kremlin ties, established a broad network of relationships with the leaders of the National Rifle Association (NRA), conservative political operatives, Republican government officials, and individuals connected to the Trump Campaign. They took steps to establish informal communications channels to influence the U.S. Government's policy towards Russia. The Committee did not find that either Butina or Torshin was able to establish consistent contact with Trump Campaign officials or senior staff.

[redacted]

Influence for Hire

(U) The Committee found that highly evolved tools used to shape popular sentiment were utilized in support of the Trump Campaign during the 2016 election season, and Russia has made use of such tools in its influence operations, but a link between Russian efforts and the Campaign's use of these tools was not established. These commercially available services—many of which are based overseas—rely on an array of personal information to build targeted messaging profiles. Russia applied these same technologies and methodologies to its influence campaign during the 2016 election and, in doing so, conducted foreign influence operations against the United States with a speed, precision, and scale not previously seen. The commoditization of these influence capabilities by for-profit firms working in the political and particularly electoral space, coupled with deeply concerning foreign government and intelligence service ties to some organizations, were troubling enough to warrant additional Committee scrutiny.

Transition

(U) Russia took advantage of members of the Transition Team's relative inexperience in government, opposition to Obama Administration policies, and Trump's desire to deepen ties with Russia to pursue unofficial channels through which Russia could conduct diplomacy. Russia was not alone in these efforts—U.S. allies and adversaries also sought

inroads with the Transition. The existence of a cadre of informal advisors to the Transition Team with varying levels of access to the President-elect and varying awareness of foreign affairs presented attractive targets for foreign influence, creating notable counterintelligence vulnerabilities. The lack of vetting of foreign interactions by Transition officials left the Transition open to influence and manipulation by foreign intelligence services, government officials, and co-opted business executives.

(U) The Transition Team repeatedly took actions that had the potential, and sometimes the effect, of interfering in the Obama Administration's diplomatic efforts. This created confusion among U.S. allies and other world leaders, most notably surrounding negotiations over a UN Security Council Resolution on Israel. Russia may have deferred response to the sanctions the Obama Administration put in place in late December because of Flynn's intervention and promise of a new relationship with the Trump administration.

(U) Also during the transition, several Russian actors not formally associated with the Russian Government attempted to establish contact with senior members of the Transition Team. In mid-December, Sergey Gorkov, the head of a U.S. sanctioned Russian bank, met with Jared Kushner and discussed diplomatic relations. Kirill Dmitriev, the CEO of U.S.-sanctioned Russian Direct Investment Fund, used multiple business contacts to try to make inroads with Transition Team officials. One such contact was Rick Gerson, a hedge fund manager and friend of Kushner's. Gerson and Dmitriev constructed a five-point plan on how to improve relations between Russia and the U.S. and presented it to the Transition Team and the Kremlin, respectively. Dmitriev also made contact with Erik Prince, who passed on the contents of the discussions to Steve Bannon. Separately, Bob Foresman, an American businessman living in Moscow who sought a position in the Trump Administration, conveyed brief messages between the Trump Campaign and several Kremlin-linked individuals, including Putin confidant Matthias Warnig, and provided other information relating to the U.S.-Russia relationship during the Transition.

Executive Branch Investigations

(U) The Committee found that certain FBI procedures and actions in response to the Russian threat to the 2016 elections were flawed, in particular its interactions with the DNC about the hacking operation and its treatment of the set of memos referred to as the Steele Dossier.

(U) The Committee found the FBI lacked a formal or considered process for escalating its warnings about the DNC hack within the organization of the DNC. Additionally, the FBI's "victim-driven" response paradigm, whereby hacked entities and organizations are treated as victims and the FBI relies on their cooperation to access and navigate targeted computer systems, hindered FBI's ability to investigate the cyberattack with appropriate urgency. The Committee understands that the FBI operates with limited resources and currently follows this victim-driven

model when responding to cyber threats. However, the Committee found that the FBI could have, and should have, escalated its communications to the DNC much sooner than it did, but also that the DNC interlocutors did not assign appropriate weight to the FBI's warnings. To this point, the Committee found that communication on both sides was inadequate, further confusing an already complex situation.

(U) Regarding the Steele Dossier, FBI gave Steele's allegations unjustified credence, based on an incomplete understanding of Steele's past reporting record. FBI used the Dossier in a FISA application and renewals and advocated for it to be included in the ICA before taking the necessary steps to validate assumptions about Steele's credibility. Further, FBI did not effectively adjust its approach to Steele's reporting once one of Steele's subsources provided information that raised serious concerns about the source descriptions in the Steele Dossier. The Committee further found that Steele's reporting lacked rigor and transparency about the quality of the sourcing.

(U) The Russian attack on the 2016 U.S. elections presented a new, quickly-evolving, and complex set of circumstances for the FBI. However, the Committee found that FBI overly adhered to the letter of its procedures in dealings with the DNC, rather than recognizing the gap between those procedures and effective the pursuit of its mission, and did not follow its procedures closely enough in the handling of Christopher Steele. During both of these matters, FBI did not quickly identify the problem and adjust course when it became clear its actions were ineffective.

II. (U) METHODOLOGY

A. (U) The Committee's Authority and Focus

(U) On January 24, 2017, the Committee formally initiated its inquiry into Russian active measures in the 2016 elections and the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) relating to Russian involvement in the 2016 elections. The Terms of Reference designated a Russian Active Measures Working Group from Committee staff to conduct the inquiry on behalf of the Committee. The five volumes of the Committee's Report capture the results of three years of investigative activity, hundreds of witness interviews and engagements, millions of pages of document review, and open and closed hearings. This Report presents the Committee's findings and recommendations as a result of its investigation.

1. (U) The Committee's Power to Investigate

(U) The Committee's power to investigate Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections derives from its jurisdiction over the Intelligence Community (IC) and Congress's broad investigative powers. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad power to investigate, because investigation is "inherent in the legislative process."[1] Congress's "power of inquiry . . . is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution."[2] Congress also plays a long-established "informing function" that the Supreme Court has described as "indispensable."[3]

(U) The Senate created the Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976 to "provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States" and to ensure that intelligence activities were "in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States."[4] The Committee is tasked with oversight of the IC, which includes 17 different intelligence elements and numerous intelligence programs. An assessment of the IC's response to the foreign intelligence threat from Russia, and by necessity the nature of that threat, fell within the Committee's jurisdiction. The Report's five volumes—covering topics of election security, social media, policy response, the ICA, and counterintelligence concerns[5] surrounding the 2016

---

[1] (U) *Watkins v. United States,* 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
[2] (U) *Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund,* 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (citing *Barenblatt v. United States,* 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959)). *See generally* Garvey, Todd and Oleszek, Walter J., "Congressional Oversight and Investigations," Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2014.
[3] (U) *Watkins,* 354 U.S. at 200; *United States v. Rumely,* 345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953). *See, e.g.*, Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Report No. 93-981, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., June 1974, p. XXIV.
[4] (U) S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976).
[5] (U) Executive Order No. 12333, as amended, defines counterintelligence as "information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage,

elections—address areas of oversight and potential legislative action for the Committee or Congress. The Committee has already taken legislative action based on its investigation.

(U) The Committee understood obstruction of its investigation to also be within its investigative purview, as efforts to obstruct the Committee could potentially stem from additional counterintelligence concerns, interfere with its oversight responsibilities, or form the basis of additional legislative action.

(U) The Committee reviewed relevant intelligence products, conducted voluntary witness interviews, and compelled both testimony and the production of documents when necessary. The Committee's investigative power was bounded by the tools available to the Legislative Branch and the statute governing the enforcement of Senate subpoenas, both of which informed the Committee's approach to obtain voluntary cooperation wherever possible.[6] If a witness refused to comply with a subpoena without asserting any valid legal privilege, the Committee could choose to pursue either criminal or civil contempt.

(U) As the Supreme Court has recognized, the power to compel testimony and evidence is a necessary component to Congress's ability to fulfill its constitutional role.[7] However, holding a witness in contempt of Congress is a multi-step, time-consuming process, requiring action both within Congress and the courts. To pursue civil contempt, the Committee would begin by issuing a valid subpoena to a witness and providing the witness an opportunity to assert legitimate privileges, along with legal authorities and rationale for any privilege assertions. After a ruling by the Chairman and Vice Chairman that the witness had failed to comply or to assert a valid legal privilege, the Committee could override the objection and direct the witness to comply. If the witness failed to comply, the Committee could then vote to report a resolution to the Senate, accompanied by a report explaining the facts at issue, and the reasons the Committee was pursuing civil contempt as opposed to criminal contempt. Reporting a resolution to the Senate is considered a privileged motion, and would trigger a vote of the full chamber. If the Senate agreed to the enforcement resolution, the Senate would direct Senate Legal Counsel to represent the Committee before a federal court, seeking an order directing the witness to appear, produce documents, or to answer specific questions. The federal court could then decide to direct the witness to answer, and the court could impose sanctions to further compel compliance if it determined them to be necessary.[8]

---

or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities." In this Report, the Committee has, at times, also used "counterintelligence" to represent the broad range of threats presented by foreign powers, including intelligence services and their agents, to U.S. elections, campaigns, and national assets that are critical to the democratic process.

[6] (U) *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1365.

[7] (U) *McGrain v. Daugherty*, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).

[8] (U) For criminal contempt, the Committee would vote to report to the Senate (or the President Pro Tempore if the Senate is not in session) a resolution referring the witness for criminal prosecution, which the Senate (or President

(U) Title 28, United States Code § 1365 gives the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia original jurisdiction over civil enforcement of Senate subpoenas.[9] However, § 1365 does not apply—and the court would not have jurisdiction under the statute to consider an enforcement action—if the subpoena is to "an officer or employee of the executive branch of the Federal Government" and the refusal to comply is "based on a governmental privilege or objection the assertion of which has been authorized by the executive branch of the Federal Government."[10]

(U) This limitation had important practical implications for the Committee's investigation. During the Committee's investigation, if a subpoenaed witness was a government official and asserted a claim of executive privilege, no matter how specious that claim appeared, the Committee was effectively foreclosed from pursuing civil contempt under § 1365.[11] The Committee interviewed several witnesses who refused to answer questions based on potential claims of executive privilege during the presidential Transition, involving the White House counsel's office (WHCO), which further complicated the potential for enforcement. For more on the Trump Administration's novel theories of executive privilege during the Transition, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. II.C.2.

(U) In some cases, the Committee's ability to obtain voluntary document production—including vast amounts of electronic communications, some of which would have been encrypted—appeared to outstrip the tools of law enforcement. But in other cases, it was clear that the limited tools available to the Legislative Branch hindered a more thorough effort. For example, the Committee spent months trying to obtain email communications hosted on a domain related to one of Paul Manafort's businesses, DMP International, LLC. Despite subpoenas issued to individuals and corporate entities, including DMP International LLC and

---

Pro Tempore) concurred would be referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington, D.C., "whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action." *See* 2 U.S.C. § 194. Despite this mandatory language, the U.S. Attorney's Office regards its duty as discretionary and is not likely to prosecute an Executive Branch official asserting privileges.

[9] (U) 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a).

[10] (U) *Ibid.*

[11] (U) Since the statute's enactment in 1978, the Senate has exclusively relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1365 in seeking civil enforcement of its subpoenas, although use of 28 U.S.C. §1331 is not foreclosed. The House of Representatives, which is not covered by § 1365, has been successful in relying on the general federal question jurisdictional grant found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in two recent district court cases seeking subpoena enforcement in the face of executive privilege or immunity claims. *See Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers,* 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008); *Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Holder,* 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). At the time of this writing, the issue of a court's role in ruling on information disputes between Congress and the executive branch is pending before an *en banc* U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. *See* Order, *Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn,* No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir. March 13, 2020).

Rackspace (which hosted the DMP email server during the relevant time frame), the Committee failed to obtain the email communications. Conversely, law enforcement would have been able to—and did—use its criminal investigative authorities to access the content of those email communications directly and without delay.[12]

(U) Locating witnesses also proved to be complicated in some cases. Witnesses were spread across the globe, and often used different names, or changed lawyers in a manner that made engagement with them increasingly challenging. The Committee is grateful to the U.S. Marshals Service for its assistance in locating and serving several witnesses throughout the investigation.

2. (U) The Committee's Counterintelligence Focus

(U) The Committee's investigation focused on the counterintelligence threat posed by the Russian intelligence services and whether the IC was appropriately positioned to meet that threat during the 2016 election cycle. The Committee's years of work on Russian active measures, including its open and closed hearings, illustrate its focus on counterintelligence concerns. In presenting the factual record, the Committee did not apply the standard of proof applicable to criminal trials, that of beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather endeavored to convey a detailed accounting of relevant events, and sometimes included conflicting information that the Committee could not reliably resolve.[13]

(U) By comparison, the report by the Special Counsel's Office (SCO), "Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election" (hereinafter "*SCO Report*"), was focused on criminal activity: to "explain[] the prosecution or declination decisions reached."[14] As then-Acting Attorney General for the Special Counsel Rod Rosenstein stated in a June 27, 2018 letter about the Special Counsel's appointment and authority: "Special Counsel Mueller is authorized to investigate potential criminal offenses. Counterintelligence investigations involving any current or future Russian election interference are not the Special Counsel's responsibility."[15]

(U) When witnesses presented both counterintelligence and criminal concerns, the Committee's priority was the counterintelligence threat.[16] Where counterintelligence concerns

---

[12] (U) For more on the Committee's approach to obtaining electronic communications metadata from providers, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. II.C.6.

[13] (U) This approach is in keeping with prior congressional reports. *See, e.g.*, Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Report No. 93-981, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., June 1974, pp. XXIII–XXV.

[14] (U) 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c).

[15] (U) Letter, Rosenstein to Grassley, June 27, 2018.

[16] (U) For example, the Committee's work with respect to Michael Cohen centered on whether Cohen was a vector for Russian influence rather than whether Cohen properly reported all of his taxable income.

and criminal activity overlapped, the Committee worked with law enforcement stakeholders to find an appropriate way forward that would best serve the Committee's investigative purpose without jeopardizing ongoing investigations or prosecutions. Where the two goals were in conflict, the Committee accommodated law enforcement imperatives.

i. (U) Referrals

(U) The Committee did not specifically seek to investigate crime or facilitate the apprehension of criminals: if the Committee became aware of information related to potential criminal activity during the course of its investigation, that information was referred to the appropriate law enforcement entity for whatever action it deemed appropriate, to include further investigation. In its referrals, the Committee expressed the view that crimes may have been committed and that further investigation might be warranted. The referral did not require law enforcement authorities to undertake any further action—a decision left solely to their discretion.

(U) The Committee made referrals for potential criminal activity uncovered during the course of the investigation. A list of these referrals is provided in Annex A to this Report.[17]

B. (U) A Bipartisan Investigation

(U) To conduct the investigation, the Committee assigned a subset of its professional staff members and counsel to an investigative team. Staff were assigned from the majority and the minority. Investigative decisions were made by the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Staff jointly reviewed the information obtained in the course of the investigation, drafted document requests, questioned witnesses, and drafted the Report. All of these practices helped to maintain the bipartisan nature of the investigation, one focused on the goal stated by the Chairman and Vice Chairman: delivering a factual record to the American people about Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.

(U) The Committee's practice was to initially seek witness testimony and document production voluntarily, and some witnesses were immediately willing to cooperate with the Committee. However, other witnesses were hesitant to cooperate and required extensive assurances about a range of topics before they would agree to appear. These negotiations often took weeks or months, and sometimes resulted in a witness not appearing until many months after the request, which prolonged the investigation. In addition, on several occasions, witnesses developed excuses for delaying or cancelling interviews. It was the Committee's practice not to discuss witness engagements publicly and to ask witnesses to keep engagements confidential.

---

[17] (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. VI.

However, the Committee was unable to prevent witnesses from disclosing their own information or engagements to the media either before, during, or after their interviews.

(U) When credible safety issues were raised by a witness, proffers and *in camera* review were considered as an alternative. In limited circumstances, either due to witness security concerns, to conduct minimal follow-ups, or because of the limited nature of the Committee's focus, written questions were used in lieu of in-person testimony. Generally, written questions proved to be a poor substitute for a live interview. Responses were frequently cursory and left out pertinent information; answers were channeled through counsel for additional edits rather than coming directly from the witness; and the Committee was unable to ask follow-up questions to challenge or probe the witness's responses.

(U) The Committee generally requested documents to be produced within 14 days of a request, but provided reasonable extensions of that deadline. Even so, witness counsel often prolonged document production for months by engaging in delay tactics. Because the investigation was focused on sometimes sensitive counterintelligence concerns, some document requests were deliberately phrased in broad language to capture all relevant materials. At times this created the need to negotiate over the scope of witness productions to avoid overproduction of irrelevant documents. Voluminous productions—which were not uncommon—arrived on a rolling basis, but only after continuing pressure from the Committee. Some productions arrived on the eve of witness interviews, in hard copy, which made it difficult to use the information effectively during the engagement.

(U) The Committee's document processing presented its own challenges, in part due to the varied nature of materials that were produced, and because of the Committee's dedication to maintaining documents in a restricted system to the extent possible. The most common manner of production consisted of emails or documents in PDF format. However, files were also sometimes produced in native format, including Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and Outlook Data Files (i.e., .pst files). On some occasions, the Committee received an image copy of the witness's hard drive. In addition, several witnesses produced documents through their attorneys using e-discovery platforms to which the Committee did not have access. The Committee encountered messages and emails in foreign languages, mobile phone screenshots of communications, and proprietary data productions from companies. Government records presented additional complications. Intake of these materials with appropriate technical restrictions involved a significant, ongoing effort by administrative and technical staff. Eventually, for review and drafting purposes, the Committee obtained licenses for analytical software to help synthesize and cull out relevant information from the voluminous investigative file.

(U) Staff prepared for interviews using all available sources of information, including witness document productions, government records, and publicly available information. Most interviews were held in a closed setting, either in the Committee conference room or in its closed

hearing room. In some cases, the interviews were classified. On other occasions, staff traveled to accommodate the witness and conducted interviews off site, including locations outside of the United States. Outlines and exhibits were prepared and agreed upon ahead of time to guide the interview. Staff did not identify by political party during the interview, and questioning was done in a conversational manner, with multiple staff participating. Nearly all interviews were transcribed.[18] The Committee gave all witnesses the opportunity to consult with counsel, or respond to questions off the record. Following the interviews, witnesses were unable to identify which staff worked for the majority and which worked for the minority. Although Committee Members were generally not present, transcripts and documents from all witness interviews were made available for Members to review.

(U) The Committee conducted follow-up interviews with five witnesses: Michael Cohen, Jared Kushner, Donald Trump Jr., John Podesta, and Jonathan Winer. The Committee held the follow-up interviews with Cohen, Kushner, and Trump Jr. in the Committee's closed hearing room with Members present. At the Chairman's direction, investigative counsel asked questions that had been prepared in advance and agreed upon by staff; Members also submitted questions for witnesses to be asked by counsel. These three witnesses had been interviewed early in the Committee's efforts, and the Committee developed additional information since the initial interview that required clarification from the witnesses. All three of these follow-up interviews occurred only after extensive negotiation between the Committee and the respective parties. In the case of both Cohen and Trump Jr., the Committee issued a subpoena to secure this second day of testimony. Cohen appeared pursuant to the subpoena. Trump Jr. did not initially appear in response to the subpoena, but later changed his position and appeared when it became clear that the Committee was considering a contempt resolution.

(U) When witnesses declined voluntary cooperation and an interview was essential to the investigation, the Committee exercised its subpoena authority to compel testimony and document production. Subpoenas were usually served electronically, when agreed to by witness counsel. On several occasions, however, the Committee relied on the assistance of the U.S. Marshals Service to serve subpoenas on some witnesses. Although the Chairman and Vice Chairman were granted authority by the Committee to jointly issue subpoenas for witnesses on which they agreed, the whole Committee considered and authorized several subpoenas that were issued to sensitive witnesses who it believed might resist compliance. The Committee experienced some additional limits to its authority, as discussed below.

C. (U) Legal Issues Encountered

---

[18] **(U)** For example, the Committee's interviews with former Secretary of State John Kerry and former FBI employee Randy Coleman were not transcribed, due to the constraints of the spaces in which the interviews took place and prior negotiation with witness counsel.

(U) Throughout the course of its investigation, the Committee encountered a spectrum of cooperation: some witnesses testified voluntarily and provided useful document production in a timely manner, and some witnesses stalled, forced the Committee to compel their appearances, and then asserted privileges in response to some of the Committee's questions. Witnesses claimed several common law and Constitutional privileges, including traditional claims of executive privilege; potential claims of executive privilege during the presidential Transition; attorney-client privilege; First Amendment privileges (related to both freedom of the press and freedom of association); and spousal privilege. The Committee was also confronted with certain statutory limitations in its requests to communications service providers for digital evidence. The Committee's strategies in navigating these issues are detailed below but were generally driven by its priorities to get the most information possible, to respect Committee and Senate equities, and to move forward without engaging in time-consuming litigation.

1. (U) Executive Privilege

(U) The time period for the Committee's document requests and interview questions for government officials generally did not go beyond noon on January 20, 2017, in part to anticipate and minimize any potential claims of executive privilege. The concept of executive privilege—which is not written anywhere in the Constitution, but derives from Constitutional considerations[19]—is itself amorphous, encompassing several varieties of potentially legitimate governmental interests: the confidentiality of a president's communications and those of the president's senior advisors; sensitive military, diplomatic, or national security information; sensitive law enforcement techniques or ongoing investigations; and internal deliberative processes. There is considerable disagreement between Congress and the Executive Branch as to the nature of the privilege and when it may be claimed, and scant case law on the particulars of its application to congressional requests. Importantly, in whatever form it may take, the privilege is not absolute.[20] It gives way to a legitimate overriding need from Congress; it can be waived; and it may not be used to withhold evidence of wrongdoing or criminal behavior within the Executive Branch.

(U) Executive privilege is the President's alone to assert. Accordingly—from the Executive Branch's perspective—in order to withhold information on the basis of a valid claim of executive privilege, a witness will frequently refuse to answer a question or produce documents on the grounds that it could implicate the privilege, thereby preserving the opportunity to assert the privilege for the President. Following notification from a witness that a request has raised a "substantial question of executive privilege," the White House's approach in

---

[19] (U) *See United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
[20] (U) *Ibid.*, 713.

theory adheres to the procedures outlined in a 1982 memorandum from then-President Reagan.[21] Traditionally, the White House will seek an opinion from Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) substantiating its position that the privilege exists as related to the specific subject matter in the question or document. If that determination is made, Congress and the Executive Branch may engage in an "accommodations" process to resolve the dispute through a proffer of the information or *in camera* review in lieu of specific testimony or document production. If, however, the process does not satisfy Congress's legitimate needs, then Congress may contest the claim.

(U) The Committee anticipated that it could face executive privilege claims from Obama Administration officials who testified about actions they took as part of the National Security Council or conversations they had with President Obama about Russian interference. In practice, though, Obama Administration officials freely shared their conversations with then-President Obama and each other related to the Russia threat. The Committee heard testimony about Principal's Committees (PCs) and Deputy's Committees (DCs) from Susan Rice, Denis McDonough, Michael Daniel, Celeste Wallander, Jeh Johnson, Ben Rhodes, Samantha Power, Loretta Lynch, Sally Yates, and Lisa Monaco, among others. This testimony provided useful insights into the history of interactions between the Obama Administration and the Russian government, which informed the Committee's report.

2. (U) A Claimed Transition Privilege

(U) The Committee did not anticipate, however, the multitude of novel and unprecedented potential executive privilege claims from the WHCO on behalf of members of President-elect Trump's Transition Team and the Transition itself, for communications before Trump took office. The Committee was surprised by these assertions because they were made inconsistently and because they have no basis in law. The Committee's experience demonstrated the potential for abuse of executive privilege, particularly as it relates to impeding a Congressional inquiry.

i. (U) Executive Privilege for the Trump Administration Began at Noon on January 20, 2017

(U) The Committee's position is that executive privilege for President Trump began when he assumed Constitutional office, at noon on January 20, 2017. During the 2016–2017 Presidential Transition, President Obama was the person holding the Constitutional office of the President, and therefore the only person who could assert a Constitutional privilege for that period. When pressed for any legal precedent or any opinion from OLC that supported the

[21] (U) Memorandum, President Reagan to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for Information, November 4, 1992.

existence of executive privilege during the Transition, WHCO continually and solely relied on a letter from then-White House Counsel Don McGahn to then-House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) Chairman Devin Nunes.[22] McGahn's letter cites important principles of executive privilege pertaining to the President's communications with close advisers, mostly found in *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) and *In re Sealed Case,* 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).[23] McGahn's letter argues that because the Presidential Transition Act ("PTA") contemplates confidentiality during the Transition, and because Congress has tacitly implied a recognition that Administrations prepare to take office before Inauguration Day (by, for example, scheduling confirmation hearings for national security cabinet official designates), executive privilege pertaining to presidential communications must then apply during the Transition.[24]

(U) This argument contorts the PTA and common understandings of executive privilege, and the Committee could identify no additional basis to support it. The argument was particularly suspect as applied to an apparent foreign policy operation run by Transition officials who can claim no Constitutional authority to be conducting American diplomacy. To date, the only court to address the existence of a Transition privilege has rejected it.[25] Throughout the investigation, and still today, the Committee adheres to the view that a valid claim of executive privilege can only exist once a President has been sworn into office.

ii. (U) The WHCO's Approach was Inconsistent, and Waiver Could Have Occurred

(U) Throughout 2017, the Committee's engagements with former Transition officials and entities representing the Transition elicited no assertions of potential executive privilege over the Transition. For instance, the Committee interviewed Jared Kushner and Hope Hicks, both senior members of the Campaign, the Transition Team, and the Administration. These witnesses testified to the Committee freely and without any assertions related to executive privilege during the Transition period. During the Committee's initial document requests and conversations with the Trustees of the Transition, [26] those representatives of the Trustees made no explicit mention of executive privilege, instead using a boilerplate paragraph that acknowledged that "[a]ll documents and information are produced by TFA subject to, and without waiving, any and all applicable constitutional, statutory, and common law privileges."[27]

---

[22] (U) Letter, McGahn to Nunes, February 14, 2018 (provided to Committee Counsel by White House Deputy Counsel via email on March 29, 2018).
[23] (U) *Ibid.*
[24] (U) *Ibid.*; *see also* PTA, Pub. L. 88-277, as amended.
[25] (U) *Fish v. Kobach*, No. 16-2105-JAR-JPO, 17 WL 1920910, *5–6 (D. Kan. May 10, 2017).
[26] (U) The Trustees of the Transition is the custodial entity that maintained Transition records once the President took office.
[27] (U) *See, e.g.*, Letter, Langhofer to Burr and Warner, December 8, 2017.

(U) However, by March of 2018 and beyond, the Committee's interview and document requests to K.T. McFarland, Sarah Flaherty,[28] Stephen Miller, Avi Berkowitz, and Steve Bannon were all met by "potential assertions" of executive privilege during the Transition. After conversations with WHCO during these witness negotiations, the Committee inquired with Transition counsel about whether any of its documents had been withheld on a basis of executive privilege concerns, rather than just attorney-client concerns. After months of discussion with both WHCO and Transition counsel, in February, 2019, the Committee learned that the Transition Trustees had withheld documents based on a potential assertion of executive privilege.[29]

(U) The Trustees of the Transition provided their documents to the WHCO for review, in order to assess whether any documents could be candidates for an executive privilege assertion. This process took approximately four additional months. McFarland and Flaherty similarly used the WHCO to filter their document production to the Committee. Ultimately, 65 documents from the Transition, 32 documents from McFarland, and one document from Flaherty were withheld from production and proffered to Committee counsel, as described below.[30]

(U) Due to time constraints and the limits of the Senate's jurisdictional statute, as described above, the Committee did not litigate these claims of executive privilege during the Transition. Despite the potential of waiver and the unusual position of the WHCO related to executive privilege, the Committee worked with witnesses to scope questions in order to obtain the most essential information, and participated in an accommodations process with WHCO.

iii. (U) The "Accommodations" Process

(U) Although the Committee strenuously disagreed with the White House's view on the validity of asserting executive privilege for Transition activities, there were strategic reasons for agreeing to an accommodations process for its requests. By obtaining a preview of the documents, the Committee could assess whether it had obtained the purportedly privileged materials through other means; gain information to further evaluate its interest in pursuing litigation to obtain the withheld materials; and measure the strength of the executive branch's argument in favor of applying the privilege. The Committee was also cognizant that the statute governing jurisdiction for subpoena enforcement—in particular, the clause which excludes enforcement in the case of a government official asserting a government privilege—could limit the possibility of prevailing in litigation, meaning that its best option to gather information was through an accommodation. Finally, applicable legal precedent from the D.C. Circuit suggested

---

[28] (U) Flaherty was an aide to Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn and McFarland, detailed to the Transition.
[29] (U) Letter, Langhofer to Burr and Warner, February 22, 2017.
[30] (U) The 65 Transition documents include 32 documents that had been withheld and separately proffered during the McFarland accommodations process.

that even if the Committee disagreed with the White House's novel invocation of the privilege, prior to initiating an enforcement proceeding, the Committee should "take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular factual situation."[31]

(U) The WHCO offered Committee counsel an opportunity to inspect some of the withheld documents, and gave summaries at varying levels of detail for others. The process proved useful in some limited respects. Most notably, the Committee found that certain materials the White House sought to protect were already in its possession and also should not have been subject to a privilege claim. This arose, for example, with respect to documents produced by Sarah Flaherty. One of these documents was described to Committee counsel as an undated eight-paragraph memorandum with a sticky note dated January 9, 2017, from Flynn to McFarland stating: "re: [a foreign nation] for your consideration." The paragraphs were further summarized as follows:

- **(U)** 1: Discussion identifying foreign government internal personnel movements.
- **(U)** 2: Recitation of the author's assessment of the foreign government's view of areas of long-term strategic concern shared with the U.S.
- **(U)** 3: Assessment of the foreign government's view concerning the effect of post-1992 U.S. policies for both countries.
- **(U)** 4: Discussion of the author's view of challenges facing the President (broad), especially in the national security area.
- **(U)** 5: List of issues for the U.S. involving the foreign government and the author's observation regarding the degree of connection or non-connection to the foreign government.
- **(U)** 6: Expresses a need for a plan to make progress on strategic matters, not specifically tied to the foreign government.
- **(U)** 7: Author's assessment that the foreign government and the people of the foreign nation have substantial goodwill towards the President-elect.

---

[31] **(U)** *United States v. AT&T*, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

- (U) 8: Suggestion/proposal for possibilities of engagement with the foreign government.[32]

(U) According to the WHCO, the document was a candidate for privilege because it had been "prepared for and shared among the President-elect's senior advisors and concerns foreign policy and national security."[33] But the WHCO had taken this position without ascertaining key facts. For example, it could not identify the author of the document; where and in what format the document had resided when in Flaherty's possession; and whether the document was prepared for the President-elect or at his request or was ever shown to him. At minimum, it knew that the document did not contain any classified information.

(U) Based on the description, the Committee identified the memorandum as a document already in its possession, produced by Robert Foresman—who was not a member of the Campaign nor the Transition Team—and written to Flynn.[34] The Committee also knew from its investigation that Foresman had adapted a substantial part of the memorandum from another document shared by Allen Vine, who is an associate of the Putin-linked Russian oligarch Suleiman Kerimov.[35] The Committee's position was that the document could not be privileged: it was not drafted by a member of the Transition Team and had, in part, originated with a close associate of a Kremlin insider. Committee counsel informed the WHCO of the general contours of these facts (though not specific names or the details of how it had acquired the information). WHCO subsequently dropped its claim of potential executive privilege and produced the document to the Committee.

(U) As this experience illustrated, White House intervention significantly hampered and prolonged the Committee's investigative effort. Most importantly, some witnesses were directed by the White House not to turn over potentially privileged information—so they refused to produce materials without first handing them over to the White House for a privilege review, or refused to answer questions concerning the Transition without first consulting with the White House. As a result, the White House had a chance to review and control the information responsive to Committee requests before the Committee did, even though the Committee was seeking information from private citizens who could not themselves assert the privilege, and who were free to disregard the White House's directive.

(U) Witness testimony also proved to be a particular challenge. In addition to the noted White House inconsistency with respect to privilege during interviews, witnesses declined to respond to questions relating to the Transition without first getting permission from WHCO,

---

[32] (U) SSCI Memorandum, January 23, 2019.
[33] (U) *Ibid.*
[34] (U) Memorandum, Foresman to Flynn (RMF-SCI-00003003–3004).
[35] (U) For a complete discussion of this document, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.K.4.iv.

sometimes even in the middle of an interview. The WHCO suggested that the Committee could present its interview questions for consideration in advance. The Committee rejected this proposal because doing so would have exposed the full scope of the Committee's investigation to WHCO and compromised the Committee's commitment to confidentiality. Instead, interview questions relating to the Transition were saved until the end of the interview, at which time they were asked and then relayed by witness counsel over the phone to the WHCO for its direction. Then, the WHCO would advise witness counsel and Committee counsel of whether or not the witness could respond.

3. (U) Obstruction, Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Joint Defense Agreement

(U) Although there is no formal requirement for Congress to honor the attorney-client privilege,[36] the Committee respected all legitimate and properly-supported invocations of the privilege during its investigation as a matter of congressional discretion. Proper assertions of the privilege did not prove to be obstacles to the Committee's work. However, the Committee encountered dubious objections to its requests and questioning based on an undocumented and unproven "joint defense agreement."

(U) The existence of a joint defense agreement arose after Michael Cohen testified to the Committee on February 26, 2019, that his former attorney, Stephen Ryan, had in 2017 circulated drafts of Cohen's prior written statement to the Committee—a statement which included numerous false statements for which Cohen later pleaded guilty[37]—to attorneys for other witnesses in the Committee's investigation, and that these attorneys had been involved in revising the statement.[38] At the Committee's request, Cohen subsequently produced several of the communications in his possession, including six emails he had received from Ryan containing or forwarding proposed edits and redlines to his draft statement from third parties, between August 16 and August 25, 2017.[39]

---

[36] (U) *See, e.g.*, Glenn A. Beard, *Congress v. The Attorney-Client Privilege: A "Full and Frank Discussion,"* 35 Amer. Crim. L. Rev., 119, 122-27 (1997) ("[C]ongressional witnesses are not legally entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, and investigation committees therefore have discretionary authority to respect or overrule such claims as they see fit."). *See also* Ethics Opinion 288, *Compliance with Subpoena from Congressional Subcommittee to Produce Lawyer's Files Containing Client Confidences or Secrets*, Legal Ethics Committee, District of Columbia Bar, February 1999 (opining that an attorney is permitted to produce client confidences or secrets in response to a congressional subpoena if a congressional subcommittee overrules objections based on attorney-client privilege and threatens fines or imprisonment for non-compliance).

[37] (U) *See* Information, *United States v. Michael Cohen*, 18-CR-850, November 29, 2018.

[38] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Cohen, February 26, 2019, pp. 21–23 ("Cohen Tr. II"). Following an initial citation, this Report refers to transcripts using a short form citation of "Witness Tr." For witnesses who were interviewed a second time, such as Cohen, citations to the transcript of the second interview are identified as such by "Witness Tr. II."

[39] (U) *See, e.g.*, Email, Ryan to Cohen, August 21, 2017, attaching draft statement ("Attached please find the current version of the Moscow statement. We sort of accepted the changes from Alan and Abbe."); Email, Ryan to

(U) Based on Cohen's testimony and document production, the Committee pursued further evidence of involvement by other witnesses in his obstruction of the Committee's investigation. This issue was pertinent, if not central, to the Committee's work. The Committee needed to evaluate testimony and evidence it had received, including determining the veracity of that testimony, as part of establishing a record of the matter under investigation.

(U) From the documents produced by Cohen, the Committee became concerned that multiple witnesses and/or their counsel could have been involved in or aware of Cohen's attempt to mislead the Committee.[40] Indeed, at least two witnesses (Donald Trump Jr. and Felix Sater) could have known that Cohen's statement falsely represented material facts about negotiations over a deal for a Trump Tower Moscow. Further, Cohen told the Committee that following his initial testimony, he received a phone call from Sekulow, who told him that Trump "heard that you did great, and don't worry, everything's going to be fine. He loves ya."[41] Cohen also testified that after his initial interview, Sekulow mentioned "pardons" or "pre-pardons" for Cohen.[42]

(U) Accordingly, the Committee pursued additional communications made by Michael Cohen or Stephen Ryan to these attorneys or their clients, and by third parties to Cohen and Ryan. Normally, these communications would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege because they were shared with third parties, and hence no longer confidential.[43] Nonetheless, the Committee was informed that the materials it requested could not be provided because they were subject to a joint defense agreement (JDA).[44]

Cohen, August 22, 2017 ("Felix would like 'salesmanship' instead of 'puffing'. He confirmed factually [sic] accuracy of doc. Sekulow liked doc. Suggested we change all 'project' references to 'proposal'—I think that is ok. Alan G asked for a word version implying he had edits. No word from Abbe (picking a jury for Menendez today) and Alan F.").

[40] (U) Cohen Tr. II, p. 21 ("The statement that was drafted was circulated through all of the various individuals. They had read it. They knew the information was false.").

[41] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[42] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 73–76.

[43] (U) *See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.*, 756 F.3d 754, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (the privilege "applies to a *confidential communication between attorney and client* if that communication was made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice to the client") (emphasis added); *Permian Corp. v. United States*, 665 F.2d 1214, (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of such a privilege is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.") (*quoting United States v. AT&T*, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

[44] (U) *See, e.g.*, Letter, Woodward and Brand to Burr and Warner, April 4, 2019; SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Jared Kushner, February 28, 2019 ("Kushner Tr. II"); SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Donald Trump Jr., June 12, 2019 ("Trump Jr. Tr. II").

(U) Courts have recognized a narrow exception to the waiver rule when a communication is made pursuant to a valid JDA.[45] However, it is the proponent's burden to demonstrate both the existence of a JDA and that the JDA covers communications a party seeks to protect.[46] Further, a JDA does not provide a blanket immunity from congressional process. That burden must be satisfied on a communication-by-communication basis (such as on a privilege log), and not categorically.[47] That is, a party seeking to demonstrate the existence of a JDA must do so "by proof, not proclamation," with sufficient information to "show that at a specific time or times, 'a joint defense or strategy has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties and their respective counsel.'"[48]

(U) Because it is "in derogation of the search for truth,"[49] the joint defense privilege should be "narrowly construed."[50] The mere practice of cooperation or information sharing between parties does not, on its own, create a JDA.[51] Rather, there must be a "coordinated legal strategy."[52] And, to be ethical, the strategy—including the sharing of confidential information outside of the attorney-client relationship—should also be known to and authorized by the client.[53]

(U) The Committee questioned several witnesses and counsel to identify the nature of the JDA. No showing to substantiate its existence was made by any proponent of the privilege. All agreed that there was nothing written to document the JDA or any of its key features, such as when it began, who was included, and the JDA's purpose. Even if the JDA were a verbal agreement (valid under some case law), that would not excuse the participants from satisfying their obligation to prove its existence.

---

[45] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Weissman*, 195 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1999).
[46] **(U)** *See ibid.*
[47] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, *Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 162 F. Supp. 3d 145, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (privilege claimant must "establish factual predicate" for withholding documents under common interest doctrine); *Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist*, 362 F. Supp. 2d 407, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (privilege claimant "must show that the particular communication at issue was disclosed in connection with the joint legal defense").
[48] **(U)** *Jansson v. Stamford Health, Inc.*, 312 F. Supp. 3d 289, 304 (D. Conn. 2018) (internal citation omitted).
[49] **(U)** *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
[50] **(U)** *Weissman*, 195 at 100.
[51] **(U)** *Minebea Co. v. Papst*, 228 F.R.D. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2005). *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Krug*, 868 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2017) ("The mere fact that the communications were among co-defendants who had joined in a joint defense agreement is, without more, insufficient to bring such statements within the attorney-client privilege.").
[52] **(U)** *Minebea*, 228 F.R.D. at 16.
[53] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, Ethics Opinion 296, *Joint Representative: Confidentiality of Information*, Legal Ethics Committee, District of Columbia Bar, February 2000 (discussing need for attorney to obtain "clear authorization" to share one client's information with another client, "even when the discussion involves the subject matter of [a] joint representation," and noting that "[t]he guarantee of confidentiality of communication between client and attorney is a cornerstone of legal ethics").

(U) Several witnesses also appeared to be unaware of their participation in the purported JDA or its purpose.[54] Yet, according to some of their attorneys, the mere fact of a client's membership in the JDA was also privileged, frustrating even the Committee's basic efforts to understand its scope.[55]

(U) The Committee gained some clarity when, in response to a subpoena for documents, Ryan's counsel provided the Committee with a privilege log containing 553 communications by members of the purported JDA. The log indicated that the purported JDA covered communications beginning on or about June 20, 2017, with an email from Alan Garten to Stephen Ryan, and continuing through at least October 27, 2017, with an email from Alan Futerfas to Alan Garten, Stephen Ryan and Jay Sekulow. A notably flurry of activity immediately preceded Cohen's submission of his August written statement, and an additional burst of communications surrounded his October 25, 2017 testimony. Based on the names of counsel identified in the log, membership in the alleged JDA appeared to include, at least, Donald Trump, Donald Trump Jr., the Trump Organization, Jared Kushner, Ivanka Trump, Paul Manafort, the Trump Campaign, Keith Schiller, Hope Hicks, Michael Flynn, and Felix Sater.[56] However, the Committee was provided with no competent evidence to substantiate the JDA's existence by Ryan or anyone else.

(U) Due to time and resource considerations, the Committee opted not to further pursue its inquiry into potentially obstructive conduct under this alleged JDA umbrella. Doing so would have likely required initiating litigation over subpoena compliance, a process that may not have resolved in time to be of investigative value.

4. (U) Fifth Amendment and Immunity

---

[54] (U) For example, when Trump Jr. was asked whether he was a member of a JDA, his counsel interjected: "I think the discussions about the existence of a joint defense agreement should not be with Mr. Trump Jr. but perhaps between the lawyers." Trump Jr. then responded: "The reality is I may or may not have. I'm not 100% sure how that's done. You'll have to speak to counsel about it. . . . I don't know the details of it. . . . If I'm specifically in there, I'm not aware of that. . . . I'm not sure." Trump Jr. Tr. II, pp. 129–130. When McFarland was questioned about her participation in a JDA, her counsel similarly objected as to whether the question could be asked, and McFarland ultimately did not respond. SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Kathleen Troia ("K.T.") McFarland, March 8, 2018, pp. 220–222.

[55] (U) When Kushner was asked whether he was a member of a JDA, his counsel protested: "He can't answer that question . . . [b]ecause the existence of a joint defense agreement is part of a joint defense agreement." Kushner Tr. II, p. 26. Counsel later asserted, without citing any factually relevant authority, that membership in a JDA is privileged because disclosure of client's identity could in some other circumstances jeopardize confidential client communications. Email, Counsel to Committee, April 19, 2019. Specifically, counsel cited *In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-34*, 723 F.2d 447, 451–455 (6th Cir. 1983), which identifies three exceptions to the general rule, none of which were applicable in this situation.

[56] (U) Privilege Log, Stephen Ryan, April 24, 2019.

(U) Some witnesses asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to the Committee's document requests, interview requests, or both.[57] In several cases where individuals asserted that the act of searching for documents constituted a testimonial act that could be self-incriminating—as was the case with Flynn, for example—the Committee was able to subpoena documents from the individual's company because the Fifth Amendment is not available to corporations.[58] In other instances, the Committee's direct investigative activity stalled once a witness asserted his or her privilege against self-incrimination. The Committee did consider limited grants of immunity to specific witnesses, but ultimately decided against taking that step.

i. (U) How Congressional Immunity Works

(U) The modern immunity statutes, enacted in 1970, provide "use" and "derivative use" immunity for witnesses—evidence proffered in a criminal prosecution of an immunized witness cannot be either the direct or indirect result of the congressional testimony.[59] Once Congress, or a congressional Committee, subpoenas a witness, the witness has four options: (1) refuse to appear and risk being held in contempt; (2) appear, but refuse to answer questions and risk contempt; (3) appear and testify; or (4) appear and refuse to answer by asserting his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Of course, immunity can compel otherwise reticent witnesses to supply necessary information.[60]

(U) If the Committee is aware that the witness plans to assert his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, the Committee may vote to grant the witness immunity prior to subpoenaing testimony, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 and 18 U.S.C. § 6005. The request must be approved by two-thirds of the members of the full Committee. Specifically, the Committee vote is a vote to grant immunity and a vote for Senate Legal Counsel to seek immunity orders

---

[57] (U) Interestingly, some witnesses testified before the HPSCI or House Judiciary and Oversight Committees, but declined to testify in front of the Senate based upon assertions of a privilege against self-incrimination (*e.g.*, George Papadopoulos and Roger Stone). It is unclear to the Committee whether the parameters for testimony in the House were markedly different than those suggested by the Committee.

[58] (U) *See, e.g.*, *Braswell v. United States*, 487 U.S. 99, 104–113 (1988) (reviewing development of the Fifth Amendment's "collective entity rule").

[59] (U) *See* 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6005. It is important to note that "use" immunity differs from "transactional" immunity. A grant of transactional immunity protects the witness from any prosecution related to any transaction the witness discusses. Congress's earlier transactional immunity statutes resulted in witnesses taking "immunity baths" whereby they would use their Congressional testimony as a confessional to avoid future prosecutions. Howard R. Sklamberg, "Investigation Versus Prosecution: The Constitutional Limits on Congress's Power to Immunize Witnesses," 78 N.C.L. REV. 153, 158 (1999). *See also Kastigar v. United States*, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (holding that granting witnesses use immunity, rather than transactional immunity, was constitutional).

[60] (U) Congress can only hold a witness in contempt when that witness "refuses to answer any question pertinent to the subject under inquiry." 2 U.S.C. § 194. By asserting a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, the witness avoids a contempt charge.

from federal district court. As a prerequisite to the court granting immunity, the Committee must provide notice to the Attorney General ten days in advance of the testimony, which allows the Attorney General time to "can" any testimony or evidence, thus preserving it for any potential future prosecution.[61] The Attorney General can waive this notice provision.[62] After the notice period passes (or is waived), the Committee may then apply for an order of immunity from a federal district judge. The court must grant the order if the Committee has met the procedural requirements for immunity, although DOJ can request an additional 20-day waiting period.[63] After the court approves the immunity order, the witness can no longer assert his or her Fifth Amendment privilege. The court's role in Congressional immunity is purely ministerial; it must grant the order if the statutory requirements are met.

ii. (U) The Committee's Considerations and Interactions with DOJ

(U) The Committee attempted to interview Rick Gates, Mike Flynn, and George Papadopoulos, and to reengage Paul Manafort and Sam Patten.[64] All five individuals asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to subpoenas and/or voluntary requests for interviews.[65]

(U) In discussions prior to considering immunity in the fall of 2018, DOJ advised the Committee that it "could not support" immunity for any of these witnesses. On December 21, 2018, the Committee sent a letter signed by all 15 Members requesting that the Deputy Attorney General (who was also the Acting Attorney General for the Special Counsel's investigation during the tenure of then-Attorney General Sessions) appear before the Committee to discuss the Department's specific concerns. The Deputy Attorney General refused to appear, but indicated that he would send a letter outlining his concerns. On January 24, 2019, the Committee received a substantive email from DOJ's Office of Legislative Affairs explaining DOJ's objections and again promising an official letter from the Deputy Attorney General. On March 6, 2019, the Committee received a letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen Boyd. The March 6, 2019

---

[61] **(U)** 18 U.S.C. § 6005.

[62] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[63] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[64] **(U)** The Committee had a very limited engagement with Manafort prior to his indictment, and had an initial interview with Patten which resulted in referring him for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, for which he eventually pleaded guilty. Manafort and Patten both refused any further Committee engagement without immunity.

[65] **(U)** DC Bar Ethics Opinions 31 and 358 advise that committee counsel may not force a witness who has expressed his or her intention to assert a privilege against self-incrimination to appear if the sole purpose of that appearance is "to pillory the witness." Ethics Opinion 358, *Subpoenaing Witness When Lawyer for Congressional Committee Has Been Advised that Witness Will Decline to Answer Any Questions on Claim of Privilege; Legal Ethics Opinion 31 Revisited*, Legal Ethics Committee, District of Columbia Bar, February 2000. While other committees have found that calling witnesses whose counsel have asserted their privilege against self-incrimination on their behalf can lead to useful testimony, here, the Committee agreed to accept written assertions from witness counsel.

letter stated that granting immunity to any of the five individuals "would be harmful to the ongoing SCO Russia and Department investigations, and prosecutions, in multiple ways." The letter relied on case law on congressional grants of immunity and the heavy burden prosecutors face in *Kastigar* hearings to prove that evidence is not derived in any way from immunized testimony. Due to these concerns, the Department "urge[d] the Committee to wait" to compel immunized testimony "until after the active criminal matters are completed," although there was no date certain, or even estimate, for when that might be.[66]

(U) On March 14, 2019, the Committee held a business meeting to consider granting immunity to Manafort, Gates, Flynn, and Patten. The vote failed, and the Committee did not consider immunity again.

5. (U) Extraterritoriality

(U) The Committee sought to interview several witnesses who lived abroad. While the Committee did successfully conduct voluntary interviews abroad, there were limited options available to compel witnesses largely residing outside of the United States.

(U) The Committee's subpoena power is a Constitutional power embedded in Congress's inherent powers to investigate. However, subpoenas directed to non-U.S. persons located outside the United States presented jurisdictional complications as to service and enforcement. Accordingly, when necessary, the Committee sought to effect service of a subpoena during a foreign individual's U.S. travel, including through the assistance of the U.S. Marshals.[67]

(U) For individuals who did not travel to the United States, the Committee could have attempted to obtain a foreign government's assistance through a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) or letter rogatory, which enable a foreign court system to use its own compulsory process to get a witness to respond to the Committee's questions. These processes may require coordination with the Department of State, the foreign government, and in the case of a letter rogatory, a federal court. However, there is precedent for Congressional investigations to use these tools.[68] Finally, the Committee could have attempted to leverage international treaty

---

[66] (U) Letter, Boyd to Burr, March 6, 2019.

[67] (U) For example, the U.S. Marshals successfully served a Committee subpoena on Emin Agalarov, a Russian citizen, on February 20, 2020, in Newark International Airport as he was heading to New York City. Agalarov provided both documents and testimony pursuant to the subpoena.

[68] (U) The House Committee on Assassinations in the 1970s used letters rogatory, and the Iran-Contra Select Committee was authorized to use letters rogatory, though never actually did so. However, numerous Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are restricted to assistance in criminal cases, which would appear to preclude assistance in a congressional investigation.

obligations or ask a friendly government to assist in document production or service of process as a matter of comity.[69]

(U) Ultimately, the Committee did not pursue any compulsory action for witnesses located outside of the United States. On several occasions, the Committee was able to persuade witnesses from overseas to travel to the United States for an interview, to conduct a proffer through their attorneys, or to submit to an interview outside the United States. Despite these accommodations, several key witnesses remained outside of the Committee's reach.

6. (U) Committee Access to Electronic Communications Data

(U) On several occasions, the Committee's investigation required access to electronic communications data, including subscriber information and transactional metadata from electronic communications service providers. These providers are generally restricted from disclosing such information to a third party under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703, unless there is a statutory exception. For certain government entities, the SCA provides a companion mechanism to compel the production of information. However, no court has addressed whether the Stored Communications Act restricts Congress's independent authority to obtain such data as part of a duly authorized investigation. And, since the 1986 enactment of the SCA, the Committee was not aware of any congressional committee that had pursued the production of such data.[70] Accordingly, the Committee carefully considered whether the SCA precluded providers from voluntary disclosure of non-content information to Congress. Then, for those providers that declined voluntary production, the Committee also considered whether the SCA's procedures for compulsory production supplanted Congress's inherent subpoena authority.[71]

(U) The SCA establishes a hierarchy of protections for different categories of communications data depending on the perceived privacy interests. With respect to the contents of a communication, disclosure by a provider is generally prohibited to "any person or entity."[72] In contrast, for non-content information, such as basic subscriber data, session logs, or to/from addressing information, disclosure by a provider is only prohibited to "any governmental entity."[73] Specific statutory exceptions apply to each of these prohibitions.

---

[69] (U) In 1992, the House October Surprise Task Force secured cooperation from the French and U.K. governments in its inquiry.

[70] (U) The Committee has become aware that other congressional committees have since followed suit in pursuing these requests.

[71] (U) The Committee did not request the contents of any communications from providers, and therefore did not examine the SCA's applicability to such requests.

[72] (U) 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1)–(2).

[73] (U) 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3).

(U) Based on the statutory text, the Committee determined that the SCA did not restrict voluntary disclosure of non-content information. "Governmental entity" is defined by the U.S. Code, Title 18, as "a department or agency of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof."[74] Indisputably, Congress is not an "agency of the United States." "Agency" means "any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense."[75]

(U) Nor is Congress a "department." "Department" is defined as "one of the executive departments . . . , unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government."[76] The context to make this showing—the statutory text and related statutes—must be "fairly powerful,"[77] and it is not present here. Had Congress sought to limit its own access to this information, it could have done so expressly.[78] Thus, the Committee determined that there is no statutory prohibition against voluntary disclosure by a provider of non-content information in response to a Committee request. This interpretation was in keeping with the Committee's early experience with voluntary productions of information relating to Russian IRA troll accounts from companies like Facebook and Twitter, information which is discussed *infra* Vol. 2.

(U) Not all providers agreed to cooperate. Accordingly, the Committee considered whether the SCA's compulsory production mechanisms supplanted its inherent subpoena power. As discussed above, the congressional subpoena authority is an "essential and appropriate" exercise of Congress's broad investigative power, itself a necessary component to Congress's constitutional role. Appropriate exercise of the legislative function demands "the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it."[79] Congress does not strip itself of this authority lightly, and the Committee determined that it did not do so in enacting the SCA.

(U) The SCA provides a specific path for a "governmental entity" to compel production of data from providers, ranging from subpoenas, to court orders, to warrants based on probable cause. But, as with voluntary production, the statutory text does not encompass Congress

---

[74] **(U)** 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4).
[75] **(U)** 18 U.S.C. § 6.
[76] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[77] **(U)** *Hubbard v. United States*, 514 U.S. 695 (1995) (holding that "context" in 18 U.S.C. § 1001, then prohibiting a false statement "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States," did not extend prohibition to legislative or judicial branches) (overruling *United States v. Bramblett*, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955)).
[78] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (proscribing specific mechanisms to govern Congressional access to tax return information).
[79] **(U)** *McGrain v. Daugherty*, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).

because Congress does not qualify as a "governmental entity." Moreover, the legal authorities outlined by the SCA are ostensibly available only for law enforcement requesters as part of a criminal investigation; although Congress may issue a subpoena, Congress cannot apply for an order or warrant from a court, as the SCA requires. In this regard, Congress is like a private litigant which may use a civil subpoena to obtain data from a provider, and the Committee proceeded under those guidelines.

(U) Based on these considerations, the Committee issued subpoenas to, and received non-content data from, multiple providers—including social media platforms, telecommunications companies, and internet service providers—none of which contested the Committee's authority.

(U) As reflected in the Committee's report, many individuals related to aspects of its investigation used a variety of electronic communications and phone calls to communicate with one another. The data the Committee obtained offered insight into both general patterns of behavior and pivotal moments involving key actors, provided new leads for further investigation, and gave the Committee the ability to corroborate or rebut information it received from other sources. Like any modern-day investigation, the Committee was faced with a need for direct access to digital evidence, and it undertook deliberate but measured steps to secure data with significant investigative value. However, the Committee chose to limit its use of this tool and did not, for instance, seek the personal telephonic toll records of Americans except in very limited situations in which other avenues for investigation had been foreclosed.

7. (U) Other Issues: First Amendment and Spousal Privilege

(U) The Committee's document requests to Fusion GPS, Dan Jones, and Cody Shearer were met with assertions of First Amendment privileges, rooted in both freedom of press and freedom of association theories. While the Committee believed these assertions were overbroad, the Committee was able to obtain the necessary documents and responses it needed to continue its investigation without further litigating these issues.

(U) The Committee also encountered potential spousal privilege claims from Bruce Ohr and Nellie Ohr, both of whom were cooperative in discussing their conversations with each other, law enforcement, and their respective employers. The Committee appreciates their cooperation with the Committee's investigation.

8. (U) Transcript Review

(U) Senate Rule XI prohibits any "memorial or other paper presented to the Senate" to be "withdrawn from its files except by order of the Senate." Standing Rule XXVI 10(a) on Committee Procedure makes clear that "[a]ll committee hearings, records, data, charts, and files shall be . . . the property of the Senate." Thus, the Committee's transcripts are "Senate papers"

and prohibited from release without a Resolution passed by the full Senate. The Committee's practices regarding transcript review had two goals: (1) to maintain an accurate record of Committee interviews; and, (2) to provide transparency to witnesses and to law enforcement about how the transcripts would be shared.

(U) The Committee allowed witnesses, to the extent practicable, to review and edit transcripts of their interviews at SSCI offices once completed. Witnesses appearing before the Committee frequently relied on memory rather than documents, so the review allowed witnesses to correct names or dates they may have misremembered, but did not permit substantive amendments of the testimony. The Committee allowed witness counsel to be present during the review, but not to take notes, and only the witness was permitted to edit his or her testimony.

D. (U) Working With and Around the Executive Branch

1. (U) DOJ, FBI, and SCO

(U) Although the Committee sought to be respectful of DOJ, FBI, and SCO investigative equities, the Committee also had an investigative basis to review pertinent FBI holdings and to interview the same witnesses or review the same documents. This led the Committee to engage with DOJ and FBI as to how the Committee would obtain access to relevant information without impeding law enforcement. During the course of its investigation, the Committee obtained access to, among other information: the FISA applications for Carter Page; materials related to other confidential human sources; source validation and other documents related to Christopher Steele; and the case opening documentation for Crossfire Hurricane. However, the Committee's access was complicated by the relationship between FBI and the SCO. FBI information allocated to SCO was restricted and unavailable to the FBI writ-large, and hence could not be conveyed to the Committee until the SCO investigation had concluded.

(U) With respect to certain non-SCO information, the FBI Counterintelligence Division agreed to brief the Committee periodically on specific individuals that the Committee identified. These briefings were classified and conducted on the record in closed Committee spaces. As reflected in this Report, some briefings provided new and relevant information to the Committee. However, many of the briefings were not satisfactory due to SCO restrictions on access to relevant information. According to FBI Counterintelligence Division, SCO "equities" prevented more comprehensive briefings and document production. Moreover, the Committee did not obtain first-hand access to the underlying FBI records used in these briefings, but rather had to rely on briefers' characterizations of the underlying FBI records.

(U) This limitation eventually compelled the Committee to pursue direct access to SCO files. In November 2018, the Chairman and Vice Chairman met with officials from the DOJ and the SCO, including the Deputy Attorney General, to convey the Committee's need for the restricted SCO information. The DOJ officials stated that it would consider a written request that

identified specific information, and the Committee provided such a list on December 7, 2018.[80] The request covered information related to the five witnesses who had asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. DOJ never provided information in response, despite repeated follow-up requests.

(U) Instead, the Committee was left waiting until after the completion of the SCO's written report. On March 29, 2019, following the public release of a letter from Attorney General William Barr discussing the *SCO Report*, the Committee transmitted a request to the FBI Director "to be fully briefed, as soon as possible, on the SCO's holdings pertinent to Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. election, and on any FBI holdings previously withheld due to SCO equities," and to be "provide[d] copies of any written results of the SCO's counterintelligence work, and all supporting documentation underlying those findings, including any documentation of counterintelligence activities conducted by the FBI supporting the SCO investigation."[81] On May 9, 2019, the Committee followed up with a letter to the Attorney General requesting that DOJ provide, or authorize FBI to provide, "all information previously withheld due to SCO equities, all intelligence information and supporting documentation related to the SCO's investigation, and any documentation of counterintelligence activities conducted by the FBI supporting the SCO investigation."[82]

(U) Information arrived slowly and incrementally, but not in response to the Committee's request. On May 29, 2019, the Committee received a less-redacted version of Volume I of the Report—which excluded grand jury information but had lifted all other redactions—for review in Committee spaces. In June 2019, DOJ made available to the Committee certain SCO investigative materials for *in camera* review following a subpoena from the House. SCO materials, which were produced by DOJ (and later FBI) on a rolling basis over the following several months until February 2020, included FBI FD-302s documenting witness interviews; FBI FD-1057s documenting and disseminating analysis of investigative information; witness communications; and other related documents. Many documents included numerous redactions, and documents referenced as being in associated attachments to the FBI records (*i.e.*, so-called "1A" attachments to FBI files) were often not produced. The Committee was also not advised of how much information DOJ was intending to provide or when, or how much information was being withheld and why. Notably, at no point did DOJ and FBI agree to provide information relating to ongoing cases, such as the prosecution related to the IRA or the prosecution related to the GRU hackers. Nonetheless, the Committee endeavored to incorporate the available information in this Report, where relevant and appropriate. DOJ may continue to provide information to the Committee after the publication of this Report, or to produce such

[80] (U) Email, SSCI to Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, and SCO, December 7, 2018.
[81] (U) Letter, Burr and Warner to Wray, March 29, 2019.
[82] (U) Letter, Burr and Warner to Barr, May 9, 2019.

information publicly, which cannot be referenced here but will inform the Committee's ongoing legislative, oversight, and investigative activities.

2. (U) Access to and Use of Classified Materials in the Report

(U) The Committee requested and, following negotiations with the ODNI, received access to a classified space at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Headquarters building where it was given pertinent, classified materials in the IC's possession not otherwise available as part of regular Committee oversight. Access to those materials was highly restricted, even among investigative staff, and sometimes made available to staff directors only. A formal "Terms of Access" was agreed to on April 12, 2017, setting forth conditions and procedures for access to documents, staff notes, computer access, and preservation of documents.[83] The Committee also made use of classified materials otherwise available as part of its regular oversight mission.

[redacted] Due to the inclusion of classified information in its report, the Committee worked with the ODNI for classification review. Upon transmittal by the Committee, the ODNI shared the volumes first with the [redacted] and [redacted] and then disseminated selections for review by other departments or agencies that had classification equities over the information. The review provided the ODNI and relevant executive branch entities with the opportunity to consider whether information in the report was properly marked and, if classified, appropriately redacted for public release.

[83] (U) The Committee's access to this information is also described *infra* Vol. 4.

III. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS

A. (U) Paul Manafort

1. (U) Introduction and Findings

(U) Paul Manafort is a former lobbyist and political consultant with ties to numerous foreign politicians and businessmen, most notably in Russia and Ukraine. In March 2016, Manafort joined the Trump Campaign as convention manager. By May 2016, then-Candidate Trump officially elevated Manafort to be the Campaign's chairman and chief strategist. On August 19, 2016, following press articles related to his past work in Ukraine for a pro-Russia political party headed by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign.

(U) Manafort had direct access to Trump and his Campaign's senior officials, strategies, and information. During the campaign, Manafort worked closely with his long-time deputy, Rick Gates, who had similar access to Campaign personnel and information.

(U) While serving on the Trump Campaign, Manafort, often with the assistance of Gates, engaged with individuals inside Russia and Ukraine on matters pertaining to both his personal business prospects and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The Committee scrutinized these contacts in order to determine whether these activities were connected to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election.

(U) Manafort's connections to Russia and Ukraine began in approximately 2004. At that time, Manafort and his political consulting firm began work for Oleg Deripaska, a Russian oligarch. Deripaska conducts influence operations, frequently in countries where he has a significant economic interest. The Russian government coordinates with and directs Deripaska on many of his influence operations. From approximately 2004 to 2009, Manafort implemented these influence operations on behalf of Deripaska, including on a broad, multi-million dollar political influence campaign directed at numerous countries of interest to Deripaska and the Russian government.

(U) At about the same time that he hired Manafort, Deripaska introduced Manafort to pro-Russia oligarchs in Ukraine, including Rinat Akhmetov. These Ukrainian oligarchs had deep economic ties to Russia and were aligned with a pro-Russia political party which was backed by the Russian government. Over the next decade, these oligarchs paid Manafort tens of millions of dollars and formed strong ties with Manafort, independent of Deripaska. Manafort's work in Ukraine culminated with the 2010 election of Viktor Yanukovych to the presidency, bringing Manafort into the inner circle of Ukrainian politics until Yanukovych's flight to Russia in 2014.

(U) At the outset of his work for the Ukrainian oligarchs and for Deripaska, Manafort hired and worked increasingly closely with a Russian national, Konstantin Kilimnik. Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer. Kilimnik quickly became an integral part of Manafort's operations in Ukraine and Russia, serving as Manafort's primary liaison to Deripaska and eventually managing Manafort's office in Kyiv. Kilimnik and Manafort formed a close and lasting relationship that would endure to the 2016 U.S. elections and beyond.

(U) By the time he joined the Trump Campaign, Manafort's work in Ukraine had diminished and his relationship with Deripaska had long soured. In late 2015 and early 2016, however, Manafort remained engaged in business disputes related to both. Manafort believed he was owed millions of dollars by oligarchs in Ukraine for past political consulting work and sought to collect on this debt. Separately, Deripaska initiated legal proceedings to recover a multi-million dollar investment in a failed Manafort business venture. These financial disputes came at a time when Manafort had no meaningful income.

(U) In the midst of these disputes, Manafort used personal contacts to offer his services—unpaid—to the Trump Campaign as early as January 2016. The Campaign hired Manafort in mid-March 2016 after conducting no known vetting of him, including of his financial situation or vulnerability to foreign influence. Prior to the public announcement of Manafort's new position on the Campaign, Manafort reached out to Kilimnik, with whom Manafort had remained in contact, to notify him of the development. Once on the Campaign, Manafort quickly sought to leverage his position to resolve his multi-million dollar foreign disputes and obtain new work in Ukraine and elsewhere. Once Manafort's hiring was publicly announced, Manafort used Kilimnik to send private messages to three Ukrainian oligarchs—at least one of whom Manafort believed owed him money—and to Deripaska.

(U) On numerous occasions over the course of his time on the Trump Campaign, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik. Gates, who served as Manafort's deputy on the Campaign, aided Manafort in this effort. Manafort communicated electronically with Kilimnik and met Kilimnik in person twice while serving on the Trump Campaign. Manafort briefed Kilimnik on sensitive Campaign polling data and the Campaign's strategy for beating Hillary Clinton. At Manafort's direction, Gates used an encrypted messaging application to send additional Campaign polling data to Kilimnik.

[redacted] Manafort also discussed with Kilimnik a peace plan for eastern Ukraine that benefited the Kremlin. At Yanukovych's direction, Kilimnik sought Manafort's assistance with the plan. Manafort continued to work with Kilimnik on the plan until at least early 2018. Kilimnik coordinated directly with Yanukovych on the plan [redacted]

(U) The Committee was unable to reliably determine why Manafort shared sensitive internal polling data or Campaign strategy with Kilimnik. Manafort and Gates both claimed that it was part of an effort to resolve past business disputes and obtain new work with their past Russian and Ukrainian clients by showcasing Manafort's success.

(U) The Committee obtained some information suggesting Kilimnik may have been connected to the GRU's hack and leak operation targeting the 2016 U.S. election.

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

[redacted] While this information suggests that a channel for coordination on the GRU hack-and-leak operation may have existed through Kilimnik, the Committee had limited insight into Kilimnik's communications with Manafort and [redacted], all of whom used sophisticated communications security practices.

[redacted] After the election, Manafort continued to coordinate with Russian persons, particularly Kilimnik and other individuals close to Deripaska, in an effort to undertake activities on their behalf. After Kilimnik arranged the meeting, Manafort met in Spain with another top Deripaska aide who was also tied to [redacted] Manafort also met secretly with Kilimnik in the United States and Spain in early 2017.

[redacted] Following the election, Manafort worked with Kilimnik on narratives that sought to undermine information showing that Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. [redacted] Deripaska participated in these influence operations. Manafort and Kilimnik also continued to pursue the pro-Russia Ukraine peace plan Kilimnik had first raised with Manafort during their August 2016 meeting, including efforts to organize a poll testing the peace plan in the spring of 2018. [redacted]

(U) The Committee found that Manafort's presence on the Campaign and proximity to Trump created opportunities for the Russian intelligence services to exert influence over, and acquire confidential information on, the Trump Campaign. The Committee assesses that Kilimnik likely served as a channel to Manafort for Russian intelligence services, and that those services likely sought to exploit Manafort's access to gain insight into the Campaign. Taken as a whole, Manafort's high-level access and willingness to share information with individuals closely affiliated with the Russian intelligence services, particularly Kilimnik, represented a grave counterintelligence threat.

2. (U) Limitations on the Committee's Investigation

(U) The Committee's investigation into Manafort's activities related to Russia and Russian interference was materially limited in several respects.

(U) First, the Committee was unable to interview Manafort or Gates about most matters related to its investigation.[84] While the Committee initially received, through counsel, brief written answers from Manafort responding to a small number of written questions and limited document production, the statements included inaccuracies and omissions and the document production was incomplete. The Committee received a limited set of documents from Gates in 2019, but these did not include many communications relevant to the Committee's investigation.[85]

(U) Second, the use of careful communications security practices, particularly by Manafort, Gates, and Kilimnik, further restricted the Committee's insight. During the 2016

---

[84] (U) By prior agreement with the Committee, Manafort provided testimony limited to the June 9, 2016 meeting in Trump Tower, which is discussed *infra* Vol. 5, Sec.C.5. Subsequently, both Manafort and Gates asserted their Fifth Amendment rights in response to the Committee's inquiries.

[85] (U) Gates provided documents pursuant to a subpoena from the HPSCI. Gates produced these same documents to the Committee but refused to produce further documents or submit to an interview with the Committee.

campaign, Kilimnik flew to the United States in order to discuss sensitive topics with Manafort in person, rather than rely on electronic communications. When they did communicate electronically, Manafort, Gates, and Kilimnik used a variety of encrypted applications, eliminating a documentary record of many communications that almost certainly would have had high investigative value.[86] Manafort, Gates, and Kilimnik also shared an email account in order to practice foldering, a technique used to avoid detection when communicating.[87] The three used coded language in other, less secure communications.[88] After he was indicted, Manafort purchased a pay-as-you-go phone specifically for the purpose of communicating with Kilimnik and Gates.[89] In 2017, as news media began publishing details from a small number of Manafort's email communications with Kilimnik, Kilimnik admitted in private communications to close associate Sam Patten that he was not worried about the publication of his emails with Manafort because he and Manafort had long practiced communications security dating back to their work in Ukraine.[90]

---

[86] (U) Manafort recalled using Viber, Signal, and WhatsApp with Kilimnik. FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/12/2018. In addition, Gates recalled using Threema with Manafort and Kilimnik. According to Gates, it was Kilimnik who had introduced some of these applications, including Viber and Threema, to Manafort and Gates. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018. Gates explained that the group often changed which encrypted application they were using when Kilimnik told them that a particular application had been compromised. FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/27/2018. Manafort admitted to using WhatsApp, Wickr, Signal, Threema, Skype, Snapchat, Viber, Hushmail, WeChat, and Voxer at some point in time with various associates. FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/20/2018. Manafort maintained a laptop computer that he used in Ukraine but did not connect to the internet while overseas. Gates and Manafort used multiple email accounts and changed them regularly. Gates and Manafort also used Silent Phone briefly in Ukraine. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.

[87] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/12/2018. Foldering is a technique in which individuals write an email and save the email as a draft in an email account accessible by both communicants, allowing them to communicate without sending the email. Manafort and Kilimnik appeared to use foldering on a Kilimnik-controlled account while Manafort served on the Trump Campaign. *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 130. Manafort, Gates, and Kilimnik later set up a Hushmail account specifically for the purpose of foldering communications. FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/12/2018; FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.

[88] (U) For example, when one wanted to notify the other that a foldered message was ready to be viewed, Manafort, Gates, and Kilimnik would tell the others to check the "tea bag" or "the updated travel schedule." FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/27/2018. The Committee only had access to the communications platforms the group deemed less secure, and the Committee's access into even these less secure communications platforms was incomplete.

[89] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/12/2018. Manafort had previously used a similar technique with Gates and Kilimnik in Ukraine. According to Gates, Manafort required new phone numbers to be issued after DMP was allegedly hacked. Gates and Manafort referred to certain phones maintained by Gates, Manafort, and Kilimnik as "bat phones." The "bat phones" were normal phones, but had different phone numbers. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.

[90] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, September 20, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000039–40). In response to press articles which revealed communications between Kilimnik and Manafort, Kilimnik advised Patten that he and Manafort had assumed that their "phones, hotel rooms, office, etc." were surveilled during their past work together and that as a result, Manafort "is kind of used to this life."

(U) Lastly, Manafort, who was interviewed by the SCO approximately a dozen times, lied consistently to the SCO during these interviews about one issue in particular: his interactions with Kilimnik, the Russian intelligence officer at the center of the Committee's investigation.[91] These lies violated Manafort's plea agreement, which obligated him to be truthful in his cooperation with the government, and exposed him to a more severe prison sentence than the agreement contemplated.[92] Manafort's obfuscation of the truth surrounding Kilimnik was particularly damaging to the Committee's investigation because it effectively foreclosed direct insight into a series of interactions and communications which represent the single most direct tie between senior Trump Campaign officials and the Russian intelligence services. Manafort's true motive in deciding to face more severe criminal penalties rather than provide complete answers about his interactions with Kilimnik is unknown, but the result is that many interactions between Manafort and Kilimnik remain hidden.

3. (U) Background on Manafort's Foreign Activities

(U) Starting in the 1970s, Manafort began working as a political consultant and lobbyist for foreign governments and political parties around the world, business that he continued to conduct for decades.[93] A review of Department of State cables showed that the nature of Manafort's work with foreign governments and politicians involved efforts to gain electoral success for local clients, or in some cases, conduct business.[94]

---

[91] (U) The federal court hearing Manafort's case in the District of Columbia found that Manafort's misleading statements about Kilimnik occurred in "multiple instances . . . and they all follow a pattern." In particular, the court found that "[c]oncessions come[] in dribs and drabs, only after it's clear that the Office of Special Counsel already knew the answer." Transcript of Sealed Hearing, *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, Case No. 17-201-1-ABJ (D.D.C. February 13, 2019), p. 29. Of particular note, Manafort misled investigators about meeting with Kilimnik in Madrid and Kilimnik's efforts to advance a Ukraine peace plan involving Yanukovych. Beyond these false or misleading statements, the court found that Manafort engaged in "multiple clusters of false or misleading or incomplete or needed-to-be-prodded-by-counsel statements, all of which center around the defendant's relationship or communications with Mr. Kilimnik." *Ibid.*, p. 40. Additionally, Sam Patten, another key witness in the investigation due to his close relationship with Kilimnik, similarly engaged in conduct designed to obfuscate his relationship with Kilimnik. Patten withheld and deleted documents related to Kilimnik that were relevant to the Committee's investigation. During the execution of a search warrant on Patten's home, Patten used his wife's phone to send a text message to Kilimnik and then deleted the message. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[92] (U) Plea Agreement of Paul J. Manafort, Jr., *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, Case No. 17-201-1-ABJ (D.D.C. September 14, 2018), p. 6.

[93] (U) As early as 1973 or 1974, Manafort was in Lebanon working to get business for a construction company in Saudi Arabia. *See* SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Tom Barrack, May 31, 2018, pp. 13–14.

[94] [redacted] Additionally, open source information suggests Manafort or his firm conducted similar foreign political consulting for other foreign governments, such as in Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, the Philippines, Angola, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia. *See* Franklin Foer, "Paul Manafort, American Hustler," *The Atlantic*, March 2018.

(U) The Committee limited its investigation of Manafort and his associates to areas related to Russia and Russian-aligned interests. The most significant of Manafort's Russian-aligned interests centered on two overlapping areas: (1) Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and (2) politicians affiliated with the now-defunct Party of Regions (PoR) and its successor, the Opposition Bloc (OB), in Ukraine. In pursuing these relationships, Manafort conducted influence operations that supported and were a part of Russian active measures campaigns, including those involving political influence and electoral interference. These past activities resulted in relationships and levers of influence, including multi-million dollar financial disputes, which persisted throughout Manafort's time as the head of the Trump Campaign. Furthermore, Manafort sought to secretly contact both Deripaska and Ukrainian oligarchs affiliated with the OB in connection with his work on the Trump Campaign. Manafort reached out to both entities before, during, and after his time on the Trump Campaign to provide inside information and offer assistance to these Russian-aligned interests.

i. (U) Manafort's Work with Oleg Deripaska

(U) Manafort's relationship with Russian government-aligned interests began with his introduction to Oleg Deripaska in approximately 2004. Since at least that time, Deripaska has acted as a proxy for the Russian state and intelligence services. Deripaska has managed and financed Kremlin-approved and -directed active measures campaigns, including information operations and election interference efforts. Deripaska has conducted these activities in an effort to install pro-Kremlin regimes, control local economies and politicians, and strengthen Kremlin-aligned powerbrokers across the globe.[95]

(U) The Committee has limited insight into the origins of Manafort's relationship with Deripaska, but it likely began in 2004.[96]

- [redacted]

---

[95] (U) For a complete description of Deripaska's involvement in Russian active measures and ties to the Russian intelligence services, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.8.i.

[96] (U) Open source information suggests that Manafort's work for Deripaska also involved Georgia as early as 2004. According to that information, Manafort undertook efforts related to the political reemergence of former Georgian Minister of State Security Igor Giorgadze. Giorgadze had previously been removed from office after being accused of organizing an attempted assassination of the then-Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze. *See* Brett Forrest, "Paul Manafort's Overseas Political Work Had a Notable Patron: a Russian Oligarch," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 30, 2017.

[97] [redacted]

- (U) Michael Caputo, a former employee of a firm run by Manafort and several others, including Roger Stone, told the Committee that in 2004, Manafort hired him on a Deripaska-related project. In particular, Caputo told the Committee that he was retained to organize U.S. media coverage that would be positive towards Deripaska in response to Deripaska's failed efforts to obtain a U.S. visa.[98]

(U) Manafort recalled that he met Deripaska through his business partner at the time, Rick Davis.[99] Davis had met Deripaska in 2003 through Nathaniel Rothschild, a British investment fund manager and scion of the Rothschild banking dynasty.[100] According to open source information, Rothschild and Deripaska have had a relationship since at least 2003.[101] Press reports further suggest that the relationship between the two men helped Deripaska secure the financing needed to cement his control of UC RUSAL in the early- to mid-2000s.[102]

a. (U) Manafort's Influence Operations in Ukraine

[redacted] At the time he hired Manafort, in approximately 2004, Deripaska [redacted] These Russian influence efforts were designed to influence the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election between PoR-candidate Viktor Yanukovych and independent candidate Viktor Yushchenko in Yanukovych's favor.[103] On November 21, 2004, after a runoff vote, Ukraine's Central Election Commission announced Yanukovych as the winner.[104] The election, however, was widely viewed as illegitimate due to

---

[98] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Caputo, May 1, 2018, p. 33. Caputo claimed he was engaged in this effort for only a 10-day period. Caputo recalled his instructions from Manafort related to Deripaska press efforts: "We need stories. Focus on wires." Caputo further recalled that he "went out there and just, excuse my French, humped every leg in journalism, and didn't get much results." *Ibid.*, p. 48. The full scope of Manafort's public relations activities on Deripaska's behalf remains unclear.

[99] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/20/2018.

[100] (U) *Ibid.*

[101] (U) "Rothschild to earn millions from RUSAL float," *The Telegraph*, January 2, 2010.

[102] (U) United Company (UC) RUSAL is a Russian company that primarily produces aluminum and related products. According to other open source reporting, Rothschild and Deripaska were central figures in British political scandals involving Peter Mandelson, a former Member of Parliament who served as European Commissioner for Trade from 2004 to 2008. In 2008, Mandelson met with Deripaska on his yacht in the Mediterranean, where they allegedly discussed preferential treatments on aluminum tariffs. In January 2005, Mandelson traveled on private jets from Davos, Switzerland, to Moscow, Russia, and then on to a private Deripaska retreat in Siberia. Rothschild was a participant in these meetings. *See, e.g.*, "The Russian oligarch, the Old Etonian billionaire and deeply disturbing questions about Lord Mandelson's integrity," *Daily Mail*, February 11, 2012.

[103] (U) Prior to the election, Russian government officials had overtly supported Yanukovych and the PoR, and Putin personally visited Yanukovych five days before the election, praising his government. *See, e.g.*, "Putin, In Ukraine, Praises Government Days Before Election," *RFE/RL*, October 26, 2004.

[104] (U) *See* Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), "Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report," May 11, 2005.

widespread fraud. Efforts to interfere in the election were systematic and included: intimidation of election monitors, fraud, ballot stuffing, multiple voting, government pressure on voters, denial of media access, media control and manipulation, disruptions of public rallies, official harassment, beatings and arrests of hundreds of students and activists, and a likely attempt on the life of the front-running opposition candidate.[105]

[redacted] The Russian government had significant involvement in these election interference efforts, and used heavy-handed political influence tactics.[106] [redacted]

[redacted] Russian electoral interference in Ukraine generated severe blowback, leading to a series of popular protests known as the Orange Revolution, which reversed Yanukovych's alleged electoral victory. Manafort in a memorandum at the time described the Orange Revolution and the defeat of Yanukovych as a "disaster."[110] [redacted][111]

(U) In the immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Deripaska contacted Manafort and directed him to begin work to rehabilitate Yanukovych and the PoR. Manafort briefed Deripaska on how to recover from this defeat and influence Ukrainian politics in a manner beneficial to both Deripaska and the Kremlin.[112]

---

105 [redacted] Freedom House, "Election Fraud in Ukraine Presidential Vote," November 22, 2004. [redacted]

106 [redacted] Richard Weitz, "Global Security Watch: Russia," p. 89. [redacted]

107 [redacted]

108 [redacted]

109 [redacted]

110 [redacted]

111 [redacted]

112 [redacted]

(U) Under Deripaska's guidance, Manafort outlined for Deripaska and Rothschild a strategy for a political influence campaign in Ukraine. Manafort referred to this influence campaign as "our program."[113] Manafort described how the program would be a broad system for influence with distinct political, lobbying, communications, and legal components.[114] The Ukraine program was, according to Manafort's memorandum, undertaken "pursuant to the directives of Mr. Deripaska" and in support of "our mutual friend in Ukraine,"[115] almost certainly a reference to Rinat Akhmetov, to whom Deripaska had previously introduced Manafort and his firm, Davis Manafort Partners.[116] Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest oligarch, was the primary backer of Yanukovych and maintained close ties to Deripaska and other Russian government and organized crime figures.[117] Akhmetov and other oligarchs in Ukraine began funding Manafort's work there, while Deripaska provided Manafort other funding and strategic guidance as part of a broader influence campaign.[118]

(U) Manafort's objective was to avoid future events like the Orange Revolution. To do this, Manafort sought to sway the political direction of Ukraine to benefit the PoR without the heavy-handed tactics that Russia and Deripaska had used in 2004.[119] This involved a strategy to "subtly influence the perceptions" of Western governments and create "an acceptable explanation for actions by governments not totally in concert with Western thinking."[120] Manafort outlined this goal in a 2005 memorandum to Deripaska and Rothschild:

---

[113] [redacted]

[114] (U) *Ibid.*

[115] (U) *Ibid.*

[116] [redacted] *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 132; *see also* SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Bo Denysyk, June 12, 2018, p. 10 ("I asked him that. He was very vague. He said through some mutual friends in Moscow. But that's all I know."); [redacted]

[117] [redacted] *See, e.g.*, Maximilian Hess, "Ukraine's Donbas Don: Who is Rinat Akhmetov," January 29, 2020. [redacted]

[118] (U) The exact funding structure at this time is unclear, but by 2005, and proceeding thereafter, Manafort made millions of dollars from Akhmetov, Deripaska, and other oligarchs.

[119] (U) Memorandum, Manafort and Davis, to Deripaska and Rothschild, June 23, 2005. In December 2004, Kilimnik had written a separate memorandum to Manafort that similarly concluded that Russia's harsh tactics in 2004 were not as effective as western tactics at playing the "modern game" of political influence where perceptions matter more than reality. Kilimnik noted to Manafort in the memorandum that Russia would "lose if they don't learn how to play this game." *See* "Russian charged with Trump's ex-campaign chief was key figure in pro-Russia strategy," *Associated Press*, July 3, 2018.

[120] (U) *Ibid.*

[W]e are confident that we can create the protections needed to ensure the avoidance of Orange Revolutions becoming acceptable in the West. The key is to understand the West and to use their tools to deal with the specific problems in ways that the West believes is in concert with them. Rather than attacking the West, the correct strategy can be created to embrace the West and in so doing restrict their options to ferment an atmosphere that gives hope to potential advocates of a different way.[121]

[redacted] Consistent with the detailed plan for influence outlined by Manafort in his briefing to Deripaska, Russia shifted its focus from direct and overt interference in Ukrainian politics toward a more subtle approach.[122] [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Connections between Manafort's program in Ukraine and Russia's own influence efforts there suggest that they were effectively part of the same campaign to undermine the Ukrainian government and support pro-Russia candidates. Both involved Deripaska and supported the PoR. Documentary information also suggests that Manafort intended to brief the Kremlin on his activities in Ukraine and understood that his activities benefited the Kremlin.[124] In his memorandum to Deripaska, Manafort stated that "we are now of the belief that this model can greatly benefit the Putin Government if employed at the correct levels with the appropriate commitments to success."[125] Manafort later explained that Deripaska needed specific talking points for Putin related to the Ukraine program, which the memorandum provided.[126]

b. (U) Manafort's Global Influence Operations For Deripaska

---

[121] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[122] **(U)** *See, e.g.,* Steven Pifer, "Averting Crisis in Ukraine," Council on Foreign Relations, January 2009, p. 35.
[123] [redacted]
[124] [redacted]
[125] [redacted]
[126] **(U)** FBI, FD-302 Manafort 9/21/2018.

(U) Manafort's work for Deripaska went beyond Ukraine and extended to matters of interest to Deripaska "worldwide."[127] Gates recalled that Manafort and Deripaska used to meet regularly and had a number of different projects ongoing.[128] This included a political influence program which Deripaska financed.[129] As part of this program, Manafort worked on influence efforts in Central Asia, Cyprus, Georgia, Guinea, Montenegro, and elsewhere in Europe.[130] Deripaska financially backed candidates in many of these countries and hired Manafort and his firm to do the on-the-ground political consulting to support these efforts.[131] Deripaska used an offshore entity to pay Manafort and his firm tens of millions of dollars for this and other work, including at least $25 million in 2008 alone.[132]

(U) According to Gates, whom Manafort hired to work on the Deripaska-directed projects starting in approximately 2007, the aim of Manafort's influence work for Deripaska was to install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.[133] However, Deripaska's work on behalf of the Kremlin included Deripaska's use of his own personal wealth for Kremlin-directed projects, blending Deripaska's interests and those of the Russian state.[134] Manafort's influence work for Deripaska was, in effect, influence work for the Russian government and its interests.

(U) An example of the overlap between Russian-directed influence efforts and those where Deripaska had a personal interest—and employed Manafort to advance both—is Montenegro. Deripaska first became involved in Montenegro in a significant way through his purchase of a majority stake in Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica (KAP), Montenegro's largest exporter, which at one point was responsible for approximately half of the country's economic output. The sale occurred as a result of a 2005 Montenegrin government-controlled privatization and required Montenegrin government approval.[135] Deripaska's purchase, however, was not purely a private business matter and was instead backed by the Russian government.

---

[127] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Adam Waldman, November 3, 2017, p. 102. As noted above, Manafort also undertook influence efforts in the United States on Deripaska's behalf, including assisting Deripaska in obtaining a U.S. visa. *See* FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018. Gates recalled that a Manafort-controlled Cypriot account, LOAV, contributed money to 501c(4) entity that supported the John McCain presidential campaign. Gates stated that the money was from Deripaska. FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/28/2018. Continued Deripaska influence efforts in Guinea are described *infra* Vol. 5, Sec III.A.8.i.

[128] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.

[129] (U) *Ibid.* Gates recalled that part of the Deripaska program was named "Eurasia 21."

[130] (U) *See, e.g.,* [redacted]; FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018; [redacted]; FBI, FD-302, Gates 3/12/2018.

[131] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.

[132] (U) *Ibid.*

[133] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 131.

[134] (U) *See also infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.8.i.

[135] (U) "Russia's Deripaska sues Montenegro for lost aluminum investment," *Reuters*, December 7, 2016.

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

(U) Deripaska expanded his own influence in Montenegro and furthered Russian government efforts to exert influence over the country, which Deripaska executed in part by hiring Manafort and his firm.

- [redacted]

- (U) Deripaska hired Manafort and his firm to work on the Montenegrin independence referendum.[140] Manafort's firm sent a team led by Manafort's partner Rick Davis to Montenegro.[141] Manafort and his firm worked with, and became internal consultants to, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic but billed and reported to Deripaska.[142]

- (U) Manafort and his team kept Deripaska informed of operational details, and Deripaska provided direction to Manafort and coordinated with him on actions Deripaska would conduct personally to assist in the influence campaign. For example, one document prepared by Manafort stated that Deripaska should, as a "follow up" to recent

---

136 [redacted]
137
138
139
140
141 (U) *Ibid.*
142 (U) *Ibid.* Since that time, Deripaska has sought to control the Montenegrin government and influence its policies toward Kremlin-aligned objectives. Most recently, this took the form of directly supporting a GRU-run coup attempt in the country in 2016, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.8.i.

activities undertaken by Manafort and his firm on the ground in Montenegro, "organize negotiations with key opposition leaders."[143]

[redacted]

(U) These operations may have been directly related to the Russian intelligence services.

[redacted]

c. (U) Konstantin Kilimnik

(U) Starting in likely late 2004, Konstantin Kilimnik began to work for Manafort in Ukraine and elsewhere on Deripaska-related projects.[146] Kilimnik attended the Russian military's language institute and served in the Russian military until at least 1995. From 1995 to 2005, Kilimnik was an employee at the International Republican Institute (IRI), serving in IRI's Moscow office.[147] Kilimnik began working alongside Manafort in Ukraine secretly while still an employee of IRI in Moscow.[148] Once this was discovered, IRI fired Kilimnik, and Kilimnik became a formal employee of Manafort's firm.[149]

(U) Open source information also suggests that, in 2004, Kilimnik began working in Ukraine for Deripaska in support of Yanukovych's election.[150] According to that report, Kilimnik traveled to Ukraine while he was still working at IRI.[151] Allegations that Kilimnik was

---

[143] (U) *Ibid.*

[144] [redacted] At the time, Shoygu was the Russian Minister of Emergency Situations and is now the Minister of Defense. Sergey Lavrov was and remains the Russian Foreign Minister. Both men have been longtime members of Putin's inner circle.

[145] [redacted]

[146] (U) Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.8.ii.

[147] (U) IRI Semi-Annual Report (IRI Production) ("Konstantin Kilimnik continues to serve in his role as acting director of the Moscow office").

[148] (U) Email, Sibley to Nix, September 7, 2018 (IRI Production).

[149] (U) *Ibid.*

[150] (U) Maria Zholobova and Roman Badanin, "The Absolute Soviet Man. A Portrait of Konstantin Kilimnik, Russian patriot and Paul Manafort's buddy," *Proekt*, August 22, 2018.

[151] (U) *Ibid.*

in Ukraine around the time of the elections are supported by IRI records, which suggest Kilimnik was present in the country for approximately seven days during the first round of voting.[152]

Экз 2 : Бухгалтерия

Организация ЗАО "Тревел Сити" ИНН: 7706237149/770501001

Юридический адрес: 115054, г. Москва, ул. Щипок, д. 11, стр1., тел.: 787-7274

РАСХОДНАЯ НАКЛАДНАЯ № 35739 от 21.10.2004

Агент: ТКП Форма оплаты: Касса

Покупатель: Международный республиканский ин Получил: Килимник Константин Викторович

№	Маршрут/Пассажир	№ билета	Класс	Кол	Тариф	Таксы	Сумма по билету	Скидка	Всего
1	Москва-Киев-Москва KILIMNIK KONSTANTIN VICTOROVICH	АЕ1002250302	Эконом	1	4 750,00	1 103,00	5 853,00		5 853,00
2	Услуги агентства			1	-	-	120,00	-	120,00
					4 750,00	1 103,00	5 973,00		5 973,00
								Итого к оплате:	5 973,00

Всего к оплате: Пять тысяч девятьсот семьдесят три рубля 00 копеек

в т.ч. НДС: Восемьсот пять рублей 31 копейка

Отпустил _____ Иванова Елена Александровна Получил _____

ПРИ ОПЛАТЕ ЧЕРЕЗ БАНК ПРОСИМ УКАЗЫВАТЬ НОМЕРА НАКЛАДНЫХ В ПЛАТЕЖНЫХ ПОРУЧЕНИЯХ!!!

While the exact start of Kilimnik's relationship with Manafort and Deripaska is unknown, IRI fired Kilimnik for moonlighting for Manafort's firm shortly after this travel.[153]

(U) Kilimnik began working for Manafort no later than early 2005, and likely as early as late 2004.[154] Over time, Kilimnik became increasingly integral to Manafort's operation and helped steer Manafort through the details and political environment in Ukraine.[155] Manafort worked long hours with Kilimnik and often ate meals together.[156] Gates described Manafort and Kilimnik as having a "close relationship."[157] Manafort sometimes went to Kilimnik's house for dinner and knew Kilimnik's family.[158]

---

[152] **(U)** IRI-002668 (a travel agency booking for Kilimnik's travel from Moscow to Kyiv, booked October 21, 2004) (pictured); *see also* IRI-002667 (an IRI travel form listing Kilimnik's travel to Kyiv from October 27, 2004 to November 3, 2004, which includes the first round of voting the in Ukrainian presidential election on October 31, 2004); IRI-002675. Records suggest Kilimnik provided a variety of reasons to IRI for this travel, including consultations with IRI officials and serving as an election observer. *See* IRI-002667; IRI-002675.

[153] **(U)** Email, Sibley to Nix, September 7, 2018 (IRI Production).

[154] **(U)** *See* "Russian charged with Trump's ex-campaign chief was key figure in pro-Russia strategy," *Associated Press*, July 3, 2018.

[155] **(U)** SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Sam Patten, January 5, 2018, pp. 19–20.

[156] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

[157] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018.

[158] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

(U) Kilimnik has long maintained close ties to Deripaska and his inner circle.[159] Since at least 2005, Kilimnik worked on Deripaska-related projects with Manafort in Ukraine, Montenegro, and elsewhere.[160] A July 2006 memorandum from Manafort to Deripaska proposed that Manafort's firm create an office in Moscow to be managed by Kilimnik. According to the plan, the Moscow office run by Kilimnik could transfer its public relations functions to a division within one of Deripaska's companies managed by Georgy Oganov, a top Deripaska aide.[161]

[redacted]

d. (U) Pericles

(U) Manafort's work with Deripaska also included a joint business venture known as Pericles Emerging Market Partners L.P., a private equity fund designed to be focused on foreign investment in eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, Russia, and Montenegro.[163] Deripaska was the sole investor in this fund through a company Deripaska controlled, B-Invest.[164] Manafort formed the fund with Rick Davis, his then-business partner.

---

[159] (U) Gates believed Kilimnik may have had a direct line to Deripaska. *See* FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018. Kilimnik retained this close relationship for years after Manafort's initial work with Deripaska ceased. According to Patten, Kilimnik has met with Deripaska and Deripaska associates, including Boyarkin. Patten understood that Kilimnik was in continuous contact with Deripaska and his inner circle. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[160] (U) *See, e.g.*, Work Proposal, "Keeping Guinea on Course" (SP_OSC_000990) (describing Kilimnik as having "managed successful political operations for Ukraine's ruling party, prime minister and president from 2005-2014," and having worked as a "senior member of campaign team for successful referendum for independence in Montenegro in 2006 and several other parliamentary and presidential campaigns."); FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

[161] [redacted] Kilimnik maintained a contact entry for Oganov with email and telephone information. Oganov is a longtime employee of Deripaska and is associated with [redacted] *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. A.8.i.c.

[162] [redacted]

[163] (U) Confidential Offering Memorandum, Pericles Emerging Market Partners, L.P., December 2006, at 1.

[164] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 131; [redacted]

(U) Gates recalled that Kilimnik assisted him on matters related to Deripaska, including serving as Manafort's point of contact with Deripaska's side of the deal for Pericles.[165] Gates recalled traveling to Russia with Kilimnik to meet with Deripaska's representatives there in relation to B-Invest.[166] However, Gates stated that Manafort at one point did not want to tell Kilimnik about Pericles because he was worried that Kilimnik would share information about Deripaska's fund with other oligarchs.[167]

[redacted] Prior to the formation of Pericles, Deripaska introduced Manafort to Kypros Chrysostomides, a Cyprus-based businessman known as "Dr. K" who specialized in the formation of offshore business entities.[168] Chrysostomides and his companies assisted Manafort and Deripaska in setting up loans to disguise income in Cypriot businesses and avoid Cypriot taxes; these efforts included Pericles.[169] Chrysostomides also helped Manafort set up bank accounts and shell companies[170] which formed the basis of Pericles. Manafort ultimately controlled the accounts in Cyprus.[171] [redacted]

[redacted]

[165] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018. Later, after the filing of a winding up petition in which Kilimnik was named as a participant in Pericles, Kilimnik claimed that when Pericles started in 2007, Kilimnik was working for Manafort and living in Moscow and that he had "zero involvement in this thing, did not even manage translation of documents." Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 17, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000426-428).

[166] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018. Kilimnik later privately disputed his involvement in Pericles. Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 17, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000426–428).

[167] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018.

[168] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

[169] [redacted]

[170] (U) *Ibid.* Chrysostomides used his company, Dr. K. Chrysostomides & Co LLC (DKCC) to create at least three shell companies on behalf of Manafort, Gates, and Deripaska—Lucile Consultants Limited, Bletilla Ventures Limited, and Yiakora Ventures Limited—all registered to 1 Lampousas Street, 1095 Nicosia, Cyprus. This was done to facilitate the transfer of money through the Cypriot accounts to Russia, Ukraine, and the United States.

[171] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018.

(U) According to Gates, by 2009 Manafort's business with Deripaska had "dried up."[174] Over the course of their business dealings, Manafort and his firm had made tens of millions of dollars from Deripaska and Deripaska had loaned him millions of dollars more.[175] The dispute that arose from the Pericles investment lasted through Manafort's joining the Trump Campaign in 2016.

ii. (U) Manafort's Work in Ukraine for the Party of Regions (PoR)

Manafort's work in Ukraine initially occurred under the strategic direction of Deripaska. However, Manafort's relationships with PoR figures, most notably Rinat Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Viktor Yanukovych, increased over time and became independent of Deripaska's involvement. The PoR maintained strong connections to Russia, received Russian assistance, and pursued a pro-Russia agenda. As a result, Manafort's work became intertwined with other aspects of Russian influence.[177]

(U) In his support of the PoR, Manafort's activity in Ukraine furthered Russian influence efforts in the run-up to the 2006 Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian legislature) elections. After receiving support from Manafort and the Russian government, the PoR gained a significant number of seats in the 2006 elections.

---

[172] According to an FBI interview of Gates, Alexander and Dmitry Cherap were the owners of Black Sea Cable and were affiliated with Rinat Akhmetov.

[173]

[174] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 132.

[175] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 131.

[176]

[177] (U) For example, by 2008 all of Manafort's income came from either Deripaska- or PoR-related work, suggesting his level of involvement in Ukraine had grown significantly. FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/20/2018.

- (U) Manafort and his firm led the Rada election effort for the PoR—Moscow's preferred party—and coordinated all aspects of the PoR's policy platform, party organization, polling, and messaging.[178]
- [redacted]

(U) Manafort's work with the PoR continued following the 2006 Rada elections, culminating in the 2010 election of Yanukovych as president of Ukraine and the elevation of the PoR as the majority party in government. According to Patten, by this time Manafort had acquired a "mythic status" in Ukraine, and Manafort's operations there expanded to include "large crews of expatriates, 10 or 15 Americans" in the country with teams "all over the place" who were "flying around with a 747 with an advance team and things like that."[181] Manafort also organized U.S.-based firms, particularly Mercury Public Affairs and the Podesta Group, to conduct lobbying and public relations on behalf of the PoR and the Yanukovych regime.[182] To manage these contracts and publicly distance them from the PoR, Manafort helped organize their work through a Belgium-based organization known as the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (ECFMU).[183] The ECFMU was secretly backed and funded by the Yanukovych regime and the PoR and reported to Manafort and Andriy Klyuyev, then a senior Ukrainian government official close to Yanukovych.[184]

(U) Kilimnik became a central part of Manafort's work in Ukraine. Kilimnik was placed in a managerial role within Manafort's firm, eventually becoming head of the Ukraine office and having "power of attorney" as the office director.[185] Department of State personnel in the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv who interacted directly with Manafort and PoR leaders viewed Kilimnik as "Manafort's man in Bankova" (Bankova is a reference to Bankova Street in Kyiv where the Ukrainian Presidential Administration is housed) and understood that Kilimnik maintained

---

[178] [redacted]; Kenzi Abou-Sabe, et al., "What Did Ex-Trump Aide Paul Manafort Really Do in Ukraine?" *NBC News*, June 27, 2017; Memorandum from Manafort and Davis to Deripaska, April 27, 2006.

[179] [redacted]

[180] (U) *Ibid.*

[181] (U) Patten Tr., pp. 27, 67.

[182] (U) *See* FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/10/2018; Statement of the Offense and Other Acts, *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, Case No. 17-201-1-ABJ (D.D.C. September 14, 2018).

[183] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/10/2018.

[184] (U) *Ibid.* According to Gates, both Vin Weber of Mercury Public Affairs and Tony Podesta of the Podesta Group were aware that the ECFMU was backed by Klyuyev. Gates also recalled that one of the ECFMU's key officers, Inna Kirsh, was paid each month directly by Klyuyev to fund the ECFMU.

[185] [redacted] Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 17, 2016 (SSCI 20017-4885-3-000426–428).

access to the inner-most circles of Ukrainian politics.[186] According to Gates, Kilimnik had "unfettered" access to Yanukovych and Yanukovych's office.[187] Gates recalled that Kilimnik joined Manafort in most meetings with the oligarchs, and could not recall an instance where Manafort conducted a meeting with oligarchs without Kilimnik present.[188]

[redacted] Once in power, the PoR under Yanukovych reengaged in electoral manipulation and corruption.[189] [redacted] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and [redacted] reports from 2012 detail widespread vote-buying, misuse of administrative resources, and the use of bribes or threats to press candidates not to stand for election.[191] Senior leaders of the PoR, who paid Manafort and with whom Manafort maintained close personal relationships, were reliant on corruption and organized crime. For example, Yuriy Boyko and Dmytro Firtash, two long-time allies and funders of the PoR who maintained close relationships with Manafort, [redacted]

(U) Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others at Manafort's firm coordinated and managed polling work, media and advertising, the hiring of consultants, preparation of talking points, and speechwriting for Yanukovych and the PoR. The work also extended beyond elections. Documents show that Manafort worked for Yanukovych and the PoR at times unrelated to election campaigns and formed a continuous relationship with the PoR and Yanukovych.[193] This

---

[186] [redacted] Email, Shultz to Tefft, et al., April 30, 2013 (CDP-2017-00011G-001383). At approximately the same time, Kilimnik conducted side projects with Deripaska's deputy Boyarkin. For instance, in May 2011, Kilimnik was seeking to meet with Boyarkin and emailed Boyarkin a document in Russian entitled "Regarding Central Asia and International Projects." This document suggested a plan of action to protect and expand RUSAL's business interests outside of Russia. In particular, the document outlined a plan to minimize the risk of potential political in foreign countries where RUSAL operated, including through a more effective use of a network of "friends" in Russia and abroad. Additionally, in June 2011, Boyarkin, Kilimnik, and several others were involved in creating a website, www.russianintelligencer.com. The website included a newsletter, which included emerging trends and leading indicators in political and economic matters related to Russia. As of August 2011, Kilimnik was providing suggestions on the site. [redacted]

[187] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018.

[188] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.

[189] (U) *See* "Ukraine election 'reversed democracy', OSCE says," *BBC*, October 29, 2012.

[190] [redacted]

[191] [redacted] "Ukraine election 'reversed democracy', OSCE says," *BBC*, October 29, 2012; [redacted]

[192] [redacted] Firtash is separately under federal indictment in the Northern District of Illinois related to an alleged international racketeering conspiracy. *See* Indictment, *United States v. Dmitry Firtash, et al.*, Case No. 13CR515 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 20, 2013).

[193] (U) *See, e.g.*, Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Second Supplemental Motion in Limine, *United States v. Paul Manafort*, Crim. No. 1:18-cr-83-TSE (E.D. Va., July 30, 2018).

included work related to foreign lobbying, public relations, and political consulting more generally.[194] Eventually, Manafort made more than $60 million from these activities in support of Yanukovych and the PoR.[195]

(U) The PoR did not have its own budget or centralized committee to pay for the work of Manafort's and his firm, DMP, in Ukraine.[196] Instead the PoR engaged a series of oligarchs who were tasked with paying for various portions of the PoR's political campaign work.[197] Over the course of Manafort's work in Ukraine, approximately 30 to 50 oligarchs chipped-in for the PoR-related work.[198] Gates referred to these oligarchs as DMP's "paymasters."[199] Primarily, however, Manafort and his firm were funded by Lyovochkin and Akhmetov.[200] Lyovochkin likely provided funding to DMP on behalf of other oligarchs, particularly Firtash.[201] Akhmetov's account with Manafort and DMP was handled by Akhmetov's deputy, Kolesnikov,[202] and Kilimnik was the primary conduit for arranging payments to DMP.[203] In particular, Gates recalled that Kilimnik would tell Gates to create invoices for certain amounts at certain times and address them to certain corporate entities located offshore.[204] When asked if there was a *quid pro quo* agreement in which the oligarchs agreed to fund DMP's contracts in exchange for something once the PoR-supported candidate was elected, Gates stated that he never saw that firsthand, but he suspected that was the case.[205]

4. (U) Manafort's Activities from 2014 until Joining the Trump Campaign

(U) Issues related to Manafort's historical involvement with Deripaska and the PoR continued through Manafort's entry into the Trump Campaign in 2016. These connections generally focused on business disputes and efforts to collect debts.

---

[194] (U) *Ibid.*
[195] (U) *Ibid.*
[196] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018.
[197] (U) *Ibid.*
[198] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.
[199] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018.
[200] (U) *Ibid.*
[201] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.
[202] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018.
[203] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.
[204] (U) *Ibid.* Gates recalled that "pretty much all" of the Cyprus entities were used for PoR work. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018. These entities were often organized by which oligarchs were funding payments to the Cypriot accounts. For example, Bletilla Ventures Limited in Cyprus was affiliated with payments related to Lyovochkin. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018. Over time, Manafort put Kilimnik in control of the majority of Manafort-related accounts in Cyprus. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018. Gates did not know why Kilimnik was in charge of these accounts, but understood that Manafort wanted it that way. *Ibid.* These accounts included Global Highway Limited and Lucicle Consultants Limited.
[205] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.

i. (U) Former-PoR Associates in Ukraine

(U) After Yanukovych fled Ukraine for Russia in 2014, the PoR effectively dissolved. Manafort, however, maintained close connections to the former PoR officials who remained in Ukraine. The remnants of the PoR consolidated into a new political party, the Opposition Bloc (OB). The OB was made up of a variety of pro-Russia politicians and former-PoR figures, causing it to be viewed as a rebranded version of the PoR.[206] Lyovochkin, Yanukovych's former chief of staff, helped lead the consolidation of the OB with the backing of Akhmetov, Yanukovych's longtime sponsor.[207]

(U) Manafort, along with Gates and Kilimnik, worked to support the newly formed OB. According to Patten, while Manafort was very expensive, Akhmetov viewed Manafort as a "lucky charm," and thus continued to pay him for consulting work.[208] Manafort remained the main political advisor to the OB, but Manafort's involvement was not at the same level as its previous peak under Yanukovych, likely due to the OB's own reduced political standing.[209] According to Gates, DMP's work for the PoR in 2014 was primarily related to a "micro-targeting campaign."[210] Manafort's continued involvement in Ukraine was noted by other observers at the time. For example, an American IRI employee who attended a meeting with OB representatives at the time noted that the OB representatives "did an EXCELLENT job pushing all the right buttons." The observer further noted:

> *Well, no wonder they performed well - Paul Manafort is their consultant, residual consultant from Yanukovych days. He was in our hotel with former IRI employee Konstantin Klimenko [sic] and is on my flight today[.] You would have thought Manafort et al would have realized what a bullet they dodged when Yanukovych left but I guess the contracts are too lucrative.*[211]

(U) Kilimnik remained deeply involved in Manafort's efforts to assist the OB. Kilimnik ostensibly ran the Kyiv office of Manafort's firm, DMP. However, Kilimnik appeared to have significant access within the OB independent of Manafort.[212] Kilimnik's ultimate source of funding and authority during this time also remains unclear. Patten, whom Kilimnik recruited to

---

[206] (U) For example, the American IRI employee observed that the OB was in fact a "Party of Regions (PoR) re-do." Email, Garrett to Green and Van Rest, October 29, 2014 (IRI Production).
[207] (U) Email, Purcell to Toko and LeClair, September 15, 2014 (CDP-2017-00011G-001489-1490).
[208] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018.
[209] (U) Patten Tr., p. 27.
[210] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.
[211] (U) Email, Garrett to Green and Van Rest, October 29, 2014 (IRI Production).
[212] [redacted]
Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 17, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000426-428).

come to Ukraine in 2014 to assist the OB and who reported to Kilimnik, recalled that although Kilimnik worked from an office in Manafort's firm in Kyiv, it was unclear to Patten whether Lyovochkin or Manafort was paying Kilimnik.[213] Patten recalled one occasion during his first meeting with Manafort in Kyiv where Manafort had spoken highly of Kilimnik and called Kilimnik a "powerful little dude."[214]

(U) While the scale of Manafort's work in Ukraine began to decline, Manafort nonetheless stayed involved in Ukraine matters in the lead-up to his March 2016 entry into the Trump Campaign. For example, a November 19, 2015 email from an associate of Gates relayed that Manafort and Gates were actively involved in the "Mariupol race on 11/29," a likely reference to a second round of elections in Mariupol on November 29, 2015.[215] The same email also relayed Gates's perspective on the latest political developments on this race and Ukrainian politics more generally, suggesting an active engagement.[216] Travel records suggest Manafort

---

[213] [redacted] Patten stated that he was hired by, paid by, and reported to Lyovochkin through Kilimnik for his 2014 work in Ukraine. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018. Patten further noted that Lyovochkin had previously managed Manafort's account for Yanukovych. FBI, FD-302, Patten 9/6/2018. Kilimnik and Lyovochkin appear to have sought to exert influence over a diverse array of Ukrainian politicians behind the scenes. According to Gates, Lyovochkin had a "cadre of candidates" whom he was running in various elections in Ukraine, and Kilimnik was assisting him in this effort. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018. Patten's Ukraine work with Kilimnik in support of Lyovochkin is consistent with Gates's characterization. In early 2015, Vitali Klitschko, a former opposition leader during the Maydan protests, hired Patten to assist in his Kyiv mayoral campaign. Kilimnik arranged the meeting where Klitschko hired Patten. Lyovochkin, who was ostensibly not a part of Klitschko's campaign or political party, paid Patten from an offshore account Lyovochkin controlled. Patten recalled one 2015 meeting with Klitschko and Kilimnik in which Klitschko kicked Kilimnik out of the meeting and told Patten that Patten worked for him (Klitschko) and not Lyovochkin. Klitschko told Patten that he kicked Kilimnik out because Kilimnik was too close to Lyovochkin. Patten, who worked in support of Klitschko for approximately a year, was paid $800,000—solely by Lyovochkin. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018. After 2015, Patten continued to work in support of Klitschko, and Kilimnik again began to support the effort directly. Kilimnik would later tell Patten that Lyovochkin "will be making all decisions" for Klitschko as it related to which political consultants to hire. Text message, Kilimnik to Patten, August 2, 201[redacted] Lyovochkin appeared to be working behind the scenes to fund pro-Kremlin political influence operations in Ukraine—likely including those which have involved Kilimnik, Patten, and Manafort—using [redacted]

[214] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018.

[215] (U) Email, Mermoud to Bensh and Afendikov, November 19, 2015 (ORP3000009).

[216] (U) *Ibid.*

was present in Ukraine from September to late October 2015.[217] During this trip, communications reflect that Kilimnik was spending time with Manafort in Kyiv.[218]

(U) During this time, Manafort believed the OB and its backers owed him money. According to Manafort, at one point in 2014, the OB owed Manafort about $4 million. At the end of 2014 and into 2015, the OB paid Manafort between $1 million and $2 million.[219] According to Gates, the Ukrainian oligarchs, particularly Akhmetov and Lyovochkin, continued to owe Manafort approximately $2.4 million.[220] According to Patten, Manafort remained involved in Ukraine because he was "trying to get paid."[221]

(U) By 2016, Gates understood that Kilimnik was no longer receiving a paycheck from DMP.[222] Instead, Gates believed Kilimnik was being paid directly by Lyovochkin.[223] However, according to Gates, Kilimnik remained engaged with the OB in an effort to keep the party together as a viable opposition party and to obtain payment for Manafort's firm.[224] Gates believed Kilimnik was still doing some work for the OB on behalf of DMP.[225]

ii. (U) Deripaska and Pericles Lawsuit

(U) As noted above, Pericles's failure after the economic downturn in 2008 and 2009 led to a souring of relations between Manafort and Deripaska. According to Gates, Manafort was upset that Deripaska had not followed through on his originally promised investment of $200 million, while Deripaska was mad because he felt the asset was not well-managed.[226] Gates also speculated that Deripaska was mad because he was not kept abreast of everything that happened with the investment.[227] Manafort said he would call Deripaska, but Gates did not know if

---

[217] [redacted] (showing a departure from Newark Liberty Airport on September 20, 2015, with an arrival at Boryspil International Airport in Ukraine the next day, and a return to the United States on October 27, 2015).

[218] (U) *See, e.g.*, Email, Kilimnik to Patten, September 24, 2015 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-001166).

[219] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018; FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018.

[220] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018. Patten stated that his understanding was that Akhmetov was "the last Ukrainian businessperson who paid Manafort." Patten Tr., p. 75.

[221] (U) Patten Tr., p. 43; FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.

[222] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.

[223] (U) *Ibid.*

[224] (U) *Ibid.*

[225] (U) *Ibid.* In 2016, Kilimnik worked primarily with Patten, who was not affiliated with DMP, on matters for both Lyovochkin and other OB-affiliated politicians, including Klitschko. Kilimnik used a DMP email address and listed DMP as his employer on U.S. visa applications as late as December 2016. CDP-2017-00011-000087–89.

[226] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.

[227] (U) *Ibid.*

Manafort ever did.[228] According to Kilimnik, at some point Manafort claimed to have reached out to Deripaska in relation to the Pericles dispute.[229] Kilimnik told Patten years later that "Manafort says he tried to make contact with him, but because he did not do it through me I have no idea how he tried to get in touch. Maybe sent emails, which Oleg never reads."[230] Gates had heard that Manafort and Deripaska had sporadic meetings between 2009 and 2014, possibly about things unrelated to the investment deal, although Gates was not aware of their substance.[231] Gates believed that between approximately 2014 and 2016, Manafort asked Kilimnik to communicate with Deripaska, who contacted Deripaska's "chief of security," Viktor Boyarkin, presumably about Pericles.[232]

(U) In December 2014, Deripaska's attorney filed a winding up petition in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands in an effort to liquidate what remained of Pericles.[233] It is unclear why such a long period of time elapsed between the end of the Pericles deal in approximately 2008 and the lawsuit filed in 2014.[234] Gates later believed that the lawsuit was a public relations stunt to help Deripaska obtain a visa.[235] The Cayman Islands court petition named Gates, Manafort, Kilimnik, and several others as key individuals involved in Pericles and claimed that Manafort and Gates had "simply disappeared."[236]

(U) After the start of the proceeding in the Cayman Islands, Adam Waldman, Deripaska's U.S.-based lawyer, told the Committee that in approximately March 2015, Deripaska asked him to "look into" the Pericles matter.[237] Waldman recalled that he sought to locate Manafort, which "took some doing."[238] Waldman left Manafort voicemails in an attempt

---

[228] (U) *Ibid.*
[229] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 17, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000426-428).
[230] (U) *Ibid.*
[231] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018.
[232] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018; FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018;
[233] (U) Winding Up Petition, *In the Matter of Section 36(3) of the Exempted Limited Partnership Law, 2014 and In the Matter of Pericles Emerging Market Partners, L.P.*, Cause No. FSD 0131 of 2014 (Grand Court of the Cayman Islands December 9, 2014).
[234] (U) Gates in particular claimed he did not know why Deripaska waited so long to file suit. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018.
[235] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018.
[236] (U) Winding Up Petition, *In the Matter of Section 36(3) of the Exempted Limited Partnership Law, 2014 and In the Matter of Pericles Emerging Market Partners, L.P.*, Cause No. FSD 0131 of 2014 (Grand Court of the Cayman Islands December 9, 2014).
[237] (U) Waldman Tr., pp. 85–86.
[238] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 85.

to get in touch with him.[239] Email records from May 2015 suggest that Waldman was continuing efforts to locate Manafort.[240]

(U) Waldman ultimately received a response from Manafort, who directed Waldman to Gates to discuss Pericles. According to Waldman, Waldman met with Gates, whom Waldman described as "very nervous," at Waldman's Washington D.C. home.[241] Waldman recalled that Gates told a "fairly complicated story about an approximately $26 million investment" from Deripaska.[242] According to Waldman, Gates described years earlier looking at numerous target companies and ultimately landing on, "with Mr. Deripaska's team's assistance," Black Sea Cable.[243] According to Waldman:

> *[T]he story became very difficult to follow, because it wasn't entirely clear that he'd actually invested in the Ukrainian cable company. It seemed that he'd invested in something somebody owned relating to the cable company, some sort of rights relating to the cable company. This became extremely convoluted. . . . One of the things that I learned was that the investment was $26 million, but the fees associated with the investment seemed to be about—seemed to be about $8 million.*[244]

(U) In August 2015, an application was initiated in the Eastern District of Virginia relating to the winding up petition in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, which sought to subpoena testimony and documents from Manafort and Gates.[245] Patten understood that a "month or two" before Manafort joined the Campaign, "Deripaska's lawyers were looking for Manafort . . . and they couldn't find him." Patten's general understanding was that at the time "both sides were pissed at each other."[246]

(U) Ultimately, Gates was deposed in November 2015 and Manafort was deposed in December 2015 in relation to the Pericles proceedings, while a dispute over access to, and use of,

---

[239] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 85–87.

[240] [redacted]

[241] (U) Waldman Tr., pp. 88, 90.

[242] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[243] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 90.

[244] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.

[245] (U) *In Re: Application Of Kris Beighton And Alex Lawson, In Their Capacities As Joint Official Liquidators Of Pericles Emerging Market Partners, L.P., A Cayman Islands Limited Partnership, For Assistance Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782*, Case No. 1:15mc20 (E.D. Va. August 12, 2015).

[246] (U) Patten Tr., p. 101.

documents was not resolved until mid-February 2016—in the midst of Manafort's private lobbying to obtain a position on the Trump Campaign.[247]

5. (U) Manafort's Activities While Serving on the Trump Campaign

i. (U) Manafort's Entry into the Trump Campaign

(U) At least as early as January 2016, Manafort was actively seeking a position on the Trump Campaign. Manafort explained to Gates—who was still working for Manafort's firm, despite a lack of clients—that working for the Trump Campaign would be "good for business" and a potential way for Manafort's firm to be paid for work done in Ukraine for which they were owed.[248] Manafort used contacts with Roger Stone and Tom Barrack, both of whom were longtime associates of Trump, to lobby for a position on the Trump Campaign.

(U) On January 30, 2016, during a meeting with Barrack, Manafort requested Barrack's help in obtaining a position on the Trump Campaign.[249] Prior to the January outreach, Barrack had not heard from Manafort for an extended period.[250] Barrack agreed to help Manafort approach Trump in an effort to obtain a position for Manafort on the Trump Campaign.[251]

(U) By February 25, 2016, Barrack had spoken to Trump twice about the possibility of Manafort joining the Campaign.[252] According to Barrack, Trump initially was not interested in the idea of hiring Manafort because Trump closely associated Manafort with Roger Stone, whom Barrack described as having a "love-hate" relationship with Trump.[253] Despite this, Manafort requested that Barrack continue to lobby Trump on his behalf.[254] Manafort sent Barrack a set of notes and talking points outlining Manafort's qualifications and his commentary on the state of the presidential campaign.[255] Gates assisted Manafort in preparing these papers.[256] In Manafort's email transmitting one such set of talking points to Barrack, Manafort highlighted

---

[247] (U) Complaint, *Surf Horizon Limited v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., et. al.*, No. 650130/2018 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. May 17, 2018).
[248] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.
[249] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, January 30, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000004). Manafort had first reached out to Barrack earlier in January and expressed interest in reconnecting in person. When the two did meet, Barrack recalled that Manafort had two specific requests; one of which was Barrack's help related to joining the Trump Campaign. Emails, Manafort and Barrack, January 17, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000001-3); Barrack Tr., p. 30.
[250] (U) Barrack Tr., p. 26. According to Barrack, the relationship between the two had been strained after Manafort had delayed full repayment of a loan from Barrack.
[251] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, January 30, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000004).
[252] (U) Email, Barrack to Manafort, February 25, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000006).
[253] (U) Emails, Manafort and Barrack, February 25, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000007); Barrack Tr., p. 26.
[254] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, February 25, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000010).
[255] (U) *Ibid.* (CLNS_SSCI_0000010-12) (with attachment).
[256] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.

that the role he envisioned for himself would be "convention manager, non paid."[257] Barrack later recalled that the issue of payment was important because "Trump wasn't interested in paying anybody for those positions."[258] Barrack recalled that Manafort's offering to work for free "were the magic words."[259]

(U) On February 29, 2016, Manafort sent another set of talking points to Barrack for his transmission to Trump.[260] In addition to outlining his own qualifications, this document described Manafort's belief that the Republican "establishment" had begun to organize an effort to disrupt Trump's nomination and provided a set of recommendations to Trump.[261] Later that day, Barrack sent an email to Trump's assistant, Rhona Graff, but addressed the message to "Donald."[262] The email described how the convention would be "critical" and that Manafort was "the most experienced and lethal of managers . . . Paul handled all of the conventions and is a killer, he would do this in an unpaid capacity. . . . I've attached a couple of Paul's thought pieces for your consideration - PLEASE PLEASE take the time to read the attachments."[263] Barrack attached to the email both of Manafort's previous memoranda to him, totaling five pages.[264] Barrack sent the same email and attachments to Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner, stating "I think it is really, really important and Manafort is a genius killer but the opposite of Stone."[265] Ivanka Trump responded that she would "print and show the attached and below to DJT following Super Tuesday."[266] Corey Lewandowski, then the campaign manager, recalled that

---

[257] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, February 25, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000010). In his email transmitting the talking point document, Manafort also highlighted his foreign political work and his knowledge of "modern campaign technology": "I have spent the last 20 years running campaigns outside of the US. So, I am up to date on modern campaign technology and the key players with expertise." The Committee has no further information about this claim. At about the same time that Manafort and Gates joined the Trump Campaign, however, Gates reached out to a political consultant with ties to Israel seeking Israeli social media influence technology. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.J.

[258] (U) Barrack Tr., p. 32.

[259] (U) *Ibid.*

[260] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, February 29, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000014–17) (with two attachments).

[261] (U) *Ibid.*

[262] (U) Email, Barrack to Graff and Marckstadt (blind copy), February 29, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000043) (with two attachments).

[263] (U) *Ibid.*

[264] (U) The 2-page document included: "I can channel my strategic skills, tactical abilities and knowledge of modern political campaign tools into the demands of this specific convention job but also will be available, if desired, to apply these skills in helping to shape a national campaign working for the team that Trump has organized."

[265] (U) Email, Barrack to I. Trump and Kushner, February 29, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000055–60 (with two attachments).

[266] (U) Email, I. Trump to Barrack and Kushner, February 29, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000085).

Ivanka Trump ultimately did share the email with her father along with a handwritten note at the bottom which read: "Daddy, Tom says we should get Paul."[267]

(U) Following Super Tuesday, Barrack continued to email Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner to press them to consider hiring Manafort.[268] Barrack forwarded these emails to Manafort, saying "FYI. I am trying."[269] Barrack also told Manafort that he would talk to Trump "one on one" on March 11, 2016, and "lean hard."[270] Later, on March 11, Manafort emailed Barrack and inquired if Barrack was still getting "pushback" from Trump.[271] Barrack responded that he was continuing to get pushback.[272] Manafort then asked Barrack if he should "be patient or start moving on," noting that he had "kept my calendar open."[273] Barrack responded that he was continuing to "push subtly."[274]

(U) Throughout this time, Manafort and Barrack both communicated with Stone. Stone shared with Barrack his belief that Trump "needs Manafort" and lobbied Barrack to help Manafort obtain a position on the Campaign.[275] Stone wrote in an email to Barrack:

> *You are the only one who can do this. Donald sees you as a peer – the rest of us are just vassals. he has no research or plan. his handlers reinforce his worst instincts. . . . I think Ivanka and Jared and Don,Jr [sic] and Eric have had their fill of Corey. We will know Tues if we are headed to a brokered convention- if so he needs Manafort or he will get robbed.*[276]

(U) According to Barrack, Stone was also in touch with Trump directly to recommend that Trump hire Manafort.[277] Phone records support this claim, showing that from March 1, 2016, to March 16, 2016, Stone made or received calls from Trump-associated numbers at least

---

[267] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Corey Lewandowski, October 18, 2017, pp. 72, 78. Hope Hicks had a similar recollection of the memos being provided to Trump: "Tom had sent a bunch of emails, I think to Ivanka Trump and to Rhona Graff. . . . I think there were some attachments from Paul outlining a strategy he might be able to help execute on getting the delegates for the convention." SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Hope Hicks, October 16, 2017, p. 108.

[268] (U) Email, Barrack to I. Trump and Kushner, March 5, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000106).

[269] (U) Email, Barrack to Manafort, March 6, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000117).

[270] (U) Email, Barrack to Manafort, March 6, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000118).

[271] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, March 11, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000134).

[272] (U) Email, Barrack to Manafort, March 11, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000134).

[273] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, March 11, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000137).

[274] (U) Email, Barrack to Manafort, March 11, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000138).

[275] (U) Email, Stone to Barrack, March 5, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000105); Barrack Tr., p. 33.

[276] (U) Email, Stone to Barrack, March 12, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000141).

[277] (U) Barrack Tr., p. 44. In a March 5, 2016 email, Stone told Barrack that he was working to help Trump with campaign strategy and that he and Trump "speak frequently." Email, Stone to Barrack, March 5, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000105).

ten times.[278] Records for that same date range also indicate that Stone either called or received calls from Manafort's primary cell phone number eleven times.[279]

(U) By the evening of March 16, 2016, Trump appears to have hired Manafort.[280] In an email to Barrack with "You are the Best!!" in the subject line, Manafort told Barrack that "[w]e are going to have so much fun, and change the world in the process."[281]

(U) Manafort's hiring was not made public until March 29, 2016, when the Campaign issued a press release. However, senior Trump Campaign officials became aware of the decision prior to the public announcement, although they were not aware with specificity as to its timing. For example, Hope Hicks, a close aide to Trump on the Campaign, recalled attending a dinner at Mar-a-Lago with Trump and Manafort on March 24. At the dinner, which had been scheduled earlier in the week, Hicks understood that the decision to hire Manafort had already been made.[282]

ii. (U) Kilimnik's Awareness of Manafort's Hiring Before the Public Announcement

(U) Manafort likely made Kilimnik aware of the possibility the he would join the Trump Campaign prior to its public announcement, judging by Kilimnik's contemporaneous communications at that time.

(U) Patten believed Manafort may have provided Kilimnik advance notice of his joining the Trump Campaign.[283] In particular, Patten told the Committee that he and Kilimnik had discussed the possibility of Manafort joining the Trump Campaign before it became public.[284]

---

[278] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures. These calls account for a total of 78 minutes of call time.
[279] (U) *Ibid.* These calls account for a total of 77 minutes of call time.
[280] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, March 16, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000153). On the evening of March 16, 2016, the day that Manafort was most likely hired, a series of calls suggest that Stone, Manafort, and numbers associated with Trump were in communication at approximately the same time. At 4:42 PM, a number associated with the Trump Organization contacted Stone and conducted an eight-minute call. Immediately after that call, Stone dialed Manafort, who did not answer. Minutes later, Manafort returned Stone's call. Manafort and Stone spoke for 10 minutes. AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[281] (U) Email, Manafort to Barrack, March 16, 2016 (CLNS_SSCI_0000153).
[282] (U) Hicks Tr., p. 108.
[283] (U) Patten Tr., p. 70.
[284] (U) Patten Tr., p. 69. In a press article authored by Patten in 2019, Patten claimed that in "late 2015," Lyovochkin asked Patten "whether it was true that Trump was going to hire Manafort to run his campaign." According to his article, Patten told Lyovochkin "that was an absurd notion." Sam Patten, "Kostya and Me: How Sam Patten Got Ensnared in Mueller's Probe," *Wired*, August 14, 2019. Given Lyovochkin's close relationship with Kilimnik, it is plausible that Lyovochkin's inquiry reflected Kilimnik's own awareness of Manafort's intention to join the Trump Campaign. If Patten's public comment is accurate, the timing of this question from Lyovochkin

Patten recalled that he believed the idea that Trump would hire Manafort was "sort of ridiculous," while Kilimnik believed it was in fact likely.[285] Immediately after the public announcement, Kilimnik emailed the Campaign's press release announcing Manafort's hiring to Patten in order to show Patten that Patten was wrong.[286] Patten further told the Committee that he knew Kilimnik and Manafort "were in contact" in the period prior to the announcement, although he was not aware any specific communication relaying this information to Kilimnik.[287]

[redacted]

would suggest Manafort and Kilimnik may have discussed the Trump Campaign significantly prior to Manafort's eventual formal hiring.

[285] (U) *Ibid.*

[286] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, March 30, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000834); Patten Tr., pp. 69–70.

[287] (U) *Ibid.*

[288] [redacted] *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.8.i for information about Boyarkin's connections to the GRU.

[289] (U) *Ibid.* For a complete discussion of this information, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.5.iv. On March 10, 2016, the GRU began spearphishing email accounts of individuals associated with Hillary Clinton. *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 37, *see also* [redacted] For a discussion of the GRU hack-and-leak operation, *see* Vol. 5, Sec. III.B.

[290] [redacted]

[291] [redacted]

[292] [redacted]

[293] [redacted]

(U) Kilimnik's other two trips to the United States in 2016 (described below) appear to be designed with the express purpose of meeting with Manafort. Nevertheless, the Committee has no insight into Kilimnik's time in the United States in March 2016, nor does it have information to suggest that the two met during the March trip.

iii. (U) Manafort Announces His Position on the Trump Campaign; Extends Private Offers to Russian and Ukrainian Oligarchs

(U) The day after the public announcement that Manafort joined the Trump Campaign on March 29, 2016, Gates sent Kilimnik an email with five attachments and instructions regarding those attachments.[294] Four of the attachments were personal memoranda from Manafort and individually addressed to four recipients.[295] Gates drafted the four personal memoranda, while Manafort reviewed and approved them.[296] Three of the intended recipients—"SL" (Serhiy Lyovochkin), "RA" (Rinat Akhmetov), and "BVK" (Boris Kolesnikov)—were Ukrainian oligarchs affiliated with the OB.[297]

- [redacted] Serhiy Lyovochkin, a longtime PoR and OB member, is commonly viewed as one of the party's more sophisticated and capable officials. Lyovochkin co-owns Ukraine's most popular television company along with U.S.-indicted oligarch and former Manafort business partner Dmytro Firtash. Lyovochkin was a key financer for Manafort's work in Ukraine during Lyovochkin's time serving as the head of Yanukovych's presidential administration, and later as a leader of the OB. Lyovochkin is a close associate of Kilimnik, and Kilimnik has maintained frequent and close access to him for years. In addition to Kilimnik, Lyovochkin has maintained other significant ties to Russia and Russian-backed actors. [redacted]

[redacted] The Committee did not seek to interview [redacted]

[294] (U) Email, Gates to Kilimnik, March 30, 2016.
[295] (U) Email, Gates to Kilimnik, March 30, 2016.
[296] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.
[297] (U) Email, Gates to Kilimnik, March 30, 2016.
[298] [redacted]
[299] [redacted]

- [redacted] Rinat Akhmetov, described above, has generally maintained pragmatic relationships with Ukrainian, Russian, and Western governments and had long been a primary financier of Manafort's work in Ukraine. As Ukraine's richest oligarch, Akhmetov was one of the PoR's—and later the OB's—most crucial backers. He has also maintained significant ties to Russia and Russian-backed actors. [redacted] As noted above, Manafort had worked for Akhmetov for over a decade, and at the time of this outreach, Manafort believed Akhmetov owed him over two million dollars.[301]

- [redacted] Boris Kolesnikov, a pro-Russia Ukrainian oligarch from Donetsk, has been a longtime PoR and OB member—at one point its co-leader—and is Rinat Akhmetov's right-hand man. [redacted] Manafort had a long history of working with Kolesnikov and had previously assisted him as early as 2005 on behalf of Akhmetov and Deripaska related to Kolesnikov's arrest on extortion charges.[304] According to emails from U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Kilimnik acted as an in interlocutor and representative to the Embassy for Kolesnikov and attempted to set up meeting for Kolesnikov with U.S. ambassadors in Russia and Ukraine in 2014 and 2015.[305]

(U) The fourth memo, which unlike the other three used only the word "north" to identify the document, was addressed to "OVD," a reference to Oleg Deripaska.[306]

---

300 [redacted]

301 (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.3.ii.

302 [redacted]

303 (U) *Ibid.* p. 25.

304 [redacted]

305 [redacted] Email Purcell to Pyatt, September 15, 2014 (CDP-2017-00011G-000809) ("I got an e-mail today from Sasha's old contact Konstantin Kilimnik proposing that you [Pyatt] meet with Kolesnikov."); Email, Purcell to Donahue and Kent, August 13, 2015 (CDP-2017-00011G-001347-1348) ("KK also made one request as a favor to Kolesnikov. Kolesnikov would like to meet with Amb. Pyatt and/or his 'good friend' Amb. Tefft sometime when he is in Moscow (which seems to be fairly often).")

306 (U) "North" is used by Kilimnik and others to refer to Russia. *See, e.g.,* Email, Kilimnik to Marson, August 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000414–416) ("people up north").

(U) Gates also sent the press release announcing Manafort's joining the Trump Campaign so it could be translated by Kilimnik, and provided as an attachment to each of the four memoranda.[307]

(U) These memoranda were short personal notes from Manafort highlighting his newly announced position with the Trump Campaign. In the memoranda to Kolesnikov, Akhmetov, and Lyovochkin, Manafort also wrote that he was interested in Ukrainian politics and implied he might be interested in assisting them:

> *I am watching intently at the prospects of a new Ukraine government potentially forming in the coming days. We should revisit this topic and think about how to best position the OB as the next majority party in parliament. As you have seen from the US election, anything is possible with the will of the people. I look forward to speaking with you soon.*[308]

(U) The fourth memorandum, addressed to Deripaska, omitted the Ukraine language and instead included the suggestion that Manafort could brief Deripaska on the Trump Campaign. "I am hopeful that we are able to talk about this development with Trump where I can brief you in more detail. I look forward to speaking with you soon."[309] Gates believed that the purpose of the correspondence with Deripaska was to confirm that Deripaska had dropped his lawsuit related to Pericles.[310] Gates believed that the letter did not need to mention the lawsuit because Manafort discussed the idea of getting Deripaska to drop the lawsuit with Kilimnik verbally.[311] According to Gates, Manafort never told him anything specific as to what Manafort was offering Deripaska.[312] Gates thought that Deripaska wanted a U.S. visa and having Manafort in a position inside the Trump Campaign might be helpful to Deripaska.[313] Manafort's position could help Deripaska develop relationships with Trump, which could have been helpful to Deripaska in other ways as well.[314]

(U) The Committee has no record of whether Kilimnik delivered these memoranda to their intended recipients. Given Kilimnik's close access to the intended recipients and other

---

[307] (U) The press release attachment included in the Gates email to Kilimnik sent at 6:57 a.m. was titled "DT PJM press release .docx." Kilimnik forwarded a document titled, "DT PJM press release .docx," to Patten later that same day. SSCI 2017-4885-3-000834.

[308] (U) Memorandum from Manafort to Kolesnikov, March 30, 2016; Memorandum from Manafort to Akhmetov, March 30, 2016; Memorandum from Manafort to Lyovochkin, March 30, 2016.

[309] [redacted]

[310] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.

[311] (U) *Ibid.*

[312] (U) *Ibid.*

[313] (U) *Ibid.*

[314] (U) *Ibid.*

records showing that Kilimnik did in fact pass other information on subsequently, it seems likely that Kilimnik would have delivered the memoranda as requested by Gates.[315]

iv. [redacted] Kilimnik [redacted]

(U) On the evening of April 10, 2016, Manafort emailed Kilimnik. In the email, Manafort inquired if Kilimnik had shown "our friends" media coverage related to Manafort.[316] Given the context, "our friends" is almost certainly a reference to the oligarchs affiliated with the OB with whom Manafort and Kilimnik had longstanding ties. Kilimnik responded, "Absolutely. Every article."[317] The next morning, Manafort asked Kilimnik how his role with the Trump Campaign could be leveraged to collect the money owed to him by the OB, and whether Deripaska had seen recent press articles relating to Manafort:[318]

> >4/11/16, 10:20 AM пользователь "Paul Manafort" <pmanafort@dmpint.com>
> >написал:
> >
> >>How do we use to get whole.
> >>
> >>Has Ovd operation seen?

(U) Kilimnik quickly responded in a lengthy email to Manafort.[319] Kilimnik first told Manafort that he had been "sending everything to Victor [Boyarkin], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."[320]

(U) Kilimnik also wrote that he had "more hopes for OVD than for idiotic Ukrainians, who seem to be completely falling apart." Kilimnik then provided a highly detailed insider's account of the current Ukrainian political scene and laid out potential scenarios for upcoming developments in Ukrainian politics. Kilimnik alluded to Ukrainian political outcomes that he had "outlined" in his "previous emails," suggesting that Manafort had already been engaging

---

[315] [redacted]

[316] **(U)** Email, Manafort to Kilimnik, April 10, 2016 (DJTFP00010544).
[317] **(U)** Email, Kilimnik to Manafort, April 11, 2016 (DJTFP00010544).
[318] **(U)** Email, Manafort to Kilimnik, April 11, 2016 (DJTFP00010544).
[319] **(U)** Email, Kilimnik to Manafort, April 11, 2016 (DJTFP00010543).
[320] **(U)** *Ibid.*

with Kilimnik on Ukrainian political issues in a substantive manner prior to this April 11, 2016 email.[321] The Committee was not able to obtain these earlier communications.[322]

[redacted]

The timing of this [redacted] is not known with precision, but occurred in close proximity to Manafort reaching out to Kilimnik, either immediately prior to or after Manafort's April 11 email.[328]

[redacted]

---

[321] (U) *Ibid.*

[322] (U) The Committee only received the April 11, 2016, email described here because Manafort forwarded the email in its entirety to Gates on Gates's Trump Campaign email account. The original exchange between Manafort and Kilimnik used the email accounts pmanafort@dmpint.com and kkilimnik@dmpint.com. It is unclear why Kilimnik was still using the @dmpint.com account, which he used for other business, including communications with officials at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv and with his business partner at the time, Sam Patten. The Committee issued a subpoena to the entity DMP International, LLC, but service through a registered agent did not yield any response from DMP International. Manafort's retained counsel claimed to not be engaged for the DMP International matter and would not engage with the Committee on its requests related to that matter. Efforts to engage Manafort directly while incarcerated also failed to elicit any substantive response. The Committee sought to gain further insight into the DMP International email account by issuing a subpoena to Rackspace Inc., a hosting company that at one point hosted the "dmpint.com" domain. By the time the Committee issued its subpoena to Rackspace, however, Rackspace had already ceased hosting the domain and had no longer retained any data. The Committee did not seek civil enforcement of its subpoena to DMP International.

[323] [redacted]

[324] (U) *Ibid.*

[325] (U) *Ibid.*

[326] (U) *Ibid.*

[327] (U) *Ibid.*

[328] [redacted] Manafort appears to have asked Kilimnik if he had been sending news articles on to Deripaska by approximately 10:20 a.m. Moscow time on April 11. Email, Manafort to Kilimnik, April 11, 2016 (DJTFP00010544). Kilimnik had confirmed to Manafort that he had "been sending everything to Victor, who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD" by 10:40 a.m. Moscow time the same day. Email, Kilimnik to Manafort, April 11, 2016 (DJTFP00010543).

[329] [redacted]

As noted above, Manafort separately used the term "our friends" in a conversation with Kilimnik to refer to oligarchs affiliated with the OB.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

---

[343] (U) *Ibid.*

[344] [redacted]

[345] [redacted] According to [redacted], on April 20, 2016, Kilimnik booked a flight itinerary to the United States, which was scheduled to depart on May 5, 2016, as a roundtrip ticket from Kyiv's Boryspil International Airport to Washington Dulles International Airport. [redacted]

[redacted]



On April 21, 2016, at 2:42 a.m., Deripaska passed through U.S. customs at Newark Liberty International Airport after arriving on a private flight.[350]

---

[346] In a series of emails to an associate on April 22, 2016, Kilimnik said that Manafort is very smart and if Trump listens to his advice, Trump will become president. Kilimnik also suggested that Manafort would become the National Security Advisor if Trump won the election and that because Manafort knows Ukraine better than anyone else, such an outcome would not be so bad for Ukraine. Additional aspects of this email chain are discussed below.

[347] (U) *Ibid.*

[348] (U) *Ibid.*

[349] (U) Kilimnik would later make reference to the possibility that Manafort could have emailed Deripaska directly, but suggested that Deripaska "never reads" his emails. Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 17, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000426-428).

[350] An April 25, 2016, Instagram post by an account affiliated with Deripaska pictured what appears to be Deripaska at United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New York and states in a caption that the Paris Climate Agreement was signed on Friday at UN Headquarters in New York. Deripaska traveled using his Russian diplomatic passport, *Ibid.*; Deripaska has retained a number of individuals to assist him in obtaining visas to the United States, which he has long struggled to routinely obtain. For more information on some of these individuals, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.B.

[redacted]

[redacted] On April 24, 2016, Deripaska departed the U.S. on a private flight from Newark Liberty International Airport.[353] Other than [redacted] the Committee has no information about whether Deripaska met or communicated with Manafort while he was in New York.[354]

[redacted]

v. (U) Manafort and Kilimnik Meet in New York City; Discuss Ukraine, Trump Campaign Strategy; Sharing of Internal Trump Campaign Polling Data with Kilimnik Begins

---

[351] [redacted]

[352] (U) *Ibid.*

[353] [redacted]

[354] Deripaska made three other trips to the United States in 2016 prior to the election. According to [redacted] Deripaska arrived in Washington, D.C., on February 24, 2016, and departed the United States from San Francisco on February 27, 2016. Deripaska also arrived in Newark on May 29, 2016, and departed the United States from San Francisco on June 2, 2016. Lastly, Deripaska arrived in Newark on September 23, 2016, and departed from Teterboro on September 29, 2016. [redacted]

[355] [redacted]

[356] (U) *Ibid.*

[357] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

(U) The Committee did not obtain the content of any direct communications between Manafort and Kilimnik from April 11, 2016 to May 6, 2016. However, other communications suggest that Manafort and Kilimnik may have discussed the U.S. elections and Manafort's strategy to defeat Clinton in this time period. On April 22, 2016, Kilimnik told an associate that Manafort had a "clever plan" for beating Clinton and expressed confidence that with Manafort's help, Trump would win.[358] After the associate expressed concern over Manafort and Trump, Kilimnik told the associate in a subsequent email that Manafort is a very good strategist and that there could be surprises, even in American politics.[359] Kilimnik added that Manafort believes in Trump and claims that Trump will definitely win. Kilimnik reiterated to the associate that Manafort said that they have a "clever plan of screwing Clinton."[360]

(U) By May 5, 2016, Manafort was aware that Kilimnik was "coming to DC this weekend for a wedding."[361] On May 5, 2016, Manafort informed Gates of this development and told Gates that Kilimnik "wanted to meet up."[362] Manafort asked Gates to discuss Kilimnik's visit the following day.[363]

---

[358] (U) [redacted] Kilimnik used the word "хитрый," which can also be translated as "cunning."

[359] (U) [redacted]

[360] [redacted] Kilimnik used the word "трахнуть." [redacted] The SCO asked Gates why Kilimnik referred to Manafort's "clever plan" to defeat Clinton in this email thread. Although Gates was not a participant on these communications, Gates stated that he believed this referred to Manafort's strategy to attack Clinton's credibility. The SCO asked Gates what was clever about such a plan, and Gates agreed that it was not clever and he did not know why Kilimnik characterized it as clever. FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018. It is unclear on what basis Gates held this belief, or whether Gates was confusing this reference with a subsequent plan to focus on Clinton's negatives that Manafort shared with Kilimnik at an August 2, 2016 meeting that Gates also partially attended. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.5.vii.a.

[361] (U) Email, Manafort to Gates, May 5, 2016 (DJTFP00021339). It is unclear how Manafort came to understand Kilimnik was coming to the United States for a wedding and "wanted to meet up." Manafort's reference to Kilimnik attending a wedding also remains unexplained. Given the other information developed about Kilimnik's activities, the most plausible time Kilimnik could have attended a wedding was during the day on May 6, 2016, when Kilimnik's whereabouts were not fully known. Patten, who was in contact with Kilimnik during his trip and met with him while he was in the United States, was unaware of any wedding. FBI, FD-302, Patten 11/27/2018. Given Manafort and Kilimnik's persistent use of coded language, nicknames, and other allusions, it is possible that "wedding" could have some other meaning. It is also possible that Manafort was incorrect about Kilimnik's plans, or that Kilimnik manufactured an innocuous reason for his trip to Washington, D.C., when relaying his travel plans to Manafort.

[362] (U) Email, Manafort to Gates, May 5, 2016 (DJTFP00021339).

[363] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted] Kilimnik arrived at Washington Dulles International Airport on May 5, 2016, and passed through U.S. customs that evening.[364] As Kilimnik arrived, Kilimnik and Patten exchanged phone calls and text messages.[365] Patten offered Kilimnik dinner that evening at his home. Patten told the Committee that he recalled meeting with Kilimnik on his trip "separately about our business," but that he did not see much of Kilimnik, who was busy with other matters.[366] Patten understood that the main purpose of Kilimnik's trip was to meet with Manafort.[367]

(U) On the evening of May 6, 2016, Kilimnik's communications suggest he met for "off the record" drinks with Department of State employees.[368] Kilimnik was frustrated by this meeting, stating that he met "Finer or whatever the fuck is his name. In total space."[369]

(U) That same evening, Kilimnik worked with Gates and Manafort to arrange logistics for an in-person meeting between Manafort and Kilimnik.[370] From 9:25 p.m. to 9:40 p.m., Gates and Kilimnik exchanged phone calls on Kilimnik's U.S. and Ukrainian phone numbers, ultimately speaking for 12 minutes.[371] At 9:49 p.m., Gates and Manafort exchanged emails about the meeting with Kilimnik, stating that the meeting would take place at 7:30 a.m. the next morning and that Kilimnik would take the train to New York from Washington, D.C.[372] At 10:03 p.m., Kilimnik and Gates again spoke on the phone.[373] Gates then worked with a travel agent to arrange Kilimnik's train tickets to New York, sending Kilimnik train tickets shortly thereafter.[374] Gates and Kilimnik conducted a number of subsequent phone calls, including at

---

[364] [redacted] Kilimnik passed through customs at 5:32 p.m. *Ibid.* According to [redacted] Kilimnik planned on staying at the Hyatt Regency hotel in Washington, D.C. [redacted] Patten recalled that Kilimnik stayed with him for one night during one of his trips to the United States, and later believed it might have been this trip. FBI, FD-302, Patten 11/27/2018.

[365] [redacted]

[366] (U) Patten Tr., p. 80.

[367] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 11/27/2018.

[368] (U) Email, Kilimnik to [redacted] May 6, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000686).

[369] (U) *Ibid.* At the time, Jonathan Finer was Chief of Staff to then-Secretary of State John Kerry. Patten said he understood "[i]n total space" to mean "in outer space" and therefore not well informed on issues involving Ukraine. Patten Tr., p. 79; FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[370] (U) The Committee does not have complete insight into the content of these communications, and it is possible that other matters were discussed.

[371] [redacted]

[372] (U) *Ibid.*

[373] (U) *Ibid.*

[374] (U) *Ibid.*

10:25 p.m. for approximately eight minutes, 10:40 p.m. for approximately three minutes, and 11:27 p.m. for approximately two minutes.[375]

(U) On May 6, 2016, Kilimnik used his kkilimnik@dmpint.com email address to write a draft email to himself related to his meeting the next day with Manafort.[376] The Committee did not obtain the contents of the email.

(U) On the morning of May 7, from approximately 3:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m., Kilimnik traveled by train to New York to meet with Manafort.[377] At approximately 7:30 a.m., Kilimnik met with Manafort alone in New York at the Peninsula Hotel.[378]

(U) According to Manafort, Kilimnik discussed Ukrainian politics, and in particular, a plan by Boyko to increase election participation in the OB's stronghold in the eastern zone of Ukraine.[379] Kilimnik had worked to gather information on Ukraine prior to the meeting with Manafort. As part of this effort, Kilimnik had spoken to Boyko after Boyko had traveled to Moscow and likely met with high-ranking Russian government officials.[380] Kilimnik also spoke with Lyovochkin prior to his trip to the United States.[381]

---

[375] (U) *Ibid.*

[376] [redacted] Manafort and Kilimnik engaged in a technique called "foldering," by which Manafort and Kilimnik would save drafts in an email account and read them without sending them, although it is unclear if this draft was created for that purpose. Later, Manafort read a draft written by Kilimnik and saved in this same account. [redacted] Patten also engaged in foldering with Kilimnik. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[377] [redacted] Late on the evening of May 6, 2019, Kilimnik emailed Patten, writing that he was in "negotiations with Manafort to get me a 6 am private flight and then 1-2 pm do Dulles." Email, Kilimnik to Patten, May 6, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000686). The following morning at 6:02 a.m., Kilimnik emailed Patten and stated that he was "leaving DC for NY" and that he would be "[h]aving breakfast with Manafort at Peninsula hotel, then taking train back to DC." Email, Kilimnik to Patten, May 7, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000686). Patten was under the impression that Kilimnik may have traveled using private air travel arranged by Manafort, potentially on the Trump-owed plane. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018. Despite Patten's impressions, Kilimnik traveled via train. Metadata associated with Kilimnik's phone indicates travel via a train route over approximately four hours from 3:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. [redacted]

[378] [redacted] Kilimnik's and Manafort's phones were both located in close proximity to the Peninsula hotel as of 7:30 a.m. Phone metadata associated with Gates's phone reveals he was located in Richmond, Virginia at the time of the meeting.

[379] (U) *Ibid.* Gates described Boyko as a pro-Russian former-PoR official who pretended to be pro-European. Gates stated that Boyko had been an emissary between Yanukovych and Putin. FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.

[380] (U) *Ibid.*; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 138.

[381] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018. Kilimnik appears to have been in close and continuous contact with Lyovochkin for years, including during this time period.

(U) In addition to Ukrainian politics, Manafort and Kilimnik also discussed the Trump Campaign, likely including details of Manafort's vision of Trump's path to victory and the margins by which he might win.[382] Manafort expected Kilimnik to pass this information back to individuals in Ukraine and elsewhere.[383] Kilimnik later shared with Patten what he had learned about Manafort's "campaign strategy" at the meeting, including a discussion of whether Trump "[has] a shot; if he has a shot, why."[384]

[redacted] At 10:59 a.m., after the meeting with Manafort, Kilimnik sent Patten an email stating that he "just got on the train" and that he would be arriving at Washington's Union Station at 2:25 p.m.[385] At 5:09 p.m., Gates asked Kilimnik to call him if he had not yet departed on his flight. At 5:26 p.m., Gates and Kilimnik conducted a 13-minute phone call.[386] Kilimnik departed the United States on a flight scheduled to depart at 6:50 p.m. from Washington Dulles.[387]

(U) Additionally, according to Gates, Manafort instructed Gates to begin sending Kilimnik certain Trump Campaign polling data and other Campaign updates as a result of this meeting between Manafort and Kilimnik.[388] Gates further stated that he periodically sent the data via WhatsApp, an encrypted messaging application, and deleted the messages to Kilimnik daily.[389] Gates described the data as "topline" data, which included the results of internal polling including state, dates, generic, decided GOP, and other such numbers. Gates said that this was a copy and paste from summary sheets provided by Trump Campaign pollster and longtime

---

[382] (U) In addition to Manafort's own statements about the meeting, *see SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 138, an email sent later by Kilimnik to Patten provides some additional, but limited, corroboration that Kilimnik and Manafort discussed the Trump Campaign at the meeting and may have discussed potential electoral outcomes. In that email, sent the day after the election, Kilimnik stated, "It was close, and if DT had been more disciplined things would have gone as Paul said in May – bigger gap." Email, Kilimnik to Patten, November 9, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000289).

[383] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 138.

[384] (U) Patten Tr., pp. 73–74.

[385] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, May 7, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000686).

[386] [redacted] Shortly after this call, Gates and Roger Stone conducted an approximately 34-minute phone call, although there is no information linking the two.

[387] [redacted] Patten appears to have flown to Kyiv on May 8, 2016, to meet with Kilimnik and others. SSCI 2017-4885-3-000702; SP_SSCI_003001.

[388] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 136–137. Gates initially told the SCO that he started sending the information to Kilimnik in April or early May 2016. Gates later told the SCO that he believed it was after the meeting on May 7, 2016, that he began sending the polling data to Kilimnik. Manafort did not acknowledge instructing Gates to send the polling data to Kilimnik.

[389] (U) *Ibid.*

Manafort associate Anthony Fabrizio.[390] Gates recalled that it was not the entire raw data set, nor was it cross tabs.[391]

(U) Gates did not know why Manafort wanted him to send Kilimnik the polling data. Gates presumed that Manafort gave the instruction to share the information with Kilimnik so that Kilimnik could share the information with Ukrainian oligarchs as a way of showing the strength of Manafort's position on the Campaign, although no direct evidence supports this conclusion.[392] Gates also understood that Kilimnik would share the information with Deripaska.[393] Beyond Gates's recollection, the Committee was unable to obtain direct evidence of what Kilimnik did with the polling data and whether that data was shared further. For more information about the sharing of polling data, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.vii.a.

vi. [redacted] Manafort Offers to Brief Deripaska Through Kilimnik and Boyarkin; Kilimnik Appears to Have Insider Knowledge of Trump Campaign; [redacted] and Kilimnik Coordinate on [redacted]

(U) Other than Gates's admission that he began using WhatsApp to send polling data to Kilimnik, the Committee has no material information about the content of communications between Manafort or Gates and Kilimnik following the May 7, 2016 meeting until July 7, 2016. On July 7, 2016, a reporter from the *Kyiv Post* sent a request for comment to Manafort regarding

---

[390] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/15/2019.

[391] (U) *Ibid.* A review of Fabrizio polling data sent to Manafort and Gates revealed a consistent format for such "topline" result documents, which were distinguished internally from "cross tabs" and "raw data." The documents labeled "topline" took a consistent form throughout the campaign period. In general, these documents provided all responses for each polled question on a questionnaire, which usually included approximately 100 questions. These questionnaires tested a variety of questions related to Trump and Clinton. For example, on June 30, 2016, Fabrizio emailed Manafort, Gates, and four other Campaign personnel "topline" data for eight of the Campaign's seventeen "Target States" (the remaining target states were also tested on different days). These eight topline documents totaled 247 pages with detailed breakdowns of aggregated responses for each question tested as part of the poll. Email, Fabrizio to Manafort, Gates, et al., June 30, 2016 (FAB007731–FAB007978) (attaching eight PDF documents, each of which related to a different target state and titled "TOPLINE"). In response to Fabrizio's sharing these topline data documents with this group, Manafort replied that "I don't want these results shared with anyone outside of the recipients of this email." Email, Manafort to Fabrizio, Gates, et al., June 30, 2016 (FAB009360). Fabrizio repeatedly produced "topline" results throughout the campaign in a similar format, creating dozens of documents with thousands of pages of text. It is unclear how much of this data Gates shared with Kilimnik. Gates did not specify whether he copied text from inside the "topline" document or simply copied the PDF itself and pasted it into WhatsApp. In describing other communications he had with a separate individual, Gates said that while he used multiple encrypted applications to communicate, documents usually came through WhatsApp. FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/10/2018.

[392] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.

[393] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 136.

an upcoming article about Pericles.[394] Manafort forwarded this inquiry to Kilimnik, telling him "FYI" and asking if there was "any movement on this issue with our friend."[395] Given the context and Kilimnik's response, "our friend" almost certainly refers to Deripaska.[396] Kilimnik responded that he was "carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest" and expected that "we" will get back to the "original relationship" with Deripaska.[397] For unknown reasons, Kilimnik suggested that Deripaska was aware that there was "time sensitivity" involved in the matter.[398]

> *Our friend V [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in his boss' [Deripaska's] mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to you pretty soon, understanding all the time sensitivity. I am more than sure that it will be resolved and we will get back to the original relationship with V.'s boss.*[399]

(U) Manafort responded by instructing Kilimnik to "[t]ell V boss that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate."[400] The following day, July 8, 2016, Kilimnik sent Manafort the resulting *Kyiv Post* story—"Trump's Campaign Manager Haunted by Past Business."[401] In his email to Kilimnik, Manafort again instructed Kilimnik that he "should cover V [Boyarkin] on this story and make certain that V understands this is all BS and the real facts are the ones we passed along last year."[402]

[redacted]

---

[394] (U) Email, Kovensky to Manafort, July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00012834–12835).
[395] (U) Email, Manafort to Kilimnik, July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00012834).
[396] (U) It is possible the reference is to Boyarkin, or to Deripaska and Boyarkin generally.
[397] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Manafort, July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00012834).
[398] (U) *Ibid.*
[399] (U) *Ibid.*
[400] (U) Email, Manafort to Kilimnik, July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00012834).
[401] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Manafort, July 8, 2016 (DJTFP00012834); Josh Kovensky, "Trump's Campaign Manager Haunted by Past Business," *Kyiv Post*, July 8, 2016.
[402] (U) Email, Manafort to Kilimnik, July 7, 2016 (DJTFP00012834).
[403] [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) In mid- to late-July 2016, Kilimnik appeared to have insider knowledge of the Trump Campaign.

[redacted]

- (U) In mid-July 2016, in response to a comment by Patten related to Trump's recent selection of Mike Pence as a presidential running mate and how that selection might negatively affect foreign policy, Kilimnik wrote to Patten: "You know Paul – he is focused on winning the elections and then dealing with foreign policy or whatever. The choice of VP is purely electoral, as I understand."[411] Manafort later singled out the topic

---

[404] (U) For more information on Steele and his reporting, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.B. Gates recalled that, at some point, Manafort had asked Kilimnik to talk to his sources about the Steele dossier and get more information about it. According to Gates, Kilimnik's sources included Deripaska's people and numerous others. FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018. Given the context, this request may have occurred after the dossier's publication.

[405] [redacted]

[406] (U) *Ibid.*

[407] [redacted]

[408] (U) *Ibid.*

[409] (U) *Ibid.*

[410] (U) *Ibid.*

[411] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, July 17, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000499). While Kilimnik did not explicitly state that this knowledge came from Manafort, the context for the comment—and Kilimnik's ongoing

of why Trump chose Pence as his running mate as one of the "public" topics on which he might have been willing to brief Deripaska.[412] Manafort, however, claimed he never briefed Deripaska on it.[413] It is possible Manafort identified this topic because he had already discussed it with Kilimnik, his primary conduit to Deripaska.

[redacted]

vii. (U) Manafort Meets with Kilimnik at the Grand Havana Room in New York City; They Discuss Polling Data, Ukraine Plan, and Debts

(U) On July 28, 2016, Kilimnik flew from Kyiv to Moscow.[418] Late that evening, Kilimnik emailed Manafort under the subject line "Black caviar" and relayed two points.[419] The first point related to a press inquiry that Lyovochkin had received.[420] With respect to this point, Kilimnik sought to determine whether Manafort wanted Lyovochkin to speak with the reporter in an effort to provide the reporter a positive view of Manafort's prior work in Ukraine.[421] The second point involved Kilimnik's request to discuss a matter with Manafort, the substance of which Kilimnik sought to speak about only indirectly in the email:

---

communications with Manafort at that time— suggests Kilimnik may have acquired this understanding based on a prior conversation with Manafort.

[412] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.
[413] (U) *Ibid.*
[414] [redacted]
[415] (U) *Ibid.*
[416] (U) *Ibid.*
[417] (U) *Ibid.*
[418] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 138.
[419] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Manafort, July 29, 2016 (DJTFP00013334).
[420] (U) *Ibid.*
[421] (U) *Ibid.*

> *I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We spent about 5 hours talking about his story, and I have several important messages from him to you. He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it by you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it, provided that he buys me a ticket. It has to do about the future of his country, and is quite interesting. So, if you are absolutely not against the concept, please let me know which dates/places will work, even next week, and I could come and see you.*[422]

(U) Manafort told the SCO that "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" was Yanukovych.[423] Manafort explained that this was a reference to a $30,000 to $40,000 jar of caviar that Yanukovych had given him at a lunch following Yanukovych's 2010 election as president.[424] Patten told the Committee that Kilimnik had relayed a similar explanation for the reference. Patten recalled:

> *According to Konstantin, they [Konstantin and Manafort] were having breakfast with the president, President Yanukovych . . . Mr. Manafort complimented the caviar. And [Yanukovych] said: Oh you like it; I'll get you more. And sort of snapped his fingers, and he's given a big vat of it.*[425]

(U) Within minutes of receiving Kilimnik's email, Manafort responded to Kilimnik, telling him that "Tuesday is best."[426] After Kilimnik asked for an alternate day, Manafort and Kilimnik settled on the evening of Wednesday, August 2, 2016, in New York.[427] Kilimnik told Manafort that he needed "about two hours" because "it is a long caviar story to tell."[428]

[redacted] According to [redacted], on August 2, 2016, at 7:43 p.m. Kilimnik passed through U.S. customs at New York John F. Kennedy International Airport.[429] Manafort's

---

[422] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[423] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 139
[424] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[425] **(U)** Patten Tr., p. 83. Gates, however, recalled a similar story, but that the event was a party hosted by Rinat Akhmetov, not Yanukovych, and that it was Akhmetov who was the man who gave Manafort his "biggest black caviar jar." FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018.
[426] **(U)** Email, Manafort to Kilimnik, July 29, 2016 (DJTFP00013334).
[427] **(U)** Emails, Manafort and Kilimnik, July 29–31, 2016 (DJTFP00013474).
[428] **(U)** Email, Kilimnik to Manafort, July 31, 2016 (DJTFP00013474). Kilimnik told Manafort that he had "our friends working on my ticket."
[429] [redacted]

Campaign email account calendar had an entry for the Kilimnik meeting starting at 9:00 p.m., following a 5:30 p.m. meeting with Trump and Rudy Giuliani in Trump Tower.[430]

(U) Manafort, Kilimnik, and Gates exchanged a number of calls and messages in the lead-up to the meeting. At 8:33 p.m., Kilimnik texted Manafort.[431] At 8:51 p.m., Manafort and Gates had a 23-minute phone call, in the middle of which Kilimnik dialed Manafort.[432] From 9:30 p.m. to 9:32 p.m., Gates and Kilimnik exchanged three short phone calls.[433]

(U) Although it is unclear exactly when the meeting began, on the evening of August 2, 2016, Manafort and Kilimnik eventually met at the Grand Havana Room, a private lounge located at 666 Fifth Avenue in New York City. According to testimony and records, Gates arrived late to the meeting.[434] At least three topics were discussed at the meeting: internal Trump polling information and strategy; a peace plan for Ukraine; and past debts and business disputes with Deripaska and the OB.[435] At the end of the meeting, Kilimnik, Gates, and Manafort deliberately departed using separate routes to avoid being seen together.[436] Late that evening, between 11:28 p.m. and 12:09 a.m., Manafort and Kilimnik also exchanged approximately ten text messages.[437]

a. (U) Internal Polling Information and Trump Campaign Strategy

---

[430] [redacted] Daily Schedule, August 2, 2016 (DJTFP00023323). The meeting is recorded as "Dinner w/ KK." "KK" is a frequently used moniker for Kilimnik. During the Transition meeting, Manafort texted Gates what appears to be a reference to meeting with Kilimnik, stating only "[t]hat is when guest and I will be downstairs." [redacted]

[431] [redacted]

[432] (U) *Ibid.*

[433] (U) *Ibid.*

[434] (U) *Ibid.*; FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018. Gates stated that there may have been topics discussed prior to Gates's arrival. FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018.

[435] (U) *See SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 139–141. The order in which these three topics are presented herein does not necessarily correlate to the order in which they were discussed in the meeting.

[436] [redacted] *Ibid.*, p. 141. Kilimnik departed from Washington D.C. on August 4, 2016 on a flight scheduled to depart at 6:55 p.m. local time. [redacted] Patten recalled Kilimnik staying at Patten's house once Kilimnik traveled to Washington, D.C., after his meeting with Manafort and Gates in New York. Patten's proximity to Kilimnik so near in time to the August 2, 2016 meeting lends some credibility to his version of events as relayed by Kilimnik.

[437] [redacted] The next day, Manafort, Gates, and Stone were in contact about a plan to "save" Trump. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.B.

(U) At the meeting, Manafort walked Kilimnik through the state of the Trump Campaign, including its internal polling data, and Manafort's plan to win.[438]

(U) As noted above, since approximately early May, Gates had been periodically sending Trump Campaign polling data to Kilimnik via WhatsApp and then deleting the messages.[439] Subsequent communications between Kilimnik and his associates obtained by the Committee also make reference to Kilimnik's awareness of Trump's internal polling, providing contemporary documentary evidence that Kilimnik had access to it.[440] This polling data included internal Trump Campaign polling data from Trump Campaign pollster and longtime Manafort associate Anthony Fabrizio.[441] Fabrizio had been hired by the Trump Campaign at Manafort's urging after Manafort joined the Campaign. Fabrizio had conducted past polling work for Manafort, including as part of Manafort's work in Ukraine.[442]

(U) Kilimnik was capable of comprehending the complex polling data he received. A large body of documentary evidence and testimony indicates that Kilimnik had significant knowledge of, and experience with, polling data. In particular, for over a decade, Kilimnik had regularly helped formulate and review polling questionnaires and scripts, hired and overseen polling experts, analyzed and interpreted polling results, and presented the outcome of polls to

---

[438] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 140; FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.

[439] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 136.

[440] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Marson, August 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000414–416) ("Trump's internal polling shows signs of strengthening of their positions among key target groups they care about.").

[441] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/7/2018; FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 136. Fabrizio later paid for some of Manafort's legal fees in an irregular arrangement. Manafort, who was not paid by the Trump Campaign, arranged for Fabrizio to be hired by the Campaign, and Fabrizio was ultimately compensated for his polling work by the Campaign directly. Further, Manafort helped setup a political action committee (PAC) run by Manafort's and Gates's close associate Laurance Gay. That PAC, one of the largest pro-Trump PACs responsible for raising over $20 million, in turn, had a contract with a Fabrizio-controlled entity, First Media Services Corporation (T/A Multi-Media Services Corporation) for election-related work. Gay received a percent of commissions as a result of this contract. *See* Declaration in Support of the Government's Breach Determination and Sentencing, *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, Case No. 1:17-CR-201 (D.D.C. January 15, 2019); Christina Wilkie, "A mysterious payment to Paul Manafort's lawyer reveals a hidden chapter of Trump's 2016 presidential campaign," *CNBC*, March 10, 2019. In June 2017, Gay asked Fabrizio to pay $125,000 of Manafort's legal fees via wire transfer from First Media Services. *Ibid.* The Fabrizio-controlled entity wired the funds to the law firm then representing Manafort, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. Email, Fabrizio to Manafort, September 21, 2017 (FAB010402). Manafort offered numerous conflicting explanations for this arrangement, and a federal judge found that Manafort had misled the SCO about the arrangement. Transcript of Sealed Hearing, *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, Case No. 1:17-CR-201 (D.D.C. February 13, 2019). While this arrangement resembles a kickback scheme, Manafort claimed the payment from Fabrizio was just a friend helping a friend. FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

[442] (U) Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, DMP International, LLC, June 27, 2017.

politicians and colleagues. Further, Kilimnik was familiar with Fabrizio's past work and had worked with him professionally.

(U) Open source information suggests that Kilimnik viewed the polling data as a key to Manafort's success and believed his interpretation of the data yielded valuable insights. In an interview with a reporter in 2018, Kilimnik stated:

> *Manafort is a guy who can merge strategy and message into something that will work for victory. He has done it all across the world and he has done it really just very skillfully. . . . I've seen him work in different countries and he really does -- takes very seriously his polling and he can spend two weeks going through the data and he will come with the best strategy you can ever have.*[443]

(U) Information obtained by the Committee suggests that Fabrizio's polling data was of significance to the Trump Campaign and was relied upon by the Campaign's data operation. The Campaign's data operation, in turn, largely determined the Campaign's resource allocation and strategy. Brad Parscale, who was in charge of the Campaign's data operation, provided some insight into how polling data was used. Parscale explained that while in some cases senior Campaign aides would independently direct Campaign resource allocation, "98 percent" of the allocation was determined by the Campaign's internal polling data as provided by its pollsters.[444] This data was updated "every few days" or "every day almost during certain periods."[445]

(U) While the Trump Campaign employed three different pollsters over the course of the 2016 campaign, information suggests that Fabrizio was the primary pollster during Manafort's tenure and potentially beyond. For example, a graphic from an internal Campaign presentation from August 2016 depicts Fabrizio as the only pollster directly linked to the Trump Campaign data operation.[446]

---

[443] (U) Christopher Miller, "'Person A' In His Own Words: On The Record With Shadowy Operative In Russia Probe," RFE/RL, April 6, 2018 (from audio clip entitled "Kilimnik2").
[444] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Brad Parscale, November 20, 2017, p. 38.
[445] (U) *Ibid.*
[446] (U) Trump Data Team Presentation, August 22, 2016 (FLYNN_SSCI_00011768) (redactions in black and emphasis in red added).



(U) Parscale further explained that the polling data was ingested into a visualization tool with the help of Cambridge Analytica developers.[447] The visualization tool was available on an iPad which Parscale carried.[448]

> *I wanted to be able to just fly around with Trump and if he asked me, how are we doing in western Michigan, I could open [the data visualization tool] up and just say: Okay, here's where you need to fly to tomorrow. . . . That was based off data coming in from polling.*[449]

(U) Manafort stated that he trusted Fabrizio's numbers and judgment.[450] Manafort's own communications to Fabrizio further underscore the importance Manafort placed on the internal polling data. For example, in a May email to Fabrizio, Manafort discussed using RNC polling as a baseline, suggesting that Fabrizio should "piggyback" off the RNC polling as much as

---

[447] **(U)** Separately, Patten worked for Cambridge Analytica, but not related to its Trump-related work. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.J.
[448] **(U)** Parscale Tr., p. 64.
[449] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[450] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.

possible.[451] Manafort underscored, however, that he and Fabrizio needed to be "in control" of Fabrizio's polling data, including what Manafort described as "the sensitive stuff."[452]

(U) At the meeting, Manafort walked Kilimnik through the internal polling data from Fabrizio in detail.[453] According to Gates, Kilimnik wanted to know how Trump could win.[454] Manafort explained his strategy in the battleground states and told Kilimnik about polls that identified voter bases in blue-collar, democratic-leaning states which Trump could swing.[455] Manafort said these voters could be reached by Trump on issues like economics, but the Campaign needed to implement a ground game.[456] Gates recalled that Manafort further discussed the "battleground" states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.[457]

(U) The Committee sought to determine with specificity what information Kilimnik actually gleaned from Manafort on August 2, 2016. Information suggests Kilimnik understood that some of the polling data showed that Clinton's negatives were particularly high; that Manafort's plan for victory called for focusing on Clinton's negatives as much as possible; and that given Clinton's high negatives, there was a chance that Trump could win.

(U) Patten's debriefing with the SCO provides the most granular account of what information Kilimnik obtained at the August 2, 2016 meeting:

---

[451] (U) Email, Manafort to Fabrizio, Gates, and Wiley, May 17, 2016 (FAB008947).

[452] (U) *Ibid.* Manafort did not elaborate further on what constituted "the sensitive stuff."

[453] [redacted] FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018; FBI, FD-302, Gates, 2/15/2019; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 140; FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018. Prior to the meeting with Kilimnik, Manafort sent Gates an email with the subject line "Print for SCh meeting." Attached to the email was a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, prepared by Fabrizio's firm, containing historical polling data and internal Campaign polling data derived from mid-July covering each of 137 designated market areas (DMAs) across Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The spreadsheet included voting data from previous presidential elections for the purposes of comparison with current internal Trump Campaign data for each DMA. Fabrizio first sent the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to Manafort and Gates on July 15, 2016, and again on July 17, 2018. Email, Fabrizio to Manafort, July 17, 2016 (FAB005382–5445) (attaching the Excel file). Metadata analysis shows that the document that Fabrizio sent on July 15 and July 17 was the same document that Manafort sent to Gates on the morning of August 2, 2016, with instructions to print the document. [redacted] Although Manafort asked him to print that data earlier in the day, Gates did not recall Manafort referencing that printed data during the meeting with Kilimnik. FBI, FD-302, Gates, 2/15/2019.

[454] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018

[455] (U) *Ibid.*

[456] (U) *Ibid.*

[457] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018. Gates's memory on this point, however, was not exceptionally clear. Gates at first believed that the meeting was in May and that Manafort had presented his plan for the primaries and delegates to Kilimnik. After being reminded that the meeting was in August, not May, Gates corrected himself, stating that Kilimnik and Manafort discussed the battleground states.

Kilimnik told Patten that at the New York cigar bar meeting, Manafort stated that they have a plan to beat Hillary Clinton which included Manafort bringing discipline and an organized strategy to the campaign. Moreover, because Clinton's negatives were so low [sic] – if they could focus on her negatives they could win the election. Manafort discussed the Fabrizio internal Trump polling data with Kilimnik, and explained that Fabrizio's polling numbers showed that the Clinton negatives, referred to as a 'therm poll,' were high. Thus, based on this polling there was a chance Trump could win.[458]

(U) Patten relayed similar information to the Committee. In particular, he told the Committee that Kilimnik mentioned Manafort's belief that "because of Clinton's high negatives, there was a chance, only because her negatives were so astronomically high, that it was possible to win."[459]

(U) The Committee also sought to understand the purpose of sharing the polling data, as well as what, if anything, Kilimnik did with the information about internal Trump polling and strategy. As noted, Gates understood that Kilimnik would share the polling data with Ukrainian oligarchs affiliated with the OB and with Deripaska. However, Gates ultimately claimed that he did not trust Kilimnik, that he did not know why Manafort was sharing internal polling data with him, and that Kilimnik could have given the data to anyone.[460] While the Committee obtained evidence revealing that Kilimnik shared with Deripaska other information passed on by Manafort—such as links to news articles—the Committee did not obtain records showing that Kilimnik passed on the polling data. However, the Committee has no records of, and extremely limited insight into, Kilimnik's communications [redacted] As a result, this lack of documentary record is not dispositive.

---

[458] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[459] **(U)** Patten Tr., p. 106. Fabrizio's firm conducted a large round of polling in mid-July. That polling covered the Campaign's seventeen designated target states and tested dozens of questions. However, documents suggest that the Campaign viewed a shift in "image" between Trump and Clinton as a key takeaway from this polling. In particular, a memorandum from Fabrizio to Manafort dated July 27, 2016, and marked "CONFIDENTIAL – EYES ONLY" focused on a recent shift in the candidates' images revealed in the mid-July polling. According to the memorandum, the recent polling showed "DJT's net image improve by 7 points with voters in our Target States" while Clinton's image "eroded a net of 7 points." According to the memorandum, this change contributed to the "bounces" the Campaign saw in polling, and Fabrizio emphasized that this shift should inform the Campaign's strategy going forward. Memorandum, "Important Supplement to Yesterday's Memo," July 27, 2016 (FAB001244). While the Campaign clearly viewed a variety of factors as important in their victory, including those unrelated to Clinton's image and favorability, these findings are consistent with Manafort relaying to Kilimnik that the Campaign had a path to victory given Clinton's negatives.

[460] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018.

(U) The Committee was unable to determine Kilimnik's actions after receiving the data. The Committee did, however, obtain a single piece of information that could plausibly be a reflection of Kilimnik's actions after the August 2 meeting.

[redacted]

(U) Despite these correlations, the Committee could not reliably determine whether this information was ultimately connected to Manafort's sharing of internal polling data and Campaign strategy.

b. (U) Ukraine Peace Plan

(U) The second item discussed at the August 2, 2016, meeting was a plan for resolving the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Information about that peace plan discussion, however, is limited to testimony from Manafort and Gates. As with his other interactions with Kilimnik, Manafort provided inaccurate information about this topic to the SCO.

(U) Gates, who arrived late to the meeting,[462] said that Kilimnik had relayed an "urgent" message at the meeting.[463] The message came from Yanukovych and asked whether Manafort would run Yanukovych's comeback campaign.[464] Kilimnik relayed that Yanukovych had reached out to Kilimnik through an "intermediary" and sent Kilimnik to present the plan to Manafort.[465] Kilimnik was directed to present the proposal and Manafort's response in person.[466]

(U) Manafort told the SCO that Kilimnik outlined a plan to have Viktor Yanukovych return to politics in eastern Ukraine, and to have eastern Ukraine declared an autonomous

---

[461] [redacted]

[462] (U) Gates stated that he had arrived to the meeting after Manafort and Kilimnik had already sat down to eat in the dining room. Gates estimated that he stayed for 45 minutes. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018.

[463] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018. Gates believed the message was "urgent" because Yanukovych needed to start rebuilding the OB immediately to prepare for his run.

[464] (U) *Ibid.*

[465] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018.

[466] (U) *Ibid.* Gates stated that he did not know the identity of the intermediary.

region.[467] Manafort understood that the plan was a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine.[468] Manafort stated that Kilimnik ran the plan by someone in the Russian government for approval.[469] Manafort admitted that Kilimnik did not need to state the obvious—that Manafort could benefit financially.[470]

(U) Manafort stated that he told Kilimnik the plan was crazy and that ended the discussion.[471] Gates recalled that Manafort laughed and declined Yanukovych's offer to "run his comeback campaign."[472] Manafort claimed that had he not cut off the discussion of this plan, Kilimnik would have asked Manafort to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace plan.[473]

(U) Despite Manafort's assertion that he cut the conversation short, Manafort and Kilimnik took a variety of follow-on actions related to the plan.

- [redacted]
- (U) As described below, this discussion was also not the last instance of Kilimnik and Manafort discussing the plan.[475] Manafort eventually admitted to reading a foldered email from Kilimnik describing the plan and steps for its implementation in December 2016. The plan was also discussed at a February 2017 Manafort-Kilimnik meeting in Madrid.
- (U) Manafort continued working with Kilimnik on the plan, including efforts to draft a poll to test aspects of the plan as late as 2018.

---

[467] (U) Communications Kilimnik had with the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv and other communications with his associates reveal Kilimnik's longstanding focus on the issue of resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The Committee obtained records indicating Kilimnik was discussing a plan related to Yanukovych as early as May 2015. Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, May 21, 2015 (CDP-2017-00011G-000427) ("The launch of Pravda, or "Bring Yanukovich Back" project may happen in the next few weeks, or so I am hearing. they are still thinking about the name, but this is on top of the shortlist for names. :))").

[468] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 140.

[469] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/12/2018. Manafort later restated this by saying that he believed Kilimnik would have run the plan by someone in the Russian government for approval.

[470] (U) *Ibid.*

[471] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 140.

[472] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018.

[473] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 140.

[474] [redacted]

[475] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 140.

(U) Separately, an email from Kilimnik suggests that he and Manafort may have also discussed the formation of Russia and Ukraine policy on the Trump Campaign during the August 2, 2016 meeting. Approximately two weeks after the meeting, Kilimnik told an associate that he had "seen Manafort last week" and "got a sense that everything that Trump says about Russia and Ukraine is Trump's own emotional opinion, not campaign strategy." Kilimnik complained that Manafort was not influencing the Campaign's strategy on Russia and Ukraine, "otherwise the message would have been much more balanced."[476]

c. (U) Manafort's Past Debts and Business Disputes with Deripaska and the OB

(U) In addition to Campaign strategy involving polling data and the Ukraine plan, Manafort and Kilimnik also discussed two financial disputes and debts at the meeting.

(U) The first dispute involved Deripaska and Pericles.[477] Gates recalled that Kilimnik relayed at the meeting that Deripaska's lawsuit had been dismissed.[478] Gates also recalled that Kilimnik was trying to obtain documentation showing the dismissal.[479]

(U) The second involved money Manafort believed he was owed by the OB for his work in Ukraine.[480] During the meeting, Kilimnik updated Manafort on what was happening with Lyovochkin, Akhmetov, and their "other friends" in Kyiv.[481] Manafort understood that the "oligarchs" wanted "intel" on the Trump Campaign.[482] The specifics of what was discussed at this meeting are unknown. Although his recollection was not specific to this meeting, Gates recalled that during the campaign Kilimnik had said that Akhmetov had agreed to pay Manafort for the money owed.[483] At one point, Kilimnik said Akhmetov was going to pay, but he was having trouble getting his money out of Ukraine.[484]

viii. (U) Possible Connections to GRU Hack-and-Leak Operations

---

[476] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Marson, August 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000414–416). Kilimnik was emailing a journalist from *The Wall Street Journal*, and given Kilimnik's repeated lying and obfuscation to the press, the accuracy of the statement is difficult to assess.
[477] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 141. Manafort recalled that Kilimnik worked for him to keep the Pericles lawsuit from getting out of hand. FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.
[478] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018.
[479] (U) *Ibid.*
[480] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 141.
[481] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018
[482] (U) *Ibid.*
[483] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/7/2018.
[484] (U) *Ibid.*

(U) Some evidence suggests Kilimnik may be connected to the GRU hack-and-leak operation related to the 2016 U.S. election. This assessment is based on a body of fragmentary information.

[redacted] As mentioned above, [redacted]

[redacted] The GRU subsequently transferred the Podesta emails to WikiLeaks, which began publicly releasing the emails on October 7, 2016.

[redacted] Kilimnik is also possibly connected to [redacted]

[redacted]

---

[485] [redacted]

[486] (U) *Ibid.*

[487] (U) *Ibid.*

[488] (U) The GRU gained access to Podesta's emails in March 2016. The GRU's first known outreach to WikiLeaks in relation to the passage of these emails occurred in mid-September 2016. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.B.

[489] [redacted]

[490] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

- [redacted] Kilimnik shared the same document with Manafort at approximately the same time.[493] Kilimnik appeared to treat the plan confidentially, stating that it was not in the public domain, and sought to quietly test the viability of the plan.[494] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[491] [redacted]

[492] (U) *Ibid.*

[493] (U) *See* Email, Manafort to Fabrizio, February 19, 2018 (FAB010419); Email, Manafort to Fabrizio and Ward, February 21, 2018. (FAB010190–10194). A version of this Ukraine plan is reproduced *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.7.vii.

[494] (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.7.vii

[495] [redacted]

[496] [redacted]

[497] [redacted]

[498] [redacted]

[499] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

[redacted]

- [redacted] On February 4, 2014, an audio recording of a phone call between then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt and then-Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland appeared on YouTube.[507] The video

---

[500] (U) *Ibid.*
[501] (U) *Ibid.*
[502] (U) *Ibid.*
[503] [redacted]
[504] (U) *Ibid.*
[505] (U) *Ibid.*
[506] (U) *Ibid.*
[507] (U) Available at: youtube.com/watch?v=MSxaa-67yGM#t=89. [redacted] targeting of Pyatt and Nuland is noteworthy because of Kilimnik's close proximity to both. When the calls got leaked, Kilimnik was acting as the primary intermediary between U.S. diplomats and the PoR prior to Yanukovych's departure, and then again with the OB after his departure. *See, e.g.,* Emails, Kasanof, Zentos, Pfleger, et al., February 23, 2014 (CDP-2017-00011G-000877) (describing Kilimnik as the primary point of contact with the PoR for scheduling PoR-related meetings with visiting Deputy Secretary of State in late-February 2014); Email, Pfleger to Pyatt, et al., November 15–18, 2013 (CDP-2017-00011G-001090- CDP-2017-00011G-001091) (describing Kilimnik as the primary point of contact in arranging a call between Yanukovych and the U.S. Vice President in November 2013). Kilimnik personally attended meetings with Pyatt and Nuland when he accompanied Lyovochkin and other PoR/OB officials. *See, e.g.* Email, Kilimnik to Pfleger, October 9, 2014 (CDP-2017-00011G-000792) (describing Kilimnik's attendance at an October 2014 meeting between Nuland and Lyovochkin). Communications occurring in early 2015

initially received only limited attention in the first hours after publication. On February 5, 2014, an aide to then-Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin tweeted a YouTube link to the audio of the call.[508] By February 6, the leak had received widespread attention in Western media.[509]

[redacted]

- [redacted]

made reference to a past instance where Kilimnik appears to have served as the interpreter for a meeting with Nuland. Email, Purcell to Toko, et al., May 21, 2015 (CDP-2017-00011G-000433).

[508] (U) Christopher J. Miller, "'Fuck the EU,' frustrated Nuland says to Pyatt, in alleged leaked phone call (UPDATE)," *Kyiv Post*, February 6, 2014. [redacted]

[509] (U) *See, e.g.*, Doina Chiacu, Arshad Mohammed, "Leaked audio reveals embarrassing U.S. exchange on Ukraine, EU," Reuters, February 6, 2014.

[510] [redacted]

[511] [redacted]

[512] [redacted]

[513] [redacted]

[514] [redacted]

- Cyber Berkut is a GRU persona influence operation which has been active since that time.[518] Cyber Berkut has leaked a wide variety of hacked material and conducted other computer network operations and influence campaigns on behalf of the Russian government.[519]

-

(U) Manafort's involvement with the GRU hack-and-leak operation is largely unknown. Kilimnik was in sustained contact with Manafort before, during, and after the GRU cyber and influence operations, but the Committee did not obtain reliable, direct evidence that Kilimnik and Manafort discussed the GRU hack-and-leak operation. As noted above, however, the content of the majority of the communications between Manafort and Kilimnik is unknown. Some of these communications involved in-person meetings; no objective record of their content exists.

(U) Two pieces of information, however, raise the possibility of Manafort's potential connection to the hack-and-leak operations.

515

516

517

518 U.K. National Cyber Security Centre, "Reckless campaign of cyber attacks by Russian military intelligence service exposed," October 3, 2018.

519 (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

[redacted] Yohai, who is no longer married to Manafort's daughter, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in 2018, and again in 2019, and was sentenced to 110 months in federal prison.[522] Manafort appears to have been in contact with Yohai during key periods in 2016. For instance, Yohai appeared on the call list Manafort maintained on his Campaign Microsoft Outlook calendar in early June 2016.[523] During approximately this same time, Yohai was involved in [redacted] with Manafort, including [redacted]

[redacted]

[520] [redacted]

[521] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

[522] (U) U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California, "Serial Con Artist Sentenced to More Than 9 Years in Federal Prison for $6.7 Million Swindle of Investors, Family and Friends," November 12, 2019.

[523] (U) Call list, Manafort, June 9, 2016 (DJTFP00022279).

[524] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the Committee has no information to corroborate this report's account of [redacted] However, the Committee was able to corroborate most other aspects of this same report.[526]

ix. (U) The "Ledger" and Manafort's Resignation

(U) On August 14, Steve Bannon was brought on to the Trump Campaign as CEO. Bannon recalled that a condition of his joining the Campaign that he worked out with Trump was that Manafort would not be fired, which Bannon explained was because he did not want to have any "bloodletting" related to the Campaign, which could be a distraction.[527] Instead, Bannon understood that Manafort would "be able to stick around as a figurehead."[528] However, Bannon recalled that later that same day, Manafort told him that *The New York Times* was nearing publication on a story alleging Manafort was involved in cash payments in Ukraine totaling

---

525 [redacted]

526 [redacted]

[redacted]

527 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Steve Bannon, November 19, 2018, p. 58.

528 (U) *Ibid.*

millions of dollars.[529] That evening, *The New York Times* published the article with the headline "Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump's Campaign Chief."[530]

(U) Manafort told the FBI that he had previously briefed Trump on his past work in Ukraine.[531] Manafort said that he did this because he wanted Trump prepared in case Manafort's Ukraine work or the Deripaska issue popped up.[532] Manafort recalled that he did not go into detail because Trump was not interested.[533] However, when information about Manafort's work in Ukraine came out, Manafort told the FBI that Trump was upset.[534]

(U) On August 18, 2016, Kilimnik told a journalist in private that he had "almost daily contacts with Manafort these days on this 'Ukraine crisis.'"[535] Kilimnik also made reference to communications with Gates.[536] However, Kilimnik claimed:

> *What others do not see is that Manafort is building a parallel system of HQ, pretty similar to what he has done in Ukraine for PofR, which plays a crucial role in key moments. Whether he has time to finish it is another story.*[537]

(U) On August 19, 2016, Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign. That same day, Kilimnik wrote to an associate that "Manafort will make billions on this free PR working for the same people he used to work. And probably get a lot of new clients with his newly found fame."[538]

6. (U) Manafort's Activities For the Remainder of the Campaign

(U) After leaving the Trump Campaign in August 2016, Manafort stayed in touch with Trump, Kushner, and others on the Trump Campaign. Manafort also stayed in touch with Kilimnik, and Kilimnik was aware of Manafort's continuing communications with the

---

[529] (U) *Ibid.* pp. 58–59.
[530] (U) Andrew E. Kramer, et al., "Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump's Campaign Chief," *The New York Times*, August 14, 2016.
[531] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.
[532] (U) *Ibid.*
[533] (U) *Ibid.*
[534] (U) *Ibid.*
[535] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Marson, August 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000414–16). The Committee was unable to obtain these communications between Kilimnik and Manafort.
[536] (U) *Ibid.*
[537] (U) *Ibid.* Gates relayed a very similar statement to the SCO, using the same term. Gates explained that, in Ukraine, Manafort had created a "parallel system" of people loyal to him inside PoR. According to Gates, Manafort did the same thing in the Trump Campaign with Parscale, Miller, Fabrizio, Dearborn, and others. Gates believed Manafort maintained these connections when he left the Campaign. FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.
[538] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Marson, August 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000414–416).

Campaign. Some evidence suggests that Manafort may have been involved in outreach from the Ukrainian government to the Trump Campaign during this time.

i. (U) Manafort's Continued Contact with the Trump Campaign; Kilimnik's awareness of these contacts

(U) After his resignation on August 19, 2016, Manafort stayed in touch with the Trump Campaign through repeated contacts with Trump, Kushner, and others.

(U) Manafort told the FBI that, after his resignation, but before the election, he and Trump had spoken "a few times."[539] While Manafort claimed to have not recalled the substance of these interactions, he did recall giving Trump advice on Trump's performance in the second debate and giving Trump ideas for the third debate.[540] Separate records indicate that Manafort and Trump spoke on the night of the election.[541]

(U) Manafort also told the SCO that from the time he left the Campaign until the election, he met with Kushner "once or twice" and spoke to Kushner on the phone "five or six times."[542] Manafort said that both sides reached out to one another.[543] According to Manafort, Donald Trump and others in his family were aware that Manafort and Kushner were in contact and Kushner "thought it would be good" for Manafort to call Trump.[544] Kushner told the Committee that he and Manafort were in contact, but that this contact occurred "infrequently." Kushner recalled Manafort telling him to "watch the Rust Belt; that's where you're going to have big success. . . . looking at the demographics and the data, he felt very strongly that the Midwest was an area that we should be very focused on."[545] Kushner did not share any more of the substance of his discussions with Manafort, although emails suggest Manafort continued to provide input on Campaign strategy and encouraged the use of WikiLeaks information. For instance, on October 21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an email with an attached memorandum that provided strategy guidance recommending that the Campaign should depict Clinton "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment," because "Wikileaks provides the Trump

---

[539] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.
[540] (U) *Ibid.*
[541] (U) Email, Manafort to Graff, November 18, 2016 (TRUMPORG_76_004856).
[542] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018. Email communications suggest that Manafort and Kushner met in-person after Manafort was fired, but prior to Election Day. For instance, in a September 13, 2016 email, Fabrizio told Manafort that he was aware that Manafort was planning on "having breakfast with Jared tomorrow." Email, Manafort to Fabrizio and Gates, September 13, 2016 (FAB008949).
[543] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.
[544] (U) *Ibid.*
[545] (U) Transcript of the Interview with Jared Kushner, July 24, 2017, p. 108.

campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way – by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."[546]

(U) On November 5, 2016, Manafort sent a document entitled "Securing the Victory" to at least Trump, Kushner, and Reince Priebus.[547] The document predicted a Trump victory in the election just days away. In the two-page memorandum, Manafort counseled that the Trump team must prepare the public and media for this result or else face rejection and backlash. In particular, Manafort voiced a concern that the Clinton Campaign would "move immediately to discredit the DT victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results."[548] Manafort told the SCO that that he had "no information" that Russia hacked voting machines.[549] For a full accounting of Russian cyber activities against U.S. electoral infrastructure, including the penetration of a state at this time, *see infra* Vol. I. Manafort also sent the memorandum to Sean Hannity, although he said he did not expect Hannity to talk to Trump about it.[550]

(U) Kilimnik was aware that Manafort remained in contact with Trump and the Campaign generally and took an interest in making use of the connection. Kilimnik told Patten that Manafort stayed in the background, but still maintained contact and stayed close to Trump.[551]

ii. (U) Manafort's Involvement in Ukrainian Government Outreach to the Campaign

(U) With Gates's help, Manafort was involved in outreach from the Ukrainian Embassy in the United States to the Trump Campaign in September 2016. This outreach came through Frank Mermoud, a former Department of State official who was involved in organizing the

---

[546] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 141.

[547] (U) Email, Priebus to Bannon, November 5, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0000961); FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018. While Manafort recalled in his interview with the SCO that he sent the memorandum to Trump's executive assistant, the Trump Organization did not produce any such document as part of the Committee's request. Because of other known deficiencies in the Trump Organization's document responses, the Committee does not draw the conclusion that no document was sent. Not all senior individuals in the Trump Campaign engaged in substantive interactions with Manafort after his departure. For instance, while Steve Bannon was the recipient of short messages of encouragement from Manafort and responded in kind, Bannon made clear internally that he thought further interactions with Manafort would negatively impact the Campaign. In response to Priebus forwarding Manafort's November 5, 2016 memorandum to him, Bannon responded, "We need to avoid manafort like he has a disease. Dems will say that the Russians are helping us win." Email, Bannon to Priebus, November 5, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0000964).

[548] (U) Email, Priebus to Bannon, November 5, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0000964).

[549] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

[550] (U) *Ibid.*

[551] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018.

diplomatic outreach for events surrounding the July 2016 Republican National Convention in Cleveland. At the Convention, Mermoud had introduced Manafort to then-Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Valeriy Chaly.[552] According to Mermoud, Chaly was "upset" about the changes to the Republican platform related to Ukraine.[553] Mermoud recalled that Manafort and Chaly had spoken on the convention floor for several minutes about Ukraine, which had appeared to "mollify" Chaly's concerns.[554]

(U) On September 14, 2016, Mermoud reached out to Gates, who at the time was still serving on the Trump Campaign, with "something of extreme interest."[555] Earlier that day Chaly had emailed Mermoud a request for help arranging a meeting between Poroshenko and Trump during Poroshenko's upcoming trip to the United Nations General Assembly.[556] Later that day, Mermoud texted Gates, asking if "Paul" had anything to say about their earlier conversation about the meeting.[557] Gates responded to Mermoud's text, "Yes. Will call shortly. Going to try and do it."[558] Gates relayed a proposed day for the Trump-Poroshenko meeting through Mermoud, but Chaly responded that day would not work for the Ukrainian side.[559] Mermoud and Gates discussed the possibility of a call between Trump and Poroshenko instead.[560] Gates told Mermoud that he supported the idea for a call, but instructed him not to "say anything to chalay about a call until I speak with Paul and our scheduler."[561] The Committee did not obtain information indicating that a phone call between Trump and Poroshenko occurred during the campaign.

(U) Mermoud was under the impression from Gates that Manafort supported the idea of a call or meeting and was involved in it, even though Manafort had already left the Campaign.[562] Mermoud explained to the Committee that it was his understanding that Manafort was "still talking to candidate Trump quite a bit."[563] Mermoud further stated that Gates told him that

---

[552] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Frank Mermoud, November 29, 2017, p. 51.
[553] (U) *Ibid.* For more on the RNC Platform Changes, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.L.3.
[554] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[555] (U) Text Message, Mermoud to Gates, September 14, 2016 (ORP3000001).
[556] (U) Email Chaly to Mermoud, September 14, 2016 (ORP5000103).
[557] (U) Text Message, Mermoud to Gates, September 14, 2016 (ORP3000001).
[558] (U) Text Message, Gates to Mermoud, September 14, 2016 (ORP3000001).
[559] (U) Text Messages, Gates and Mermoud, September 15–16, 2016 (ORP3000001–2); Emails, Chaly and Mermoud, September 14–16, 2016 (ORP5000103) ("Paul Manafort, who I introduced you to on the Convention floor in Cleveland, has been engaged in this effort to assist in getting your President to meet with the candidate. . . . Paul will continue to help to promote that and facilitate efforts of communication behind the scenes.").
[560] (U) Text Messages, Gates and Mermoud, September 16, 2016 (ORP3000002).
[561] (U) Text Message, Gates to Mermoud, September 16, 2016 (ORP3000002).
[562] (U) Mermoud Tr., p. 74.
[563] (U) *Ibid.* p. 74.

Manafort was "still involved, particularly at this juncture, on political issues relating to the campaign."[564]

7. (U) Manafort's Activities After the Election

(U) Many of Manafort's activities during the post-election period remain unknown to the Committee, making a complete account of Manafort's conduct difficult to reliably determine.

(U) However, the Committee was able to locate or substantiate numerous meetings and communications which, while representing only fragmentary and incomplete information, reveal that Manafort actively coordinated with both Kilimnik and associates of Deripaska on multiple lines of effort. Some of these lines of effort continued themes first raised during his tenure on the Trump Campaign. These included a plan to return Viktor Yanukovych to power in Ukraine and resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine in a manner beneficial to Russia. They also included efforts to resolve the Pericles issue with Deripaska and return to a cooperative relationship, including on unspecified areas as the result of a discreet meeting in Spain in early 2017. Other lines of effort took shape only after Manafort left the Campaign, including efforts involving Kilimnik, Deripaska, and others to counter the ongoing allegations against them in the press and allegations against Russian interference in the U.S. election more generally.

i. [redacted] Kilimnik Seeks to Leverage His Relationship with Manafort; Coordinates [redacted]

(U) Immediately after Trump's victory, Kilimnik began considering how to leverage his relationship with Manafort for influence. One example of this involved Patten, whom Kilimnik appeared interested in getting appointed to a position inside the U.S. Government. The day after the election, Kilimnik raised with Patten the idea of "talking to Paul" in order to find a job for Patten in the incoming administration.[565] Kilimnik raised this idea again the following day, asking Patten "[s]hould I raise you with Paul, so that they could at least have somebody smart there?"[566] Kilimnik simultaneously claimed that he wanted to be able to continue to make money with Patten as part of their joint consulting business, which Patten's joining the administration would prevent. However, Kilimnik continued to push the issue, telling Patten that "[y]our knowledge of the region is superb, and you could do your country a favor by running policy not based on false perceptions, but on facts."[567] Patten said he declined Kilimnik's

---

[564] (U) *Ibid.* p. 76.

[565] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, November 9, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000289).

[566] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, November 10, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000287).

[567] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, November 10, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000286). Kilimnik also told Patten that his "egoistic sense is against mentioning your name in response to Manafort's question." *Ibid.* It is unclear what Kilimnik's mention of "Manafort's question" refers to, although it seems to suggest that Manafort asked Kilimnik

offer.[568] Kilimnik ultimately said he would tell Manafort that Patten was engaged in other matters.

(U) Kilimnik also displayed interest in using Manafort to exert influence on politics elsewhere. For instance, in December 2016, Kilimnik, who knew of Patten's continuing work on political issues in Iraq, sent Patten a request for information about Patten's "Iraq solution" which Kilimnik thought might be useful to share with Manafort.[569] Kilimnik explained to Patten that he was interested in using Manafort as a means to influence both the Trump Administration and the Russian government to effect a certain political outcome.[570] Patten agreed that "PJM could be instrumental in a solution if he will push it actively."[571]

[redacted] For more information on Oganov's ties [redacted] *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.8.i.c.

- [redacted]

for recommendations for administration positions on Ukraine. Gates recalled that in January 2017, Manafort claimed he was using intermediaries, including Kushner, to get people appointed to administration positions. Additionally, Manafort said he had other people helping him, including Rudy Giuliani. FBI, FD-302, Gates, 11/14/2018.

[568] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018.

[569] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, December 21, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000234).

[570] (U) *Ibid.* ("At some point I am very interested in a page on Iraq solution. It will be very timely in early January. Again, not urgent, but pls think if there is anything new and how we can organize DT through PJM and Russia into accepting what is in everybody's best interests. Except probably Iran, but who cares.").

[571] (U) Email, Patten to Kilimnik, December 21, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000234). Patten may have written a one page Iraq solution proposal and provided it to Kilimnik, which Patten assumed would be provided to Manafort. At the time of the December email, Patten knew that Kilimnik was in Moscow and it was possible that Kilimnik shared this email with someone in Russia, but Patten did not know if Kilimnik did share it. FBI, FD-302, Patten 6/12/2018.

[572] [redacted] World Policy Conference, "Georgy Oganov," 2019; [redacted]

[573] [redacted]

[574] [redacted]

[redacted] The extent of coordination between Manafort's attorney and Oganov is unknown.

- [redacted]

ii. (U) Manafort and Kilimnik Communicate with Yanukovych in Russia Related to Ukraine Plan; Attempt Communications Countermeasures

(U) Kilimnik specifically sought to leverage Manafort's contacts with the incoming Trump administration to advance Kilimnik's agenda, particularly with regard to the Ukraine plan. Kilimnik thought that Trump could solve Ukraine's problems because of Manafort's connection to Trump.[579]

(U) Kilimnik and Manafort secretly coordinated on Ukraine matters, practicing communications security through the continued use of foldering. On December 8, 2016, Kilimnik drafted an email and saved it in his kkilimnik@dmpint.com email account.[580] Manafort acknowledged reading this email, despite the fact that it was not sent.[581]

(U) In the email, Kilimnik stated that he had a meeting with "BG" today, a reference to Yanukovych.[582] Kilimnik relayed that Yanukovych had asked Kilimnik to pass on several items to Manafort.[583] Among them were messages about a plan to resolve the Ukraine conflict which

---

575 [redacted]

576 [redacted]

577 [redacted]

578 [redacted]

579 (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018.

580 (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 140.

581 (U) *Ibid.*

582 (U) Email, Kilimnik to Kilimnik, December 8, 2016 [redacted] *SCO Report*, Vol. 1, p. 139. According to Gates, both Manafort and Kilimnik sometimes called Yanukovych "big guy." FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/30/2018. Other historical communications from Kilimnik refer to Yanukovych as the "BG." Email, Kilimnik to Kasanof, November 27, 2013 (CDP-2017-00011G-001071).

583 (U) Email, Kilimnik to Kilimnik, December 8, 2016 [redacted] Kilimnik appeared to hide his Ukraine-related efforts with Manafort from Patten, his associate and business partner. In late November 2016, Patten was working to coordinate the hiring of a new social media company and digital vendor for

involved Yanukovych, the same plan that Kilimnik had raised with Manafort during the August 2, 2016 meeting.[584] The email said:

> *Russians at the very top level are in principle not against this plan and will work with the BG to start the process of uniting DNR and LNR into one entity, with security issues resolved (i.e. Russian troops withdrawn, radical criminal elements eliminated). The rest will be done by the BG and his people.*[585]

(U) Kilimnik further wrote that "[a]ll that is required to start the process is a very minor 'wink' (or slight push) from DT saying 'he wants peace in Ukraine and Donbass back in Ukraine' and a decision to be a 'special representative' and manage this process."[586] Following that, Kilimnik suggested that Manafort "could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia (BG guarantees your reception at the very top level, cutting through all the bullshit and getting down to business), Ukraine, and key EU capitals."[587] The email also suggested that once then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko understood this "message" from the United States, the process "will go very fast and DT could have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration."[588] Kilimnik promised to brief Manafort "in detail" when he next saw him.[589]

[redacted] Separately, OB officials conducted outreach to Manafort on the peace plan. [redacted]

[redacted]

work in Ukraine and asked Kilimnik, "[A]re we still actively not wanting PJM to find out, or does it not matter?"[583] Kilimnik responded that "PJM is NOT part of this whole story, and we do not want him to find out under any circumstances." Emails, Patten and Kilimnik, November 27, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000264). Days later, Kilimnik would draft the foldered email privately laying out a Ukraine plan for Manafort.

[584] **(U)** Email, Kilimnik to Kilimnik, December 8, 2016 [redacted]

[585] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[586] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[587] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[588] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[589] **(U)** *Ibid.* Kilimnik also told Manafort that Yanukovych believed the plan would be "hugely beneficial for you personally because this will open way to a much higher status for you for fixing Ukraine problem and will also open way to a lot of serious business deals."

iii. [redacted] Kilimnik and Boyarkin Arrange a Meeting for Manafort in Madrid; Manafort [redacted]

(U) Prior to Kilimnik's December 8, 2016 email, Manafort also communicated with Kilimnik about setting up a meeting with a Deripaska representative.

[redacted]

[redacted] Around this same time, Kilimnik and Manafort discussed the meeting via encrypted chat. A [redacted] of some of these encrypted messages between Kilimnik and Manafort taken from [redacted] and obtained by the Committee suggests the meeting was designed to be about "recreating old friendship" and "global politics." The below represents the exchange as captured by [redacted]:

Kilimnik:

> *3) V understands where you can potentially come and is working with his boss to get a meeting organized. My understanding is that it will be about recreating old friendship and talking about global politics, not about money or Pericles.*

Kilimnik:

> *Wonder if I can/should share this with V*

Manafort:

> *Yes you should share. Say I am confused*
> *–Nothing to negotiate*
> *–No rush to finish*

---

590 [redacted]
591
592 (U) *Ibid.*

I need this finished before Jan 20.[593]



[redacted] On January 8, 2017, hours after returning to the United States from a trip to Cuba, Manafort flew to Madrid, Spain.[598] Manafort met with Oganov in Madrid during what he claimed was a one-hour breakfast meeting.[599] Manafort told the FBI that, at the meeting, Oganov told him that he needed to meet with Deripaska in person to resolve the Pericles matter.[600] Manafort agreed but said he would not travel to Ukraine or Russia for the meeting.[601]

(U) Manafort provided false and misleading information about the purpose, content, and follow-up to the meeting with Oganov to both the Committee and the SCO. In particular, Manafort told the Committee in a written response through counsel that he attended a meeting on or around January 17, 2017, in Madrid with "Georgy Organov."[602] The written response claimed that the meeting was "regarding a private litigation matter involving Oleg Deripaska."[603] Despite admitting his attendance at the meeting to the Committee in May 2017, Manafort initially denied

---

[593] [redacted] Messages, Kilimnik and Manafort [redacted] The text message string, including Kilimnik's first two points which presumably were included in his message, is cut off because only [redacted] of this conversation was available to the Committee. Almost all messages on encrypted applications between Kilimnik and Manafort were unavailable to the Committee.

[594] [redacted]

[595] (U) *Ibid.*

[596] (U) *Ibid.*

[597] (U) *Ibid.*

[598] [redacted] (showing Manafort's flight to Madrid as scheduled to arrive in Madrid on January 9, 2017, at 10:25 a.m. local time).

[599] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.

[600] (U) *Ibid.*

[601] (U) *Ibid.*

[602] (U) Letter, Brown and Shapiro to SSCI, May 9, 2017. "Organov" is an apparent misspelling of Oganov.

[603] (U) *Ibid.*

attending the meeting in his interviews with the SCO in the fall of 2018.[604] He eventually admitted to attending the meeting with Oganov, and then repeated what he described in his letter to the Committee—that the meeting had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit.[605]

[redacted] Manafort's claims about the meeting were false. As the above messages show, the meeting was not designed to be about Pericles, but was also about recreating the "old friendship" and "global politics." Further, [redacted] that was never revealed to investigators.[606]

- [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Manafort returned to the United States from Madrid on January 12, 2017.[615] Three days later, Manafort sent an email to K.T. McFarland, who at the time was designated to become

---

[604] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 142.
[605] (U) *Ibid.*
[606] [redacted]
[607] (U) *Ibid.* It is unclear if Kilimnik gained this knowledge from personally attending the meeting, or from receiving a readout from Manafort or Oganov immediately after the meeting.
[608] (U) *Ibid.*
[609] (U) *Ibid.*
[610] (U) *Ibid.*
[611] (U) *Ibid.*
[612] (U) *Ibid.*
[613] (U) *Ibid.*
[614] (U) *Ibid.*
[615] (U) Email, Manafort to McFarland, January 15. 2017 [redacted]

the number two official in Trump's National Security Council and was serving as Flynn's deputy on the Transition.[616] In the email, Manafort asked McFarland if she was in Washington D.C. that week and, if so, if she was willing to meet informally.[617] Manafort said he had "some important information I want to share that I picked up on my travels over the last month."[618]

(U) Before responding to Manafort, McFarland forwarded Manafort's request to Flynn and inquired whether she should agree to meet with Manafort.[619] Flynn responded by recommending that McFarland not meet with Manafort "until we're in the hot seats," presumably a reference to their taking official roles in the U.S. Government.[620] It is unclear what Manafort hoped to speak with McFarland about, but he claimed to the SCO it involved matters related to Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine.[621]

iv. (U) Kilimnik and Lyovochkin Travel to Washington D.C. for Inauguration, Meet with Manafort and Discuss Ukraine

(U) Shortly after Manafort and Oganov's meeting in Madrid, Kilimnik and Lyovochkin traveled to the United States for the presidential inauguration in January 2017. On the trip, Kilimnik and Lyovochkin secretly met with Manafort. The content of this meeting is almost entirely unknown, although Manafort claimed that they discussed the Ukraine plan.[622]

[redacted] In early January 2017, Kilimnik asked Patten to obtain tickets to the inauguration through the Presidential Inaugural Committee (PIC). According to Patten, Kilimnik made this request on behalf of Lyovochkin.[623] Patten eventually obtained tickets through a straw purchaser, intended for Kilimnik, Lyovochkin, and Vadim Novinsky, a Ukrainian businessman and politician affiliated with the OB.[624] Only Kilimnik and Lyovochkin ultimately traveled to the United States in order to attend. Kilimnik departed from Moscow and landed at Washington

---

[616] (U) *Ibid.*
[617] (U) *Ibid.*
[618] (U) *Ibid.*
[619] (U) *Ibid.*
[620] (U) *Ibid.*
[621] [redacted] *SCO Report*, Vol. 1, p. 142. In particular, Manafort claimed that it dealt with an effort Manafort undertook with Brad Zackson, who had arranged a meeting between Manafort and "Castro's son" in Havana, Cuba. FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018; *see also* [redacted] (showing Manafort and Zackson on same flight booking to Havana).
[622] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. 1, p. 142; FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/11/2018.
[623] (U) It is illegal for foreign nationals to purchase tickets to the PIC's events.
[624] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

Dulles on January 19, 2017.[625] That evening, Patten, Kilimnik, Lyovochkin, and a pollster who had worked with Kilimnik and Patten in Ukraine had dinner together.[626]

(U) The day of the inauguration, Patten, Lyovochkin, and Kilimnik had lunch in Alexandria, Virginia.[627] Kilimnik told Patten that he was nervous that he would see Manafort because Kilimnik knew that Manafort resided in Alexandria.[628] Patten believed Kilimnik was trying to distance himself from Manafort in furtherance of his work in Ukraine.[629] Unbeknownst to Patten, Kilimnik and Lyovochkin met with Manafort at the Westin in Alexandria during this trip.[630]

(U) According to Gates, Manafort had at some point mentioned the possibility of returning to do work in Ukraine, and the only name Manafort had mentioned in this context was Lyovochkin.[631] As noted above, Lyovochkin had paid for Manafort's work in Ukraine in prior years, and Kilimnik maintained an exceptionally close relationship with Lyovochkin throughout 2016 and 2017. While the Committee has no further evidence of direct communications between Lyovochkin and Manafort after this meeting, Manafort continued to work closely on Ukraine issues with Kilimnik.

(U) According to Patten, he and Kilimnik watched the inauguration in the lobby of the Mandarin Oriental hotel in Washington, D.C., where Patten understood Kilimnik was staying.[632] That evening, Patten and Lyovochkin briefly attended an inaugural ball. Kilimnik told Patten that he was staying in his hotel room.[633]

[redacted] Kilimnik departed from the United States on the evening of January 22, 2017, returning to Moscow.[634]

---

[625] [redacted] Kilimnik passed through U.S. customs at Washington Dulles at 4:48 p.m. local time.

[626] (U) Emails, Patten and Kilimnik, January 18–19, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000218–219); FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[627] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 11/27/2018. In a separate debriefing, Patten stated that the three had dinner at "EON" in Alexandria, but did not specify the date. This may have been a reference to Restaurant Eve, a now-closed restaurant in Alexandria, Virginia.

[628] (U) *Ibid.*

[629] (U) *Ibid.*

[630] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. 1, p. 142.

[631] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018. Gates also recalled that at some point around the inauguration, Manafort had said that nobody would care about Crimea because Russia's takeover was already complete. According to Gates, Manafort had previously done polling in 2014 regarding Ukrainians' views on Crimea.

[632] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 11/27/2018; 5/22/2018.

[633] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 11/27/2018.

[634] [redacted]

v. (U) Kilimnik and Manafort Meet in Madrid; Discuss Counter-Narratives and Ukraine

[redacted]

[redacted] On February 23, 2017, Kilimnik flew from Kyiv to Moscow, where he stayed for four days before flying to Madrid on February 26, 2017.[641] The Committee has no insight into Kilimnik's activities in Moscow during this time. Kilimnik was scheduled to arrive in Madrid on the morning of February 26, 2017.[642] On February 25, 2017, Manafort departed from New York City and arrived in Madrid on a flight scheduled to arrive on the morning of February 26, 2017.[643]

(U) After arriving in Madrid, Kilimnik and Manafort met. The majority of what Manafort and Kilimnik said during this meeting is unknown.[644] In his interviews with the SCO, Manafort initially denied meeting with Kilimnik in Madrid. However, once confronted with

---

[635] [redacted]

[636] (U) *Ibid.*

[637] (U) *Ibid.*

[638] (U) *Ibid.*

[639] (U) *Ibid.*

[640] (U) *Ibid.*

[641] [redacted]

[642] (U) *Ibid.*

[643] [redacted] Manafort traveled on a booking made with a second passenger, Hector Hoyos-Aliff. *Ibid.* [redacted] The Committee did not engage Hoyos-Aliff.

[644] (U) Manafort's account of the meeting, which came after repeated false statements about whether a meeting with Kilimnik occurred, is the Committee's sole source information about the meeting.

travel records showing that Kilimnik was also in Madrid at the same time, Manafort ultimately admitted that he met with Kilimnik in Madrid during the February trip.[645]

(U) According to Manafort, Kilimnik had been putting together background information on the status of inquiries by reporters and investigators about Manafort's activities in Kyiv, at Manafort's request.[646] Manafort claimed that Kilimnik came to Madrid to update him on the work of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau related to the ledger.[647] Manafort further claimed that he met with Kilimnik for an hour and a half at Manafort's hotel, where Kilimnik told him that the criminal investigation in Ukraine was "going nowhere."[648] Manafort claimed he did not ask Kilimnik to Madrid in order to talk about the peace plan, but he said Kilimnik would have raised it.[649]

[redacted] Kilimnik was scheduled to depart Madrid and return to Moscow on a flight departing just after midnight early on February 27, 2017.[650] Manafort subsequently traveled to Shanghai and possibly other locations, and did not return to the United States until over a week later.[651]

vi. (U) Russian Influence Operations to Undermine Investigations into Russian Interference

[redacted] The Committee observed numerous Russian-government actors from late 2016 until at least January 2020 consistently spreading overlapping false narratives which sought to discredit investigations into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections and spread false information about the events of 2016. Manafort, Kilimnik, Deripaska, and others associated with Deripaska participated in these influence operations. As part of these efforts, Manafort and Kilimnik both sought to promote the narrative that Ukraine, not Russia, had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election and that the "ledger" naming payments to Manafort was fake. These efforts coincided with a [redacted] and related efforts by Deripaska to discredit investigations into Russian meddling.[652] Similarities in narrative content, the use of common dissemination platforms, the involvement of Kremlin agents Kilimnik and Deripaska, and [redacted] all suggest that these influence efforts were coordinated to some degree.

---

[645] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.
[646] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[647] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[648] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[649] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[650] [redacted]
[651] [redacted]
[652] [redacted]

(U) These influence efforts took place in the larger context of existing Russian information operations targeting Ukraine and the United States.



(U) In August 2016, immediately after news articles regarding Manafort's work in Ukraine, Manafort and Kilimnik began discussing the Ukrainian government's supposed involvement in the reporting. Manafort claimed that then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko was behind the media campaign to "smear" Manafort.[660] Manafort said Poroshenko had fabricated the "black ledger" and was supporting Hillary Clinton.[661] Manafort recalled that, at some point, Lyovochkin heard from Poroshenko that the U.S. Embassy was pressuring Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau for information on Manafort.[662] Kilimnik promoted the

---

653 [redacted]
654 (U) *Ibid.*
655 (U) *Ibid.*
656 (U) *Ibid.*
657 (U) *Ibid.*
658 (U) *Ibid.*
659 (U) *Ibid.*
660 (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.
661 (U) *Ibid.*
662 (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 10/1/2018. Manafort did not specify if this came directly from Lyovochkin, or through Kilimnik. Gates also recalled that Lyovochkin reached out to Manafort once or twice. The first time was to

narrative that the Ukrainian authorities had "artificially instigated" stories related to Manafort's work in Ukraine, including the alleged black ledger.[663]

(U) The day after Manafort resigned, Kilimnik was coordinating with Manafort to counteract negative public media. For example, Kilimnik wrote an email to Patten in which he said that he was "talking to PJM" and suggested that they were considering suing reporters who published negative articles about Kilimnik and Manafort.[664]

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 9:35 AM, K. Kilimnik <kkilimnik@dmpint.com> wrote:
>
> I am talking to PJM about suing them.
> He continues with Trump and needs to take this into consideration.

(U) Kilimnik almost certainly helped arrange some of the first public messaging that Ukraine had interfered in the U.S. election. On August 23, 2016, Kilimnik exchanged emails with Roman Olearchyk, a journalist with the *Financial Times* in Kyiv.[665] Five days later, the *Financial Times* published an article by Olearchyk, entitled "Ukraine's leaders campaign against 'pro-Putin' Trump."[666] The article quoted "a former Yanukovich loyalist now playing a lead role in the Regions party's successor, called Opposition Bloc" who, according to the article, "let loose a string of expletives" and "accused western media of 'working in the interests of Hillary Clinton by trying to bring down Trump.'"[667] After the article was published, Kilimnik shared the article with Gates with the subject "FT - unbelievable."[668] In the email, Kilimnik explained to Gates that "these idiots actually admit that PP's government was deliberately trying to

---

discuss a story on Manafort for which reporters had contacted Lyovochkin for comment. This may be a reference to Kilimnik's outreach in late July 2016, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec.A.5.vii.

[663] **(U)** Email, Kilimnik to Marson, August 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000414–416). Kilimnik appeared to be under the impression that Trump believed that Ukraine interfered. Kilimnik made this statement in a private email with a journalist, making the accuracy of the statement is difficult to assess. The Committee's efforts focused on investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election. However, during the course of the investigation, the Committee identified no reliable evidence that the Ukrainian government interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.

[664] **(U)** Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 20, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000408). Although Kilimnik's reference to these communications with Manafort were reflected in Kilimnik's communication to Patten, the Committee was not able to obtain the underlying communications between Manafort and Kilimnik.

[665] **(U)** Emails, Kilimnik and Olearchyk, August 23, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000384).

[666] **(U)** Roman Olearchyk, "Ukraine's leaders campaign against 'pro-Putin' Trump," *Financial Times*, August 28, 2016.

[667] **(U)** *Ibid.* The Committee did not obtain direct evidence that Kilimnik was involved in arranging this quote, but given Kilimnik's communications with Olearchyk, his other efforts to promote the Ukraine interference messages, and his intimate involvement with the OB and its leadership, his involvement seems likely.

[668] **(U)** Email, Kilimnik to Gates, August 29, 2016 (Gates Production). Kilimnik also sent the article to Patten. Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 29, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000376).

destabilize Trump's campaign."[669] Kilimnik told Gates that "this article is actually helpful to us" and said that he "hope[s] DT sees it."[670]

(U) Kilimnik also updated Manafort on the Ukrainian government's investigation into Manafort and other related investigations, including their key players and progress. In late-November 2016, Kilimnik sent Manafort a summary of an interview with the head of Ukraine's Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO).[671] In the email, Kilimnik explained to Manafort that parts of the interview were "very relevant to us" and highlighted several narratives, including around Ukrainian parliamentarian Serhiy Leshchenko's role in the release of the "black ledger":

> *The prosecutor who is investigating the case is basically making a point that a) the scans of alleged "black ledger" appeared in public domain in violation of existing procedures and were used for a specific purpose by Leschenko and Avakov, b) there is no evidence than any of that stuff is real, and have been no real movement since the beginning of investigation in august, and c) there are absolutely no grounds to suspect anyone, especially PJM in this whole thing.*[672]

(U) Manafort appears to have been involved in efforts to arrange a call between Poroshenko and Trump after the election, which appears to have been motivated by Manafort's own interest in countering these same Ukrainian criminal investigations.

- (U) On November 10, 2016, Kilimnik forwarded a foreign press article to Manafort and Gates about the investigations in Ukraine. The article discussed Ukrainian politicians aligned with Poroshenko's political party who had reversed course after Trump's victory and were now accusing Leshchenko of "falsifying evidence" in a Ukrainian criminal case related to Manafort.[673] Kilimnik believed that Leshchenko was "part of the group of deputies who launched [a] PR offensive in coordination with HRC HQ and poured mud over us in the media,

---

[669] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Gates, August 29, 2016 (Gates Production).
[670] (U) *Ibid.* Additionally, on September 5, 2016, Manafort and Roger Stone conducted three calls for a total call time of 26 minutes. AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures. The next day, Stone tweeted about the same *Financial Times* article, stating that "the only interference in the US election is from Hillary's friends in Ukraine." Internet Archive, Capture of twitter.com/rogerjstonejr/status/773162795240189952, October 17, 2016; Thomas Rid, "Who's Really to Blame for the 'Ukraine Did It' Conspiracy Theory?" *The Atlantic*, December 5, 2019.
[671] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Manafort and Gates, November 19, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000268–269). The head of SAPO, Nazar Kholodnytskyy, would continue making allegations related to U.S. involvement in the Manafort case and the "black ledger" through 2019. *See, e.g.,* John Solomon, "How the Obama White House engaged Ukraine to give Russia collusion narrative an early boost," *The Hill*, April 25, 2019.
[672] (U) *Ibid.* Arsen Avakov is the Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs.
[673] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Manafort and Gates, November 10, 2016 (DJTFP00024681).

using false evidence and copies of something resembling 'black accounting book of PR.'"[674]

- (U) After receiving Kilimnik's November 10, 2016 email, Manafort messaged Gates, writing: "This makes the Frank project even more timely. Let me know if Frank [Mermoud] can do what we discussed."[675] According to Gates, Manafort had asked Gates to reach out to Mermoud to offer Manafort's assistance to then-Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Valeriy Chaly in repairing relationships Manafort believed Poroshenko had damaged.[676]

- (U) The next day, November 11, 2016, Mermoud emailed Chaly and asked for a phone call to discuss a matter which Mermoud that Chaly would find "of interest and value."[677] Mermoud informed Gates that he had messaged Chaly "to ask for a phone call."[678] On November 13, 2016, Mermoud forwarded to Gates a message which Mermoud had received from Chaly, stating: "Got it. [We] are in contact with his executive assistant Ms. Rhona Graf. Still waiting for confirmation of slot for a phone call by my President on Tuesday."[679] On November 15, 2016, Trump and Poroshenko held their first call.[680]

- (U) After the call, Mermoud and Gates discussed arranging a meeting between Manafort and Chaly. On November 22, 2016, Mermoud messaged Gates: "Ambo just called me . . . . Said he would welcome meeting with Paul. He has some information to share."[681] Gates responded, "Interesting. I will share with P." Several days later, Mermoud informed Gates that he would be meeting with Chaly on a separate subject soon and asked if he had "any guidance" from Manafort.[682] Gates responded that the "[o]nly guidance is to reinforce the

---

[674] (U) *Ibid.*
[675] (U) Email, Manafort to Gates, November 10, 2016 (DJTFP00024681).
[676] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/2/2018.
[677] (U) Email, Mermoud to Chaly, November 11, 2016 (ORP5000103).
[678] (U) Text Message, Mermoud to Gates, November 13, 2016 (ORP3000003).
[679] (U) Text Message, Mermoud to Gates, November 13, 2016 (ORP3000003).
[680] (U) "President Poroshenko had a phone call with President-elect Donald Trump," President of Ukraine, Official Website, November 15, 2016. Beyond a brief readout of the call provided by the Ukrainian government, the substance of the call is unknown.
[681] (U) Text message, Mermoud to Gates, November 22, 2016 (ORP3000003).
[682] (U) Text message, Gates to Mermoud, November 28, 2016 (ORP3000003).

previous points" and to tell Chaly that Manafort had "helped organize the call between the two presidents."[683] Mermoud met with Chaly the next day.[684]

[redacted]

(U) While he was discussing Ukrainian investigations with Manafort, Kilimnik helped write an opinion article under Lyovochkin's name that included similar themes.[691] Kilimnik and Patten circulated a draft of the article in January 2017, which included language suggesting that Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) had "manufactur[ed] a case" against Manafort.[692] The article further insinuated that Trump had no Russia ties, stating that there was

---

[683] (U) Text message, Mermoud to Gates, November 28, 2016 (ORP3000003).
[684] (U) Text message, Mermoud to Gates, November 29, 2016 (ORP3000003). After the meeting, Mermoud asked to speak with Gates, presumably on matters related to Manafort.
[685] [redacted] In February 2017, Putin publicly alleged that there was Ukrainian influence in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Kremlin.ru, "Joint news conference with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban," February 2, 2017.
[686] [redacted]
[687] [redacted]
[688] (U) *Ibid.*
[689] (U) *Ibid.*
[690] (U) *Ibid.*
[691] (U) Emails, Kilimnik and Patten, January 26, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000211–213) (attaching draft opinion article).
[692] (U) *Ibid.*

"no real fire behind all this smoke."[693] The article ultimately was published by *U.S. News & World Report* on February 6, 2017.[694]

(U) Manafort embraced and promoted the narrative of Ukraine's alleged involvement in the 2016 elections. For example, in a February 2017 meeting with Donald Trump Jr., Manafort discussed how Ukraine, not Russia had meddled in the election. In an email to Trump Jr., Manafort shared a *Politico* article that seems to have underpinned repeated claims by others helping advance this narrative.[695]

From: Paul Manafort [pmanafort@dmpint.com]
Sent: 2/14/2017 4:15:07 PM
To: Donald Trump Jr. [/o=ExchangeLabs/ou=Exchange Administrative Group (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/cn=Recipients/cn=3e47f0472653400d85d07849e0f57b42-djtjr]
Subject: Enjoyed our meeting

Don
It was great to reconnect. I am pursuing the topics we discussed and will be back to you.

On a separate note, I have pasted below the Ken Vogel story in Politico that ran about 3 weeks ago. He lays out clearly the conspiracy to implement the disinformation campaign on me between the DNC/Obama Administration and the Govt of Ukraine.The Ukraine Govt has now totally backed off saying that there is no interest ever in me and the ledger was a falsified document.

Of coarse, now with the Flynn resignation, all of this will be dragged up again, with no facts and no basis for anything.
Best
Paul

http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/ukraine-sabotage-trump-backfire-233446

(U) As described above, in late-February 2017 Manafort met with Kilimnik in Madrid to discuss the Russia-related investigations, including the one in Ukraine, which Kilimnik said was "going nowhere."[696]

---

[693] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[694] **(U)** Serhiy Lyovochkin, "Ukraine Can Win in the Trump Age," *U.S. News & World Report*, February 6, 2017. Patten pleaded guilty to violating FARA based, in part, on his efforts drafting and placing this article with Kilimnik. Criminal Information, *United States v. W. Samuel Patten*, Case No: 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. August 31, 2018).
[695] **(U)** Email, Manafort to Trump Jr., February 14, 2017 (TRUMPORG_76_001248*); see also* Emails, Manafort and Trump Jr., February 2–6, 2016 (indicating that Manafort planned to meet Trump Jr. in Trump Jr.'s New York office on February 7, 2016). The *Politico* article Manafort sent would be used by others close to Manafort to make the case that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the U.S. elections. For example, on August 22, 2017, Kilimnik's alias Twitter account, @PBaranenko, retweeted a story by *Sputnik* reporter Lee Stranahan who used the *Politico* article as a basis to legitimize his claims that DNC contractor Alexandra Chalupa and the Ukrainian government was "THE REAL 2016 Election Interference." Tweet, @PBaranenko, August 22, 2018 (Retweet of @stranahan).
[696] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

Given Kilimnik's communications with , Kilimnik's overlapping efforts with Manafort, and it is likely that some coordination occurred between Deripaska-directed efforts and those undertaken by Kilimnik and Manafort.[697]

-
- On March 22, 2017, the *Associated Press* published an article stating that Manafort had in the mid-2000s proposed a confidential plan to influence politics, business dealings, and news coverage to "greatly benefit the Putin Government."[701]

697

698

699 As of February 2017, Waldman sought to engage Vice Chairman Warner related to two separate clients: Julian Assange, on a potential deal with the U.S. Government related to an investigation into Assange and Assange's possession of documents later known as "Vault 7"; and Christopher Steele, about his involvement in reports that had recently been released related to the Trump Campaign, Manafort, and others. According to Waldman's communications, as of mid-February 2017, Waldman was aware that the WikiLeaks release of Vault 7 documents would severely damage U.S. national security and the CIA. Text message, Waldman to Warner, February 16, 2017 (AW_00000075).

700

701 (U) Jeff Horvitz and Chad Day, "AP Exclusive: Before Trump Job, Manafort Worked to Aid Putin," *Associated Press*, March 22, 2017.

702

- (U) Shortly thereafter, on March 25, 2017, Waldman discussed with Vice Chairman Warner the possibility of a potential Committee engagement with Deripaska.[704] Waldman said that he raised the idea with Deripaska, who would be in London in the coming days, and that Deripaska was potentially interested in the engagement.[705]

- (U) On March 28, 2017, Deripaska took out several large advertisements in major U.S. newspapers offering to testify before the SSCI and the HPSCI. Waldman later explained that he understood that Deripaska intended to testify not about potential election interference, but rather about Manafort.[706]

(U) As of June 2017, Kilimnik continued to engage with Manafort on Ukrainian investigations related to Manafort. Kilimnik emailed Manafort about statements from Ukraine's SAPO, including a statement claiming that Manafort was not a subject of SAPO's investigation into the "black ledger" because of a lack of evidence.[707] Kilimnik told Manafort that the statement was "a big deal" and suggested that "[y]our people should see this."[708]

(U) Also in mid-2017, other Russian-government proxies and personas worked to spread the false narrative that Ukraine interfered in the U.S. election. On July 12, 2017, Cyber Berkut—which had been dormant for months—alleged on its blog that Ukraine had interfered in the 2016 U.S. elections.[709] In the post, Cyber Berkut claimed that hacked emails revealed a set of financial transactions between Viktor Pinchuk and the Clinton Foundation.[710] On July 13, 2017, @USA_Gunslinger, a long-running false persona account of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), tweeted about "Clinton and her campaign team's collusion with Ukraine to interfere in the US election."[711]

[redacted] On July 24, 2017, Ukrainian parliamentarian Andrii Derkach sent a letter to then Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko to ask Lutsenko to investigate

---

[703] (U) *Ibid.*
[704] (U) Text Messages, Waldman and Warner, March 23–25, 2017 (AW_00000082).
[705] (U) *Ibid.*
[706] (U) Waldman Tr., p. 109.
[707] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Manafort and Gates, June 5, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000118).
[708] (U) *Ibid.*
[709] (U) CyberBerkut was a fake persona controlled by the GRU. Chris Bing, "Russian hacker group 'CyberBerkut' returns to public light with allegation against Clinton," *CyberScoop*, July 12, 2017.
[710] (U) *Ibid.*
[711] (U) IRA handles (June 2018); 4332740714-tweets.txt; Thomas Rid, "Who's Really to Blame for the 'Ukraine Did It' Conspiracy Theory?" *The Atlantic*, December 5, 2019.

"interference" in the 2016 U.S. elections, particularly as it related to NABU's role in this interference.[712] [redacted]

(U) Kilimnik also worked to conduct messaging to U.S. Government officials and the media to undercut other Ukrainian government investigations related to Manafort.[716] In September 2017, Kilimnik shared a letter with Patten that Lyovochkin and his OB associates drafted allegedly on behalf of Oleksandr Lavrynovych.[717] Lavrynovych is a former Ukrainian justice minister who was involved in Manafort's 2011 hiring of U.S. law firm Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom LLP for Ukraine-related work, and who had come under investigation by Ukrainian authorities.[718] Lyovochkin wanted to use Kilimnik to push this letter to embassies and the media.[719] Kilimnik also noted that Lyovochkin separately wanted to write a similar letter to U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovich and U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker on the matter.[720]

[redacted]

- [redacted]

---

[712] (U) Facebook Post, Андрей Деркач, August 15, 2017.

[713] [redacted]

[714] (U) *Ibid.*

[715] (U) *Ibid.*

[716] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, September 19, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000038).

[717] (U) *Ibid.*

[718] (U) *See, e.g.,* Kenneth P. Vogel and Andrew E. Kramer, "Skadden, Big New York Law Firm, Faces Questions on Work With Manafort," September 21, 2017. Separately, when the Skadden work came under public and government scrutiny, Manafort, Gates, and Kilimnik talked about purging documents related to a report Skadden produced for the PoR. Manafort said to purge all evidence of the coordination with Skadden attorneys. After this discussion, Gates deleted some emails. Gates deleted more emails in 2016 after he learned about inquiries from DOJ's FARA unit. FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/31/2018.

[719] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, September 19, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000038).

[720] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

721 [redacted]
722
723
724 (U) *Ibid.*
725 (U) *Ibid.*
726 (U) *Ibid.*
727 (U) *Ibid.*
728 (U) *Ibid.*

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted] On May 14, 2018, Solomon published an article in *The Hill* titled "Mueller May Have a Conflict—And It Leads Directly to a Russian Oligarch," which outlined [redacted], including Deripaska's alleged cooperation with the FBI on matters related to Robert Levinson and implying that his history with the FBI might create a "conflict" for the SCO.[734] [redacted] Solomon appeared on Hannity's television show that evening to discuss the same allegations.[735]

[redacted]

---

[729] (U) *Ibid.* Waldman's contact with Jones is discussed *infra*, Section 4.B.6.vi.
[730] (U) *Ibid.*
[731] (U) *Ibid.*
[732] (U) *Ibid.*
[733] (U) *Ibid.*
[734] (U) John Solomon, "Mueller May Have a Conflict—And It Leads Directly to a Russian Oligarch," *The Hill*, May 14, 2018.
[735] (U) "Transcript: Conflict of interest for Robert Mueller?" *Fox News*, May 14, 2018.
[736] [redacted]
[737] (U) *Ibid.*

- **(U)** On March 20, 2019, Solomon published an article from an interview he conducted with former Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko. In the interview, Lutsenko made the false claim that, in 2016, the then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovich, passed him a list of individuals who should not be prosecuted.[739] The day Solomon's article was published, Trump retweeted it.[740]

- A supposed copy of the list turned up in an online forum.[743]

- **(U)** On the same day, Solomon published a second article derived from the same interview with Lutsenko.[745] That article repeated Lutsenko's claim that he had "opened a probe into alleged attempts by Ukrainians to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential

---

[738] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[739] **(U)** John Solomon, "Top Ukrainian justice official says US ambassador gave him a do not prosecute list," *The Hill*, March 20, 2019. Lutsenko's claim that he was given a "list" of individuals to not prosecute was false; he later recanted it.

[740] **(U)** Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, March 20, 2019. On May 7, 2019, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Yovanovitch was recalled early from Ukraine.

[741]

[742] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[743] **(U)** Debatepolitics.com, "The names of 'improsecutable' Ukrainians from the Yovanovitch list got out," March 25, 2019.

[744] *see also* Ben Nimmo, "UK Trade Leaks and Secondary Infektion: New Findings and Insights from a Known Russian Operation," Graphika, December 2019.

[745] **(U)** John Solomon, "Senior Ukrainian official says he's opened probe into US election interference," *The Hill*, March 20, 2019.

election."[746] Kilimnik, using an alias Twitter account registered under a false persona, retweeted the story.[747]

- [redacted] Kilimnik had previously reached out to Lutsenko in late 2016 in an apparent effort to propose that Lutsenko pursue political office with the assistance of Kilimnik and others. In November 2016, Patten and Kilimnik arranged for a polling company to test the viability of a new political party which would include Klitschko, Lutsenko, and two other Ukrainian political figures.[748] The poll work was likely funded by Lyovochkin. Email communications suggest Patten reviewed the proposal, and Kilimnik planned to deliver the proposal to Lutsenko in December 2016, per Lyovochkin's instructions.[749] [redacted]

(U) Starting in 2017, and continuing at least until late 2019, Kilimnik used an alias Twitter account registered under a false persona to push a variety of false information, much of which centered on efforts to discredit the Russia investigations and assert that Ukraine, not Russia, had intervened in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.[751]

---

[746] (U) *Ibid.*

[747] (U) Tweet, @PBaranenko, March 20, 2019 (Retweet of @JackPosobiec).

[748] (U) Slide deck, "Ukraine November Survey Presentation," December 4, 2016 (SP_OSC_000702-759); Email, Kilimnik to Patten, et al., December 18, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000237) (responding to a email with a document "Lutsenko vote and coalitions").

[749] (U) *Ibid.*

[750] [redacted]

[751] (U) Kilimnik tweets under the alias Petro Baranenko (@PBaranenko). Twitter, @pbaranenko (account information showing account creation email of borattulukbaev@yahoo.com). While the @PBaranenko account was registered in February 2017, the earliest tweet the Committee obtained was from August 1, 2017. A separate account in true name, @k_kilimnik, is no longer active. This account could have been affiliated with Kilimnik, but the Committee could not confirm that it was. In 2018 and 2019, Kilimnik used his @PBaranenko account to tweet a variety of pro-Russian themes, including false information about NotPetya, Bill Browder, Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17, and the 2014 Maydan protests. For example, Kilimnik retweeted a claim "[t]he stakes are rising as they try to keep the truth about Browder from coming out." Tweet, @PBaranenko, September 15, 2018 (retweet of @TFL1728). Kilimnik also retweeted a tweet disparaging Bellingcat and Eliot Higgins, using #Bellingcrap and #MH17 and attaching an image purporting to show that part of Bellingcat's analysis of the MH-17 BuK launcher was "made up." Tweet, @PBaranenko, September 17, 2018 (retweet of @Deus_Abscondis). On September 23, 2018, Kilimnik retweeted the same account, which purported to show that the serial number depicted in images of missile parts related to the MH-17 shootdown was a "forgery." Tweet, @PBaranenko, September 23, 2018 (retweet of @Deus_Abscondis). Kilimnik also repeatedly pushed false information claiming that those Maydan participants killed in the protests where shot by "Georgian snipers" as part of a "false flag." Tweet, @PBaranenko, March 18, 2019 (retweet of @elenaevdokimov7).

- (U) Kilimnik repeatedly tweeted information related to the Bidens and Ukraine, much of which originated from Solomon. For example, on April 1, 2019, Kilimnik retweeted Solomon's own tweet linking to his article in *The Hill* titled, "Joe Biden's 2020 Ukrainian nightmare: A closed probe is revived."[752] On May 14, 2019, Kilimnik tweeted, "Ukraine's Prosecutor General Lutsenko is ready to provide payment orders concerning Hunter Biden, says there are payments for millions USD" and attached a link to an article about the issue.[753]

- (U) On September 16, 2018, Kilimnik retweeted a tweet by Donald Trump which stated, "The illegal Mueller Witch Hunt continues in search of a crime. There was never Collusion with Russia, except by the Clinton campaign."[754]

- (U) On August 22, 2018, Kilimnik retweeted *Sputnik* reporter Lee Stranahan's tweet related to allegations that Alexandra Chalupa, a former DNC contractor, was involved in interfering in the U.S. elections and that the "real" election interference had been between the DNC and Ukraine.[755] Kilimnik retweeted Stranahan or others restating Stranahan's claims on this theme dozens of times. In January 2019, Kilimnik used his persona's account to send a single direct message to Stranahan.[756]

[redacted]

[752] (U) Tweet, @PBaranenko, April 1, 2019 (Retweet of @jsolomonReports).
[753] (U) Tweet, @PBaranenko, May 14, 2019.
[754] (U) Tweet, @PBaranenko, September 16, 2018 (Retweet of @realDonaldTrump).
[755] (U) Tweet, @PBaranenko, August 22, 2018 (Retweet of @stranahan).
[756] (U) Twitter, @PBaranenko (direct messaging metadata).
[757] [redacted]
[758] (U) *Ibid.*
[759] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

vii. (U) Manafort's Continued Efforts with Kilimnik on Ukraine; Kilimnik's Own Continued Activities

(U) After the U.S. presidential election, Kilimnik and Patten began developing ideas for peaceful settlement to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Kilimnik and Patten drafted a paper outlining the plan, which was to decentralize power, limit Kyiv's role in running the country, engage in direct bilateral talks between Poroshenko and Putin, and focus on local elections.[763]

---

[760] (U) *Ibid.*
[761] (U) *Ibid.*
[762] [redacted]
[763] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018. *See also* Emails, Kilimnik and Patten, August 19–20, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000014-18) (attaching an document entitled "Re-Framing the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in Pursuit of an Outside the Box Pathway to Peace" edited by both Patten and Kilimnik).

The plan included having the United States serve as an honest broker and work directly with Russia at the highest levels to resolve the conflict.[764] Patten recalled Kilimnik discussing exiled former PoR members living in Moscow—including Yanukovych—whom Kilimnik collectively called "the refugees."[765] Kilimnik was interested in these refugees and their possible return to politics in Ukraine.[766]

(U) Kilimnik used his work with Patten to test the viability of a Yanukovych return. Patten recalled conducting at least one poll with Kilimnik in 2017 as part of their ongoing work for the OB.[767] In mid-2017, Kilimnik and Patten organized a survey at Kilimnik's urging to, in part, discreetly measure voters' openness to Yanukovych's return.[768] According to Patten, Kilimnik thought that if Yanukovych returned to politics in eastern Ukraine, it would help the OB because Yanukovych would bring strong leadership back to the OB.[769] The poll revealed that Yanukovych was not viable at that time.[770] While Patten was aware that Kilimnik would periodically mention Yanukovych, Patten claimed he never got the sense that Kilimnik was trying to push Yanukovych's return.[771] Patten also believed that Kilimnik was attempting to distance himself from Manafort in furtherance of Kilimnik's own ongoing work in Ukraine.[772] As described *infra*, emails, testimony, and records show that Kilimnik had, in fact, engaged in an effort to return Yanukovych to Ukraine since 2016 and extending to at least 2018.

(U) Kilimnik separately continued to push the Yanukovych peace plan with Manafort and others. By early 2018, Kilimnik was again working with Manafort—who was under criminal indictment in the United States—in an attempt to organize a poll in Ukraine that would quietly try to gauge voter sentiment on Yanukovych. Kilimnik and Manafort planned to use the poll, which tested other Ukrainian political issues and OB politicians, to gauge voter sentiment for the peace plan involving Yanukovych without overtly revealing the purpose of the poll. Manafort worked with Fabrizio's company in an effort to create a questionnaire for the poll. Kilimnik, meanwhile, directly coordinating these efforts with Yanukovych in Russia.

---

[764] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018.
[765] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 11/27/2018.
[766] (U) *Ibid.*
[767] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018.
[768] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten and Garrett, July 31, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000024–26) ("I would also discreetly measure Yanukovich"). Patten recalled that the poll tested a wide variety of issues, but included questions designed to test voters' sentiment of Yanukovych. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018. *See also* Email, Kilimnik to Patten and Garrett, July 11, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000054) (responding to focus group testing, Kilimnik asked if respondents were "open to Yanuk return" which he believed was an "important question.").
[769] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/30/2018. The OB had been suffering from internal personality conflicts, which Kilimnik had long worked to resolve.
[770] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 11/27/2018.
[771] (U) *Ibid.*
[772] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]



(U) At approximately the same time, Manafort shared a draft of the Kilimnik-authored plan with Fabrizio and his firm for their use in creating polling questions to test its viability.[777] The draft plan, which aimed to garner Trump's support, was obtained by the Committee and is reproduced below.

> *A New **Initiative to Settle the Conflict in South-East of Ukraine***
>
> *The beginning of 2018 has seen an increase in violence in the conflict zone of the South-Eastern Ukraine. Each day brings news about casualties on the [sic] both sides, while the Minsk agreements are stalling because the [sic] both sides of the conflict lack desire to achieve peace.*
>
> *The leadership of Ukraine represented by President Poroshenko is not interested in the [sic] peaceful settlement, and has been using the conflict to justify its failed economic policy. The toxicity of the leaders of DNR and LNR is complicating their participation in the negotiations' process, and in fact is depriving millions of the region's residents of the right to be represented in the [sic] international politics. Neither Kyiv, nor DNR/LNR want Donbass back in Ukraine. This nullifies the efforts of the international community aimed at stopping the conflict.*
>
> ***Continuation of the conflict in Donbass leads to uncontrolled scenarios, and presents a risk of the violence getting out to other countries of the region.** In*

---

773 [redacted]
774 [redacted]
775 [redacted]
776 (U) *Ibid.*
777 (U) Email, Manafort to Fabrizio and Ward, February 21, 2018 (FAB010190).

order to prevent it a new approach to settlement of the conflict and return of the country to peace and civic accord is needed.

The proposed approach envisions:

1) Creation of a new entity – The Autonomous Republic of Donbass (ARD), which will be an autonomous region of Ukraine. The ARD will be created within the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that existed prior to April 2014, when the armed conflict began. A decision to create the ARD should ideally be passed by a protocol of Normandy format meeting.

2) Passing of a special law by Verkhovna Rada, which will determine the legal status and timeframe of incremental reintegration of the ARD into Ukraine. This measure will immediately unblock the peaceful process and create conditions for implementation of a joint plan of ceasefire. If the Rada does not pass this law, President Poroshenko should approve it by his Decree and disband the Verkhovna Rada as an obstacle to implementation of peace agreements.

3) Election of the Prime Minister for the transitional period based on the guidelines of a temporary Constitution of the ARD. The Prime Minister of the ARD shall be elected by the Parliament (People's Assembly) of the ARD and will lead the process of negotiations to settle the conflict between the ARD and Ukraine. The Prime Minister of the ARD shall be a legitimate and plenipotentiary representative of the ARD in talks with international structures within the framework of programs to rebuild the economy and overcome the consequences of the armed conflict. An optimal candidate for this job is Victor Yanukovich. Based on his experience and respect in the region he is able to create the necessary conditions for peaceful settlement and restoration of the political balance in Donbass.

A key driver that will bring back the dynamics into the peaceful settlement process can be an initiative of the President of the United States Donald Trump proposing to create the ARD and involve Mr. Yanukovich into the peaceful settlement process. This initiative then can be raised by representatives of the United States during their contacts with their Russian counterparts. In case of agreement of Russia and Mr. Yanukovich such initiative will make it possible to quickly develop a road map for settlement of the conflict and approve it soonest at a Normandy format meeting.

Another key condition of success of this plan is practical effort by the United States, aimed at convincing Ukraine's President Poroshenko to announce his support of initiative to create the ARD and start a new stage of peaceful

settlement. This plan will be beneficial for the Ukrainian government, because Poroshenko will be able to implement his election promise of 2014 and end the war. Election of Mr. Yanukovich as head of the ARD with consent of the United States and Russia will significantly increase chances of peaceful settlement of the conflict. Support of this initiative by the United States will be a fair and democratic decision with respect to Mr. Yanukovich, who did everything possible for peaceful settlement in 2014 and signed a plan of peaceful settlement with the Opposition on February 21, 2014. This plan subsequently was blown up by the radicals. This fact failed to obtain a proper reaction by the EU officials, who guaranteed it with their signatures, and led to serious deterioration of the situation in Ukraine.

Implementation of the plan will make it possible to create new dynamics in the process of peaceful settlement and can in fact become a starting point for return of peace into Ukraine, where the United States should play a leading role in restoring peace and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Personal participation of the US President will lead to stopping the bloodshed, returning political balance and stability in Ukraine, creating a stable and effective pro-European legislative majority, able of implementing effective reforms.[778]

[redacted] Manafort reached out to Fabrizio about the possibility of conducting a poll in Ukraine.[779] Fabrizio, Fabrizio's polling firm, and Manafort began organizing the details of the Ukraine-related polling work.

(U) Manafort wanted to use Evgeny Kopatko to conduct the survey and fieldwork, which would be coordinated through Kilimnik.[780] Kopatko is a Ukrainian, pro-Russian sociologist and pollster who has recently been awarded Russian citizenship by Putin.[781] Manafort provided a draft questionnaire to Fabrizio and his company. The questionnaire focused broadly on numerous candidates and parties in Ukraine, but also sought to test the idea of Yanukovych's return in eastern Ukraine. In particular, question 72(a) directly asked for respondents' reactions

---

[778] **(U)** Document, "New Initiative for Peace copy.docx" (FAB010192-10194).

[779] **(U)** Emails, Manafort and Fabrizio, February 5, 2017 (FAB010524) (setting up a telephone call); Email, Manafort to Fabrizio, February 12, 2018 (FAB010513) ("It looks like we are going to move forward on the poll that I discussed with you about 10 days ago.").

[780] **(U)** Emails, Manafort and Fabrizio, February 19, 2018 (FAB010509).

[781] **(U)** [redacted] "Ukrainian sociologist Kopatko received Russian citizenship," *Ukrop News 24*, April 26, 2017.

to a statement that Donetsk and Luhansk need to "be led to unite into one republic and bring back Yanukovych as their leader."[782] Kilimnik and Manafort, however, requested that this question be redesigned to test sentiment about a Yanukovych comeback without explicitly revealing the plan through the question. Manafort instructed Fabrizio's partner, Bob Ward, to "remove VY as the player in this plan" and instead referenced only "someone who is part of east and a leader in the PoR during the VY years."[783] Kilimnik had separately pointed out to the group that Yanukovych's associations with the peace plan was "not in the public domain."[784] After removing an explicit reference to Yanukovych as the potential leader, Manafort directed Ward to test "VY as an acceptable player to the Ukrainian people (vs. leadership) to assist in bringing peace to DONBASS."[785]

(U) In addition to these instructions, Manafort sent the above-described Kilimnik peace plan document to Fabrizio and Ward.[786] Fabrizio's firm created another questionnaire based on Manafort's guidance and the Kilimnik-authored peace plan.[787]

23. I am going to describe a plan that have been proposed to resolve the conflict in Donbas.

Create an Autonomous Republic of the Donbas from the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts which would elect a new prime minister, someone with real government experience and stature from the region that can engage in reasonable discussions with Kiev, Russia and the United States and implement a plan for disbanding and granting amnesty to the Donbas militia, restoring order, and reopen the borders with the rest of Ukraine. Like Crimea before the conflict, this autonomous republic would be part of Ukraine, elect deputies to the Verkhovna Rada, vote for president of Ukraine, but elect its own leadership and govern itself locally. Its territorial integrity would be defended by the Ukrainian armed forces.

Based on this, is this a plan you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose?

---

[782] **(U)** Email, Fabrizio to Ward, February 19, 2018 (FAB010419–10461) (attaching a 120-question questionnaire).
[783] **(U)** Email, Manafort to Ward and Fabrizio, February 21, 2018 (FAB010190).
[784] **(U)** Email, Manafort to Fabrizio, February 19, 2018 (FAB010419) ("This is what I received from KK. His answers are in red."). On February 23, 2017, *RFE/RL* published an article which included quotes from Kilimnik and included Kilimnik's admission that he had drafted a peace plan, referred to as the "Mariupol plan," which would involve the return of Yanukovych to bring peace to eastern Ukraine. Christopher Miller, "Who is Paul Manafort's Man in Kyiv? An Interview with Konstantin Kilimnik," *RFE/RL*, February 23, 2017. Patten later told a journalist privately that his understanding was that Kilimnik thought his conversation with the *RFE/RL* journalist was off-the-record. Email, Patten to Helderman, June 7, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000107).
[785] **(U)** Email, Manafort to Ward and Fabrizio, February 21, 2018 (FAB010190–10194) (attaching "New initiative for Peace copy.docx").
[786] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[787] **(U)** Email, Ward to Manafort and Fabrizio, February 21, 2018 (FAB010406-10417) (attaching a draft survey questionnaire).

24. Which of these outcomes do you support the most?
25. Which of these outcomes do you think is the easiest to get agreement on?
26. Which of these outcomes do you think is in the best interests of you and your community?

[USE SAME CARD FOR EACH]

1 DNR and LNR receive special status with broad autonomy, and can chose any leader, as long as there is a plan for reintegration back in Ukraine

2 DNR and LNR become an independent state

3 DNR and LNR return to Ukraine as normal oblasts as they were before

4 DNR and LNR become part of Russia

5 not sure (do not read)
6 refused (do not read)

27. Some have suggested that former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych, as someone from the Donbas and who can deal with Russia, can play a constructive role in ending the conflict in the Donbas and help bring stability to the region. Do you agree or disagree with this view? (IF CHOICE MADE, ASK) Is that strongly (agree/disagree) or just somewhat (agree/disagree)?

(U) Through Manafort, Kilimnik provided Fabrizio and his firm feedback on the questionnaire. In his feedback, Kilimnik asked Fabrizio and Ward to "get a deeper understanding of attitudes toward Yanukovich/Azarov and what they can do for Ukraine to get back. Implement a peace plan, rebuild Donbass, bring back good ties with Russia, etc."[788] The draft with Kilimnik edits included questions about Mykola Azarov's viability with the same peace plan.

(U) Azarov, the former Prime Minister under Yanukovych who had also fled to Russia, had long been involved in potential efforts to return to Ukraine and establish a pro-Russia government. Azarov almost certainly had the backing of the Russian government.

- [redacted] As early as 2015, a nationalist Russian

[788] **(U)** Document, "KK Note on Dr 4" (FAB010356). Kilimnik also raised the possibility of measuring "the toxicity of the Party of Regions. It still technically exists, and there are constant conversations about its revival. Understanding how toxic the political parties are, there could be a chance."
[789] [redacted]

press outlet suggested that Azarov could help run a "national salvation government" in Ukraine.[790] Shortly thereafter, Azarov announced a government-in-exile from his Moscow-based hotel.

- [redacted] Azarov's press spokesperson both during his time serving as Prime Minister in Ukraine and when he announced his government-in-exile from Moscow, was Serhiy Zavorotnyy, an SVR officer involved in influence operations.[791]

- [redacted]

(U) Work on the poll continued with Fabrizio's firm until at least March 10, 2018.[794] Fabrizio's firm did not ultimately field the poll, although it is unclear why.

(U) Kilimnik, however, continued efforts to reestablish Yanukovych as part of a peace settlement. Kilimnik worked with associates inside Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere to affect U.S. perceptions of the conflict in Ukraine. These plans blended Kilimnik's efforts to bring about Yanukovych's return—including his exoneration related to the violence in the Maydan in February 2014—with the aforementioned themes promoting the narrative that Ukraine, not Russia, had interfered in the 2016 U.S. elections.

- [redacted]

---

790 [redacted]

791 [redacted] identifies as Zavorotnyy as a member of military unit 33949, which is identified with the SVR. For more information about unit 33949 and its affiliation with the SVR, *see* Sergey Kanev, "Everyone knew the traitor," *Novaya Gazeta*, November 20, 2010 (Russian language). Zavorotnyy now appears on pro-Kremlin media in Russia and frequently promotes the views and priorities of the Russian government. [redacted]

793 [redacted]

794 **(U)** Email, Manafort to Fabrizio, et al., March 9, 2016 (FAB010231) (attaching ten documents, including "Ukr Qu Dr 4 KK.docx" and "KK note on Dr 4.docx").

795 [redacted]



[redacted]

805 [redacted]
806 [redacted]
807 (U) *Ibid.*
808 (U) *Ibid.*
809 (U) *Ibid.*
810 [redacted]
811 (U) *Ibid.*
812 (U) *Ibid.*
813 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] For example, in late May 2019, Telizhenko claimed that the "black ledger" naming Manafort was a forgery solicited by the Obama administration.[819]

[redacted]

---

[814] (U) *Ibid.*

[815] [redacted]

[816] (U) *Ibid.*

[817] (U) *Ibid.*

[818] [redacted] Kilimnik tweeted and retweeted about Portnov. For example, on May 31, 2019 Kilimnik tweeted, "Portnov is one of the best Ukrainian lawyers. Also author of totaly [sic] Western-supported Criminal-Procedural code (one of many achievements of the Yanukovich Administration). He was prosecuted by Poroshenko on totally fake charges and has a moral right to do what he is doing." Tweet, @PBaranenko, May 31, 2019.

[819] (U) Josh Dawsey and David Stern, "Giuliani meets with former diplomat as he continues to press Ukraine inquiries," *The Washington Post*, May 24, 2019.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]

[redacted]

823 (U) *Ibid.*
824 (U) *Ibid.*
825 (U) *Ibid.*
826 (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

[827] (U) *Ibid.*
[828] (U) *Ibid.*
[829] (U) *Ibid.*
[830] (U) *Ibid.*
[831] (U) *Ibid.*
[832] (U) *Ibid.*
[833] (U) *Ibid.*
[834] (U) *Ibid.*
[835] [redacted]
[836] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

837 (U) *Ibid.*
838 [redacted]
839 (U) *Ibid.*
840 [redacted]
841 (U) *Ibid.*
842 [redacted]
843 [redacted]
844 (U) *Ibid.*
845 (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

[redacted] Telizhenko participated in a documentary film that aired on a U.S. news channel, entitled "One America News Investigates – The Ukraine Hoax: Impeachment, Biden Cash, and Mass Murder with Michael Caputo."[848] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

---

846 [redacted]

848 (U) One America News Network, "'One America News Investigates –The Ukraine Hoax: Impeachment, Biden Cash, and Mass Murder with Michael Caputo' To Air This Saturday And Sunday At 10 PM ET, 7 PM PT," January 21, 2020.

849 [redacted]

850 (U) *Ibid.*

851 (U) *Ibid.*

852 (U) *Ibid.*

853 [redacted]

854 (U) *Ibid.*

855 (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

viii. (U) Manafort and Gates Communications Regarding Investigations

(U) Until Gates entered into a plea agreement with the SCO in February 2018, Manafort and Gates remained in close contact and regularly discussed the investigations into both of their activities.[858]

- (U) Manafort and Gates discussed the possibility of a presidential pardon.[859] Manafort recalled that Gates suggested Manafort should ask an attorney for Trump about a pardon.[860] Manafort claimed he had no discussion with the White House or anyone with access to the White House about a pardon.[861]

- (U) Manafort was aware that the RNC had raised money for a defense fund. Manafort asked John Dowd, then a lead attorney for Trump, if Manafort and Gates were eligible for money from this fund.[862] Dowd said yes.[863]

- (U) In early 2018, Manafort asked Laurance Gay, a friend of Manafort and Gates, to dissuade Gates from accepting a plea agreement.[864]

- (U) Manafort and Gates continued to remain in contact while Gates was proffering to the SCO.[865] According to Manafort, Gates had denied that he was proffering to the SCO.[866]

8. (U) Manafort's Associates' Ties to Russian Intelligence Services

---

[856] (U) *Ibid.*
[857] [redacted]
[858] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/12/2018.
[859] (U) *Ibid.*
[860] (U) *Ibid.*
[861] (U) *Ibid.*
[862] (U) *Ibid.*
[863] (U) *Ibid.*
[864] (U) *Ibid.*
[865] (U) *Ibid.*
[866] (U) *Ibid.*

i. (U) Oleg Deripaska and His Aides

(U) The Committee found that, since at least the time he hired Paul Manafort in approximately 2004, Oleg Deripaska has acted as a proxy for the Russian state and Russian intelligence services. Deripaska has managed and financed influence operations on the Kremlin's behalf. Deripaska's activities include Kremlin-approved and -directed active measures—including information operations and election interference efforts—conducted to install pro-Kremlin regimes and strengthen Kremlin-aligned powerbrokers across the globe. Deripaska's right-hand-man for the implementation of Russian active measures is Viktor Boyarkin, a GRU officer working for Deripaska.

a. (U) Deripaska's Kremlin Ties

[redacted] Oleg Deripaska's close relationship with Putin probably dates to Putin's election in 2000. [redacted]

867 [redacted]
868
869

[redacted]

[redacted] Deripaska also has a Russian diplomatic passport and has used diplomatic credentials to attend the UN General Assembly as a representative of Russia.[873]

[redacted]

b. (U) Deripaska's "Chief of Staff": Viktor Boyarkin

---

870 [redacted]
871 [redacted]
872 [redacted]
873 (U) Waldman Tr., p. 32
874 [redacted]
875 [redacted]
876 [redacted]
877 (U) *Ibid.*
878 [redacted] This information directly conflicts with information provided by Christopher Steele to DOJ at a time when Steele had a business relationship with Deripaska through Deripaska's attorneys. For more information, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.B.

(U) Oleg Deripaska primarily implements Russian active measures through Russian national Viktor Boyarkin. Boyarkin is a Russian intelligence officer affiliated with the GRU. The Committee found reliable evidence suggesting that Boyarkin is part of a cadre of individuals ostensibly operating outside of the Russian government but who nonetheless implement influence operations that are directed by the Kremlin, and funded by key Russian oligarchs, particularly Deripaska. The Committee bases its assessment that Boyarkin is a Russian intelligence officer on the following information:

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

879 [redacted]
880 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 6.
881 [redacted]
882 [redacted]
883 (U) *Ibid.*
884 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 10.
885 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

886 (U) *Ibid.*

887 [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Boyarkin appeared to coordinate with other Russian nationals operating seemingly outside of the Russian government but who nonetheless undertook influence operations on its behalf.

- [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Boyarkin also coordinated sensitive operations on Deripaska's behalf. For example, Nastya Rybka, a former Deripaska mistress, was arrested in Thailand and claimed that she was "the only witness and the missing link in the connection between Russia and the U.S. elections—the long chain of Oleg Deripaska, Prikhodko, Manafort, and Trump."[893] Rybka also suggested that she was in possession of more than 16 hours of audio recordings she made of Deripaska's conversations with business associates and Russian political leaders, namely Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Prikhodko.[894]

[redacted]

[892] (U) *Ibid.*

[893] (U) Anton Troianovski, "A self-described sex expert says she will spill information on Trump and Russia to get out of a Thai jail," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 2018. Rybka's true name is Anastasia Vashukevich.

[894] (U) *See, e.g.,* Nataliya Zotova and Oleg Boldyrev, "Nastya Rybka: Model who got caught up in the Trump-Russia row," *BBC*, January 31, 2019; Richard Paddock, "Escort Says Audio Recordings Show Russian Meddling in U.S. Election," *The New York Times*, March 5, 2018.

- (U) Prior to her arrest in Thailand, Rybka's social media posts had been the subject of a lawsuit filed by Deripaska against Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny. In February 2018, Navalny posted to his website a 25-minute video outlining alleged connections—including a romantic relationship—between Rybka and Deripaska. The video includes a number of vignettes apparently collected from Rybka's social media accounts and focuses on an August 2016 meeting between Deripaska and Prikhodko aboard Deripaska's yacht near Norway.[896] Almost immediately after the video appeared on Navalny's website, Deripaska sought, and was granted, a court order demanding the removal of a number of Instagram posts and YouTube videos. Russia's communications regulator, Roskomnadzor, issued an order to Russian internet service providers blocking access to Navalny's website on February 15, 2018.[897]

- (U) Following her arrest, Rybka told reporters she was afraid to return to Russia, and offered to tell her story to American investigators in exchange for asylum. Her colleague Alexander Kirillov allegedly requested, in a letter to the American consulate, political asylum for those arrested with Rybka.[898] Her arrest also apparently attracted the attention of Deripaska and his business associates. A recording available on YouTube purports to reproduce a conference call conversation between "Georgy" (presumably Georgy Oganov), Tatiana Monaghan,[899] and William Sein about this matter.[900]

- [redacted]

---

[895] [redacted]

[896] (U) *See, e.g.,* "Navalny Website Blocked in Russia Over 'Rybkagate' Report," *RFE/RL*, February 16, 2018; YouTube, http://youtu.be/RQZr2NgKPiU.

[897] (U) *Ibid.*

[898] (U) Richard Paddock, "Escort Says Audio Recordings Show Russian Meddling in U.S. Election," *The New York Times*, March 5, 2018. It is the Committee's understanding that U.S. Government investigators sought to interview Rybka in Thailand, but were not granted access. The Committee did not seek its own interview with Rybka.

[899] (U) Monaghan is a close Deripaska associate who serves as President of the Russian National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce. Monaghan is also connected to Boyarkin. In March and May 2016, Monaghan and the ICC hosted roundtables touting RUSAL's efforts to develop an Ebola vaccine. Monaghan appears to have co-hosted the March event with Boyarkin, and both appear to have attended the May event.

[900] (U) YouTube, https://youtu.be/zqU2L_05yUI. The Committee does not have any independent verification of the sourcing or content of this call.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

---

901 [redacted]
902 [redacted] *Ibid.* [redacted] The Committee sought an interview with Soriano, but was unable to secure one. [redacted]
903 [redacted]
904 (U) *Ibid.*
905 (U) *Ibid.*
906 (U) *Ibid.*
907 (U) *Ibid.*
908 (U) *Ibid.*
909 (U) *Ibid.*
910 [redacted]
911 (U) *Ibid.*
912 (U) *Ibid.*
913 (U) *Ibid.*

- [redacted]

- (U) In statements to the media in August 2018, Rybka suggested she sent copies of her recordings to Deripaska, and expressed her hope that he would help secure her release from prison.[920] In January 2019, Rybka was released from Thai custody and deported to Russia.

[redacted] The Committee assesses that Boyarkin handled other influence operations funded by and coordinated with Deripaska—with the approval and direction of the Kremlin. [redacted][925]

---

[914] [redacted]
[915] (U) *Ibid.*
[916] (U) *Ibid.*
[917] (U) *Ibid.*
[918] (U) *Ibid.*
[919] [redacted]
[920] (U) *See, e.g.*, Richard Paddock, "She Gambled on Her Claim to Link Russians and Trump. She is Losing," *The New York Times*, August 31, 2018.
[921] [redacted]
[922] (U) *Ibid.*
[923] (U) *Ibid.*
[924] [redacted] *Ibid.* According to Boyarkin, this included securing the assistance U.S. law firm [redacted] to provide legal assistance to [redacted] case.
[925] [redacted]

c. (U) Deripaska's Strategic Advisor: Georgy Oganov

(U) Georgy Oganov is a longtime advisor to Deripaska and is affiliated with [redacted] Oganov attended the Moscow State Institute for International Relations.[926] Waldman described Oganov as speaking seven or eight languages. Waldman also assessed that, as a senior advisor to Deripaska, Oganov had direct access to him.[927] Waldman also understood that Oganov maintains ties to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs "at the deputies level" and "[c]ertainly he and the foreign minister know each other."[928]

[redacted] Oganov was ostensibly a diplomat. [redacted]

[redacted]

d. (U) Deripaska's Role in Russian Active Measures in Montenegro

---

[926] (U) World Policy Conference, "Georgy Oganov," 2019.
[927] (U) Waldman Tr., pp. 57, 59.
[928] (U) *Ibid.* pp. 59–60.
[929] [redacted]
[930] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[931] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[932] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[933] [redacted]

(U) While Deripaska's influence operations on behalf of the Kremlin span the globe, the activities of Deripaska, Boyarkin, and their associates in Montenegro provide a clear example of Deripaska's malign influence efforts.

(U) As noted above, Deripaska first became involved in Montenegro when he purchased a controlling share in KAP, a deal that was likely done in coordination with the Russian government to extend Russian influence in Montenegro. Deripaska hired Manafort, whose company began working in Montenegro on Deripaska's behalf as early as 2005.[934]

[redacted]

[redacted] By 2016, Deripaska was involved in funding and executing an aggressive Russian-directed campaign to overthrow the Montenegrin government and assassinate the Prime Minister in a violent coup. [redacted] These efforts supported a pro-Russia and anti-NATO Montenegrin opposition party, the Democratic Front (DF).

[redacted]

[redacted]

[934] (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.3.i. Open source information indicates that Paul Manafort was in discussions to participate in political consulting in Montenegro on behalf of the DF in the lead up to the October 2016 election in Montenegro and the coup attempt. *See* Simon Shuster, "Exclusive: Russian Ex-Spy Pressured Manafort Over Debts to an Oligarch," *Time*, December 29, 2018. The Committee does not have further information about his potential involvement.

[935] [redacted]

[936] [redacted]

[937] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

[redacted] Boyarkin directly facilitated many of these activities, including [redacted] and payments to DF politicians, [redacted]

---

938 [redacted]

939 [redacted]

940 (U) This is a Russian term which is now used for activities which used to be referred to by the Russian government as "active measures."

941 [redacted]

942 [redacted] Treasury, "Treasury Targets Russian Operatives over Election Interference, World Anti-Doping Agency Hacking, and Other Malign Activities," December 19, 2018; [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted][945]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

---

[943] [redacted]

[944] (U) *Ibid.*

[945] [redacted] *See, e.g.*, Samir Kajosevic, "Monetenegro Prosecution Suspects Israeli Consultant of Coup Role," *Balkan Insight*, July 31, 2019; [redacted]

[946] [redacted]

[947] [redacted]

[948] [redacted]

[949] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

954 (U) *Ibid.*
955 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 34.
956 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 33.
957 (U) *Ibid.*
958 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 34.
959 [redacted]

[redacted] Additionally, Deripaska initiated

Mishakov is also an associate and business partner of Andrey Rozov, the developer with whom Michael Cohen and Felix Sater worked on a potential Trump Tower Moscow deal during the 2016 presidential campaign. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. D.ii.a.

960 [redacted]
961 (U) *Ibid.*
962 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 36.
963 (U) *Ibid.*
964 (U) *Ibid.*
965 (U) *Ibid.*, p. 37.
966 (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 37.
967 [redacted]
968 (U) *Ibid.*

a lawsuit against the Montenegrin government seeking hundreds of millions of Euros, claiming unlawful expropriation of his KAP investment.[969]

[redacted] On April 1, 2017, Aleksandar Vucic was elected president in Serbia.[970]

[redacted]

[969] (U) Dusica Tomovic, "Russian Billionaire Sues Montenegro Over Lost Investment," *Balkan Insight*, December 7, 2016.

[970] (U) Aleksandar Vascovic and Ivana Sekularac, "Serbia's Vucic confirms domination with presidential win," *Reuters*, April 1, 2017.

[971] [redacted]

[972] (U) *Ibid.*

[973] (U) *Ibid.*

[974] (U) *Ibid.*

[975] [redacted]

[976] (U) *Ibid.*

[977] (U) *Ibid.*

[978] (U) *Ibid.*

[979] (U) *Ibid.*

[980] (U) *Ibid.*

e. (U) Deripaska's Involvement in Other Russian Active Measures

[redacted] Deripaska has conducted numerous other Russian active measures campaigns and information operations, including those that interfere directly in democratic processes and elections. [redacted]

[redacted] Other Deripaska employees beyond Boyarkin and Kilimnik are also connected to GRU influence operations, suggesting Deripaska's operations are thoroughly integrated into Kremlin influence operations planning. [redacted]

[redacted] Deripaska's companies, including RUSAL, are proxies for the Kremlin, including for Russian government influence efforts, economic measures, and diplomatic relations. [redacted]

- (U) In approximately 2008 or 2009, Manafort worked on a project for Deripaska in Guinea where Deripaska had a large interest in bauxite mining and alumina refinery facilities.[986] Boyarkin managed the project for Deripaska.[987] Gates recalled meeting with

---

[981] [redacted]
[982] (U) *Ibid.*
[983] [redacted]
[984] (U) *Ibid.*
[985] (U) *Ibid.*
[986] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018. Deripaska's business interest primarily involved the Friguia Bauxite and Alumina Complex, which had been privatized in 2006. The Friguia complex is one of the largest employers in Guinea. *See* "Friguia Bauxite and Alumina Complex," RUSAL.com.
[987] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/18/2018.

Boyarkin, Kilimnik, and Manafort about the project.[988] Boyarkin had intelligence regarding politicians in Guinea and contacts within the Guinean government.[989] Deripaska's strategy was to use American campaign techniques in Guinea to get the person he supported elected president.[990] Gates recalled that after working on the project for several months, the presidential candidate Manafort's firm was supporting was shot.[991] After the shooting, Boyarkin moved a Russian military ship to Guinea as a show of force to anyone who was trying to impede Deripaska.[992] Gates believed the work in Guinea ended shortly thereafter, work for which Manafort's firm was paid over $1 million.[993]

- [redacted]

[redacted]

[988] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018. At the time of the meeting, Gates recalled that it was clear that Kilimnik and Manafort already knew Boyarkin. FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/18/2018. According to Gates, Boyarkin behaved deferentially to both Manafort and Deripaska. FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018.
[989] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/18/2018.
[990] (U) *Ibid.*
[991] (U) *Ibid.*
[992] (U) *Ibid.*
[993] (U) *Ibid.*
[994] [redacted]
[995] (U) *Ibid.*
[996] (U) *Ibid.*
[997] (U) *Ibid.*
[998] (U) *Ibid.* In addition to the Guinea work, Kilimnik worked on a number of projects for Deripaska and Boyarkin and frequently sought to involve his business partner Patten. Patten participated in a number of pitches and proposals on Deripaska-related work, but claimed his work on the underlying projects never came to fruition. For example, Patten was offered a project working for Deripaska in Montenegro. Patten stated that he declined the offer to work on the Montenegro project because the project went beyond politics, violence would emanate from the project, and Patten thought it was better for Montenegro to be aligned with NATO. (As noted above, [redacted]

[redacted] Patten told the FBI that he recalled having a Skype call with Boyarkin and Kilimnik on May 24, 2015, about the Guinea project.[1004] Patten told the Committee during his interview that he did not know a "Viktor Boyarkin."[1005] Patten later told the SCO that he did not lie to the Committee because at the time he only knew Boyarkin as "Viktor," a Russian associate of Kilimnik's who worked for Deripaska.[1006]

- [redacted]

[redacted].) Another potential Deripaska project related to Kazakhstan. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[999] [redacted]

[1000] (U) *Ibid.*

[1001] (U) *Ibid.*

[1002] (U) *Ibid.*

[1003] (U) *Ibid.*

[1004] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018. As noted above, Patten told the SCO that the proposals he worked on with Kilimnik related to Guinea, Kazakhstan, and others were for Deripaska. FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018. Email evidence obtained by the Committee provides some reflections of this work. For example, one project involving RUSAL's interests in Kazakhstan occurred three months after the Skype call with Boyarkin about Guinea. Patten and Kilimnik took steps to hide their work on this Kazakhstan project by using foldering on Hushmail. For example, on August 23, 2015, Kilimnik emailed Patten to tell him that Kilimnik had had a "very good and interesting meeting with Victor" and that "[t]here is real interest in KZ [Kazakhstan], but we need to change the format of the memo a bit – make it short and basically tie it to the program I outlined earlier." Shortly thereafter, Kilimnik told Patten to "Pls check hush." Patten's subsequent response appeared to suggest he had received Kilimnik's edits. Emails, Kilimnik and Patten, August 23–24, 2015 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-001216). A document in Patten's possession offered a proposal to support RUSAL in Kazakhstan's markets, as well as possibilities for "impacting" Kazakhstan's "political machinations." The proposal continued: "Like in Ukraine in 2005, RUSAL's shareholders can play a crucial role by assigning an 'anti-crisis political team,' which will ensure electoral success and international acceptance for the right party and leader, contributing to internal political stability and protection of RUSAL's assets against uncontrolled scenarios and deterioration in business and rule of law environment." Memorandum, "Where Will Kazakhstan's Devaluation Lead?" (SP_OSC_000988) (referencing Kazakhstan's currency free float "last week," suggesting the document was written in late-August 2015). Kilimnik and Patten appeared to continue using Hushmail to edit documents. *See, e.g.*, Emails, Kilimnik and Patten, December 21, 2015 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-001010).

[1005] (U) Patten Tr., p. 172.

[1006] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1007 [redacted]
1008 (U) *Ibid.*
1009 (U) *Ibid.*
1010 (U) *Ibid.*
1011 (U) *Ibid.*
1012 (U) *Ibid.*
1013 (U) *Ibid.*
1014 (U) *Ibid.*
1015 (U) *Ibid.*
1016 (U) *Ibid.*
1017 (U) *Ibid.*
1018 [redacted]

f. (U) Deripaska's Connections to Hacking Operations

[redacted]

[1019] [redacted]

[1020] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

ii. (U) Konstantin Kilimnik

[redacted] The Committee found that Konstantin Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer. The Committee found reliable evidence suggesting that Kilimnik—like Boyarkin—is part of a cadre of individuals ostensibly operating outside of the Russian government but who nonetheless

---

1021 [redacted]

1022 [redacted]

1023 [redacted]

1024 [redacted]

implement Kremlin-directed influence operations. These operations are funded by both the Russian government and by key Russian oligarchs, including Deripaska. The Committee bases this assessment on a body of information it obtained in the course of its investigation, including electronic communications; interviews; law enforcement information; and [redacted] and [redacted]. The following information was relevant in making this assessment:

- [redacted]

[redacted]

1025 [redacted]

1026

1027 (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted] The *SCO Report* found that Kilimnik had "ties" to the Russian intelligence services.[1036] However, [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

1034 [redacted]
1035 (U) *Ibid.*
1036 (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 133.
1037 [redacted]
1038 [redacted]
1039 [redacted]
1040 [redacted]
1041 (U) *Ibid.*
1042 [redacted]

[redacted]

- (U) Kilimnik was trained in languages at the Russian Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense (VKIMO), an institute that Kilimnik himself admitted to colleagues was used by both the GRU and KGB. Kilimnik, however, downplayed and mischaracterized the type of career these intelligence officers followed compared to his own and claimed that his former classmates were not involved in intelligence matters.[1046] In particular, Kilimnik claimed in private correspondence to his close associate and business partner Sam Patten that, because he was not a military attaché, he could not be a GRU officer. Kilimnik also claimed to Patten that "GRU does not have agents abroad. Not its business after the reforms."[1047] Kilimnik further claimed:

> *Never had any contacts later with military, KGB . . . . NONE of [my classmates] stayed in the military . . . all do top jobs at telecoms, consulting, standard and poors, accounting etc. . . . we do not talk because have [sic] time to keep in touch.*[1048]

[redacted] All of these assertions are lies. [redacted]

[1043] [redacted]

[1044] [redacted]

[1045] (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.B.

[1046] (U) Patten told the Committee that although he was not an expert on the Russian intelligence services, he did not believe Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence officer. Patten Tr., pp. 98–99.

[1047] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, August 20, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000408).

[1048] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted] This information suggests Kilimnik intentionally downplayed and mischaracterized—including in private to his associates like Patten—the profile of Russian intelligence officers and his connections to them in order to distance himself from these allegations.[1051]

- (U) Kilimnik sought to counter and deny Russian involvement in the 2016 U.S. elections and push pro-Russia narratives. In 2017, Kilimnik denied in private communications with Patten that there was Russian interference in the U.S. elections.[1052] Patten recalled Kilimnik claiming that the Russia intervention "narrative" was "hugely, if not entirely, exaggerated."[1053] In an email to Patten responding to the public revelation of Kilimnik's campaign correspondence with Manafort, Kilimnik suggested that the Russians were "idiots" who were "too disorganized" to conduct such interference and that they "distrusted" Manafort too much to use him in any election meddling.[1054] For years, Kilimnik was defensive about Russian interference in Ukraine with U.S. Embassy in Kyiv officials; he would admit some Russian interference by well-known Russian agents like Medvedchuk, but attempt to distance himself and the OB from Russia.[1055] Kilimnik would later push false counter-narratives about the Maidan protests that were similar in

---

1049 [redacted]

1050 [redacted]

1051 (U) Kilimnik appeared to mislead Patten about a variety of matters beyond those described above. For example, Kilimnik hid his work and meetings with Manafort in 2017 and 2018 from Patten.

1052 (U) For example, Kilimnik emailed Patten a *Financial Times* article on Russian interference in the U.S. elections, suggesting that the U.S. intelligence community "must be having very little sleep chasing those squirrels who they think exist." Email, Kilimnik to Patten, September 12, 2016 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000347).

1053 (U) Patten Tr., p. 109.

1054 (U) Email, Kilimnik to Patten, September 20, 2017 (SSCI 2017-4885-3-000039).

1055 [redacted] *See, e.g.*, Email, Purcell to Pyatt, et al., April 24, 2015 (CDP-2017-00011G-001378); Email, Purcell to Pyatt, et al., May 19, 2015 (CDP-2017-00011G-001380). Separate information suggests that Kilimnik was incorrect that the OB was not supported by the Russians. [redacted]

nature to Russian counter-narratives on the topic.[1056] As described *infra,* Kilimnik used his @PBaranenko alias account to tweet a variety of pro-Russian themes, including false information about NotPetya, Bill Browder, MH-17, and the 2014 Maidan protests.

- [redacted] In the spring of 2014, during Russia's invasion of Crimea, Kilimnik contacted Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI Consulting and worked with Manafort on Yanukovych-related work. Kilimnik offered Hawker an opportunity to conduct a public relations campaign for an unspecified Russian government entity that would attempt to tout the Russian invasion as a liberation of Crimea.[1057] In an email to Hawker, Kilimnik stated that the purpose of the project was "to build a framework for clarifying and promoting Russia's position on Crimea and Ukraine in the Western and Ukrainian media using existing contacts and modern mechanisms."[1058] Kilimnik then facilitated a meeting between Hawker and an individual believed to be affiliated with the Russian government.[1059] Hawker ultimately attended a meeting in Russia and said he presumed the person he met with was a Russian operative. Hawker later explained that he submitted a proposal but with an overly high price because he did not want to engage in the work.[1060]

- (U) Patten told the SCO that after he had left IRI, an IRI employee who worked at IRI's Belarus desk, Trig Olson, made a claim that Kilimnik leaked information to Russian intelligence.[1061] Olson based his assessment on a situation where information provided in a meeting that Kilimnik had attended was leaked to Russian intelligence.[1062] Patten ultimately confronted Kilimnik about Olson's allegation, and Kilimnik denied he was the source of the leak.[1063]

- [redacted] Kilimnik has repeatedly claimed that in April 1995 he stopped his Russian military service at the rank of Lieutenant after having been assigned to teach Swedish at VKIMO and traveling on several "Russian trade delegations" to Sweden. Kilimnik further claimed that after leaving the Russian military, he was hired at the International

---

[1056] [redacted] For example, according to Manafort, Kilimnik believed that "Georgian mercenaries hired by the West" committed the violence in the Maydan in February 2014, not the Yanukovych regime. Kilimnik shared documentaries to this effect with Manafort. FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

[1057] [redacted]

[1058] [redacted] Email, Hawker and Tulukbaev, March 18, 2014 (Doc ID 0.7.1120.104630).

[1059] [redacted]

[1060] (U) *Ibid.*

[1061] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018.

[1062] (U) *Ibid.*

[1063] (U) FBI, FD-302, Patten 5/22/2018. Patten said he was skeptical of Olson's allegations about Kilimnik's ties to Russian intelligence in part because he believed Olson had a score to settle with Manafort because Olson had been fired from the McCain Campaign by Rick Davis, Manafort's former business partner.

Republican Institute (IRI). A review of IRI records confirmed Kilimnik's employment at IRI no later than mid-1995.[1064] Kilimnik, however, appears to have not completely broken ties with the Russian government by 1995. [redacted] reflect that an official Russian diplomatic passport for "Konstantin Viktorovich Klimnik," born April 27, 1970, in Ukraine, was issued a diplomatic type B1/B2 (temporary visitor) visa in Moscow on October 28, 1997, over two years after he began working for IRI. The visa was valid until October 27, 1998.[1065]

- (U) Kilimnik was hired by IRI "fresh out of Russian Ministry of Defense."[1066] At IRI, he was placed as a program manager in charge of the NGO program. Russia has a long history of focus on foreign NGO activity, particularly IRI.[1067]

[redacted]

- (U) Despite claiming both publicly and in a statement sent to the Committee through Manafort's attorneys that "Ukraine is my country," the Committee found Kilimnik in fact maintains deep ties to Russia, which he attempts to obscure.[1069] In particular, Kilimnik maintains a permanent residence with a family in Moscow, has a Russian passport, and is a Russian citizen. When U.S. media published Kilimnik's name in August 2016, Kilimnik returned to Russia, allegedly for protection. When asked to explain why Kilimnik would choose Russia to return for protection, Patten explained to the Committee, "He's a Russian citizen, he owns a house there. Often we go home when we want to get out of a bad situation."[1070]

[1064] (U) IRI internal memorandum, Kilimnik to Griffin, July 12, 1995 (IRI-001039). The *SCO Report* misstates when Kilimnik first became affiliated with IRI; it was 1995, not 1998.

[1065] (U) The Committee considered alternative explanations for this discrepancy, including the possibility that for reasons of convenience or error Kilimnik maintained a diplomatic passport despite not having a government affiliation for over two years. Because such alternative explanations are credible, the Committee did not weigh this piece information heavily as evidence of Kilimnik's ongoing Russian government ties. Nonetheless, the information remains anomalous and is included because it is only one of many such anomalies which, taken as a whole, have greater weight.

[1066] (U) Email Mefford to Holzen and Kondraciuk, July 8, 2016 (IRI Production).

[1067] (U) At IRI, Kilimnik was exposed to a wide variety of government officials, some of whom went on to senior positions in the Russian government. *See, e.g.*, IRI, "Participants to Regional Networking Conference" February 24-27, 1999 (IRI-000054).

[1068] [redacted]

[1069] (U) Letter, Brown to SSCI, June 19, 2017.

[1070] (U) Patten Tr., pp. 47–48.

- (U) Gates told the FBI that he joked about Kilimnik being a Russian spy because he did not know for sure if Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence officer.[1071] Gates stated, however, that he suspected Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence officer.[1072] Gates stated that Kilimnik was well connected in Russia and Ukraine and could obtain information easily.[1073] Gates characterized Kilimnik as an "odd guy" and that Kilimnik was always gathering information about everything.[1074] Gates also did not believe that Kilimnik could afford his lifestyle solely on his DMP salary.[1075] Gates recalled visiting Kilimnik's home in Kyiv where he noticed an Audi A8 in his garage, which Gates had never seen Kilimnik drive to work before.[1076]

- [redacted] According to Manafort, some people in the PoR thought Manafort worked for the CIA and Kilimnik worked for the KGB.[1077] Gates recalled that occasionally Manafort would intentionally make a false statement in Kilimnik's presence to test if Kilimnik was sharing information with others.[1078] At one point in time, Manafort told Yanukovych that Yanukovych should have Kilimnik checked out so that they would not have to hold back during "sensitive" conversations in Kilimnik's presence.[1079] Manafort relayed this advice to Yanukovych through Lyovochkin in 2010.[1080] Manafort recalled that Yanukovych subsequently told him that the SBU had cleared Kilimnik.[1081] However, at this time, the SBU was widely compromised by the Russian intelligence services. [redacted]

[1071] (U) [redacted] FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018.
[1072] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018.
[1073] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018.
[1074] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018.
[1075] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018.
[1076] (U) *Ibid.*
[1077] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.
[1078] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/29/2018. Manafort, like others who dealt with Kilimnik, at some point harbored suspicions that Kilimnik had ties to intelligence services. Manafort was undeniably aware—often from first-hand experience—of suspicious aspects of Kilimnik's behavior and network. Nevertheless, Manafort later asserted to the SCO that Kilimnik was not a spy.
[1079] (U) *Ibid.*; FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.
[1080] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.
[1081] [redacted]
[1082] [redacted]

Despite his status as a Russian national, Kilimnik had "unfettered access" to Yanukovych and Yanukovych's office.[1084]

Several other pieces of information about Kilimnik—while not as probative in isolation—are consistent with Kilimnik's affiliation with the Russian intelligence services because they closely align with Russian intelligence tradecraft. For example, Kilimnik conducted broad engagement with diplomats and embassies, especially in Kyiv;[1085] used multiple encrypted applications to enhance his communications security;[1086] used coded and vague language when discussing sensitive topics in writing; used "foldering" in emails;[1087] and used pseudonyms, such as "[redacted]",[1088] "[redacted]",[1089] and "[redacted]"[1090] for use in electronic communications.

(U) Kilimnik also worked to undermine investigations into those close to him by interfering with witness testimony.

- (U) In June 2018, the SCO charged Kilimnik and Manafort with conspiring to obstruct justice. Starting in February 2018, Manafort and Kilimnik had attempted to persuade two

---

[1083] (U) SSCI Memorandum, "Trip Report – Ukraine, Turkey, Austria," April 2014 (2014-2915).
[1084] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 1/29/2018.
[1085] (U) Kilimnik "regularly met with all manner of embassies, diplomats, so forth and so on." Patten Tr., p. 79. *See also* Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, January 21, 2016 (CDP-2017-00011G-000276) (Kilimnik stating that he sent notes to the German and French embassies in Kyiv).
[1086] Kilimnik used at least Viber, Threema, and WhatsApp with Patten. This was at least in part because Kilimnik was, in his own view, most likely a regular subject of surveillance. Patten Tr., pp. 119–120, 167–168.
[1087] (U) Manafort and Patten separately admitted to the SCO that they engaged in foldering with Kilimnik.
[1088] (U) Text Message thread, Patten and Kilimnik (SP_OSC_002819).
[1089] For example, Kilimnik used the
[1090] (U) *Ibid.*
[1091]
[1092] (U) *Ibid.*

individuals with who they had previously worked on Ukraine matters to influence their testimony.[1093] Manafort later admitted to this conspiracy with Kilimnik.[1094]

- **(U)** On May 31, 2018, the day Patten was scheduled to testify before a grand jury, Kilimnik asked Patten if there was "anything I can help you with on the GJ [grand jury]."[1095] Patten expressed concern to Kilimnik about his testimony related to purchasing inauguration tickets for Lyovochkin and money from Lyovochkin transferred to Patten for that purpose.[1096] Kilimnik offered Patten an "explanation," suggesting to Patten a fabrication he could offer to the grand jury:

> *How about they sent it to us for a poll they wanted to do, and because they (as they typically do) canceled the poll you decided to use it for inauguration tickets. Do your client a favor. One failed to come, no one actually attended other than you and SL. Business development for us.*[1097]

(U) Given Kilimnik's work as a Russian intelligence officer, the Committee also sought to understand Kilimnik's engagement with the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv during this time period. Beginning in the Yanukovych administration and continuing through at least late 2016, Kilimnik was in regular contact with personnel serving in the Embassy's political section.[1098]

(U) Kilimnik, first as an employee of Manafort's in Kyiv, and later as Patten's partner, served in several roles, most notably as an advisor to the presidential administration and in particular to Yanukoych's then-chief of staff, Lyovochkin. Kilimnik's access to these PoR politicians, and to the oligarchs that backed them, made Kilimnik an important contact of the political section. Kilimnik's ability to navigate the Maydan-led ouster of Yanukovych, and his transition to power broker within the OB made him a valuable resource to the Embassy.

[1093] **(U)** Superseding Indictment, *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., et al.*, Case No. 1:17-CR-201 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018).

[1094] **(U)** Plea Agreement of Paul J. Manafort, Jr., *United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr.*, Case No. 17-201-1-ABJ (D.D.C. September 14, 2018).

[1095] **(U)** Text Message, Kilimnik to Patten, May 31, 2018 [redacted]

[1096] **(U)** Text Message, Patten to Kilimnik, May 31, 2018 [redacted]

[1097] **(U)** Text Message, Kilimnik to Patten, May 31, 2018 [redacted] In September 2018, Kilimnik offered to arrange for Patten to receive money from Lyovochkin even after Patten's work for Lyovochkin had ceased and Patten's cooperation with the Government was public. Kilimnik asked Patten about the possibility of "sending a post-factum invoice for lobbying to SL." Kilimnik further stated that SL is "ready to do it" as compensation for Patten's legal costs. Text Message, Kilimnik to Patten, September 16, 2018 [redacted]

[1098] **(U)** The political section of the Embassy in Kyiv serves as the chief point of contact between embassy officials and representatives of the host government, and reports to the Department of State on issues affecting the relationship between the United States and Ukraine, including domestic political events.

[redacted] Among the issues Kilimnik discussed with the Embassy were Lyovochkin's analysis of the Minsk Accord implementation[1099] and OB polling data.[1100] Kilimnik also worked to arrange meetings between Department of State officials and senior Ukrainian politicians, most notably Lyovochkin.[1101] Kilimnik's reporting was widely discussed within the political section, and on at least one occasion [redacted]

(U) Despite the widespread discussion and use of Kilimnik's reporting, which over the course of four years appears to have generated hundreds of pages of emails, and support for his visa applications, it is clear to the Committee that most Department of State personnel were appropriately skeptical of Kilimnik, occasionally dismissive of his reporting, and sometimes noted the need for caution when dealing with Kilimnik. Examples of the political section's skepticism of Kilimnik include:

- (U) Expressions of doubt about Kilimnik's reporting about Boris Filatov.[1104]
- (U) In March and July 2014 email exchanges, multiple officials calling into question the polling results Kilimnik was providing, and expressing concern about bias.[1105]
- (U) In September 2014, an Embassy officer suggesting to another that he needed Kilimnik's input on a subject, while noting the need to "be careful with that relationship."[1106]

[1099] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, January 21, 2016 (CDP-2017-00011G-000276).
[1100] (U) Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, February 28, 2016 (CDP-2017-00011G -000262–263); Email, Kasanof to Kyiv POL Core Section (CDP-2017-00011G-000810 –830); Email, Kasanof to Pyatt, et al., April 10, 2014 (CDP-2017-00011G-000834–836).
[1101] (U) Email, [redacted] to Kasanof, October 8, 2014 (CDP-2017-00011G-000776).
[1102] [redacted]
[1103] [redacted]
[1104] (U) Email, Purcell to [redacted] and [redacted] November 20, 2015 (CDP-2017-00011G-000300).
[1105] (U) Email, [redacted] to [redacted] and [redacted] (CDP-2017-00011G-000834) ("WTF? Of course K is going to s how [sic] us doom and gloom polls that are not in favor of the current government.").
[1106] (U) Email, [redacted] to [redacted] and LeClair, September 16, 2014 (CDP-2017-00011G-000804).

- (U) Statements by one of Kilimnik's key Embassy interlocutors, made to another Department of State official in July 2015, discussing the degree to which a third official "knows I dislike and distrust Kilimnik."[1107]

- (U) Also in July 2015, then-Ambassador Pyatt's statement "Frankly, I have zero respect for KK's advice."[1108]

(U) The Embassy's view is perhaps best summed up in an August 2014 email from an Embassy official. In that email, the Embassy official reminds other Embassy employees that they should take Kilimnik's claims "with as much salt as you think appropriate" because "KK has his own history and agenda."[1109]

[1107] (U) Email, [redacted] to [redacted] July 9, 2015 (CDP-2017-00011G-000403).
[1108] (U) Email, Pyatt to Purcell, et al., July 8, 2015 (CDP-2017-00011G-000405).
[1109] (U) Email, Purcell to Donahue, et al., August 7, 2014 (CDP-2017-00011G-001446).

B. (U) Hack and Leak

1. (U) Introduction and Findings

(U) Beginning in March 2016, officers of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate, the GRU, successfully hacked computer networks belonging to the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and the email accounts of Clinton Campaign officials and employees, including Campaign Chairman John Podesta. Over the following months, these hackers carefully established persistent access in confidential areas of the victims' systems and stole massive amounts of politically sensitive data and personal communications. The data was subsequently leaked by GRU personas and WikiLeaks at strategic moments during the 2016 election, as part of a coordinated hack-and-leak operation intended to damage the Clinton Campaign, help the Trump Campaign (the "Campaign"), and undermine the U.S. democratic process.[1110]

(U) The Committee sought to understand the nature of the Russian hacking operation, including its origins and intent. The Committee further examined the relationship between the GRU's operation and WikiLeaks, including when, how, and why WikiLeaks was provided with the hacked DNC and Podesta documents, and what it sought to achieve. The Committee also investigated the relationship between WikiLeaks and the Campaign, including the Campaign's treatment of WikiLeaks and any attempts to contact or coordinate with it.[1111]

(U) The Committee found that Russian President Vladimir Putin directed the hack-and-leak campaign targeting the DNC, DCCC, and the Clinton Campaign. Moscow's intent was to damage the Clinton Campaign and tarnish what it expected might be a Clinton presidential administration, help the Trump Campaign after Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee, and generally undermine the U.S. democratic process. The Committee's findings are based on a variety of information, including raw intelligence reporting.

[1110] (U) This conduct earned twelve GRU officers a criminal indictment from the SCO for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, committing aggravated identity theft, money laundering, and conspiracy. Indictment, *United States v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho*, Case No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ (D.D.C. July 13, 2018) (hereinafter "*Netyksho* indictment").

[1111] (U) As part of its work, the Committee reviewed a variety of information relating to the Russian hacking of the DNC, DCCC and various officials and associates of the Clinton Campaign during the 2016 U.S. election. This included intelligence community reporting relating to GRU hack-and-leak activities and Russian cyber operations more broadly; information and analysis by computer forensic experts conducting incident response at the DNC and DCCC; and information gathered during the SCO's investigation, as reflected in the *SCO Report* and the *Netyksho* indictment, as well as the 2019 criminal trial of Roger Stone.

(U) The hack-and-leak campaign was conducted by the GRU through specialized cyber units, executed using established GRU infrastructure, and planned and coordinated by GRU headquarters elements. Starting in March 2016, the GRU used spearphishing techniques to gain unauthorized access to the email accounts of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign, including Campaign Manager John Podesta, and stole thousands of emails. In April 2016, the GRU leveraged stolen credentials of some of these individuals to obtain further unauthorized access to the networks of the DNC and DCCC, where it identified and carefully exfiltrated tens of thousands of politically sensitive documents from April through June 2016.[1112] The GRU continued to conduct hacking operations to obtain additional material from accounts associated with the Clinton Campaign until at least September 2016.

(U) The GRU quickly integrated the materials it stole during its hacking operation into an influence operation that relied on two primary fake personas—Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks—to promote and disseminate the hacked documents. The influence activities using these personas spanned June 2016 through the election, and included attempts to obscure Russia's responsibility for the hacking operation.[1113] In addition to publishing the stolen documents, the Russian personas used social engineering to seed information with specific individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. The GRU also relied on U.S. social media platforms and media attention for its influence operations.

[redacted] WikiLeaks actively sought, and played, a key role in the Russian campaign and very likely knew it was assisting a Russian intelligence influence effort. The Committee found significant indications that Julian Assange and WikiLeaks have benefited from Russian government support [redacted]

[redacted]

[1112] (U) For the Committee's discussion of FBI's role in the incident response and communications with the DNC, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. IV.A.

[1113] (U) Additional attempts to obscure Russian government involvement in these activities are discussed *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.7.vi.

(U) The GRU transferred the information stolen from the Clinton Campaign and DNC to WikiLeaks, likely because WikiLeaks offered a more effective platform to disseminate stolen documents than the GRU's own organic methods. The GRU communicated with WikiLeaks using its fake personas throughout the summer of 2016. It transferred data to WikiLeaks through electronic means, and may also have transferred data to WikiLeaks through human couriers.

(U) As described in Volume 3 of this Report, the Committee notes that views on WikiLeaks remained conflicted within the U.S. Government and in the media at this time. The media also conducted its own outreach to WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and DCLeaks. Views on WikiLeaks's status only began to shift late in the summer of 2016.

(U) After receiving the GRU's materials, WikiLeaks timed its document releases for maximum political impact. WikiLeaks released the GRU-hacked materials obtained from the DNC on the eve of the Democratic National Convention. It released materials stolen from Podesta's email account starting on October 7, 2016, and continued to release Podesta's emails up until the election.

(U) While the GRU and WikiLeaks were releasing hacked documents, the Trump Campaign sought to maximize the impact of those materials to aid Trump's electoral prospects. To do so, the Trump Campaign took actions to obtain advance notice about WikiLeaks releases of Clinton emails; took steps to obtain inside information about the content of releases once WikiLeaks began to publish stolen information; created messaging strategies to promote and share the materials in anticipation of and following their release; and encouraged further theft of information and continued leaks.

(U) Trump and senior Campaign officials sought to obtain advance information about WikiLeaks through Roger Stone. In spring 2016, prior to Assange's public announcements, Stone advised the Campaign that WikiLeaks would be releasing materials harmful to Clinton. Following the July 22 DNC release, Trump and the Campaign believed that Roger Stone had known of the release and had inside access to WikiLeaks, and repeatedly communicated with Stone about WikiLeaks throughout the summer and fall of 2016. Trump and other senior Campaign officials specifically directed Stone to obtain information about upcoming document releases relating to Clinton and report back. At their direction, Stone took action to gain inside knowledge for the Campaign and shared his purported knowledge directly with Trump and senior Campaign officials on multiple occasions. Trump and the Campaign believed that Stone had inside information and expressed satisfaction that Stone's information suggested more releases would be forthcoming.

(U) In August 2016, following the Campaign's tasking, Stone obtained information indicating that John Podesta would be a target of an upcoming release, prior to WikiLeaks releasing Podesta's emails on October 7. Stone then communicated this information to Trump and other senior Campaign officials and affiliates, including Manafort and Gates. After the October 7 release, Trump, Manafort, Gates and others found Stone's information to be correct. Stone likely received this information from Jerome Corsi, who informed Stone in early August that WikiLeaks would be releasing Podesta's emails.

(U) The Committee could not reliably determine the extent of authentic, non-public knowledge about WikiLeaks that Stone obtained and shared with the Campaign. Corsi made contradictory statements about whether he acquired this information from a source or deduced it on his own. Corsi also coordinated with Stone on a cover story for Stone's information and deleted communications relating to the issue. Separately, Stone communicated with Randy Credico between August and October 2016 in an attempt to obtain advance information about WikiLeaks, but Credico denied having any non-public knowledge, despite having some connections to Assange.

(U) Obtaining Clinton-related emails was a primary focus of the Trump Campaign's opposition research effort. While it was seeking advance information about potential WikiLeaks releases, the Campaign created a messaging strategy to promote the stolen materials. When the hacked emails were released, the Campaign used the contents of the emails to attack Clinton. In addition, Trump publicly requested that Russia find and release the "missing" emails from Clinton's server, and hours later, GRU hackers attempted new spearphishing attacks against the Clinton Campaign. Trump also directed individuals in, and associated with, his Campaign to seek out Clinton's "missing" emails.[1114]

(U) Trump and the Campaign continued to promote and disseminate the hacked WikiLeaks documents, even after the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security released a joint statement officially attributing the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia as part of its interference in the U.S. presidential election. The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia, and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort.

2. (U) Limitations on the Committee's Investigation

(U) The Committee faced several limitations to its inquiry. Most importantly, several witnesses implicated in the SCO's investigation refused interviews and document production, on the basis of their Fifth Amendment rights. These witnesses included Roger Stone, Paul

---

[1114] (U) One effort to locate these "missing" emails is described *infra*, Vol. 5, Sec. L.1.

Manafort,[1115] Rick Gates, Randy Credico, and Jerome Corsi. In addition, the Committee requested but did not obtain an interview with Julian Assange. Ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions further limited the Committee's access to materials in the possession of FBI and the Department of Justice, such as the criminal cases against Roger Stone and the GRU hackers. Finally, the Committee faced limitations on its legal authorities, including the inability to compel evidence from entities outside the United States.

3. (U) Background on GRU Hacking Activities

[redacted]The GRU is one of three Russian intelligence services—in addition to the FSB and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)—that maintains an active cyber program.[redacted]

[redacted] The ICA states, with high confidence, that Putin ordered the 2016 influence campaign against the U.S. presidential election.[1121]

[1115] (U) As noted elsewhere, Manafort did agree to a limited interview on the June 9, 2016 meeting in Trump Tower.

[1116] [redacted]

[1117] [redacted]

[1118] [redacted]

[1119] [redacted]

[1120] (U) *Ibid.*

[1121] (U) NIC, "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections," January 6, 2017 (hereinafter *Declassified ICA*).

[redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

1122 [redacted]

1123 [redacted]

1124 [redacted]

1125 [redacted] Seven GRU officers belonging to Unit 26165 were charged with a conspiracy to commit computer intrusions and publicize stolen information in order to undermine and retaliate against efforts by anti-doping agencies involved in exposing Russian athletic doping programs, among other crimes. Indictment, *United States v. Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets*, No. 2:18-cr-263-MRH (W.D. Pa. October 3, 2018).

1126 [redacted]

1127 [redacted]

1128 [redacted]

1129 [redacted]

1130 [redacted]

[redacted]

- **(U)** FPN 26165 was given primary responsibility for the technical work associated with the hack-and-leak operation: hacking into the DCCC, DNC and accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign.[1132] This operation was further parceled out to specialized sub-units that separately focus on developing malware, spearphishing, and bitcoin mining.[1133]

- **(U)** FPN 74455 had primary responsibility for the influence side of the hack-and-leak operation: it assisted in the release of stolen documents, promotion of those materials, and, among others, the publication of anti-Clinton content on GRU-operated social media accounts.[1134] As described in Volume I of this Committee's Report, FPN 74455 also separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies involved in administration of U.S. elections.[1135]

- [redacted]

(U) Although the 2016 hack-and-leak campaign was by far Russia's most significant election interference operation targeting the United States, the GRU's effort was, in hindsight, a surprise but not an anomaly. It reflects a growing trend of Russia's increasing use of hack-and-leak operations over the past several years to target its foreign adversaries. In addition, many of the techniques that the GRU had honed in its earlier campaigns reappeared in 2016, although at a larger scale and with more sophistication: the use of fake personas on social media; the posting of stolen materials directly on GRU-operated websites for public consumption; and the use of specific individuals and existing outlets to push narratives about the documents that were advantageous to Russia.

[1131] [redacted] *See also* *Netyksho* indictment; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 36–37.
[1132] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 37.
[1133] **(U)** *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37.
[1134] **(U)** *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[1135] **(U)** *Ibid.* For a full discussion of Russian activities involving election infrastructure, *see* Vol. 1.
[1136] [redacted]

[redacted] The GRU has conducted [redacted] significant hack-and-leak operations around the world since 2014, including: the 2016 U.S. elections (using the personas Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks), as well as operations conducted through the personas [redacted] "Cyber Caliphate," and "Cyber Berkut."[1137] [redacted] these operations took place prior to the 2016 U.S. election interference; others occurred contemporaneously or soon afterwards:

- [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[1137] [redacted] Public reporting from the United Kingdom attributes a variety of threat actors to the GRU, including Fancy Bear, APT 28, CyberCaliphate, Cyber Berkut, and others. *See* U.K. National Cyber Security Centre, "Reckless campaign of cyber attacks by Russian military intelligence service exposed," October 3, 2018.

[1138] [redacted]

[1139] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[1140] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[1141] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[1142] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[1143] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[redacted]

4. (U) The GRU Plans and Executes the Theft of Sensitive Political Documents

(U) In March 2016, GRU hackers began a coordinated, multi-month hacking effort against email accounts and computer networks associated with the Clinton Campaign and the Democratic Party. During the intrusion, the GRU identified and stole thousands of emails and sensitive political materials that it would later release and promote through fake online personas and WikiLeaks.

i. (U) Initial Stages

(U) In March 2016, GRU hackers began using research and targeting efforts to learn about Democratic Party websites, including the domains they ultimately hacked. Among other things, the hackers conducted technical queries for the IP configurations of victim domains and to identify network-connected devices, as well as metadata associated with those devices, such as the active operating systems, with the aid of the search engine "Shodan."[1146] They also conducted open-source research to learn about the DNC network, the Democratic Party, and Hillary Clinton's campaign.[1147] These searches permitted the hackers to identify technical vulnerabilities in the potential targets, craft effective spearphishing emails, and to assess the information their expected victims might possess. All of this activity took place before the GRU had successfully gained access to the victim systems.[1148]

[redacted]

[1144] (U) *Ibid.*
[1145] (U) *Ibid.*
[1146] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 23; [redacted] Shodan is a search engine for internet-connected devices; it allows users to discover which devices are connected to the Internet, where they are located, and how they are configured. *See, e.g.*, J.M. Porup, "What is Shodan? The search engine for everything on the internet," *CSO*, October 18, 2018.
[1147] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 23.
[1148] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 37.
[1149] [redacted]

The abbreviated URL links were created by a Senior Lieutenant in Unit 26165, with the username "john356gh."[1153] and the GRU later used it to spearphish Democratic Party targets, including on March 25, 2016.[1155]

(U) Beginning on or about March 10, 2016, GRU officers sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email accounts of employees and volunteers of the Clinton Campaign.[1157] Ninety spearphishing emails were directed to accounts hosted at hillaryclinton.com.[1158] By March 15, the GRU also began targeting Google and dnc.org email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees.[1159] On April 6, the GRU successfully spearphished a DCCC employee.[1160] In total, over 300 accounts were targeted.[1161]

(U) The GRU used multiple techniques to fool recipients of its spearphishing emails. Some of the emails it sent contained a fake link purporting to let the recipient reset an account password, but in reality stole their credentials.[1162] Others, sent by a spoofed account that appeared to be from a known member of the Clinton Campaign, included a fake link purporting to direct the recipient to a spreadsheet about Clinton's ratings.[1163] GRU hackers used a URL-shortening service to obfuscate the link's malicious nature.[1164] A user who was tricked into

---

[1150] (U) *Ibid.*
[1151] (U) Bitly provides a URL-shortening service and link management platform. *See, e.g.*, www.bitly.com/pages/features/link-shortening.
[1152]
[1153] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶¶ 13, 21.
[1154]
[1155] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶¶ 13, 21.
[1156]
[1157] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 37.
[1158] (U) *Ibid.*
[1159] (U) *Ibid.*
[1160] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 24.
[1161] (U) *Ibid.*, ¶ 21.
[1162] (U) *Ibid.*
[1163] (U) *Ibid.*
[1164] (U) *Ibid.*

clicking on the links and sharing his or her credentials gave the GRU control over the accounts, including the ability to steal the accounts' contents.[1165]



(U) The most recognizable victim of this spearphishing effort was John Podesta, the chairman of the Clinton Campaign. On March 19, 2016, Podesta's account received a spearphishing email purporting to be from Google. The email claimed that someone had tried to access his Google account and recommended that he change his password immediately by using a link embedded in the email.[1166] Based on an apparent mistake by a security specialist stating that the email was "legitimate" rather than "illegitimate," Podesta's assistant clicked the link, giving GRU hackers access to the account.[1167] On March 21, 2016, within two days of first accessing Podesta's account, the GRU hackers stole 50,000 of Podesta's emails.[1168]

[1165] **(U)** *Ibid.* Pictured is a publicly-available sample of one of the spearphishing emails sent by the GRU. Eric Lipton, et al., "The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S.," *The New York Times*, December 13, 2016.

[1166] **(U)** *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 21.

[1167] **(U)** Jim Sciutto, "How one typo helped let Russian hackers in," *CNN*, June 27, 2017; Ellen Nakashima and Shane Harris, "How the Russians hacked the DNC and passed its emails to WikiLeaks," *The Washington Post*, July 13, 2018. According to media reports, the security contractor meant to respond that the spearphishing email was "illegitimate."

[1168] **(U)** *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 21.

ii. (U) Compromise of the DNC and DCCC Networks

(U) These initial compromises provided the jumping-off point for subsequent large-scale intrusions, starting with the DCCC. On April 7, 2016, the day after successfully spearphishing a DCCC employee, a GRU officer searched for technical information about the DCCC's network configurations to help identify connected devices and, presumably, vulnerabilities.[1169] The GRU then established its presence on the DCCC network on April 12, 2016, when hackers leveraged stolen credentials from the compromised DCCC employee to access the DCCC network.[1170] GRU hackers gained access to 29 computers on the network over the following weeks, including by stealing network administrator credentials through the use of keystroke loggers. The GRU compromised the network credentials belonging to at least 18 users.[1171]

(U) Once established on the network, the hackers moved quickly toward identifying and stealing politically-sensitive materials. On April 14, 2016, just days after the intrusion began, the GRU hackers installed rar.exe, a tool often used by hackers to compile and compress large amounts of data for easier exfiltration.[1172] The same day, they began to scour the system for political intelligence, using search terms like "Hillary," "Cruz," and "Trump," copying entire DCCC folders (including one labeled "Benghazi Investigations") and targeting computers that hosted opposition research and field operation plans for the election.[1173]

(U) Then, on April 18, 2016, the GRU gained access to the DNC network through a virtual private network (VPN) that connected the DNC and DCCC networks.[1174] The VPN was intended to give certain DCCC employees access to databases on the DNC network.[1175] The GRU had used malware called "X-Agent" to take screenshots and capture the key strokes of a DCCC employee who had authorization to access the DNC network.[1176]

(U) On April 19, the day after it had gained access to the DNC, the GRU established an external set of proxy computers, which the GRU referred to as the "middle servers," to interact with its malware.[1177] The GRU used these proxy servers to help mask the involvement of

---

[1169] (U) *Ibid.*, ¶ 23.
[1170] (U) *Ibid.*, ¶ 24; Crowdstrike, *Draft Incident Investigation Report, DCCC*, August 8, 2016 (hereinafter *Crowdstrike DCCC Report*), p. 6.
[1171] (U) *Crowdstrike DCCC Report*, pp. 6, 10; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 38.
[1172] (U) *Crowdstrike DCCC Report*, p. 19; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 40.
[1173] [redacted]
[1174] [redacted] *DNC Report*, pp. 5–7; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 38.
[1176] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 26.
[1177] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol I., p. 39.

Russian government actors. The "middle servers" in turn connected to a second-set of GRU-controlled computers, known within the GRU as the "AMS Panel," which the GRU used to monitor and control its malware operations.[1178] The AMS Panel, which was housed on a server in Arizona leased by the GRU, also served as a repository for data obtained via keylogging sessions.[1179] Other servers the GRU used were located elsewhere in the United States and all over the world.[1180]

(U) The GRU quickly capitalized on its access to the DNC. On April 22, it exfiltrated an initial set of documents. Between May 25 and June 1, 2016, it again accessed the mail server and stole thousands of emails and attachments.[1181] By June 8, 2016, GRU hackers gained access to over 30 computers on the DNC network, including the mail server and shared file server.[1182]

(U) Within days of establishing its network of proxy computers, the GRU had also identified relevant materials to take from the DCCC. On April 25, the hackers began collecting and compressing over 70 Gigabytes of election-related documents on the DCCC network for exfiltration, which they separated into smaller parts, likely to avoid detection.[1183] On April 28, they used additional malware known as X-Tunnel to create an encrypted connection between the DCCC computers and GRU-controlled proxy computers for secure, large-scale data transfers, and then exfiltrated the over-70 Gigabytes of compressed data to a remote, GRU-controlled server.[1184] Consistent with GRU techniques and "methods of persistence" identified by computer forensic investigators in other intrusions, the hackers again used X-Agent to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gather system data; used a lateral-movement tool called RemCom; and used Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool.[1185] The GRU also destroyed evidence of its activities by deleting logs and computer files that reflected its presence on the DNC and DCCC network, and the AMS panel.[1186]

5. (U) Russia "Weaponizes" Stolen Information with Fake Personas

(U) Shortly after gaining access to the DNC network, and months before it released any materials, the GRU prepared infrastructure to leak stolen information. Consistent with prior influence campaigns, the GRU used multiple fake personas on social media platforms—

[1178] (U) *Ibid.*, Vol I., pp. 39–40; *Netyksho* indictment, ¶¶ 24–25.
[1179] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol I., pp. 39–40; *Netyksho* indictment, ¶¶ 24–26.
[1180] (U) *See SCO Report*, Vol I., pp. 39–40; *Netyksho* indictment, ¶¶ 21, 24, 25.
[1181] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol I., pp. 40–41.
[1182] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[1183] (U) *Crowdstrike DCCC Report*, p. 6; *SCO Report*, Vol I., p. 40.
[1184] (U) *Crowdstrike DCCC Report*, pp. 6, 10; *SCO Report*, Vol I., p. 40.
[1185] (U) *Crowdstrike DCCC Report*, pp. 7, 10; *SCO Report*, Vol I., p. 38.
[1186] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 31. The GRU sought to maintain access to the DNC and DCCC networks even after it had exfiltrated these materials. *See ibid.*, ¶¶ 32–34.

including a persona known as "Guccifer 2.0" and others associated with the fake outlet "DCLeaks"—to promote and disseminate its information, including by providing content in advance to media organizations and targeted U.S. persons. This influence campaign was used to promote the stolen documents and associated narratives, push back on early attribution of the attacks to the Russian government, and create plausible deniability for individuals who sought to use the stolen information.

i. (U) GRU Operation of the DCLeaks Site and Related Personas

(U) To launch its influence operation, the GRU created a website, dcleaks.com, which was operational from June 2016 to March 2017.[1187] The GRU used this website and affiliated social media personas to promote and disseminate stolen documents from the DNC and DCCC, while obscuring the GRU's involvement in the influence campaign.

[redacted] The DCLeaks website was registered by the GRU's Unit 26165 on April 19, 2016, the day after the GRU had gained access to the DNC and before any documents had been exfiltrated from the DCCC or DNC.[1188] [redacted]

(U) DCLeaks was not the GRU's first attempt to create a fake outlet related to the U.S. election. In fact, one week prior, around the same time it had first gained access into the DCCC network, the GRU had also tried to register the website "electionleaks.com."[1190] At that time, the GRU was only in possession of stolen emails from Campaign officials and others associated with the Democratic Party, including John Podesta. This information indicates that the GRU had been anticipating a "leak" campaign while it was still in the early stages of its intrusion.

(U) The GRU launched the DCLeaks website publicly on June 8, 2016.[1191] On the website, the GRU falsely presented DCLeaks as an independent transparency-focused platform, run by Americans for Americans. For example, on its "About" page, DCLeaks stated that its "aim is to find out and tell you the truth about U.S. decision-making process as well as about the key elements of American political life." DCLeaks also claimed to be "launched by the

---

[1187] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol I., pp. 41–42.
[1188] **(U)** *Ibid.*, Vol I., p. 41. As discussed, however, the Russians had already stolen emails from John Podesta and other individuals.
[1189] [redacted]
[1190] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol I., p. 41.
[1191] **(U)** *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 36.

American hacktivists who respect and appreciate freedom of speech, human rights and government of the people"[1192]:



(U) The website offered visitors links to different sets of hacked materials, which were indexed by sender and recipient identities and contact information. The emails initially released by DCLeaks on June 8 appeared to originate from personal email accounts of Campaign employees, advisors, and volunteers, rather than the compromised DNC or DCCC networks.[1193] The GRU controlled access to document releases by password-protecting the pages it wanted to restrict, and would invite select journalists or U.S. persons to preview restricted material before it

---

[1192] **(U)** Internet Archive, Capture of dcleaks.com/index.php/about, July 20, 2016.
[1193] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol I., p. 41.

became public.[1194] The site received over one million page views before it was shut down in March 2017.[1195]

[redacted] In addition to creating a false narrative about DCLeaks, the GRU took a variety of steps to obscure the Russian government's identity as the website operator. For example, the GRU paid for the registration with bitcoin it had mined and used an anonymizing service to register the site.[1196] [redacted]

(U) In connection with its releases, the GRU created a corresponding DCLeaks Twitter account, @dcleaks_, on June 8, 2016. In doing so, the GRU hid itself behind US-based proxies. The Twitter account was registered under the Gmail address dcleaksproject@gmail.com and from an IP address that resolved to a U.S. webhosting company based in Williamsville, New York.[1198] In keeping with broader attempts to avoid attribution, the GRU used Polish and Ukrainian phone numbers.[1199] The GRU used the DCLeaks account to communicate privately with targeted individuals and organizations. From June 14, 2016, to November 8, 2016, Committee analysis of the DCLeaks Twitter account shows that it sent 259 direct messages to other Twitter accounts, including WikiLeaks and Guccifer 2.0, as further discussed *infra*.[1200]

(U) Also on June 8, 2016, the GRU used a preexisting Facebook account under the name "Alice Donovan" to create a DCLeaks Facebook page.[1201] The DCLeaks Facebook page was used to promote products on the DCLeaks website, along with other personas that purported to be administrators of the DCLeaks site, like the Donovan persona. These additional administrator personas included "Richard Gingrey" and "Jason Scott."[1202] The first activity associated with the DCLeaks Facebook page occurred on June 8, with the posting of hacked private correspondence involving NATO's approach to Russia and a link to the DCLeaks website.[1203] On June 14, the DCLeaks page posted for the first time about stolen DNC documents with a link to the DCLeaks website: "Check restricted documents leaked from Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign

---

[1194] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.
[1195] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 36.
[1196] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol I., p. 41.
[1197] [redacted]
[1198] (U) Twitter, @DCLeaks (registration information). The Committee reviewed publicly available WhoIs IP address information to identify the webhosting company.
[1199] (U) *Ibid.* Phone numbers were associated with countries based on their country codes.
[1200] (U) Twitter, @DCLeaks (direct messaging metadata).
[1201] (U) Facebook, Account ID [redacted] (DCLeaks registration information); *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 38. The Facebook ID associated with DCLeaks is [redacted]
[1202] (U) Facebook, Account ID [redacted] (DCLeaks registration information); *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 38.
[1203] (U) Facebook, Account ID [redacted] (DCLeaks post on June 8, 2016 at 13:48 UTC).

staff."[1204] This was the same day that *The Washington Post* first reported the Russian government's suspected hack of the DNC.[1205] The GRU posted additional materials to the DCLeaks Facebook page on June 14, 2016; July 11, 2016; August 3, 2016; and September 5, 15, 22, and 30, 2016, which included "status updates" and "shares" of existing media. The Facebook page itself did not appear to generate significant activity on the platform—831 engagements across all posts[1206]—suggesting that the GRU was either not well postured to, or did not focus on, distributing the hacked documents through Facebook.[1207]

(U) In a limited way, the GRU tried to bolster the DCLeaks Facebook page with other, more established GRU personas. The use of these additional personas was likely intended to generate a broader audience and lend an aura of credibility to the DCLeaks entity. However, technical information demonstrates that the accounts were all controlled by the GRU. For example, on multiple occasions, the GRU used the same IP address to log in to the different administrator accounts for DCLeaks on the same day, within minutes or hours.[1208]

- **(U)** The individual administrator accounts used to manage the DCLeaks Facebook page were created more than a year prior to the creation of the DCLeaks page. The Donovan and Gingrey accounts were both registered on January 13, 2015, from the same IP address, [redacted]—Donovan at 11:27:58 UTC and Gingrey at 11:03:54 UTC.[1209] The Scott account was registered on February 2, 2015, using IP address [redacted], which was also used to log in to the Gingrey account that same day and the Donovan account several days earlier.[1210]

- **(U)** All three administrator accounts displayed significant activity, including public postings and private messaging, well before the GRU created the DCLeaks Facebook page. For instance, Committee analysis of messaging metadata indicates that the

---

[1204] **(U)** Facebook, Account ID [redacted] (DCLeaks post on June 14, 2016 at 14:58 UTC).
[1205] **(U)** Ellen Nakashima, "Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump," *The Washington Post*, June 14, 2016.
[1206] **(U)** Facebook, Account ID [redacted] (DCLeaks page information).
[1207] **(U)** *See* Renee DiResta, Shelby Grossman, *Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014-2019*, Stanford Internet Observatory, pp. 7–8.
[1208] **(U)** Facebook, Account ID [redacted] (DCLeaks administrative logins by Donovan, Gingrey, and Scott).
[1209] **(U)** Facebook, Account IDs [redacted] (Donovan registration information), [redacted] (Gingrey registration information). The IP address resolves to the U.S. subsidiary of a multinational web hosting provider.
[1210] **(U)** Facebook, Account IDs [redacted] (Donovan login information), [redacted] (Gingrey login information), [redacted] (Scott login information).

Donovan account engaged in hundreds of chat "threads" with other individual users and groups, sending almost 1,500 private messages.[1211]

- (U) The GRU caused some of the administrator accounts to communicate with each other. For example, on March 3, 2015, the Donovan persona sent a private message to the Scott persona.[1212] It is not clear why the GRU chose to do this.

[redacted] The GRU used additional Facebook personas connected to other GRU influence operations to support the DCLeaks campaign. The GRU used one particularly active persona—"Steve Wanders"—to communicate with journalists on behalf of DCLeaks, as described *infra*. [redacted] Notably, the Alice Donovan persona began communicating with the Michael Waters persona in February 2015, and the two accounts continued to communicate until July 12, 2016, after DCLeaks went live.[1214]

[redacted] The GRU also leveraged some of these connections as social engineering techniques to gain access to other social media groups. For exampl [redacted]

(U) Despite the GRU's attempts to legitimize the DCLeaks personas and obfuscate Russian involvement, additional technical information linked the DCLeaks site to the GRU and its other interference efforts. For example:

- [redacted]

[1211] (U) Facebook, Account ID [redacted] (Donovan messaging metadata).
[1212] (U) *Ibid.*
[1213] [redacted]
[1214] (U) Facebook, Account ID [redacted] (Donovan messaging metadata).
[1215] [redacted]

[redacted]

- (U) The GRU operated the DCLeaks Twitter account, @dcleaks_, from the same computer it used for other interference efforts, including the Twitter account @BaltimoreIsWhr, which encouraged a "flash mob" and posting of images to oppose Clinton.[1219]

- (U) The GRU paid for the dcleaks.com domain using a cryptocurrency account that was also used to lease a virtual private server. That virtual private server was registered with an email address that the GRU also used to obtain the account at the URL-shortening service behind the spearphishing links.[1220]

ii. (U) GRU Operation of the Guccifer 2.0 Persona and Rebuttal of Attribution Efforts

(U) In addition to the DCLeaks persona, the GRU created and deployed a persona known as "Guccifer 2.0" to undercut attribution of the attacks to Russia and to promote and disseminate stolen data.

(U) On June 14, 2016, only six days after the DCLeaks website went public, *The Washington Post* reported that the DNC had been hacked by Russian government hackers.[1221] Dmitry Peskov, spokesperson for the Kremlin, responded immediately: "I completely rule out a possibility that the [Russian] government or the government bodies have been involved in this."[1222] Actions by the Russian intelligence services also quickly followed.

1216 [redacted]
1217 (U) *Ibid.*
1218 [redacted]
1219 (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 39.
1220 (U) *Ibid.*, ¶ 35.
1221 (U) Ellen Nakashima, "Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump," *The Washington Post*, June 14, 2016.
1222 (U) Dustin Volz and Emily Stephenson, "Russians steal research on Trump in hack of U.S. Democratic Party," *Reuters*, June 14, 2016.

(U) The next day, the GRU created a WordPress site under the Guccifer 2.0 persona and published its first blog post, entitled "Guccifer 2.0 DNC's servers hacked by a lone hacker"[1223]:



(U) In the blog post, the GRU provided a sample of hacked documents. It also sought to rebut reporting that Russia hacked the DNC and DCCC, and instead suggest that the hacks were the work of a single cybercriminal. The post read:

> *Worldwide known cyber security company CrowdStrike announced that the Democratic National Committee (DNC) servers had been hacked by "sophisticated" hacker groups.*
> *I'm very pleased the company appreciated my skills so highly))) But in fact, it was easy, very easy.*
> *Guccifer may have been the first one who penetrated Hillary Clinton's and other Democrats' mail servers. But he certainly wasn't the last. No wonder any other hacker could easily get access to the DNC's servers.*
> *Shame on CrowdStrike: Do you think I've been in the DNC's networks for almost a year and saved only 2 documents? Do you really believe it?*
> *Here are just a few docs from many thousands I extracted when hacking into DNC's network.*
> . . .
> *Some hundred sheets! This's a serious case isn't it?*
> *And it's just a tiny part of all docs I downloaded from the Democrats networks.*
> . . .
> *The main part of the papers, thousands of files and mails, I gave to Wikileaks. They will publish them soon.*

[1223] **(U)** Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/15/dnc/, June15, 2016.

I guess CrowdStrike customers should think twice about company's competence Fuck the Illuminati and their conspiracies!!!!!!!!! Fuck CrowdStrike!!!!!!!!![1224]

(U) The text of the blog post provided evidence of GRU control. As outlined by the SCO, the post included a variety of terms and phrases that GRU hackers had searched for online earlier that day from a computer used by FPN 74455, such as "some hundred sheets," "dcleaks," "illuminati," "worldwide known," "think twice about," and "company's competence."[1225]

(U) Other Russian government actors and WikiLeaks bolstered Guccifer 2.0's efforts to direct attention away from Russian responsibility. For example, Russian government media outlet RT announced: "'Guccifer 2.0' releases hacked DNC docs revealing mega donors, Clinton collusion." It continued: "This contradicts the initial DNC reports that Russia was behind the attack."[1226] WikiLeaks also publicized the release on Twitter, but not the alleged Russian involvement, stating: "DNC 'hacker' releases 200+ page internal report on Trump, says gave WikiLeaks the all [sic] rest."[1227]

(U) The Guccifer 2.0 persona released thousands of documents over the course of another 16 posts on the blog. The posts began with additional efforts to publish stolen DNC documents, combined with purported "background" information about Guccifer 2.0's alleged identity.[1228] By mid-August, the posts began to include documents stolen from the DCCC in an effort to promote a narrative that U.S. elections were "becoming a farce."[1229] As the general election neared, the GRU sought to build distrust in the democratic process, claiming that "the Democrats may rig the elections on November 8."[1230]

(U) The documents were not released randomly; rather, they were organized around specific issues or states, suggesting that the GRU had spent time reviewing and organizing the

---

[1224] (U) Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/15/dnc/, June 15, 2016 (document links and images omitted).
[1225] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶¶ 41–42.
[1226] (U) "Guccifer 2.0 releases hacked DNC docs revealing mega donors, Clinton collusion," *RT*, June 16, 2016.
[1227] (U) Tweet, @wikileaks, June 16, 2016.
[1228] (U) *See* Internet Archive, Captures of guccifer2.wordpress.com, July 31, 2017 (listing blog posts from June 18, 2016 to July 14, 2016).
[1229] (U) Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com, August 12, 2016 (under post entitled "Guccifer 2.0 Hacked DCCC," calling presidential election "a farce"); *see also* Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com, August 15, 2016 (under post entitled "DCCC Internal Docs on Primaries in Florida," calling congressional primaries "a farce").
[1230] (U) Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com, November 4, 2016 (November 4, 2016 post entitled "Info from Inside the FEC: the Democrats may rig the elections").

stolen documents and attempting to identify materials that would provoke the most interest.[1231] For example, the GRU released specific sets of DCCC documents related to races in Florida on August 15, 2016,[1232] and to races in Pennsylvania on August 21, 2016.[1233] In addition, the GRU released opposition research documents, internal policy recommendations related to politically sensitive issues, and analyses of specific congressional races.[1234]

(U) The GRU relied heavily on the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account, "@Guccifer_2," to promote postings and engage directly with media and U.S. persons, although it again used proxy accounts to hide the GRU's control. The account, which was registered on June 20, 2016, used the email address "guccifer20@gmx.us" and was connected to an Israeli phone number on June 23, 2016. The account was registered from a French IP address and administered at varying times from IP addresses across the globe.[1235] Committee analysis indicates that the account's first direct messages occurred the next day, June 21, and the GRU used the platform extensively, engaging in private, direct communications with over 1,200 unique users, involving approximately 15,000 unique messages.[1236] Analysis of the timing of the messages—often spanning every hour of the day—indicated that the account was likely administered by multiple individuals.[1237] Public reporting also suggests that the persona's syntax and language proficiency changed over the course of chats.[1238]

iii. (U) GRU Social Engineering to Promote and Disseminate Information via Third Parties

---

[1231] **(U)** Documents were posted to the Guccifer 2.0 blog on June 18, 20, and 21; July 6 and 14; August 12, 15, 21, and 31; September 15 and 23; October 4 and 18; and November 4, 2016. *See generally* Internet Archive, Captures of guccifer2.wordpress.com, June 15, 2016–January 12, 2017; *see also SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 43.

[1232] **(U)** Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com, August 15, 2016 (post entitled "DCCC Internal Docs on Primaries in Florida")

[1233] **(U)** Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com, August 21, 2016 (post entitled "DCCC Docs on Pennsylvania")

[1234] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com, August 31, 2016 (post entitled "DCCC Docs from Pelosi's PC"); Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com, September 15, 2016 (post entitled "Dems Internal Workings in New Hampshire, Ohio, Illinois, North Carolina"). Even after the election, the GRU used the persona to undermine the IC assessment attributing the influence campaign to Russia in a January 12, 2017 post. *See* Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com, January 12, 2017 (under post entitled "Here I am again, my friends," stating "The U.S. intelligence agencies have published several reports of late claiming I have ties with Russia. I'd like to make it clear enough that these accusations are unfounded. I have totally no relation to the Russian government.").

[1235] **(U)** Twitter, @Guccifer_2 (registration information and IP audit).

[1236] **(U)** Twitter, @Guccifer_2 (direct messaging metadata).

[1237] **(U)** *Ibid.*

[1238] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, "Why Does DNC Hacker 'Guccifer 2.0' Talk Like This?," *VICE*, June 23, 2016.

(U) While it was disseminating the fruits of its hacking publicly, the GRU also used its personas to contact individuals associated with the Trump Campaign and journalists interested in publicizing the materials. Although the Committee does not have access to the contents of all of these communications, select information illustrates some of the GRU's strategic outreach to and social engineering of key targets. The GRU's collaboration with established outlets and individuals appeared to be more successful at generating attention and engagement with the hacked documents than GRU attempts to promote content through fake personas.

a. (U) General Media Outreach

(U) The GRU's outreach using the Guccifer 2.0 persona focused in large part on the media. The GRU communicated publicly and privately using the Guccifer 2.0 persona, including on the WordPress blog and through Twitter direct messages.

(U) On June 22, 2016, as part of the GRU's continued effort to redirect attribution for the DNC and DCCC hacks away from Russia, the GRU posted on its blog, "Want to Know More About Guccifer 2.0?":

> *Hi All! I see many people wanna know a little more about me and ask a lot of questions. And I'm ready to tell you what you're interested in if it doesn't threaten my safety. Unfortunately I can't give personal answers to everybody. That's why I'd like journalists to send me their questions via Twitter Direct Messages. I'll post the most popular questions and answers in this blog so that everybody can read them in original and doesn't distort my words as some journalists try to do. So I'm eager to see your questions and will be glad to give my responses. My Twitter account @Guccifer_2.*[1239]

(U) After receiving the questions, the GRU posted responses on June 30 under a post entitled "FAQ From Guccifer 2.0," which reiterated its false claim that Guccifer 2.0 was an independent hacker from Eastern Europe not connected to Russia.[1240]

(U) The GRU also pursued extensive contact with targeted outlets and personalities and attempted to seed information with them.

[1239] (U) Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/22/about-guccifer2, June 23, 2016.
[1240] (U) Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/30/faq, June 30, 2016. The post also made a number of statements relating to Romanian hacker Marcel Lazer, whose moniker "Guccifer" had been adopted by the GRU for its persona. *Ibid.*

- (U) Using the Guccifer 2.0 persona, the GRU emailed *The Smoking Gun* news website on June 27, 2016, offering "exclusive access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton's staff."[1241]

- (U) The Guccifer 2.0 persona also communicated approximately 80 times with Cassandra Fairbanks, then a journalist at *Sputnik*, who later reported that Guccifer 2.0 was interested in providing documents to support a class action lawsuit against the DNC, asking "Can it influence the election in any how?"[1242]

(U) The GRU also communicated and shared stolen Florida documents with Aaron Nevins, who runs a Florida-focused political blog called "HelloFLA!" Nevins produced communications with the Guccifer 2.0 persona to the Committee. According to those records, on August 12, 2016, after the GRU released materials taken from the DCCC, Nevins suggested over Twitter direct messages that the Guccifer 2.0 persona send "any Florida based information" to his email address.[1243] On August 12, Nevins's blog also published a commentary on Florida-related documents that the Guccifer 2.0 persona had already released.[1244]

(U) The following week, on August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona messaged Nevins about additional Florida documents and sent him variety of non-public information, which Nevins began to review and publish on his blog.[1245] On September 7, the Guccifer 2.0 persona and Nevins traded additional messages over Twitter about the significance of certain materials relating to a "turnout model."[1246] For example, Nevins wrote on September 7 and 8[1247]:

[1241] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 43.

[1242] (U) Twitter, @Guccifer_2 (direct messaging metadata); Cassandra Fairbanks, "My Strange Interactions With Guccifer 2.0," *Big League Politics*, April 23, 2017.

[1243] (U) Twitter direct messages, @Guccifer_2 and Aaron Nevins, August 12, 2016 (Nevins Production, IMG_4731.png).

[1244] (U) "Guccifer 2.0 Strikes FL-18," *Mark Miewurd's HelloFLA!*, August 12, 2016.

[1245] (U) Twitter direct messages, @Guccifer_2 and Aaron Nevins, August 12, 2016 (Nevins Production); "**Exclusive! **Full DCCC Florida Docs," *Mark Miewurd's HelloFLA!*, August 22, 2016 ("Last week we posted a link to the selected Florida Congressional Primary overviews that were released by Guccifer2, the hacker who dumped the DCCC archives on the web. Earlier, he contacted us with the entire Florida Archive of 250MB! Now, you can only find this EXCLUSIVE content on HelloFLA!").

[1246] (U) Nevins explained to the Guccifer 2.0 persona that anyone with the right software could "build a list and copy their targeting" and then "[b]lunt it with mail" of their own. Twitter direct messages, @Guccifer_2 and Aaron Nevins, September 7, 2016 (Nevins Production, IMG_4744.png).

[1247] (U) Twitter direct messages, @Guccifer_2 and Aaron Nevins, September 7–8, 2016 (Nevins Production).



(U) Nevins posted about the "turnout model" as an exclusive on September 8, 2016, and shared the post with the Guccifer 2.0 persona.[1248] The GRU then shared the post with Roger Stone, as described below.

b. (U) Outreach to Roger Stone

(U) Some of the individuals the GRU targeted for outreach with the Guccifer 2.0 persona were closely associated with the Trump Campaign, such as long-time Trump advisor Roger Stone.[1249] On August 5, 2016, Stone penned an opinion piece asserting that Guccifer 2.0, not the

---

[1248] **(U)** Twitter, @Guccifer_2 (direct messaging metadata); "**Exclusive! ** Democrats Turnout Model," *Mark Miewurd's HelloFLA!*, September 8, 2016 ("It's been almost two weeks since we received an exclusive package of dcouments directly from Guccifer 2, the hacker that picked the DCCC clean of documents.").

[1249] **(U)** Roger Stone, an experienced political consultant and long-time advisor to, and sometimes friend of, Donald Trump, had worked for the Trump Campaign from approximately December 2014 to August 2015. *See* Transcript of SSCI Interview of Sam Nunberg, January 11, 2019, pp. 59–60; Indictment, *United States v. Roger Jason Stone Jr.*, 1:19-cr-00018-ABJ (D.D.C. January 24, 2019). After Stone left the Campaign, he remained in close contact with Trump and Campaign leadership throughout the remainder of the election. As described more fully below,

Russians, had hacked the DNC, and repeating the false claims made by the GRU on the Guccifer 2.0 website and Twitter account.[1250] On August 12, the GRU released DCCC records, including the cell phone numbers and email addresses of almost all Democrats in the House of Representatives through the Guccifer 2.0 persona,[1251] and tweeted publicly at Stone: "thanks that u believe in the real #Guccifer2."[1252] When Twitter then suspended the Guccifer 2.0 account, WikiLeaks complained: "@Guccifer_2 has account completely censored by Twitter after publishing some files from Democratic campaign #DCCC."[1253] Stone also tweeted at WikiLeaks and the Guccifer 2.0 persona in response to the suspension, calling it "outrageous"[1254] and referring to Guccifer 2.0 as a "HERO."[1255]

(U) On August 14, following Twitter's reinstatement of the Guccifer 2.0 account, Stone reached out to congratulate the Guccifer 2.0 persona over Twitter direct messaging, stating he was "delighted."[1256] The Guccifer 2.0 persona responded, "wow. thank u for writing back, and thank u for an article about me!!! do you find anyting [sic] interesting in the docs i posted?" [1257] On August 16, Stone requested that Guccifer 2.0 retweet a column Stone had written about how the 2016 election could be "rigged against Donald Trump"; the GRU replied "done."[1258] On August 17, the Guccifer 2.0 persona called Stone "a great man" and asked "if I can help u anyhow," explaining that "it would be a great pleasure to me."[1259] The Committee is not aware of any response by Stone.

(U) On September 9, the Guccifer 2.0 persona shared the *HelloFLA!* blog post with Stone that provided an "exclusive" report of a hacked Democratic turnout model that the GRU

Stone was tasked by Trump, through Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, to conduct outreach to WikiLeaks regarding releases of emails that would be damaging to Clinton and reported his findings back to Trump, Manafort, Gates, and others. The GRU's outreach to Stone through the Guccifer 2.0 persona occurred while Stone was actively seeking information about pending WikiLeaks releases for the Trump Campaign.

[1250] **(U)** Roger Stone, "Dear Hillary: DNC Hack Solved, So Now Stop Blaming Russia," *Breitbart*, August 5, 2016.

[1251] **(U)** Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/08/12/guccifer-2-0-hacked-dccc, August 13, 2016 (posting contact information for Democratic Representatives in the 114th Congress).

[1252] **(U)** Tweet, @Guccifer_2, August 12, 2016.

[1253] **(U)** Tweet, @wikileaks, August 13, 2016.

[1254] **(U)** Tweet, @RogerJStoneJr, August 13, 2016 ("@wikileaks @Guccifer_2 Outrageous ! . . .").

[1255] **(U)** Tweet, @RogerJStoneJr, August 13, 2016 ("Gruccifer2 [sic] is a HERO.").

[1256] **(U)** Roger Stone, "The Smoking Gun Aims, Fires, Misses," *StoneColdTruth*, March 20, 2017 (documenting messages between @RogerJStoneJr and @Guccifer_2 on August 14, 2016). The Committee confirmed the timing and completeness of the direct messages that Stone disclosed online based on metadata produced by Twitter.

[1257] **(U)** *Ibid.* (documenting messages between @RogerJStoneJr and @Guccifer_2 on August 15, 2016).

[1258] **(U)** *Ibid.* (documenting messages between @RogerJStoneJr and @Guccifer_2 on August 16–17, 2016).

[1259] **(U)** *Ibid.* (documenting messages between @RogerJStoneJr and @Guccifer_2 on August 17, 2016).

had fed to Nevins, noted above, and asked for Stone's opinion. Stone responded, "Pretty standard."[1260]

(U) The nature of these communications suggested that the GRU sought to launder and amplify its stolen information through established outlets and individuals, including by cultivating a relationship with Stone, a known close associate of Trump. This approach provided additional avenues for the GRU to spread the hacked materials to American audiences without relying solely on its websites or online personas. It also permitted the GRU to tap into individual sectors of the American public that it believed would be receptive to specific documents or information.[1261]

c. (U) Outreach to [redacted]

[redacted]

[1260] (U) *Ibid.* (documenting messages between @RogerJStoneJr and @Guccifer_2 on September 9, 2016); *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 44. The report referenced by Guccifer 2.0 to Stone was a post by Nevins about information Nevins had been provided by the GRU's persona. *See supra.*
[1261] (U) In this regard, the GRU's approach differed from the IRA's behavior, which focused more on trying to get narratives or content to go viral, as described in Volume 2.
[1262] [redacted]
[1263] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[1264] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[1265] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[1266] (U) *Ibid.*

[redacted]

That day, Mikael Thalen published an article on the InfoWars website titled "Exclusive: Dem Senator's Private Email Hacked" and subtitled "DCLeaks shows InfoWars emails of Colorado democratic senator."[1271]

[redacted]

iv. (U) Coordination and Communications Between GRU Personas

(U) The Committee found substantial technical evidence linking the GRU to the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas, and the personas to each other. As described above, the accounts used for the GRU's spearphishing attacks can be traced to the GRU's registration of the DCLeaks domain. In addition, the GRU also used overlapping infrastructure and resources to manage accounts for both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas. For example:

[1267] (U) *Ibid.*
[1268] (U) *Ibid.*
[1269] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 41–43.
[1270] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44.
[1271] (U) Mikael Thalen, "Exclusive: Dem Senator's Private Email Hacked," *Infowars.com*, October 27, 2016. Thalen reportedly refused separate outreach by the GRU through the Guccifer 2.0 persona, in which it offered documents purportedly hacked from the DNC that showed the DNC's plans to attack Paul Manafort for his Ukraine work. Max Fisher, "Russian Hackers Find Ready Bullhorns in the Media," *The New York Times*, January 8, 2017.
[1272] [redacted]
[1273] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 44.

- (U) The GRU used a pool of bitcoin to lease a server in Malaysia where it hosted the DCLeaks website.[1274]
- [redacted]
- (U) The GRU used bitcoin from the same pool to purchase a virtual private network (VPN) account that it subsequently used to administer the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account in early July.[1277]
- (U) The GRU opened this VPN account from the same server it used to register domains used as part of its hack of the DCCC and DNC.[1278]

(U) The personas also had access to each other's documents. For example, on one occasion, the Guccifer 2.0 persona provided a link and password to *The Smoking Gun* to access a closed portion of the DCLeaks site.[1279] Before doing so, however, the GRU sent the reporter an email on June 27 stating that it had "asked the DCLeaks, the WikiLeaks sub project, to release a part with a closed access" and that *The Smoking Gun* would have a couple of days before it was made available publicly.[1280] The Committee was unable to determine why the GRU chose to disseminate some of the documents through a combination of the Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks personas, which had not been otherwise linked.

(U) The GRU may have sought to portray Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks as fully independent actors. One factor supporting this hypothesis was the significant number of communications exchanged between the Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks accounts over Twitter direct messaging.

- [redacted] The first known Twitter correspondence between the two GRU personas occurred on September 15, 2016, when the Guccifer 2.0 account notified the

---

[1274] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 45.
[1275] [redacted]
[1276] (U) *Ibid.*
[1277] (U) *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 45.
[1278] (U) *Ibid.*
[1279] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 43.
[1280] (U) "Tracking The Hackers Who Hit DNC, Clinton," *The Smoking Gun*, August 12, 2016.

DCLeaks account that WikiLeaks was seeking to communicate with it through secure email.[1281] [redacted] The two accounts messaged a total of 11 times that day.[1283]

- [redacted]

- (U) The accounts exchanged a total of 45 communications from September 15 through October 18.[1285]

(U) The Committee does not have specific insight into why the GRU chose these particular occasions to communicate over a medium known to be accessible to U.S. law enforcement. It may have done so to plant false evidence that the accounts were not linked, or to help the accounts appear more authentic.

6. (U) Russia and WikiLeaks Coordinate On Interference in the U.S. Election

(U) In addition to disseminating hacked materials through its own personas, the GRU gave information to WikiLeaks as part of a joint effort to secure wider distribution of stolen DNC documents and John Podesta emails. WikiLeaks opted to release those materials, first on July 22 and later on an ongoing basis between October 7 and the election. WikiLeaks also actively solicited and then released the documents for maximum effect, despite mounting evidence that they had been stolen by Russian government hackers. Notably, this was not the first instance that WikiLeaks had taken actions for the purpose of harming U.S. interests. Nor is it the only instance of contact between the Russian government and WikiLeaks, which have a history of parallel and sometimes coordinated actions in attacking U.S. institutions.

i. (U) Background on WikiLeaks

(U) Since its emergence in 2010, WikiLeaks has directed its efforts toward publishing a variety of information normally legally restricted from public disclosure. A disproportionate number of WikiLeaks disclosures have targeted the United States and benefited U.S.

[1281] (U) *SCO Report*, pp. 46–47; Twitter, @Guccifer_2, @dcleaks_ (direct messaging metadata).

[1282] [redacted]

[1283] (U) Twitter, @Guccifer_2, @dcleaks_ (direct messaging metadata).

[1284] [redacted]

[1285] (U) Twitter, @Guccifer_2, @dcleaks_ (direct messaging metadata); *SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 46–47. Contacts between the GRU and WikiLeaks are described further below.

adversaries.[1286] Although WikiLeaks seeks to portray itself as a legitimate media organization, its disclosures have jeopardized the safety and privacy of individual Americans and foreign allies because WikiLeaks has made only minimal, and sometimes no efforts to redact sensitive information, and does not seem to weigh whether its disclosures add any public interest value.[1287] While WikiLeaks has systematically targeted the United States in this way, the Committee has identified no corresponding pattern with respect to leaks targeting Russia or its allies. As noted below, WikiLeaks has also coordinated the transfer of restricted information to U.S. adversaries, and encouraged and aided the violation of U.S. law to secure access to classified documents. As a result, WikiLeaks and its senior leadership "resemble a non state hostile intelligence service often abetted by state actors."[1288]

[redacted] The Committee is unaware of information of comparable volume and sensitivity that WikiLeaks has solicited or released about any

[1286] (U) Jo Becker, et al., "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets," *The New York Times*, August 31, 2016 ("[A] New York Times examination of WikiLeaks activities during Mr. Assange's years in exile found a different pattern: . . . WikiLeaks' document releases, along with many of Mr. Assange's statements, have often benefited Russia, at the expense of the West.").
[1287] (U) For example, the indictment of Julian Assange alleges how WikiLeaks knowingly published classified documents about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars without redacting the names of local sources who had reported information and were vulnerable to retribution. *See* Indictment, *United States v. Julian Assange*, Case 1:18-cr-00111-CMH, ¶¶ 39–44 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2019) ("*Assange* indictment"). A former WikiLeaks staffer has described another occasion when WikiLeaks published a large cache of documents that had no newsworthiness without applying any redactions to protect the identities of "activists, opposition politicians, bloggers in autocratic regimes and their real identities, victims of crime and political coercion, and others driven by conscience to speak to the US government." James Ball, "Why I felt I had to turn my back on WikiLeaks," *The Guardian*, September 2, 2011.
[1288] (U) National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, P.L. 116-92, Section 6747, December 20, 2019.
[1289] [redacted]
[1290] (U) *Ibid.*
[1291] (U) *Ibid.*

other national government, including authoritarian and oppressive regimes with substantial records of human rights and civil liberties violations.

- **(U)** WikiLeaks has passed information to U.S. adversaries, including approximately 90,000 U.S. Department of State cables to a Russian national named Israel Shamir. Shamir in turn provided them to Belarus's Aleksandr Lukashenko, an authoritarian leader who relied on the documents to justify the arrest of opposition figures on allegations of spying for the United States.[1292]

- [redacted] Julian Assange has said that he focuses his efforts on the United States because it is the world's "superpower."[1293] A former colleague of Assange has described his work as a "one-dimensional confrontation with the U.S.A.,"[1294] and emails [redacted] probably [redacted] drafted by Assange reflect his ambition to "bring down" the United States with leaks.[1295] The WikiLeaks website previously stated that WikiLeaks "aim[s] for maximum political impact."[1296]

[redacted] Of particular not [redacted]

ii. (U) Russia's Strategic Support for and Partnership with WikiLeaks

(U) The Russian government has pursued a relationship with Julian Assange and WikiLeaks that includes formal partnerships with state-owned media platforms, government assistance for WikiLeaks associates and sources, and information sharing. This relationship has existed since at least 2012 and reflects an alignment between the Russian government and WikiLeaks in seeking to undermine U.S. institutions and security.

(U) RT (formerly Russia Today) has provided both beneficial coverage of WikiLeaks and a formal, compensated media platform for Assange. RT first signed a contract with Assange

---

[1292] **(U)** *Ibid.*; James Ball, "Why I felt I had to turn my back on WikiLeaks," *The Guardian*, September 2, 2011.
[1293] [redacted] Julian Assange, *Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet*, November 2012.
[1294] **(U)** "WikiLeaks Spokesman Quits," *Speigel Online*, September 27, 2010 (interview with Daniel Schmitt).
[1295] [redacted] *see* Cryptome.org (leaking email dated December 29, 2006, stating "sufficient leaking will bring down many administrations that rely on concealing reality – including the US administration").
[1296] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, Internet Archive, Capture of wikileaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:About, February 24, 2009.
[1297] [redacted]

in 2012 for ten shows, which aired as "The World Tomorrow."[1298] In August 2013, RT's editor-in-chief, Margarita Simonyan, visited Assange in the Ecuador Embassy in London to renew the contract.[1299] Following the meeting, Russian media quickly touted RT as "the only Russian media company" to establish a relationship with WikiLeaks and receive "new leaks of secret information," indicating that a Russian government-run propaganda outlet could be the ultimate beneficiary of classified WikiLeaks materials.[1300]

[redacted]

(U) The alliance between RT and WikiLeaks is part of the Russian government's overall strategy to use its state-controlled media to undermine U.S. democratic institutions. The declassified January 2017 ICA states that RT and Sputnik (formerly The Voice of Russia and RIA Novosti)[1303] acted as part of "Russia's state-run propaganda machine" during Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. elections. The declassified ICA observes that RT "conducts strategic messaging for [the] Russian government" and "seeks to influence politics, [and] fuel discontent in the U.S."[1304] As a result of their ties to the Russian government, the Department of Justice directed the production companies for both RT (T&R Productions LLC) and Sputnik

---

[1298] **(U)** "Exclusive TV series hosted by Julian Assange to premiere on RT in March," *RT*, January 25, 2012; Internet Archive, Capture of worldtomorrow.wikileaks.org, April 15, 2012.
[1299] **(U)** *Declassified ICA*, p. 3.
[1300] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1301] [redacted]
[1302] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1303] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, Jim Rutenberg, "RT, Sputnik and Russia's New Theory of War," *The New York Times*, September 13, 2017.
[1304] **(U)** *Declassified ICA*, p. 3.

(RIA Global) to register as foreign agents under FARA.[1305] Both have complied, despite their claims that they exercise editorial independence from the Russian state.[1306]

[redacted] Putin has publicly acknowledged that RT "is funded by the government, so it cannot help but reflect the Russian government's official position."[1307] But the connections are far more malignant. For example, the Kremlin staffs RT with individuals who are ideologically aligned with Russian messaging and supervises its coverage.[1308] [redacted] Aleksey Gromov is also one of RT's founders and Simonyan, who is considered his protégé, has publicly stated that she has benefited from his protection.[1310] [redacted]

[1305] (U) RT has sought to distance itself formally from Russian government control through contractual financing and production arrangements, in part to avoid FARA registration requirements. *See Declassified ICA*, Annex A, p. 12. In its FARA filings, T&R Productions identified ANO TV-Novosti as its foreign principal and represented that RT's shows are produced "pursuant to various commercial agreements with ANO (autonomous non-profit organization) TV-Novosti." TV-Novosti is financed by the Russian government and organized under Russian law. *See* T&R Productions LLC, Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, and Exhibits, November 10, 2017. Separately, RIA Global filed its registration identifying the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency—a government-owned news agency—as its foreign principal. RIA's shows are also governed by a contractual arrangement with its principal. *See* RIA Global LLC, Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, and Exhibits, February 16, 2018.

[1306] (U) In May 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida agreed with the Department of Justice's position that RM Broadcasting also acts as an agent of the Russian state-owned Rossiya Segodnya and must register as such under FARA. This ruling marked the first civil enforcement action concerning Russian state-owned media. According to the evidence, RM entered into an agreement with Rossiya Segodnya to broadcast "Sputnik" radio programs, but RM could not alter the programs in any way. As a result, the agreement gave Rossiya Segodnya direction and control over all RM content. *See RM Broadcasting v. United States*, Case No. 9:18-cv-81418 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2019).

[1307] (U) "Putin talks NSA, Syria, Iran, drones in RT interview," *RT*, June 12, 2013.

[1308] (U) *Declassified ICA*, Annex A, p. 9.

[1309] [redacted]

[1310] (U) *Declassified ICA*, Annex A, p. 9.

[1311] [redacted] For more on Gromov, *see, e.g., infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.C.5.b.

[1312] [redacted]

(U) Other incidents illustrate close alignment between WikiLeaks and Russia in opposing U.S. interests:

- (U) WikiLeaks and Russian government talking points have closely mirrored each other. In April 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks criticized the release of information in the Panama Papers as a "Putin attack [that] was produced by OCCRP which targets Russia & former USSR and was funded by USAID & Soros,"[1313] a frequent refrain in Russian state-sponsored influence operations.[1314] Putin echoed this two days later, stating: "WikiLeaks has showed us that official people and official organs of the US are behind this."[1315]

- (U) In 2010, after Assange was arrested in England for questioning by Swedish authorities on rape allegations, Putin made statements supportive of Assange. Putin has also referred to the charges against Assange as "politically motivated" and that Assange was being "persecuted for spreading the information he received from the U.S. military regarding the action of the U.S.A. in the Middle East, including Iraq." In 2011, the Kremlin issued Assange a Russian visa.[1316]

- (U) Throughout the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, RT and Sputnik used their social media accounts to push WikiLeaks-related content that disparaged Hillary Clinton. On at least two occasions, RT announced WikiLeaks releases on Twitter prior to WikiLeaks making that announcement itself.[1317]

- [redacted] or instance, in 2013, WikiLeaks personnel assisted in securing asylum for Edward Snowden from the Russian government

[1313] (U) Tweet, @wikileaks, April 5, 2016. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit investigative platform focused on exposing crime and corruption, funded in part by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State.

[1314] (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.7.vi.

[1315] (U) Alan Luhn and Luke Harding, "Putin dismisses Panama Papers as an attempt to destabilise Russia," *The Guardian*, April 7, 2016.

[1316] (U) Jo Becker, et al., "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets," *The New York Times*, August 31, 2016.

[1317] (U) *See, e.g.*, Tweet, @RT_com, October 19, 2016 ("BREAKING: @wikileaks releases fresh batch of emails from Clinton campaign chair #podestaemails"); Tweet, @RT_com, October 17, 2016 ("BREAKING: @wikileaks releases more emails from Clinton campaign chair #Podesta10"); Tweet, @RT_com, October 15, 2016 ("MORE: @wikileaks uploads new batch of 1,000 emails from Clinton's campaign chair #Podesta"); Tweet, @RT_com, October 13, 2016 ("#BREAKING: #WikiLeaks releases 6th #Podesta #email batch on.rt.com/7rtd #PodestaEmails6"). RT has suggested that it was merely monitoring the WikiLeaks website closely and that it posted on Twitter as soon as documents appeared on the website.

and accompanied him in the Moscow airport while he was awaiting the asylum decision.[1318] [redacted]

In an interview with *DemocracyNow!*, Assange said that he "advised Edward Snowden, that he would be safest in Moscow."[1320]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted] the Russian government has offered indirect means of support that provided Assange with a valuable platform. For example, in April 2012, RT purchased a broadcasting license for Assange's show, "The World Tomorrow," shortly after funding for WikiLeaks reportedly began "drying up."[1324]

[redacted] The Committee observed that Assange received multiple visits at the Ecuador Embassy in London from RT employees during the summer of 2016. Nikolay Bogachikhin, RT's London bureau chief, visited the Embassy twice in early June. He was followed by Afshin Rattansi, another RT journalist, who visited Assange three more times that month, as well as [redacted], both affiliated with RT, in August

---

[1318] (U) Sara Corbett, "How a Snowdenista Kept the NSA Leaker Hidden in a Moscow Airport," *Vogue*, February 19, 2015.

[1319] [redacted]

[1320] (U) Jo Becker, et al., "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets," *The New York Times*, August 31, 2016.

[1321] [redacted]

[1322] [redacted]

[1323] [redacted]

[1324] (U) Jo Becker, et al., "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets," *The New York Times*, August 31, 2016.

2016.[1325] RT has claimed that these visits reflected its participation in a WikiLeaks Brexit special, and had nothing to do with WikiLeaks activities relating to the U.S. presidential election.[1326]

iii. (U) WikiLeaks's Record of Opposition to Hillary Clinton

(U) In the early parts of the 2016 election, before WikiLeaks had received hacked materials from the GRU, Assange expressed his opposition to Hillary Clinton's candidacy. He did so in private communications and in public announcements, and WikiLeaks took actions to insert itself into the U.S. 2016 elections by publishing a searchable archive of Clinton emails that it believed would encourage the submission of election-related leaks.

(U) As early as November 19, 2015, in a Twitter group chat, WikiLeaks repeatedly disparaged Clinton's prospects as president,[1327] stating, among other things:

- (U) "We believe it would be much better for [the] GOP to win."[1328]
- (U) "She's a bright, well connected, sadistic sociopath."[1329]
- (U) "Hence hillary has greater freedom to start wars than the GOP and has the will to do so."[1330]

(U) Publicly, Assange also argued against Clinton's candidacy based on his perception of her U.S. defense and national security views.[1331] In an August 31 interview with *The New York Times*, Assange referred to Clinton as a "demon that is going to put nooses around

---

[1325] [redacted] Stephanie Kirchgaessner, et al., "Assange's guest list: the RT reporters, hackers and film-makers who visited the embassy," *The Guardian*, May 18, 2018; Marshall Cohen, "Exclusive: Security reports reveal how Assange turned an embassy into a command post for election meddling," *CNN*, July 15, 2019.

[1326] (U) Stephanie Kirchgaessner, et al., "Assange's guest list: the RT reporters, hackers and film-makers who visited the embassy," *The Guardian*, May 18, 2018.

[1327] (U) The contents of these chats are described in the *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 44, and were also publicly released online at emma.best/2018/07/29/1100-messages-from-private-wikileaks-chat-released/.

[1328] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 44.

[1329] (U) *Ibid.*

[1330] (U) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 45.

[1331] (U) Tweet, @wikileaks, February 11, 2016 (""#Assange: Hillary Clinton gets an unseemly emotional rush out of killing people"); Tweet, @wikileaks, February 10, 2016 ("#Assange: Hillary Clinton shouldn't be let near a gun shop, let alone an army"); Tweet, @wikileaks, February 9, 2016 ("#Assange: A vote today for Hillary Clinton is a vote for endless, stupid war").

everyone's necks as soon as she wins the election."[1332] His statements echoed his March 2016 opposition in the private Twitter chat that "HC [Hillary Clinton] in whitehouse with her bloodlutt [sic] and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees."[1333]

(U) On March 16, 2016, shortly after the GRU began its spearphishing campaign, WikiLeaks also began publishing a searchable archive of Clinton emails that had already been publicly released by the U.S. Department of State in response to a FOIA request.[1334] The archive included over 30,000 emails and attachments sent to or from Clinton between June 2010 and August 2014, but did not include any previously non-public information. According to one WikiLeaks associate, while part of the goal was to "become 'the place' to search for background on hillary's plotting at the state department," creating the archive would also allow WikiLeaks to "be seen to be a resource/player in the US election, because eit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks."[1335]

iv. (U) Coordination Between the GRU and WikiLeaks on the Release of Hacked Documents

(U) In June 2016, following the GRU's initial releases of stolen documents, WikiLeaks and the GRU personas exchanged the first of their many Twitter direct messages. These initial contacts eventually led to a coordinated release of documents on the eve of the 2016 Democratic National Convention and later on the heels of the October 7 publication of the *Access Hollywood* tape.[1336] As described below, the GRU used both DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 personas to communicate with WikiLeaks, using private Twitter direct messaging, as well as encrypted channels, possibly including the email of encrypted files and WikiLeaks's private communication system.[1337] The GRU transferred the hacked DNC materials to WikiLeaks electronically by July 18, 2016. As discussed *infra*, the GRU may have transferred the hacked John Podesta emails, either electronically or via a human courier, in or about mid-September, although the precise timing is unclear.

[1332] **(U)** Kelsey Sutton, "Julian Assange: American press supports 'demon' Hillary Clinton," *Politico*, August 31, 2016.

[1333] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 45.

[1334] **(U)** *See* "Hillary Clinton Email Archive," wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/.

[1335] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 45.

[1336] **(U)** At approximately 4:00 p.m. that day, *The Washington Post* released a video tape of Trump discussing grabbing women by their genitals during a hot mic during a conversation with Billy Bush of *Access Hollywood* (the "*Access Hollywood* tape"). David Farenthold, "Trump recorded having extremely lewd conversation about women in 2005," *The Washington Post*, October 8, 2016.

[1337] **(U)** It is unclear why the personas would have used Twitter to connect with WikiLeaks, given the readily available and more secure alternatives. However, Andrew Muller-Maguhn, a close associate of Julian Assange, has suggested that Assange "lives on Twitter" and a direct message is the only reliable way to contact him. *See* Ellen Nakashima, et al., "A German hacker offers a rare look inside the secretive world of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks," *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2018.

(U) The GRU's decision to use WikiLeaks to release documents was [redacted]. The IC assesses, with high confidence, that "the GRU relayed material it acquired . . . to WikiLeaks," and that Putin ordered the 2016 influence campaign against the U.S. presidential election.[1338]

[redacted]

However, the Committee found significant evidence to suggest that, in the summer of 2016, WikiLeaks was knowingly collaborating with Russian government officials [redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]

[1338] (U) *Declassified ICA*, pp. 1, 3. [redacted]

[1339] [redacted]

[1340] [redacted]

[1341] [redacted]

[1342] [redacted] there was substantial public information describing the likely Russian government role in hacking the DNC emails. Reporting by victims, cyber security firms, and news organizations beginning in June 2016 attributed the hack and related influence activities by DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 as Russian-government backed activity. In one notable example, on July 26, 2016, *The New York*

a. (U) Communications and Transfer of Data Related to the DNC Release

(U) On June 12, 2016, Julian Assange gave an interview on ITV indicating publicly—and for the first time that summer—that WikiLeaks would be releasing materials on Hillary Clinton. During the interview, he claimed that WikiLeaks had "emails related to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication."[1343] Days later, on June 14, DCLeaks reached out to WikiLeaks on Twitter direct message:

> *You announced your organization was preparing to publish more Hillary's emails. We are ready to support you. We have some sensitive information too, in particular, her financial documents. Let's do it together. What do you think about publishing our info at the same moment? Thank you.*[1344]

(U) WikiLeaks did not respond on Twitter.[1345] But on June 15, the day after *The Washington Post* published the first article detailing suspected Russian hacking of the DNC, the GRU's Guccifer 2.0 persona referenced WikiLeaks in its first blog post, claiming that it had given "thousands of files and mails" stolen from the DNC to Wikileaks, which would "publish them soon."[1346] That day, Guccifer 2.0 emailed some of the stolen documents to two websites, *Gawker* and *The Smoking Gun*, and stated that the materials sent to WikiLeaks included "election programs, strategies, plans against Reps, financial reports, etc."[1347]

Times reported that "American intelligence agencies have told the White House they now have 'high confidence' that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the Democratic National Committee." David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, "Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C.," *The New York Times*, July 26, 2016. Assange would have been aware of the ongoing commentary on Russian involvement, as demonstrated by his public statements deflecting such attribution. Open-source research, which was widely reported at the time, also identified technical indicators of Russian involvement in the documents that were being released by those two personas. These indicators included unique code and Russian language in the metadata for the hacked documents. *See, e.g.*, Dan Goodin, "'Guccifer' leak of DNC Trump research has a Russian's fingerprints on it," *ArsTechnica*, June 16, 2016. Further, on October 7, prior to WikiLeaks releasing Podesta's stolen emails, the U.S. Government publicly attributed the hack-and-leak effort to Russia's intelligence agencies. *See* DHS, ODNI, Joint Statement on Election Security, October 7, 2016.

[1343] (U) "Assange on Peston on Sunday: 'More Clinton Leaks to Come,'" *ITV.com*, June 12, 2016. It remains unclear what emails Assange was referring to. For example, he could have been referring to Clinton emails released by the Department of State under FOIA that WikiLeaks had been collecting and publishing on its website in March 2016. *See supra.* The Department of State was producing Clinton emails under FOIA throughout 2016. *See* foia.state.gov/search/collections/aspx.

[1344] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 45.

[1345] (U) *See* Twitter, @wikileaks and @dcleaks_ (direct messaging metadata).

[1346] (U) Internet Archive, Capture of guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/15/dnc/, June 15, 2016.

[1347] (U) Sam Biddle and Garbrielle Bluestone, "This Looks Like the DNC's Hacked Trump Oppo File," *Gawker*, June 15, 2016; "DNC Hacker Releases Trump Oppo Report," *The Smoking Gun*, June 15, 2016.

(U) As discussed below, the GRU transferred hacked materials to WikiLeaks on or about July 14, 2016, approximately one month after this June 15 blog post. The Committee could not determine if the GRU also transferred hacked DNC materials prior to June 15, as it represented in that blog post and as Assange's comments seem to suggest.[1348]

(U) Judging from the timing and content of numerous Twitter direct messages, it took several weeks for the GRU to transfer the hacked DNC materials to WikiLeaks, and the two parties appeared to encounter a number of technical difficulties in exchanging the materials.

(U) On June 22, after the Guccifer 2.0 persona had posted three additional sets of DNC documents to its WordPress site on June 18, 20 and 21, WikiLeaks reached out to Guccifer 2.0 via Twitter. In a direct message, WikiLeaks asked Guccifer 2.0, "Do you have secure communications?" and suggested that Guccifer 2.0 "[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing."[1349] The two accounts exchanged seven additional messages that day over Twitter, including further discussion about establishing secure communications, such as through the use of a program for exchanging encrypted information known as "GPG," and messages about the materials WikiLeaks claimed to possess already.[1350] The two exchanged eight more messages on June 24 and June 27: on June 24, they discussed the use of the messaging service "Jabber," and WikiLeaks provided instructions on how to send it an email with an encrypted message, including a key to encrypt the message; later, on June 27, Guccifer 2.0 wrote to WikiLeaks that it had sent "an email with a text message encrypted and an open key," and it was "waiting for ur response."[1351] On June 29, the GRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send a large encrypted file to a WikiLeaks email account, which appeared to be unsuccessful.[1352]

[redacted]

(U) On July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks contacted Guccifer 2.0 again through a Twitter direct message and instructed: "if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic] days prefable [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters

---

[1348] (U) On June 17, shortly after the Guccifer 2.0 blog post, WikiLeaks posted an 88-gigabyte encrypted file, "Torrent WIKILEAKS INSURANCE 2016-06-03," purporting to "protect our coming publications." Tweet, @wikileaks, June 17, 2016. The contents of the file are unknown to the Committee and may have no relation to the 2016 election, but the timing and reference to "coming publications" are suggestive.

[1349] (U) Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, Case 1:17-mj-00821, November 11, 2017, ¶ 22.

[1350] (U) *Ibid.*

[1351] (U) *Ibid.*, ¶¶ 23–24; Twitter, @Guccifer_2 (direct messaging metadata).

[1352] (U) According to the *SCO Report*, the email did not appear to have been delivered. *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 46.

[1353] [redacted]

behind her after."[1354] Guccifer 2.0 responded: "ok . . . i see."[1355] WikiLeaks went on to explain: "we think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary . . . so conflict between bernie and hillary is interesting."[1356] WikiLeaks also wrote: "[W]e think the public interest is greatest now and in early [O]ctober."[1357] The accounts exchanged a total of 82 messages that day alone.[1358] Although again the Committee does not know the content of all of the communications, the Guccifer 2.0 persona messaged WikiLeaks that, among other things, it had sent "yesterday, an archive of about 1 gb. via [website link]," to which WikiLeaks later responded, "Please don't make anything you send to us public. It's a lot of work to go through it and the impact is severely reduced if we are not the first to publish it."[1359] On July 7, the GRU asked WikiLeaks whether it had "another way [besides email] to receive large volumes of data" because a GRU email containing "a check archive from another email box" had not been successfully delivered.[1360] The GRU sent WikiLeaks another eight messages on July 11, 2016, including one message that the GRU had "sent it via ur submission."[1361]

(U) On July 14, the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to email WikiLeaks an encrypted attachment with the file name "wk dnc link1.txt.gpg."[1362] The subject of the email stated "big archive" and the message body said "a new attempt,"[1363] suggesting that previous efforts to share the data through other channels had failed. On the same day, Guccifer 2.0 and WikiLeaks exchanged Twitter direct messages once again, during which the GRU sent WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on opening it.[1364]

[redacted]

[1354] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 45.
[1355] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1356] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1357] **(U)** Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, Case 1:17-mj-00821, November 11, 2017, ¶ 31.
[1358] **(U)** Twitter, @Guccifer_2 (direct messaging metadata).
[1359] **(U)** Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, Case 1:17-mj-00821, November 11, 2017, ¶ 26. Some of the Guccifer 2.0 messages discussed documents it was trying to share with WikiLeaks that related to Brexit.
[1360] **(U)** *Ibid.*, ¶ 33.
[1361] **(U)** *Ibid.*, ¶ 34.
[1362] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 46. The file extension "gpg" indicates that the file was encrypted using GNU Privacy Guard, which is an open-source analog of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption.
[1363] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1364] **(U)** *Ibid.* The GRU advised WikiLeaks, "Check ur email. sent u a link to a big archive and a pass." Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, Case 1:17-mj-00821, November 11, 2017, ¶ 35.

(U) On July 18, WikiLeaks confirmed receipt to the Guccifer 2.0 persona via Twitter, stating that it had "the 1Gb or so archive" and would be releasing the files "this week."[1366] The accounts exchanged another 29 messages that day.[1367] Among other things, WikiLeaks also asked Guccifer 2.0 if it had "any bigger datasets" and whether it had received "our fast transfer details," and suggested that WikiLeaks had taken the step of "arrang[ing] that server just for that purpose" presumably referring to the transfer of more data. The two entities then discussed the optimal timing for the GRU to transfer the remainder of its documents; whereas WikiLeaks pushed for the data transfer to happen soon, the GRU seemed reluctant to do so before WikiLeaks had released the initial tranche of DNC information, advising "i'll ponder it."[1368]

(U) The DNC emails were released four days later, on July 22, 2016, three days before the July 25 Democratic National Convention. WikiLeaks released 19,252 emails and 8,034 attachments obtained from seven email accounts at the DNC. The emails covered the period of January 2015 through May 25, 2016, the first date that the GRU exfiltrated data from the DNC email server.[1369] The Trump Campaign's awareness of and reaction to the release is discussed *infra*.

(U) After the July release, Assange left no doubt that his intention was to influence the election with the DNC information. For example, on July 29, 2016, Assange gave an interview to *CNN* and agreed that the release was timed for "maximum impact," further stating "that's when we knew that there would be maximum interest by readers."[1370] He also gave an interview to *DemocracyNow!* stating that the release was handled differently than normal "because of the pending D[emocratic] N[ational] C[onvention]."[1371]

[1365] [redacted]

[1366] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 46.

[1367] (U) Twitter, @Guccifer_2 (direct messaging metadata).

[1368] (U) Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, Case 1:17-mj-00821, November 11, 2017, ¶¶ 35–36.

[1369] (U) *See* www.wikileaks.org/dnc-emails/; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 40–41. The SCO noted that "the last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May 25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DN's email server." *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 41.

[1370] (U) Anderson Cooper 360, " Julian Assange: We have more material on Clinton," *CNN*, July 29, 2016.

[1371] (U) "EXCLUSIVE: WikiLeaks' Julian Assange on Releasing DNC Emails That Ousted Debbie Wasserman Schultz," *DemocracyNow!*, July 25, 2016 ("Often it's the case that we have to do a lot of exploration and marketing of the material we publish ourselves to get a big political impact for it. But in this case, we knew, because of the pending DNC, because of the degree of interest in the U.S. election, we didn't need to establish partnerships . . . we took the data set, analyzed it, verified it, made it in a presentable, searchable form, presented it for all journalists and the public to mine.").

b. (U) Communications and Transfer of Data Related to the Podesta Release

(U) WikiLeaks did not release additional hacked documents relating to the 2016 U.S. election until October 7, 2016, when it began a month-long process of leaking stolen Podesta emails. The Committee, like the SCO, was unable to determine precisely when and how the GRU transferred the hacked John Podesta emails to WikiLeaks. Communications between WikiLeaks and GRU personas, coupled with forensic analysis of documents, suggest that at least some Podesta emails could have been transferred as late as September 2016.[1372] Information reviewed by the Committee, detailed below, further suggests the GRU may have transferred the Podesta emails using encrypted email or, alternatively, by human courier.

(U) Communications between the GRU's DCLeaks persona and WikiLeaks provide some indications that the GRU used the DCLeaks persona to transfer data in the lead up to the Podesta release. On September 15, the DCLeaks persona reached out to WikiLeaks on Twitter:

> *hi there! I'm from DC Leaks. How could we discuss some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via your secured chat but getting no response. I've got something that might interest you. You won't be disappointed, I promise.*[1373]

After having seemingly ignored the prior Twitter messages, WikiLeaks responded, "Hi there."[1374] No additional communications occurred on Twitter that day between DCLeaks and WikiLeaks.[1375]

(U) However, later on the same day, Guccifer 2.0 messaged the DCLeaks persona, also over Twitter, that "WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails."[1376] This was the first of many Twitter messages between the two

---

[1372] (U) However, Assange was hinting publicly about additional releases between July 22 and mid-September, suggesting that he could have been aware of additional content that had already been secured by the GRU and would be provided to him or, alternatively, that he may have had already acquired some content that he intended to release. For example, in an August 24, 2016 interview, Assange discussed soon-to-be-released information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. Kelly File, "Assange: WikiLeaks to release 'significant' Clinton material," *Fox News*, August 24, 2016.

[1373] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 46.

[1374] (U) *Ibid.*

[1375] (U) Twitter, @wikileaks, @dcleaks_ (direct messaging metadata). The Committee does not know if the GRU and WikiLeaks communicated in other ways around this time.

[1376] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, pp. 46–47.

GRU-controlled accounts, as discussed above.[1377] The message indicates that WikiLeaks suspected Guccifer 2.0 could assist it in communicating with DCLeaks.

(U) On September 19, 2016, DCLeaks and WikiLeaks exchanged further Twitter messages. Thereafter, on September 22, the GRU used a DCLeaks email account (dcleaksproject@gmail.com) to send an email to WikiLeaks. The subject line of the email was "Submission" and the body of the message stated "Hi from DCLeaks," and it included a PGP-encrypted message with the file name "wiki_mail.txt.gpg." Although this file resembled the one previously shared by the GRU with WikiLeaks on July 14, 2016, using the Guccifer 2.0 persona, the contents and attributes of the file are unknown. On the same day, the DCLeaks Twitter account sent a string of characters to the WikiLeaks account that was potentially a password to access a file archive it had made available.[1378]

(U) Some evidence suggests that the GRU transferred the Podesta emails to WikiLeaks either via this encrypted email or through other means during the same time frame. Forensic data from the stolen Podesta emails showed a creation date of September 19, 2016, in the midst of these exchanges.[1379] According to Ecuador Embassy officials, Assange had access to Apple desktop and laptop computers inside the Embassy.[1380] Based on an assessment by the SCO of the Apple operating systems possibly running on Assange's computer, this could reflect the date the GRU staged the stolen emails for transfer to WikiLeaks, because the default setting on some Apple operating systems retains the file creation date of a downloaded file from the original host computer.[1381] Although some of the attachments and files showed a later creation date of October 2, 2016, that actually appears to reflect the date that attachments were staged individually on the WikiLeaks site.[1382]

(U) As sophisticated actors, WikiLeaks and the GRU were almost certainly aware that their emails and Twitter messages were in plain text and could be obtained by U.S. law enforcement.[1383] WikiLeaks had specifically requested that they communicate in an encrypted

---

[1377] (U) Twitter, @dcleaks_, @Guccifer_2 (direct messaging metadata).
[1378] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 47.
[1379] (U) *Ibid.*
[1380] [redacted]
[1381] (U) *Ibid.*
[1382] (U) *Ibid.* The timing of this staging indicates that WikiLeaks was prepared to release emails as promised by October 3, and therefore also prepared to release emails quickly on October 7, as discussed *infra*.
[1383] (U) For example, on August 23, 2016, in response to question from *The Smoking Gun* about Guccifer 2.0 persona's contact with Stone, the GRU wrote from the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account: "the fbi's tracing me, reading my dm [direct messages] and giving u hints." William Bastone, "Roger Stone's Russian Hacking 'Hero,'" *The Smoking Gun*, March 8, 2017.

channel. In addition, the GRU had very likely used direct messaging between the Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks personas to mask the hand of the Russian government.[1384] Despite this, both WikiLeaks and the GRU used unencrypted emails and U.S. providers to communicate. This behavior raises the possibility that both parties expected the messages to be read by U.S. authorities, exchanged these messages in order to mislead investigators, and in fact chose to transmit the data in a different way.

(U) For example, it is also possible that files were transferred to WikiLeaks by individuals who visited Assange in person. Assange, who was residing at the time at the Ecuador Embassy in London, had frequent visitors in the summer and fall of 2016. Several individuals of note stood out [redacted].

- [redacted] One of these visitors, Andrew Müller-Maguhn, a German national, supporter of WikiLeaks and founding member of the hacker collective Chaos Computer Club,[1385] [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted] In addition, [redacted] other WikiLeaks associates, including Assange's two assistants, visited him multiple times per week, although [redacted].[1388]

[redacted]

[1384] (U) *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.B.5.iv.
[1385] (U) Ellen Nakashima, et al., "A German hacker offers a rare look inside the secretive world of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks," *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2018.
[1386] [redacted]
[1387] (U) *Ibid.*
[1388] [redacted]







[redacted]

[redacted] Müller-Maguhn had also visted Assange on July 28.

[redacted]

(U) Andrew Müller-Maguhn admitted to reporters that once, in 2016, he transported a flash drive containing what he believed (but could not be certain) were personal messages to Assange, but did not identify the sender. He also did not identify when this occurred. However, he asserted in that article that he was never in possession of the hacked emails before they were posted, and never transported them.[1419]

v. (U) WikiLeaks Promotes Alternative, False Theories About the Source of the GRU Materials

(U) Assange and WikiLeaks undertook efforts to obscure the source of the stolen emails, including through false narratives. Assange's use of such disinformation suggests Assange possibly knew of and sought to hide Russian involvement. One narrative from Assange involved a conspiracy theory that Seth Rich, a DNC staffer killed in a botched robbery, was the source of the DNC email leak and had been murdered in response. On August 9, Assange gave an interview on Dutch television implying that Rich was the source of the DNC emails,[1420] and that day WikiLeaks announced that it would be issuing a reward for information about Rich's murder.[1421] In a subsequent interview, Assange commented about the WikiLeaks interest in the Rich case as concerning "someone who's potentially connected to our publication."[1422] The Committee found that no credible evidence supports this narrative.

(U) Assange also attempted to rebut criticism that WikiLeaks does not release documents critical of or damaging to Russia. For example, on September 19, 2017, WikiLeaks released 35 internal documents from a Russian IT company that services Moscow's wiretap system.[1423] The existence and nature of the system was already well known to Russian and American researchers and was not assessed to be damaging to Russia.[1424] Nonetheless, Assange

---

[1418] (U) *Ibid.*
[1419] (U) Ellen Nakashima, et al., "A German hacker offers a rare look inside the secretive world of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks," *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2018. The Committee did not interview Müller-Maguhn.
[1420] (U) "Interview of Julian Assange," *Nieuwsuur*, August 9, 2016 ("I am suggesting that our sources take risks.").
[1421] (U) Tweet, @wikileaks, August 9, 2016.
[1422] (U) "Assange: 'Murdered DNC Staffer Was Potential WikiLeaks Source,'" *Fox News*, August 25, 2016 (video of Assange interview). WikiLeaks also issued a vaguely-worded statement that did not confirm or deny whether Rich was a source. *See* Tweet, @wikileaks, August 10, 2016.
[1423] (U) *See* https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/russia/.
[1424] (U) Adam Taylor, "WikiLeaks releases files that appear to offer details of Russian surveillance system," *The Washington Post*, September 19, 2017.

complained that U.S. media had not paid sufficient attention to the release.[1425] The timing and limited nature of this release is consistent with indications that WikiLeaks knowingly aided the Russian 2016 election influence campaign.

(U) In 2017, Assange also promised to provide evidence to then-Congressman Dana Rohrabacher that Russia was not his source, but only in exchange for protection from U.S. authorities. Rohrabacher had been "told by a number of experts that it was impossible" for the DNC data "to have been sucked out of the machine and hacked back to Russia." Rather, Rohrabacher believed it had been "someone on the inside who downloaded it with some sort of quick download."[1426] Rohrabacher, convinced that "the Russians were now being accused of something they didn't do," instead "felt like [he] needed to go see how [he] could prove that one way or the other" by speaking with Assange.[1427] The meeting took place in the Ecuador Embassy on August 16, 2017,[1428] and was also attended by Charles Johnson, a conservative political activist who helped Rohrabacher set up the meeting,[1429] and Assange's lawyer.[1430]

(U) According to Rohrabacher, Assange "made it very clear to me that he was saying that the Russians did not do it" and "he had proof" of who was responsible.[1431] In exchange, Assange wanted an "assurance"—whether in the form of a pardon or otherwise—that he would not be taken into custody when he left the Ecuador Embassy.[1432] Rohrabacher promised to "go back to the White House and see if we can arrange something where you won't be arrested."[1433] He then attempted but was "not permitted" to speak to Trump on the subject, and told the Committee that he did not communicate again with Assange about the potential deal.[1434] The Committee found no evidence to support Rohrabacher's theories or Assange's claims.[1435]

7. (U) Efforts to Capitalize on WikiLeaks, Gain Advance Information on Releases

---

[1425] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, Tweet, @wikileaks, January 26, 2019 (replying to @MeetThePress and linking to "Spy Files Russia").
[1426] **(U)** SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Dana Rohrabacher, December 19, 2017, pp. 8, 18–19.
[1427] **(U)** *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
[1428] [redacted]
[1429] **(U)** Rohrabacher Tr., p. 11.
[1430] **(U)** *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[1431] **(U)** *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[1432] **(U)** *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.
[1433] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1434] **(U)** *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20. Rohrabacher said that then-White House Chief of Staff John Kelly was "concerned any conversation with myself and the President on this issue might be declared obstruction of justice." *Ibid.* p. 19.
[1435] **(U)** CrowdStrike's forensic analysis of the DNC computers also reflected that there were no USB entries. *See generally* Crowdstrike, *DNC Report*. Sean Henry testified that CrowdStrike did not detect any threat actors other than "the two Bears." SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Sean Henry, October 5, 2017, p. 82.

(U) While the GRU and WikiLeaks were coordinating the release of hacked DNC, DCCC, and Podesta documents, Trump and senior Campaign officials sought information relating to "missing" Hillary Clinton emails as part of the Campaign's opposition research and press strategies. Beginning in April or May 2016, Roger Stone repeatedly conveyed to Trump and senior Campaign staff that WikiLeaks would be releasing information damaging to Clinton. After the July 22 WikiLeaks release, Trump and senior Campaign officials believed Stone had access to non-public information about WikiLeaks's ability and intent to release emails harmful to Clinton.

(U) Thereafter, Trump directed Campaign officials to stay in touch with Roger Stone about future WikiLeaks activities regarding Clinton-related emails. Manafort in turn tasked Stone to contact Julian Assange, and Stone endeavored to reach Assange through several intermediaries. Stone reported back to senior Campaign officials and associates, and to Trump directly, and provided advance information about another expected release relating to John Podesta, which he said would be damaging to Clinton. After WikiLeaks published the Podesta emails on October 7, Trump and the Campaign believed Stone had again acquired accurate, non-public information. The Committee could not reliably trace the provision of non-public information from WikiLeaks to Stone, and as a result could not evaluate the full scope of Stone's non-public knowledge of WikiLeaks's activities.

(U) The Trump Campaign strategically monitored and promoted the WikiLeaks releases of John Podesta's emails from October 7 until the election. The Campaign tried to cast doubt on the October 7 joint DHS/ODNI assessment formally attributing the activity to Russia, and was indifferent to the significance of acquiring, promoting, or disseminating materials from a Russian intelligence services hack-and-leak campaign.[1436]

i. (U) The July 22 WikiLeaks DNC Release

(U) In the spring of 2016, the Trump Campaign's opposition research team primarily focused on Clinton's "missing" emails, and financial contributions to the Clinton Foundation.[1437]

[1436] (U) In contrast to the Campaign's decision, other lawmakers refused to engage in such exploitation of the stolen material. For example, in an October 2016 interview, Senator Marco Rubio said that he would "not discuss any issue that has become public solely on the basis of WikiLeaks," noting that "these leaks are an effort by a foreign government to interfere with our electoral process, and I will not indulge it." Jonathan Karl and Benjamin Siegel, "Exclusive: Rubio Won't Talk About WikiLeaks, and Neither Should Donald Trump," *ABC News,* October 19, 2016.

[1437] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/10/2018. The Committee assesses that, at this time, the references to Clinton's "emails" reflected a focus on allegedly missing or deleted emails from Clinton's personal server during her tenure as Secretary of State. As described *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.L.1, there was parallel effort to obtain Clinton's "missing" emails by Peter W. Smith and Barbara Ledeen, both of whom had a connection to the Trump Campaign through Flynn.

In April and May, the Campaign's interest in the Clinton emails increased as the Campaign became convinced that public interest in the emails could benefit Trump's chances to win.[1438] According to Rick Gates, Trump Jr. would ask where the Clinton emails were during "family meetings," regularly-scheduled meetings of senior Trump Campaign officials and Trump family members.[1439] Other senior advisors, including Flynn, Kushner, Manafort, Lewandowski, then-Senator Jeff Sessions, and Campaign policy advisor Sam Clovis also expressed interest in obtaining the emails.[1440]

(U) Around the same time, in approximately May 2016, Roger Stone alerted Rick Gates and Paul Manafort that WikiLeaks would be releasing information about Clinton, but provided no details about the timing.[1441] Stone had known Trump for years and had served as an advisor to the Trump Campaign from late 2014 until approximately August 2015. Although Stone no longer had a formal position on the Campaign at this time, the Campaign "still had people he knew," including Trump, Gates, Paul Manafort, and (later) Steve Bannon, and Stone "had the ability to access these people."[1442] Stone stayed in close communication with the Campaign. In April and May 2016, Stone and Gates had approximately 67 phone calls; during the same time period, Stone and Manafort spoke by phone approximately 64 times, and Stone also spoke 67 times with Trump donor Erik Prince.[1443]

(U) Manafort also recalled hearing from Stone sometime in June 2016 that "a source close to WikiLeaks confirmed that WikiLeaks had the emails from Clinton's server."[1444] Like Gates, Manafort recalled Stone telling him that the emails would be released "soon," but Stone

---

[1438] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/10/2018.
[1439] **(U)** *Ibid.* The existence and nature of the "family meetings" are further described in connection with the June 9 2016 meeting, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.C.5.
[1440] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/10/2018.
[1441] **(U)** Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, pp. 921, 928; FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018. Gates also said at trial that Stone may have passed him this information as early as April 2016. Gates, who pleaded guilty to various offenses and false statements, has been consistent in his statements about Stone conveying this information. For example, Gates also told the SCO in a debriefing that he recalled Stone saying to both him and Manafort, at least a couple of weeks prior to June 12, 2016, that this information would be released. *See* FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/18. The *SCO Report* similarly states: "Before Assange's June 12 announcement, Gates and Stone had a phone conversation in which Stone said something 'big' was coming and had to do with a leak of information." *SCO Report*, p. 52. Stone's comments occurred after WikiLeaks created a searchable archive in March 2016 of Clinton Department of State emails that were released pursuant to a FOIA request, but these emails were part of a set that had already been made public. *See* wikileaks.org/elinton-emails/.
[1442] **(U)** Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, pp. 920–921. Although Bannon did not take a formal position on the Campaign until August 2016, Stone spoke with him several times across March, April, July, and August 2016. *See* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1443] **(U)** *United States v. Roger Stone*, Gov. Ex. 167 (summary chart of Stone/Campaign phone calls); AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1444] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

"did not know when."[1445] Manafort, who was not convinced that the documents were coming out, directed Gates to check in with Stone "from time to time" to see if his WikiLeaks information remained "real and viable."[1446]

(U) Although Manafort did not identify a precise date for his June conversation with Stone about WikiLeaks, phone records reflect six phone calls between the two during that month, including on June 4, June 12, June 20, and June 23.[1447] According to Manafort's Campaign calendar, Manafort and Stone were scheduled to meet in person at 12:30 p.m. on June 23 in the Trump Tower cafeteria for 30 minutes.[1448] The Committee received no further information about the purpose of the meeting.[1449] Nonetheless, phone records and calendar entries depict a pattern of communication involving Manafort, Gates, and Stone. Phone records for June and July reflect a total of 28 calls between Gates and Stone and a total of 18 between Manafort and Stone, including those described below.[1450] From early June to the July 22 WikiLeaks release, Manafort and Gates both called to ask Stone when the release would happen and Stone repeated that the information was coming.[1451]

(U) In one call during that period, Stone also told Gates that the WikiLeaks information could be from the Russians. However, Gates did not recall Stone suggesting a connection between WikiLeaks and Russia. Gates also thought that Stone could have based his theory of Russian involvement on publicly available information.[1452]

(U) According to Gates, Stone was the only person conveying this information to the Campaign at the time,[1453] and he did so before WikiLeaks began publicizing its access to Clinton documents on June 12.[1454] On June 12, Julian Assange gave an interview in which he said that WikiLeaks was planning to release information on Hillary Clinton.[1455] The Trump Campaign

---

[1445] (U) *Ibid.*

[1446] (U) Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, p. 932; *see also* FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1447] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.

[1448] (U) *See* Daily Schedule for Paul Manafort, June 23, 2016 (DJTFP00022874).

[1449] (U) Kushner testified that he was not aware of the meeting. *See* Kushner Tr. II, p. 58. Gates recalled accompanying Manafort to an in-person meeting with Stone in either April or May 2016, but it is unknown whether this is the same meeting that Gates recalled. *See* FBI, FD-302, Gates 3/1/2018.

[1450] (U) *United States v. Roger Stone*, Gov. Ex. 167 (summary chart of Stone/Campaign phone calls); AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures. The Committee was able to identify relevant calls in Stone's phone records based on open source information, document production from other witnesses, as well as a factual stipulation and other evidence entered in the *United States v. Roger Stone* trial.

[1451] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1452] (U) *Ibid.* According to Gates, Stone floated the "inside job" theory at a later point in time.

[1453] (U) Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, p. 921.

[1454] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1455] (U) *See* "Assange on Peston on Sunday: 'More Clinton leaks to come,'" *ITV.com*, June 12, 2016 (stating WikiLeaks had "upcoming leaks in relation to Hillary Clinton .... We have emails pending publication.").

was elated by the news about WikiLeaks's plans, which it considered an unexpected "gift."[1456] Gates said that the Campaign believed the comments had to do with missing Clinton emails, and Manafort said that Stone got "half credit" because Stone's prediction had been corroborated.[1457] However, some in the Campaign were uncertain that WikiLeaks had these materials because Stone had been making representations about WikiLeaks "for so long" and there was no other evidence of the emails being released.[1458]

(U) The day after Assange's announcement, Stone emailed Gates to schedule a call for "guidance on many things."[1459] They spoke that evening for 20 minutes.[1460] Gates said that one of the issues Stone needed "guidance" on was WikiLeaks.[1461] He did not say exactly what guidance he provided.

(U) On June 14, 2016, only two days after Assange's interview, the DNC announced that it had been compromised by Russian government hackers.[1462] That evening, at 9:03 p.m., Stone called Trump at Trump's home number.[1463] Trump returned Stone's call from his cell phone two times, at 9:53 p.m. and 9:56 p.m.: the calls lasted about two-and-a-half minutes and two minutes, respectively.[1464] The Committee does not know the substance of these conversations, but the pattern and timing of Stone's calls with Trump and others during this period suggest that the two could have discussed the DNC hack and WikiLeaks.

(U) Campaign leadership reacted positively to the news that the DNC had been hacked by the Russians. Gates described the reaction in part as "disbelief," but also given "what we were told that information might be about," the Campaign "felt it would give [them] a leg up" if released.[1465]

[1456] **(U)** Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, p. 927.
[1457] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.
[1458] **(U)** Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, p. 927.
[1459] **(U)** Email correspondence between Roger Stone and Rick Gates, June 13, 2016, *United States v. Roger Stone*, Gov. Ex. 21.
[1460] **(U)** *See* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1461] **(U)** Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, pp. 928–929.
[1462] **(U)** Ellen Nakashima, "Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research on Trump," *The Washington Post*, June 14, 2016.
[1463] **(U)** *See United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 148; AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1464] **(U)** *Ibid.* The calls from Trump were made from a blocked number, which the Committee was able to identify as Trump's based on corresponding information admitted as evidence in the trial against Roger Stone. Trump's use of a blocked number generally made it difficult for the Committee to identify all of the pertinent contacts between the two. The blocked number was likely Trump's cell phone; other Trump Org. phones, including Trump's direct line, appeared in both the Stone and Trump Org. records that the Committee obtained.
[1465] **(U)** Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, pp. 928–929. This—and a variety of other information the Committee found relating to the Campaign's interest in the hacked materials—is in contrast to what

(U) In response to the Assange announcement, Stone's information, and presumably the news of the DNC hack, the Campaign planned a "press strategy, a communications campaign, and messaging based on the possibility the emails existed," and conversations were held "about what the campaign could plan for in the way of emails."[1466] Before WikiLeaks had released any materials, Trump was reportedly frustrated that the Clinton emails had not been found.[1467] Michael Cohen, Trump's personal attorney and longtime confidant, recalled Trump commenting: "I wonder where they are. Somebody's got to have them."[1468] Cohen described Trump as "obsessed . . . the same way he was obsessed with finding Barack Obama's birth certificate."[1469]

(U) Just after midnight on June 16, Stone and Gates discussed the DNC hack by phone.[1470] Hours earlier on June 15, the GRU had released for the first time, through the Guccifer 2.0 persona, documents stolen from the DNC, as described above. During the over-30-minute call, Stone told Gates that "more information would be coming out of the DNC hack."[1471] Stone then requested contact information from Gates for Jared Kushner, in order to "brief" Kushner on WikiLeaks documents.[1472] Gates then sent Kushner's contact information to Stone.[1473] Kushner told the Committee: "I have only met Roger Stone once in my life, and I shook his hand briefly during the transition, and I never met him before that."[1474]

(U) Because Manafort was initially dubious that Stone had accurate information about WikiLeaks, he instructed Stone "not to tell Trump until they could confirm it." Manafort said

---

some witnesses claimed to the Committee: that the hack had no immediate impact on the Campaign. For example, Bannon said the releases were a "non-event." Bannon Tr., pp. 169–170.

[1466] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/11/2018. The Committee did not determine exactly when the messaging strategy began, but it predated the July 22 WikiLeaks release of DNC documents. For example, Trump and the Campaign were already focused on Clinton emails prior to the release, the Campaign had already been in contact with Stone about a potential release, and Assange had already suggested he had Clinton emails. Gates estimated that it took place in the June/July 2016 time frame, as the Campaign began to anticipate a release of information. FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1467] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018. As described elsewhere in this Report, there were various lines of unsuccessful efforts to locate the "missing" emails from Clinton's server by various individuals with ties to the Campaign.

[1468] (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 8/7/2018.

[1469] (U) *Ibid.*

[1470] (U) Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, pp. 930–931; Text messages, Stone and Gates, June 15, 2016, *United States v. Roger Stone*, Gov. Ex. 20 ("Call me. Important.").

[1471] (U) Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, pp. 930–931; AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.

[1472] (U) Testimony of Richard Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, pp. 931–932; Emails, Stone and Gates, June 13, 2016, *United States v. Roger Stone*, Gov. Ex. 22.

[1473] (U) Emails, Stone and Gates, June 13, 2016, *United States v. Roger Stone*, Gov. Ex. 22.

[1474] (U) Kushner Tr., p. 98. In its limited review, the Committee did not identify any calls with the one known Kushner number in Stone's cell phone records.

that he wanted to keep Trump focused on speeches and meeting members of Congress, not distracted "by the titillation of a WikiLeaks release."[1475] But while Manafort claimed that he was reluctant to tell Trump and cautioned Stone against doing so, Stone could—and did—contact Trump directly, as Stone did on June 14. In addition, Manafort believed Stone would have told Trump anyway because he "wanted the credit for knowing in advance."[1476]

(U) Witness testimony and documentary evidence support that Stone spoke to Trump about the WikiLeaks information prior to its release. Gates was aware that Stone called Trump during the campaign.[1477] Cohen similarly noted that "Stone called Trump all the time," and "could call Trump's cell phone, especially if at night."[1478] Trump himself acknowledged that he "spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign."[1479]

(U) Though the records obtained by the Committee are limited, they show numerous phone calls throughout June and July between Trump and Stone.[1480] In addition to the June 14 phone call, Stone received brief calls from a Trump Organization number on June 21 and 28,

---

[1475] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018. Gates also suggested that Manafort tried to keep conversation about Stone's claims minimal because Manafort thought people would lose faith in him if they knew information was coming from Stone. FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1476] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/18. In fact, Stone had remained actively involved with the Campaign long after he had been fired, and was involved in getting Manafort hired. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.5.i. Lewandowski testified: "When Mr. Manafort came to the campaign Mr. Stone had renewed access to the campaign. He and Paul spent a considerable amount of time on the phone together discussing strategy. I believe Paul would allow him on conference calls that Roger really had no business being on. He wasn't part of the team, but Roger was there." Lewandowski Tr., p. 127.

[1477] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1478] (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 8/7/2018.

[1479] (U) *SCO Report*, Appendix C, pp. C-18–19.

[1480] (U) According to Stone's cell phone call records and call records from the Trump Organization, in addition to records obtained by the SCO, Trump and Stone had multiple calls in June and July 2016, all before the July 22 release, either between Stone and Trump or Stone and another Trump Organization phone number. *See generally* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures; Trump Corp., Outbound Call Detail, Invoices of July 1, 2016–August 1, 2016 (TRUMPORG_73_000005–8); *United States v. Roger Stone*, Gov. Ex. 167 (summary chart of Stone/Campaign phone calls). These data points only represent what the Committee could confirm from Stone's cell phone call records and Trump Organization document productions, as supplemented by information presented by the United States in the trial against Roger Stone. In addition, the Trump Organization used a "trunk line" system, so its records reflected outgoing calls to Roger Stone from a central line, but did not identify the individual or extension making the call and did not include incoming calls at all. *See* Email, Trump Organization to Committee, April 9, 2019. However, the Committee could infer from witness testimony and contemporaneous communications that calls made by Stone to Trump Org. numbers other than Trump's direct line generally reflected communications or attempted communications from Stone to Trump. For example, Tom Barrack noted that Trump "was easily accessible" through his assistant, Rhona Graff, "who Roger knew well." Barrack Tr., p. 45. In addition, multiple witnesses testified that it was commonplace for Trump to make and receive calls on others' phones, records for which the Committee does not possess. For example, Trump may have tried to hide his communications with Stone from campaign advisors by using others' phones, such as Keith Schiller's. Nunberg Tr., p. 73.

although these calls did not appear to connect.[1481] Shortly after the June 28 call, Stone called Michael Cohen for nine minutes.[1482] On June 30 (another day that Guccifer 2.0 posted commentary online), Stone called Rhona Graff's line at the Trump Organization for eight minutes.[1483] Later that same day, he traded missed calls with Trump at various numbers, culminating in a four-minute call from Stone to Trump's direct line.[1484] Any of these calls would have provided Stone with an opportunity to share additional information about WikiLeaks directly with Trump, and given the content of his conversations with Manafort and Gates combined with Trump's known interest in the issue, the Committee assesses he likely did.

(U) Still, some senior Campaign officials the Committee interviewed claimed to have no knowledge of these communications, and the Campaign sought to distance itself publicly from Stone.[1485] For instance, Jared Kushner said he "never saw [Trump] speak with [Stone]" and "never saw [Stone] around at anything," so he did not think "there was too much involvement in the campaign in any way."[1486] Others appeared to minimize Stone's influence. Bannon—who joined the Campaign later on—insisted that Stone had "no engagement" with the Campaign while Bannon was involved, and that he was not aware of any communications between Stone and Trump during that time.[1487] However, phone records reflect at least three calls between Stone and Bannon after Bannon had joined the Campaign, suggesting Bannon was himself was later in contact with Stone about Campaign issues.[1488]

(U) In addition to working with Stone, in late June, the Trump Campaign was searching for "noteworthy" DNC documents that had been posted by the GRU under the Guccifer 2.0 persona.[1489] At the time, WikiLeaks had not released any hacked DNC documents. Nonetheless, an internal Campaign email regarding use of the mid-June DNC document releases by Guccifer

---

[1481] **(U)** Trump Corp., Outbound Call Detail, Invoice of July 1, 2016 (TRUMPORG_73_000006).
[1482] **(U)** AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00032); *see also* AT&T Mobility, Cohen phone records (number ending in [redacted]
[1483] **(U)** AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00033).
[1484] **(U)** *See ibid.*; Trump Corp., Outbound Call Detail, Invoice of July 1, 2016 (TRUMPORG_73_000007); *United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 148.
[1485] **(U)** *See* Email, Hicks to O'Neill, August 8, 2016 (DJTFP00023443) (asserting that "Roger is not affiliated with the campaign"); *see also* SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Boris Epshteyn, November 30, 2018, p. 137 ("Roger Stone was not a player as far as any of us was concerned.").
[1486] **(U)** Kushner Tr., pp. 104–105.
[1487] **(U)** Bannon Tr., pp. 150–151.
[1488] **(U)** *See* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures. Some of these calls took place in August, shortly after Bannon became Campaign CEO. Records indicate Stone and Bannon had been in touch prior to that point as well. On September 7, 2016, Stone and Bannon texted to arrange a meeting, and Bannon asked Stone if he could "come by trump tower now?" Affidavit in Support of an Application for a Search Warrant, Case 1:18-sc-00662, March 14, 2018, ¶ 32.
[1489] **(U)** Email, Mashburn to Perdue and Barrow, June 18, 2016 (DJTFP00003429) ("Re: 2nd DNC Dump from hacker," noting that he was looking for "anything noteworthy folks higher up should know?").

2.0 foreshadowed the Campaign's approach to WikiLeaks. Before downloading the newest batch of Guccifer 2.0 emails and "sending them to the team," a Campaign staffer asked if "Senate or campaign rules preclude us from possessing data that's been hacked from a third party and distributed via the internet."[1490] John Mashburn, the Policy Director for the Trump Campaign, replied: "I don't see a problem. Just like WikiLeaks material."[1491]

(U) Nonetheless, a possible WikiLeaks release appeared central to the Campaign's strategic focus. For example, after the June 12 announcement by Assange, Gates described learning from Manafort that the RNC was "energized" by the potential of a WikiLeaks release. Further, Manafort told Gates that the RNC was going to "run the WikiLeaks issue to ground."[1492] Trump and Kushner were reportedly willing to "cooperate" with the RNC's efforts on this front, overcoming their earlier skepticism of working with the RNC, and demonstrating that both were focused on the possibility of WikiLeaks releasing Clinton documents.[1493]

(U) Witness testimony indicates that Stone may have raised WikiLeaks again to Trump in late July, shortly before the DNC release occurred. Although Manafort did not know whether Stone and Trump spoke about WikiLeaks that week, he assumed they did.[1494] Michael Cohen recalled overhearing a phone call from Stone in Trump's office on what he believed was the 18th or 19th of July. As recalled by Cohen:

> *I was sitting in Mr. Trump's office when Rhona Graff yelled out: "Mr. Trump, Roger Stone on line 1." And as the way Mr. Trump's habit is, he doesn't use the handset of the phone. He uses a little black box. A speaker box that [he] maintains on his desk. And without telling Roger Stone that I was in the office, Mr. Trump hit the power button and Roger Stone responded: "Mr. Trump," he said. "Roger, how are you?" He says: "Good, I just want to let you know I got off the telephone a moment ago with Julian Assange. And in a couple of days, there's going to be a massive dump of emails that's going to be extremely*

[1490] (U) Emails, Perdue and Mashburn, June 18, 2016 (DJTFP00029314) (discussing "2nd DNC dump from hacker").

[1491] (U) *Ibid.*; *see also* Email, Perdue to Mashburn, Gordon, et al., June 18, 2016 (DJTFP00029316) (distributing documents stolen from DNC and released by Guccifer 2.0).

[1492] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/10/2018. Gates also said that the RNC "indicated they knew the timing of the upcoming releases," but did not convey who specifically had this information, how it was acquired, or when. The RNC has denied that it had advance knowledge of the timing of WikiLeaks releases.

[1493] (U) *Ibid.* It is not clear to the Committee exactly when the notion of cooperation between the RNC and the Campaign arose, and Kushner never mentioned it in any interviews with the Committee. However, the context of these statements suggests that this was in response to early warnings about a pending WikiLeaks document dump and before the July 22 release occurred. The Committee did not examine the RNC's activity or its interactions with the Campaign on this topic.

[1494] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

damaging to the Clinton campaign." Mr. Trump said: "Uh, that's good. Keep me posted." To which point, after they hung up, Mr. Trump looked at me and he said to me: "Do you believe him? Do you think Roger really spoke to Assange?" And I responded: "I don't know. Roger is Roger, and for all you know, he was looking on his Twitter account. I don't know the answer."[1495]

(U) The limited records reviewed by the Committee did not reflect a call from Stone's known cell phone to a Trump-associated number on either of those days, which conflicts with Cohen's testimony.[1496] However, the Committee cannot rule out the possibility that either Stone or Trump used alternative numbers.[1497] The Committee did not obtain the phone records for Stone's residences in Florida or New York, or records reflecting the transmission or receipt of text messages. In addition, the Committee did not seek to obtain the phone records for Trump's cell phone, which Stone could sometimes call.[1498]

(U) However, Stone's phone records show that Keith Schiller placed a five-minute call to Stone on the afternoon of July 17, 2016.[1499] Witnesses said that Trump often used Schiller's phone to hide his communications. For example, Sam Nunberg recalled Stone commenting in the late 2015 to early 2016 time frame that Trump would call Stone from Keith Schiller's phone because he did not want his advisors to know they were talking.[1500]

(U) In June and July 2016, prior to the release of DNC materials by WikiLeaks, the Campaign worked on a "messaging strategy" based on "the possible content of an upcoming release.[1501] Gates described the effort as "brainstorming sessions" to determine what the Campaign would say if materials—including the 33,000 "missing" Clinton emails—were released.[1502] Manafort was involved in creating the strategy, as were Gates, Stephen Miller, and

---

[1495] (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 7–8

[1496] (U) *See generally* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.

[1497] (U) In addition, as previously noted, the Trump Org. system did not record incoming calls, according to counsel.

[1498] (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 8/7/2018.

[1499] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures. This call—likely made by or on behalf of Trump—appeared to take place before Michael Cohen's flight from Rome, Italy (Alitalia Flight 602) had landed at New York's JFK International Airport, suggesting that he would not have been present for this call. *See* DHS, TECS Person Encounter List, Cohen (CBP000006).

[1500] (U) Nunberg Tr., pp. 73–74. Michael Cohen described other reasons that Trump would use Schiller's phone. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.C.3.iv.

[1501] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/11/2018.

[1502] (U) Testimony of Rick Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, p. 934; FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

Jason Miller.[1503] Among other things, the strategy included a focus on Clinton's perceived low-level of trustworthiness and her emails.[1504]

(U) On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released and publicized 20,000 emails the GRU had stolen from the DNC.[1505]

(U) After the July 22 release, Trump and his Campaign immediately pivoted to leveraging the WikiLeaks documents. Gates recalled that Manafort "express[ed] excitement" about the release.[1506] On the afternoon of July 22, Manafort and Trump discussed how they could use the DNC emails relating to Debbie Wasserman Schultz.[1507] Although Manafort was confused by Stone's prediction, which was that WikiLeaks had emails from "Clinton's server," whereas the document released that day came from the DNC, he still used the "fact of the hack and the substance of the emails" to attack Clinton and deflect attention from Trump's comments towards Senator Ted Cruz and Cruz's wife.[1508] Cohen and Trump also discussed "the usefulness of the released emails," including in relation to Bernie Sanders, Donna Brazile, and Wasserman Shultz.[1509] Gates recalled that following the email release, he was with Trump on Trump's plane on the tarmac, and takeoff was delayed for thirty minutes so that Trump could work the emails into his next speech.[1510]

(U) According to Michael Cohen, after the DNC release, Trump confided to him: "I guess Roger was right."[1511] Cohen also said that Trump told him "he guessed Stone knew what he was talking about."[1512] Similarly, despite Manafort's initial skepticism, after the email release

---

[1503] (U) Testimony of Rick Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, p. 934. Gates also said that Hope Hicks and Bryan Lanza were involved in the brainstorming sessions. FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.
[1504] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018; *see* email, Manafort to Fabrizio, Parscale, Reed, and Gates, May 27, 2019 (FAB002247) (identifying messaging themes for Fabrizio as "honesty, trustworthiness, competence, character, will do anything to win"). Stone spoke at length by phone with the Campaign's pollster, Tony Fabrizio, on several occasions, including on July 14 for 16 minutes. AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00035).
[1505] (U) Tweet, @WikiLeaks, July 22, 2016 ("RELEASE: 19,252 emails from the US Democratic National Committee wikileaks.org/dnc-emails/").
[1506] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/11/2018; FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.
[1507] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.
[1508] (U) *Ibid.*; FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/11/2018. For example, Manafort sought to "draw [a] comparison to [the] fact that the Dems attack Russia for hacking them but want us to believe that the server in HC['s] home was safe from hacking" and that Clinton had "put national security at risk." Email, Manafort to Spicer, Miller, Parscale, Reed, Gates, Fabrizio, and Kushner, July 24, 2016 (DJTFP00012961). This was also a theme he discussed with Roger Stone. *See* FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018 ("If WikiLeaks had the emails, it would prove the argument that Clinton put the country at risk.").
[1509] (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 8/7/2018.
[1510] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018.
[1511] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 53.
[1512] (U) FBI, FD-302, Cohen 8/7/2018.

on July 22, Manafort "thought that Stone had been right."[1513] The Committee did not identify who, if anyone, was Roger Stone's source of information in advance of the July 22 WikiLeaks release.

(U) On July 23, the Campaign used the release to attack the Democratic Party, saying that the "anti-Bernie DNC email leak issue threatens to destroy their party."[1514] Trump also highlighted the release in a July 23 tweet: "The Wikileaks e-mail release today was so bad to Sanders that it will make it impossible for him to support her, unless he is a fraud!"[1515] On July 25, Trump's talking points highlighted the WikiLeaks materials, including the "rigging of the system" and emphasizing the division between Clinton and Sanders supporters.[1516] These attacks mirrored the discussion between WikiLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 about using the emails to create conflict within the Democratic Party by splitting Clinton and Sanders supporters, discussed *supra*. They also echoed social media efforts by Russia to drive a wedge between supporters of Clinton and Sanders, as described in Volume 2.

(U) At a news conference on July 27, Trump also declared: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press."[1517] Senior Campaign officials believed that the statement was unscripted.[1518] However, Gates also recalled Stone mentioning that Russia was probably the source of the materials, and Gates also acknowledged there were public indications at the time that Russia was responsible.[1519] Within five hours of Trump's statement, GRU hackers spearphished non-public email accounts of Clinton's personal office for the first time and targeted seventy-six email accounts hosted by the Clinton Campaign's domain.[1520]

ii. (U) The October 7 Podesta Release

(U) Following July 22, the Campaign believed that WikiLeaks would release further materials and, as a result, began to more actively pursue leads on WikiLeaks activities.[1521] Manafort reminded Trump that Stone had predicted the release and claimed to have access to

---

[1513] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.
[1514] (U) Email, J. Miller to J. Miller, July 23, 2016 (DJTFP00012930–12931).
[1515] (U) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, July 23, 2016. This tweet echoed the Trump Campaign's press team messaging. *See* Email, J. Miller to J. Miller, July 23, 2016 (DJTFP00012930–12931).
[1516] (U) Email, Abboud to J. Miller, Hicks, and Lanza, July 25, 2016 (DJTFP00012984–12985); Email, Smith to Conway, Gordon, Denysyk, et al., July 25, 2016 (DJTFP00023180–23181).
[1517] (U) *See, e.g.*, Ashley Parker, David E. Sanger, "Donald Trump Calls on Russia to Find Hillary Clinton's Missing Emails," *The New York Times*, July 27, 2016 (containing video of Trump's remarks).
[1518] (U) *See* FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/11/2018; FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018; Bannon Tr., pp. 173–174.
[1519] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates, 10/25/2018.
[1520] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 49; *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 22.
[1521] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/11/2018.

WikiLeaks.[1522] In response, Trump directed Manafort to stay in touch with Stone to see if there were more emails coming out.[1523] Manafort then spoke with Stone during the week of the Democratic National Convention.[1524] At the time, Stone said he did not know what else would come out or when, but he agreed to follow up, although he did not say when he would do so.[1525]

(U) Manafort also instructed Gates to follow up with Stone on occasion to find out when additional information might be released and told Gates that he would be "updating other people on the Campaign, including the candidate."[1526] Gates himself recalled having a conversation with Stone in which Stone said that the WikiLeaks July 22 release was what Stone had previously predicted would come out, and that additional information would be coming.[1527] But while Manafort and Gates tasked Stone with communicating with WikiLeaks, Manafort advised Gates and others throughout the Campaign that no one should "touch" Assange, even though there was a "growing belief that Assange was, in fact, assisting their effort."[1528]

(U) After receiving Trump's directive via Manafort, Stone channeled his efforts to reach Assange through Jerome Corsi. Corsi, who at the time worked for WorldNetDaily (WND), an online publication, had developed a working relationship with Stone during the first half of 2016 when he began interviewing Stone for WND.[1529] Corsi occasionally assisted Stone with research projects.[1530] Although Corsi was aware that Stone had left the Trump Campaign, Stone claimed

---

[1522] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 53.
[1523] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 53.
[1524] (U) *Ibid.* Stone was in Cleveland for the Republican National Convention, which occurred directly prior to the Democratic National Convention.
[1525] (U) *Ibid.*
[1526] (U) Testimony of Rick Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, p. 938.
[1527] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 936–37; FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.
[1528] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 3/1/2018. Although the intent of Manafort's statement is unclear, it suggests that Manafort was aware that direct communication between the Campaign and WikiLeaks, other than through Stone, could be perceived as problematic.
[1529] (U) Corsi purportedly originated the "birther" conspiracy about Barack Obama and the "swift boat" attack on John Kerry. *See* SCO Report, Vol. I, p. 54.
[1530] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/6/2018. The Committee reviewed five FBI FD-302s documenting five interviews of Corsi conducted by the SCO. During the FBI's initial interview of Corsi on September 6, 2018, Corsi provided inaccurate information, denying that he had communicated with Stone about WikiLeaks and that he had taken any actions to contact Assange, despite clear evidence to the contrary. He subsequently revised those statements in interviews conducted on September 17 and 21, only to later walk back some of these new admissions during interviews on November 1 and 2, 2018. In the November 1 interview, he said that "the way he wanted to remember things was not actually how things happened" and that he had "self promoted himself to Stone and made it sound like he knew what he was talking about and had sources to WikiLeaks." As a result, although some of Corsi's testimony was consistent and could be corroborated by documents and phone records, the Committee encountered difficulty in determining the veracity of Corsi's conflicting statements regarding how he had obtained information about WikiLeaks possessing information on John Podesta—namely, whether he had been told the information by a source or had deduced it on his own.

to Corsi that he spoke with Trump "every day" and could "get a message" to Trump "at any time."[1531] Gates recalled that Corsi himself was present around Trump Tower often and that Trump liked him.[1532]

(U) Corsi recalled that he and Stone had discussed, either in phone or in person, Corsi's "ability to get to Assange."[1533] This may have been on the evening of July 22, when the two spoke for 28 minutes by phone, or on July 25, when they spoke for another 27 minutes.[1534]

(U) On July 25, 2016, Stone emailed Jerome Corsi, with the subject line "Get to Assange," telling him to "**Get to Assange**" (emphasis in the original). An hour later, Corsi forwarded the email to Ted Malloch, an American author who lived in London and was believed to have contacts with associates of Assange, writing: "From Roger Stone."[1535]

[1531] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/6/2018.
[1532] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/19/2018.
[1533] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/6/2018.
[1534] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1535] (U) Email, Corsi to Malloch, July 25, 2016 (Corsi production) (highlights and writing in original, as produced by Corsi to the Committee).

From: Jerome Corsi [redacted]
Subject: Fwd: Get to Assange
Date: July 25, 2016 at 3:11 PM
To: Ted Malloch [redacted]

* Very important
Key email
J Corsi

Ted
From Roger Stone
Jerry

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Players2 ." <[redacted]
Subject: Get to Assange
Date: July 25, 2016 at 2:05:16 PM EDT
To: [redacted]

Roger stone

Get to Assange

| Al Ecuadorian Embassy in London and get the pending wikileaks emails. they deal wit: Foundation allegedly

(U) Corsi had previously been involved in publishing Ted Malloch's memoirs, and had introduced Malloch and Stone earlier in 2016, when Malloch sought involvement in the Campaign.[1536] Malloch had also met Trump and Corey Lewandowski at the Council for National Policy candidate forum.[1537] In May 2016, Malloch traveled to New York City.[1538] While he was there, Malloch visited Trump Tower with Corsi and met Campaign staffers. His "objective was to communicate his willingness to assist the Campaign with whatever they needed."[1539] On either May 15 or 16, he had dinner with Stone and Corsi, and Malloch understood that Stone "still had an unofficial role in the campaign and Trump listened to him," so Malloch stayed in touch and offered to help with opposition research. [1540]

[1536] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 55.
[1537] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Malloch 6/8/2018. The SCO interviewed Malloch twice. In the first interview on March 27, 2018, Malloch denied communicating with Corsi and Stone about WikiLeaks. He corrected his statement in the second interview on June 8, 2018.
[1538] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1539] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1540] **(U)** *Ibid.*

(U) According to Malloch, at about this same time, he and Corsi had a FaceTime conversation about the July 22 release. During the conversation, Corsi asked him "if he could facilitate an interview with Julian Assange" or if he knew anyone in Nigel Farage's circle who could help.[1541] According to Malloch, Corsi had no connection to either Assange or Farage, and Malloch did not try to use Farage to reach Assange.[1542] Corsi stated that he never heard back about this request,[1543] and gave conflicting accounts about whether he told Stone that Malloch had been tasked.[1544]

(U) Phone records indicate that Stone remained in contact with Trump and the Campaign at the same time he was coordinating with Corsi. Records reflect one-minute calls (suggesting no connection) between Stone and Manafort on July 28 and 29.[1545] On July 29, Stone messaged Manafort about finding a time for the two of them to communicate, writing that there was "good shit happening."[1546] The back-and-forth between Stone and Manafort ultimately culminated in a 68-minute call on July 30, the longest call between the two of which the Committee is aware.[1547]

(U) Gates may have been present for this call between Stone and Manafort. Gates recalled a conversation between Manafort and Stone shortly after the July 22 release that Manafort placed on speaker phone, during which Stone indicated that "additional information would be coming out down the road."[1548] Manafort was "surprised" and "thought that would be great."[1549]

(U) On Sunday July 31, at 9:15 p.m., the day after speaking at length with Manafort, Stone called Gates.[1550] Ten minutes later, Stone had two phone calls with Trump that lasted over

---

[1541] [redacted] *Ibid.* Farage had several interactions with the Trump Campaign and Transition. On June 28, Bannon spoke with Farage about Farage addressing the Republican National Convention, and Bannon emailed Kushner and Manafort about that possibility the following day. Email, Bannon to Kushner and Manafort, June 29, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001140). On August 24, Farage spoke at a Trump rally. Matthew Teague, "Farage at Trump rally: 'I wouldn't vote for Clinton if you paid me,'" *The Guardian*, August 25, 2016. Trump Jr. also recalled seeing him at a few campaign events. *See* Trump Jr. Tr. II, pp. 91–92. Following the election, on or about December 15, 2016, Farage requested and was scheduled to meet with K.T. McFarland at Trump Tower for a briefing. Email, McFarland to Bannon, Flynn, et al., December 15, 2016 (TFA0017787); List of McFarland Foreign Contact Meetings (TFA0016252). [redacted]

[1542] (U) FBI, FD-302, Malloch 6/8/2018.
[1543] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018.
[1544] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/17/2018; FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018.
[1545] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1546] (U) Email, Stone to Manafort, July 29, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 24).
[1547] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1548] (U) Testimony of Rick Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, p. 936.
[1549] (U) *Ibid.*
[1550] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.

ten minutes.[1551] Stone then emailed Jessica Macchia, one of Trump's assistants, eight draft tweets for Trump, under the subject line "Tweets Mr. Trump requested last night."[1552] Many of the draft tweets attacked Clinton for her adversarial posture toward Russia and mentioned a new peace deal with Putin, such as "I want a new detente with Russia under Putin."[1553]

(U) At 10:45 p.m. that same evening, Stone emailed Corsi again with the subject line "Call me MON[day]" and writing that "Malloch should see Assange."[1554]

(U) The next morning, August 1, Stone again spoke twice with Trump.[1555] Stone later informed Gates of these calls.[1556] According to an email that morning from Stone to Macchia, Trump had "asked [Stone] for some other things" that Stone said he was "writing now."[1557]

(U) Corsi, who was in Italy at the time, responded to Stone's email about Assange on August 2:

> *Word is friend in embassy plans 2 more dumps. One shortly after I'm back. 2nd in Oct. Impact planned to be very damaging.*
>
> . . .

[1551] (U) Records reviewed by the Committee showed a six minute call from Stone to Trump on July 31 at approximately 9:25 p.m. and a five-minute call from Stone to himself at approximately 9:36 p.m.. *See* AT&T Toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00039). Evidence introduced at trial against Stone showed corresponding calls with Trump at those same times and for the same length of time, including a call from Trump at the number "-1" to Stone at 9:36 p.m. *See United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 148; *United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 164; Testimony of Michelle Taylor, *United States v. Stone*, pp. 348–349. This suggests that that Trump's phone would sometimes appear in another person's phone records as that person calling him or herself, or as a call with phone number "-1." A number of such calls appear in Stone's records and others, including records provided by Donald Trump Jr., during relevant time periods, but the Committee did not investigate those additional calls further.

[1552] (U) Email, Stone to Macchia, July 31, 2016 (TRUMPORG_18_001307).

[1553] (U) *Ibid.* One draft tweet referenced the Clinton Foundation. Stone followed up about the tweets with Rhona Graff the following morning, August 1, to make sure Trump received them. Email, Stone to Graff, August 1, 2016 (TRUMPORG_18_001310).

[1554] (U) Email, Stone to Corsi, July 31, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 36). Stone also asked Corsi to follow up on two other tasks intended to attack the Clintons: (1) to talk to Bernie Sanders' brother "who called Bill a rapist – turn him for Trump"; and (2) to "find Eileen Wellstone or more proof of Bill getting kicked out." Although Corsi produced some of his communications about WikiLeaks to the Committee, he had already deleted many of the most incriminating exchanges with Stone, including this email. The Committee did not have the forensic capabilities to review Corsi's electronic media and therefore relied on the government's exhibits for this information. These deleted emails were obtained by the SCO through the use of Apple "Time Machine" backups, which provided snapshots of Corsi's hard drive prior to his deleting the documents.

[1555] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.

[1556] (U) Text message, Stone to Gates, August 2, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 20) ("Spoke to Trump a cpl of times.").

[1557] (U) Email, Stone to Macchia, August 1, 2016 (TRUMPORG_18_001315).

Time to let more than Podesta to be exposed as in bed w[ith] enemy if they are not ready to drop HRC.
That appears to be the game hackers are now about. Would not hurt to start suggesting HRC old, memory bad, has stroke – neither he nor she well. I expect that much of next dump focus, setting stage for Foundation debacle.[1558]

(U) Stone spoke by phone with Gates that night, and then called Manafort the next morning, but appeared unable to connect.[1559] Shortly after placing that call, Stone emailed Manafort with the subject line "I have an idea" and with the message text "to save Trump's ass."[1560] Later that morning, Manafort called Stone back, and Stone tried to reach Gates again that afternoon.[1561]

(U) During this period, Stone announced his affiliation with Julian Assange publicly and privately—claims that he later retracted. For example, in early August, Sam Nunberg, an associate of Stone's and a former Trump Campaign official, recalled emailing Stone asking his whereabouts.[1562] Nunberg recalled Stone responding on August 4 that he had just returned from London, where he had dinner with Julian Assange.[1563] Nunberg, who was in frequent contact with Stone that month,[1564] recalled that Stone told him that he had "met with Julian Assange about the emails"; when Nunberg asked Stone if the next release would deal with Benghazi, Stone told him that the emails would relate to the Clinton Foundation.[1565] When he later learned that Nunberg had been subpoenaed to testify before the Grand Jury, Stone denied meeting with Assange and claimed he had been joking.[1566] He also publicly denied having traveled to London during that time.[1567]

(U) Stone, however, also advertised his association with WikiLeaks in public. On August 8, Stone gave a speech to the Southwest Broward Republican Organization. After his remarks, a member of the audience asked: "With regard to the October surprise, what would be your forecast on that given what Julian Assange has intimated he's going to do?" Stone replied, "Well, it could be any number of things. I actually have communicated with Assange. I believe

---

[1558] **(U)** Email, Corsi to Stone, August 2, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 37). The email is time-stamped 3:40 a.m.
[1559] **(U)** AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00039).
[1560] **(U)** Email, Stone to Manafort, August 3, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 25).
[1561] **(U)** AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1562] **(U)** Nunberg Tr., pp. 84, 90, 96.
[1563] **(U)** *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 90, 96.
[1564] **(U)** *See* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00039–ATTSSCI00046).
[1565] **(U)** Nunberg Tr., pp. 84, 90, 96.
[1566] **(U)** *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91, 99–100.
[1567] **(U)** Shelby Holliday and Rob Barry, "Roger Stone's Claim of a 2016 Julian Assange Meeting Draws Scrutiny," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 2, 2018.

the next tranche of his documents pertain to the Clinton Foundation but there's no telling what the October surprise may be."[1568] This was Stone's first public statement claiming to communicate with Assange, and he clarified on August 16 that this communication was through a "mutual acquaintance."[1569] Corsi assumed that he was the "mutual acquaintance," because the two had spoken the day before about John Podesta.[1570]

(U) On Twitter, WikiLeaks denied contact with Stone. On August 9, WikiLeaks tweeted: "We are not aware of having communicated with Roger Stone. We do however take, and verify, anonymous tips."[1571]

(U) The Committee is uncertain how Corsi determined that Assange had John Podesta's emails. Corsi initially explained in an interview with the SCO that during his trip to Italy, someone told him Assange had the Podesta emails. Corsi also recalled learning that Assange was going to "release the emails seriatim and not all at once."[1572] However, Corsi claimed not to remember who provided him with this information, saying he could only recall that "it feels like a man" who told him.[1573]

(U) Corsi further recalled that on August 15, after he returned from Italy, he conveyed this information to Stone by phone.[1574] According to Corsi, the information was new to Stone. Stone seemed "happy to hear it," and the two of them "discussed how the emails would be very damaging" to Clinton.[1575] Corsi also reiterated by both text and email to Stone on August 15 that there was "[m]ore to come than anyone realizes. Won't really get started until after Labor Day."[1576]

[1568] (U) YouTube, "Roger Stone at the Southwest Broward Republican Organization," *Stone Cold Truth*, August 10, 2016.
[1569] (U) YouTube, "Roger Stone Discusses The Future Plans of WikiLeaks," *BlazeTV*, August 16, 2016.
[1570] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018; AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (documenting a 24-minute phone call between Stone and Corsi at 12:14 p.m. on August 15, 2016).
[1571] (U) Tweet, @wikileaks, August 9, 2016.
[1572] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/17/2018.
[1573] (U) *Ibid.*
[1574] (U) *Ibid.*; FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018. Location information contained in phone records produced by Corsi to the Committee indicate that he was in Italy until at least August 11 and had returned to New Jersey by August 13. According to Roger Stone's phone records, Corsi's first phone call with Stone following the trip was for 24 minutes on August 15. *See* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1575] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018.
[1576] (U) Text message, Corsi to Stone, August 15, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 38); Email, Corsi to Stone, August 15, 2016 (*United States v. Roger Stone*, Gov. Ex. 39). On August 15, Corsi also published an article on *WorldNetDaily*, reporting an unverified claim by Stone that he had been hacked in retaliation for commenting about WikiLeaks's plans. *See* Jerome Corsi, "Trump adviser: Wikileaks plotting email dump to derail Hillary," *WorldNetDaily*, August 15, 2016. On August 8, 13 and 16, 2016, Stone tweeted that he had been hacked. *See* Tweets, @RogerJStoneJr, August 8, 13, and 16, 2016.

(U) However, during a later interview with the SCO, Corsi revised how he had learned that Assange would be releasing Podesta's emails. Corsi claimed that, rather than being told this information by a source, he had deduced it from Assange's public statements. In particular, Corsi said he had determined that when "Assange said something damaging to Clinton was coming out, it meant something related to Podesta."[1577] However, he thought it would be "more believable" to tell Stone that he had "sources," which also "made it sound like he knew what he was talking about."[1578] The Committee did not interview Corsi, who asserted his Fifth Amendment rights in response to a Committee subpoena, and could not determine if either of the two versions of these events was accurate.

(U) Separately, Gates recalled Stone advising him, prior to the release of an August 14 article in *The New York Times* about Paul Manafort's "secret ledger," that damaging information was going to be released about Podesta.[1579] Gates understood that Stone was referring to non-public information. Gates further recalled later conversations with Stone about how to save Manafort's role on the Campaign, and that Stone was focused on getting information about John Podesta, but said that Stone did not reveal the "inner workings" of that plan to Gates.[1580]

(U) Stone appeared to believe Corsi's prediction to him that John Podesta was WikiLeaks's next target. On August 21, a month-and-a-half before WikiLeaks ultimately released its first batch of stolen John Podesta emails, Roger Stone tweeted[1581]:

[1577] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018. Corsi did not specify the Assange statement that purportedly triggered his belief.

[1578] (U) *Ibid.* Despite Corsi's claim that he had deduced the information about Podesta on his own, as opposed to getting the information from a source, Corsi did not tell Stone that "there was nothing to hide" when Stone was called to testify before Congress. FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018.

[1579] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018; *see* Andrew Kramer, et al., "Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump's Campaign Chief," *The New York Times*, August 14, 2016. Because the timing of this conversation pre-dates Corsi's August 15 call with Stone, it is not clear that Gates is entirely accurate in his recollection. Most of the communications between Stone and Corsi appear to have taken place over the phone, and records indicate that Gates and Stone did not speak over their cell phones between August 3 and August 17, which suggests that Stone actually informed Gates of the Podesta information two days *after* the August 15 call with Corsi. AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures. Although both Stone and Gates may have used encrypted apps, there is no information to indicate that they did so when communicating with one another. It is also possible that Gates did not read *The New York Times* article about Manafort until later, even though it was first published on August 14.

[1580] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1581] (U) Tweet, @RogerJStoneJr, August 21, 2016.



(U) Corsi and Stone had numerous phone calls later in August.[1582] Corsi said that "Stone was asking for further information" about "timing and content of the Podesta email release."[1583] Corsi believed Assange would release the documents as an "October surprise."[1584] Stone told Corsi that he was talking to Trump, and Corsi assumed that Stone was conveying Corsi's information to the Campaign.[1585] Records show that Stone had at least 25 phone calls with Manafort, 20 phone calls with Gates, two calls with Bannon and two calls with Trump in the month of August 2016 alone.[1586]

(U) Bannon recalled discussing WikiLeaks and Assange with Stone both before and after taking over as the chief executive officer of the Trump Campaign on August 13, 2016.[1587] Bannon recalled that, prior to joining the Campaign, "Stone told him that he had a connection to Assange" and "implied that he had inside information about WikiLeaks."[1588] After Bannon assumed the role of Campaign CEO, Stone repeated to him that he "had a relationship with Assange and said that WikiLeaks was going to dump additional materials that would be bad for the Clinton Campaign."[1589]

(U) Corsi recalled that, at the end of August, Stone grew concerned about having made a statement about the release of Podesta materials before WikiLeaks had released any documents.[1590] On August 30, Stone and Corsi agreed to fabricate a story that Stone's knowledge and his August 21 Podesta tweet were both based on a public article and subsequent

---

[1582] **(U)** AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1583] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018.
[1584] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1585] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1586] **(U)** *See* Summary Chart of Stone Calls with Campaign (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 167); AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1587] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 54; Testimony of Steve Bannon, *United States v. Stone*, p. 850. Bannon also said that he "might" have communicated with Ted Malloch during the campaign, but did not say when or what they discussed. *Ibid.*, p. 856.
[1588] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 54.
[1589] **(U)** *Ibid.*; Testimony of Steve Bannon, *United States v. Stone*, pp. 850, 857–861. In an email on August 18, Stone wrote to Bannon: "I do know how to win this but it ain't pretty." Email, Stone to Bannon, August 18, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 28). Bannon responded, "Let's talk ASAP." *Ibid.*
[1590] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018.

memorandum from Corsi.[1591] However, Corsi understood that he was Stone's actual source of information and admitted that this "cover story" was "bullshit."[1592] The next day, August 31, he wrote a fake memorandum to Stone highlighting a "much overlooked" CNN article dated August 19 that reported on an alleged investigation into the Podesta Group.[1593]

(U) Stone also began communicating with radio host and comedian Randy Credico about WikiLeaks during this period. Credico, a comedian who describes himself as a "political satirist" and "activist," is the former director of the William Moses Kunstler Fund for Racial Justice and has run for political office in New York multiple times.[1594] Stone and Credico have known each other for years and overlapped on political campaigns.[1595] On August 19, Stone learned from Randy Credico that Julian Assange was slated to be a guest on his (Credico's) radio show the following Thursday, August 25.[1596]

(U) Stone then appeared on Credico's show on August 23, and Credico asked him: "What about the October surprise? I mean, you've been in touch indirectly with Julian Assange. What—can you give us any kind of insight? Is there an October surprise happening?"[1597] Stone responded: "Well, first of all, I don't want to intimate in any way that I control or have influence with Assange, because I do not. . . . We have a mutual friend, somebody we both trust, and therefore I am a recipient of good information."[1598] Credico did not know who Stone was referring to, although Stone later described the source as a "guy" and a "journalist."[1599]

(U) During Assange's interview with Credico on August 25, Assange denied contact with Stone, stating "we have not had any communications with him whatsoever."[1600] On August 26, after Assange appeared on the show, Credico informed Stone that Assange had talked about him: "He didn't say anything bad but we were talking about how the Press is trying to make it

---

[1591] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1592] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018.
[1593] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018; *see* Memorandum, Corsi to Stone, "John Podesta Ties to Russia," August 31, 2016 (Corsi Production).
[1594] **(U)** *See* Program page, "Randy Credico – Live on the Fly," WBAI; Jessica Kwong, "Who is Randy Credico? Roger Stone Threatened to Take Away Associate's Dog if He Cooperated with Russia Investigation: Indictment," *Newsweek*, January 25, 2019.
[1595] **(U)** Josh Gerstein and Darren Samuelsohn, "Stone's odd friendship with Randy Credico," *Politico*, November 8, 2019.
[1596] **(U)** Text messages, Stone and Credico, August 19, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 189). Stone had lengthy phone calls with Manafort on both August 19 and 21. *See* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1597] **(U)** WBAI Radio Interview, Randy Credico and Roger Stone, August 25, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 134).
[1598] **(U)** *Ibid.*; Testimony of Randy Credico, *United States v. Stone*, p. 607.
[1599] **(U)** Testimony of Randy Credico, *United States v. Stone*, pp. 607, 616.
[1600] **(U)** Ari Melber, Interview with Randy Credico, *MSNBC*, March 21, 2018 (playing recording of interview between Credico and Assange).

look like you and he are in cahoots."[1601] The next day, Credico updated Stone that the station was "working on a Julian Assange radio show" and he was "in charge" of the project; Credico later texted Stone that "Assange has kryptonite on Hillary."[1602] According to Credico, this was the first time they had discussed what information Assange might have.[1603] Credico testified that his statement was based on "public statements" by Assange.[1604]

(U) On September 18, Stone texted Credico that he was "e-mailing u a request to pass on to [A]ssange." Credico agreed to be a messenger, but then added: "Just remember do not name me as your connection to Assange[,] you had one before that you referred to."[1605] That day, Stone emailed Credico an article with allegations about then-candidate Clinton related to her service as Secretary of State and wrote: "Please ask Assange for any State or HRC e-mail from August 10 to August 30—particularly on August 20, 2011 that mention Dr. R.K[.] Paul or confirm this narrative."[1606] Stone followed up the next day, September 19, and texted Credico: "Pass my message . . . to Assange." Credico responded: "I did,"[1607] and then, on September 20, forwarded Stone's message to an attorney with the ability to contact Assange, and blind-copied Stone on the message[1608]:

WIKILEAK SEARCH..DO YOU KNOW IF

From:	Randy Credico [redacted]
To:	Margaret Ratner Kunstler [redacted]
Bcc:	Players2 . [redacted]
Date:	Tue, 20 Sep 2016 09:13:25 -0400
Attachments:	Clinton and Libya FINAL.pdf (23.74 MB)

CAN YOU FIND OUT FROM JA IF THERE IS A S tate or HRC e-mail from August 10 to August 30--particularly on August 20, 2011 that mention Dr. R.K Paul or confirm this narrative

---

[1601] **(U)** Text messages, Stone and Credico, August 26, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 189).
[1602] **(U)** Text messages, Stone and Credico, August 27, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 189).
[1603] **(U)** Testimony of Randy Credico, *United States v. Stone*, p. 613.
[1604] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1605] **(U)** Text messages, Stone and Credico, September 18, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 48).
[1606] **(U)** Email, Stone to Credico, September 18, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 50).
[1607] **(U)** Text messages, Stone and Credico, September 19, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 48).
[1608] **(U)** Email, Credico to Kunstler (blind copying Stone), September 20, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 55).

(U) Credico insinuated to Stone that he was communicating regularly with WikiLeaks, commenting, "That batch probably coming out in the next drop . . . I can't ask them favors every other day. I asked one of his lawyers."[1609] The attorney was Margaret Ratner Kunstler, who assisted in representing WikiLeaks and Assange in 2015 and 2016 and helped to coordinate Assange's interview with Credico.[1610] Kunstler was also referenced by Assange in a Twitter message to Donald Trump Jr. as his point-of-contact for submissions.[1611] [redacted][1612] At trial, Kunstler testified that she did not do anything with the September 20 request from Credico.[1613]

(U) Stone spoke with Credico again on September 26, 27 and 28.[1614] In addition, Stone and Corsi had further phone calls on September 21, 24, and 25.[1615]

(U) At the end of September, Stone privately conveyed information about a future WikiLeaks release to Trump and Manafort. Manafort, who had left the Campaign in August,[1616] recalled speaking with Stone around the first presidential debate between Trump and Clinton, which took place on September 26, 2016.[1617] Stone told Manafort that "John Podesta was going to be in the barrel" and that "there were going to be leaks of John Podesta's emails."[1618]

(U) On September 29, a call took place between Stone and Trump while Trump and Gates were on the way to LaGuardia Airport. After the call ended, Trump told Gates that "more releases of damaging information would be coming."[1619] Phone records show that this was not the first phone call between them that day. Trump called Stone three times just before 10:00 a.m. on the morning of September 29, but could not connect.[1620] Stone returned the call to a

---

[1609] (U) Email, Credico to Stone, September 19, 2016, (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 51). Credico testified at Stone's trial that this email was not based on any inside information. Testimony of Randy Credico, *United States v. Stone*, pp. 619–620.

[1610] (U) Testimony of Margaret Kunstler, *United States v. Stone*, p. 836.

[1611] (U) Twitter direct message, @wikileaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr, July 11, 2017 (Trump Jr. Production).

[1612] [redacted].

[1613] (U) *See* Testimony of Margaret Kunstler, *United States v. Stone*, p. 836. Kunstler did not respond to the Committee's voluntary request for documents and an interview.

[1614] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.

[1615] (U) *Ibid.* On September 24, Stone spoke with Corsi for a total of 23 minutes.

[1616] (U) Manafort, however, stayed in contact with senior Campaign officials, including Trump. *See infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.6.i.

[1617] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

[1618] (U) *Ibid.*

[1619] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 54; Testimony of Rick Gates, *United States v. Stone*, p. 946.

[1620] (U) *See United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 148.

Trump Organization number two hours later, but the call lasted only two minutes.[1621] Then, at approximately 1:40 p.m., Stone received a one-minute call from Keith Schiller's phone number, which records show originating from East Elmhurst, New York—in proximity to LaGuardia Airport.[1622] Stone returned the call to Schiller at 1:51 p.m. for three minutes.[1623] This call matches the conversation between Stone and Trump that Gates remembered.

(U) Trump, in written responses to the SCO, stated: "I do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with [Stone], nor do I recall being aware of Mr. Stone having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign."[1624] Trump further claimed that he had "no recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June 1, 2016 and November 8, 2016."[1625] Despite Trump's recollection, the Committee assesses that Trump did, in fact, speak with Stone about WikiLeaks and with members of his Campaign about Stone's access to WikiLeaks on multiple occasions.

(U) On September 27, it was reported that Assange would be making an "announcement" on October 4 at the Ecuador Embassy.[1626] On September 30, the announcement was reportedly canceled due to "security concerns."[1627] That same day, Credico texted Stone a photo of himself standing outside the Ecuador Embassy.[1628] Credico was in London to see a friend and had agreed to deliver a letter to Assange from Berthold Reimers, Manager of the WBAI radio station.[1629] Credico said that he handed the letter to someone at the door of the Embassy, but never made it inside.[1630]

[1621] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00053).
[1622] (U) Invoice, Call Detail for Keith Schiller (TRUMPORG_73_000020).
[1623] (U) *Ibid.*; AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00053).
[1624] (U) *SCO Report*, Appendix C, p. C-19.
[1625] (U) *Ibid.*, Appendix C, pp. C-18–19.
[1626] (U) Tweet, @JesseRodriguez, September 27, 2016 ("Julian Assange set to make an announcement from his balcony in London next Tuesday, according to @wikileaks.").
[1627] (U) Tweet, @JesseRodriguez, September 30, 2016 ("Due to security concerns at the Ecuadorian Embassy, Julian Assange's balcony announcement on Tues has been canceled, per @wikileaks.").
[1628] (U) Text messages, Stone and Credico, September 30, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 190). Credico shared the image publicly on Twitter several days later. Tweet, @Credico2016, October 5, 2016 ("leaving Ecuador Embassy London past scarey brit agent").
[1629] (U) Testimony of Randy Credico, *United States v. Stone*, pp. 623–624.
[1630] [redacted] *Ibid.*, p. 624. [redacted] While he was making the delivery, Credico noticed people "following [him] around," which reinforced his belief that "something is happening here" and "something was coming out" from Assange. Testimony of Randy Credico, *United States v. Stone*, pp. 625–626.

(U) On the evening of October 1, Credico sent Stone new messages about an upcoming WikiLeaks release.[1631] In the text messages to Stone, Credico conveyed that there would be "big news Wednesday" (October 5) and that "Hillary's campaign will die this week."[1632] Credico also wrote, "now pretend u don't know me," to which Stone responded "U died 5 years ago."[1633]

(U) On October 2, WikiLeaks announced that Assange would be appearing by video at a Berlin press conference on Tuesday, October 4.[1634] Later that day, Stone emailed Credico an article about the change in Assange's announcement, to which Credico responded, "head fake."[1635] Stone also texted Credico, "Did Assange back off," to which Credico replied the following day, "I can't tal[k] about it."[1636]

(U) Stone commented publicly regarding Assange's change in plans. On October 2, Stone tweeted, "Wednesday @HillaryClinton is done. #WikiLeaks."[1637] That day, Stone also appeared on The Alex Jones Show and advised that he had been "assured" by an intermediary to Assange that "the mother lode is coming Wednesday." He continued: "It wouldn't be an October surprise if I told you what it was but I have reason to believe that it is devastating because people with political judgment who are aware of the subject matter tell me this."[1638]

(U) On October 3, WikiLeaks announced on Twitter that it would be hosting a "WikiLeaks press conference Tuesday 10:00 am Berlin time on the past, present & future of WikiLeaks."[1639] Stone and Corsi also had a 24-minute phone call.[1640] In addition, following more text messages from Stone, Credico advised him: "I think it's on for tomorrow."[1641] That day, Stone tweeted: "I have total confidence that @wikileaks and my hero Julian Assange will educate the American people soon #LockHerUp."[1642]

[1631] **(U)** Text messages, Stone and Credico, October 1, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 190).
[1632] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1633] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1634] **(U)** Julia Boccagno, "WikiLeaks changes venue for 'October surprise' announcement," *CBS News*, October 3, 2016.
[1635] **(U)** Emails, Stone and Credico, October 2, 2016, (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 59) (although there was no text other than a link to the article, the subject line of Stone's email was "WTF?").
[1636] **(U)** Text messages, Stone and Credico, October 2–3, 2016, (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 190).
[1637] **(U)** Tweet, @RogerJStoneJr, October 2, 2016.
[1638] **(U)** "Trump Advisor Roger Stone Says He's Been 'Assured' Through An Assange Intermediary That 'The Mother Lode is Coming," *Media Matters*, October 3, 2016 (date of posting).
[1639] **(U)** Tweet, @wikileaks, October 3, 2016.
[1640] **(U)** AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1641] **(U)** Text messages, Stone and Credico, October 3, 2016, (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 190). Credico's comment was part of a longer October 3 dialogue on the expected WikiLeaks announcement, during which Stone references using Signal to communicate, because it considers it to be "secure."
[1642] **(U)** Tweet, @RogerJStoneJr, October 3, 2016.

(U) The Trump Campaign tracked Stone's commentary and the news about WikiLeaks. On October 2, Andrew Surabian, who ran the Campaign's war room, emailed Stone's Twitter prediction about a Wednesday release to Bannon, Kellyanne Conway, and the Trump Campaign press team.[1643] On October 3, Dan Scavino emailed the October 3 WikiLeaks Twitter announcement to Bannon.[1644] That evening, Bannon reached out to two *Breitbart* editors, Wynton Hall and Peter Schweizer, to ask if they would be awake "to get what he [Assange] has live."[1645]

(U) Separately, also on October 3, Bannon received an email from Matthew Boyle, another *Breitbart* editor, forwarding Boyle's correspondence from earlier that day with Stone. In it, Boyle had asked Stone, "Assange – what's he got? Hope it's good." Stone responded, "It is. I'd tell Bannon but he doesn't call me back." In his email to Bannon, Boyle advised Bannon to call Stone, and when Bannon said he had "important stuff to worry about," Boyle replied, "Well clearly he knows what Assange has. I'd say that's important."[1646]

(U) Stone also emailed Erik Prince on October 3, telling him: "Spoke to my friend in London last night. The payload is still coming."[1647]

(U) In the midst of the speculation, WikiLeaks reached out directly to Donald Trump Jr. and asked him to "comment on/push" a report about Clinton asking whether Assange could be droned. Trump Jr. responded that he had already done so.[1648] Two minutes later, Trump Jr. wrote to WikiLeaks: "What's behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?"[1649] He did not receive a response. Trump Jr. testified to the Committee that he did not recall how he had heard about a "Wednesday leak."[1650]

(U) On Tuesday, October 4, 2016, the 10th anniversary of WikiLeaks, Assange announced that he would be releasing more documents starting that week, including those "affecting three powerful organizations in three different states as well as, of course, information previously referred to about the U.S. election process," which he characterized as

---

[1643] (U) Email, Surabian to Bannon, Conway, and Team Press, October 2, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001941).
[1644] (U) Email, Scavino to Bannon, October 3, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001795).
[1645] (U) Email, Bannon to Hall and Schweizer, October 3, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001773).
[1646] (U) Michael Schmidt, et al., "Read the Emails: The Trump Campaign and Roger Stone," *The New York Times*, November 1, 2018. Bannon did not produce these emails to the Committee, but when confronted with them as reproduced in *The New York Times*, said that he was familiar with them and that although he did not "know if they are accurate," he "assume[d] they are." Bannon Tr., p. 188.
[1647] (U) Email, Stone and Prince, October 3, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 31).
[1648] (U) Tweet, @DonaldJTrumpJr, November 13, 2017 (posting October 3, 2016 direct message exchange with @wikileaks); Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 187–188.
[1649] (U) Twitter direct message, @DonaldJTrumpJ. to @wikileaks, October 3, 2016 (Trump Jr. Production).
[1650] (U) Trump Jr. Tr., p. 190.

"significant."[1651] He also said that WikiLeaks would be "publishing every week for the next 10 weeks" so that "all the U.S. election-related documents" would come out before November 8.[1652] Assange made no specific reference to Clinton or Podesta, and WikiLeaks did not release any documents.

(U) Trump was frustrated with the absence of a WikiLeaks release on October 4. Gates recalled that Trump had anticipated something would be released and later asked: "When is the other stuff coming out?"[1653]

(U) Following the announcement, Bannon complained to Stone by email about the lack of any new releases, asking "what was that this morning???"[1654] Bannon wrote to Stone because Stone had said he "knew WikiLeaks and knew Julian Assange."[1655] Stone responded, echoing information he had received from Credico and Assange's own announcement: "Fear. Serious security concern. He thinks they are going to kill him and the London police are standing done [sic]. However—a load every week going forward."[1656]

(U) On October 4, Prince also asked Stone whether Assange had "chicken[ed] out." Stone responded that he was "[n]ot sure," but "checking." Later that day, Prince texted Stone again to ask whether he had "hear[d] anymore from London." Stone wrote, "Yes—want to talk on a secure line—got Whatsapp?" and previewed that it was "good."[1657] Prince recalled later speaking with Stone, who told him that WikiLeaks would release more materials harmful to the Clinton Campaign. Prince also described Stone having the equivalent of "insider stock trading" information about Assange.[1658]

(U) WikiLeaks did not release any documents the following day, Wednesday, October 5, as Credico and Stone had originally expected. Stone, however, maintained his prediction that Assange would be releasing Clinton materials. On October 5, Stone tweeted: "Libs thinking

---

[1651] (U) Andrea Shalal, "WikiLeaks' Assange signals release of documents before U.S. election," *Reuters*, October 4, 2016 (linking to video).
[1652] (U) Tim Hains, "Julian Assange: First 'October Surprise' Leak Will Be Released This Week," *RealClearPolitics*, October 4, 2016 (linking to video).
[1653] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.
[1654] (U) Email, Bannon to Stone, October 4, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 32).
[1655] (U) Testimony of Steve Bannon, *United States v. Stone*, p. 876.
[1656] (U) Email, Stone to Bannon, October 4, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 32).
[1657] (U) Text messages, Stone and Prince, October 4, 2016 (*United States v. Stone*, Gov. Ex. 33). In text messages, Prince promised to call Stone on October 5. *Ibid.*
[1658] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol., p. 57.

Assange will stand down are wishful thinking. Payload coming #Lockthemup."[1659] On the evening of October 5, Stone and Credico spoke for 12 minutes.[1660]

(U) WikiLeaks did not release anything on October 6. Nevertheless, on October 6, Stone tweeted: "Julian Assange will deliver a devastating expose on Hillary at a time of his choosing. I stand by my prediction. #handcuffs4hillary."[1661] Stone and Credico had five additional calls that day.[1662]

(U) On the afternoon of October 6, Stone received a call from Keith Schiller's number. Stone returned the call about 20 minutes later, and spoke—almost certainly to Trump—for six minutes.[1663] The substance of that conversation is not known to the Committee. However, at the time, Stone was focused on the potential for a WikiLeaks release, the Campaign was following WikiLeaks's announcements, and Trump's prior call with Stone on September 29, also using Schiller's phone, related to a WikiLeaks release. Given these facts, it appears quite likely that Stone and Trump spoke about WikiLeaks.

(U) At approximately 4 p.m. on October 7, *The Washington Post* released the *Access Hollywood* tape.[1664] Witnesses involved in Trump's debate preparation recalled that the team first heard of the tape about an hour prior to its public release.[1665] According to Jerome Corsi, however, news of the release also made its way to Roger Stone.[1666] Corsi and Stone spoke twice that day at length: once at 1:42 p.m. for 18 minutes, and once at 2:18 p.m. for 21 minutes.[1667] Corsi recalled learning from Stone that the *Access Hollywood* tape would be coming out, and that Stone "[w]anted the Podesta stuff to balance the news cycle" either "right then or at least

---

[1659] (U) Tweet, @RogerJStoneJr, October 5, 2016.
[1660] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1661] (U) Tweet, @RogerJStoneJr, October 6, 2016.
[1662] (U) AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures.
[1663] (U) *Ibid.*; Trump Org. call records, Keith Schiller (TRUMPORG_73_000021). As noted above, Trump would use Schiller's phone to make and receive calls, including with Stone, as also illustrated by the September 29 phone calls.
[1664] (U) *See* David A. Farenthold, "Trump recorded having extremely lewd conversation about women in 2005," *The Washington Post*, October 7, 2016 (linking to video).
[1665] (U) Bannon Tr., p. 206.
[1666] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018.
[1667] (U) In an email to the SCO that he later produced to the Committee, Corsi also stated that he called and spoke to Stone at 11:47 a.m. about the "status of the Wikileaks publication of the Podesta emails and Roger's concern that Assange should start publishing immediately the Podesta emails." *See* Email, Corsi to Gray, October 2, 2018 (Corsi Production). Corsi's phone records reflect only one minute of call time, suggesting that a conversation, if one occurred, was short. *See* Corsi Phone Records, October 7, 2016 (Corsi Production).

coincident."[1668] According to Corsi, Stone also told him to have WikiLeaks "drop the Podesta emails immediately."[1669]

(U) When the tape later became public, Corsi claimed that he was not surprised by the graphic language because he had already heard it.[1670] Corsi recalled previewing the *Access Hollywood* tape with conference call participants during one or two calls that day: a *WorldNetDaily* staff call at 1:08 p.m., or a 2 p.m. call involving Total Banking Solutions that included Malloch.[1671] Corsi remembered telling conference participants that the tape was a problem and to contact Assange.[1672] Corsi then "watched all day to see what Assange would do," and when the Podesta emails were released, he thought to himself that Malloch "had finally got to Assange."[1673] However, Corsi later told investigators that he did not call Malloch or Stone after the WikiLeaks release to convey this reaction because, in contradiction to his earlier statements, he was "doubtful" that Malloch had succeeded.[1674]

(U) Corsi also claimed that he tweeted publicly at WikiLeaks in order to get them to release documents, but no such tweets could be located.[1675] The SCO was unable to identify any conference call participants who recalled getting non-public information about the tape from Corsi that day; the Committee did not seek to confirm those findings.[1676]

(U) At approximately 4:32 p.m. on October 7—approximately 32 minutes after the release of the *Access Hollywood* tape—WikiLeaks released 2,050 emails that the GRU had stolen from John Podesta, repeatedly announcing the leak on Twitter and linking to a searchable archive of the documents.[1677]

(U) After the Podesta emails were released on October 7, 2016, Trump and senior Campaign officials acknowledged internally and to Stone that Stone had predicted the WikiLeaks release about Podesta. Manafort recalled Trump acknowledging to him that "Stone

---

[1668] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018. It is not clear how Stone received news of the tape. Stone's phone records did not reflect any calls that day with the Trump Campaign and only one 18-minute call with a *Washington Post* number—but, according to the SCO, the records do not, on their face, indicate that the call involved any of the reporters who broke the *Access Hollywood* story. *See* AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures; *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 59.

[1669] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018.

[1670] (U) *Ibid.*

[1671] (U) *Ibid.*; FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018.

[1672] (U) *Ibid.*

[1673] (U) *Ibid.*

[1674] (U) *Ibid.*

[1675] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018. The SCO was also unable to locate the alleged tweets. *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 59.

[1676] (U) *SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 59.

[1677] (U) Tweet, @wikileaks, October 7, 2016

had information on the release in advance" of it becoming public.[1678] Manafort spoke with Stone by phone and told Stone that Stone had been right.[1679] Gates also spoke with Stone shortly after the release, and Stone confirmed that this was the information he had said would be coming out.[1680] On October 8, Stone messaged Corsi: "Lunch postponed – have to go see T," referring to Trump.[1681]

(U) Corsi said that after the October 7 WikiLeaks release, he and Stone agreed that they deserved credit and that "Trump should reward us."[1682] However, Corsi said that Stone was concerned about having advance information about the Podesta release, and that Stone recruited Corsi to make sure no one knew Stone had advance knowledge of that information. After the October 7 release, Corsi claimed that Stone directed him to delete emails relating to the Podesta information.[1683] As outlined in his indictment and presented at trial, in subsequent congressional testimony to the HPSCI, Stone hid his communications with Corsi about WikiLeaks, and instead identified Credico as his intermediary; he also concealed communications he made directing both Corsi and Credico to obtain advance information about future WikiLeaks releases; and he made misleading and false statements about his communications with the Trump Campaign and individuals associated with the Campaign.[1684] Following this testimony, Corsi said that Stone directed him to "stick to the plan"; Stone also threatened Credico to prevent him from testifying to HPSCI and contradicting Stone's story.[1685]

(U) On October 13, 2016, after WikiLeaks had publicly disclaimed any connection to Stone,[1686] Stone wrote directly to the WikiLeaks Twitter account: "Since I was all over national TV, cable and print defending wikileaks and assange against the claim that you are Russian agents and debunking the false charges of sexual assault as trumped up bs you may want to

---

[1678] (U) FBI, FD-302, Manafort 9/13/2018.

[1679] (U) *Ibid.* Stone's cell phone records show a 17-minute call with Manafort on October 12, although they may have been in touch through other means following the Podesta release. AT&T toll records, Roger Stone/Drake Ventures (ATTSSCI00058). Manafort told Gates that the release was three months late. FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1680] (U) Testimony of Rick Gates, *United States v. Roger Stone*, pp. 946–947. Gates did not recall Stone saying that he had orchestrated the timing of the release, although Stone told Gates that the release would "help." FBI, FD-302, Gates 10/25/2018.

[1681] (U) Affidavit in Support of an Application for a Search Warrant, Case 1:18-sc-02524, July 27, 2018, ¶ 66. It is unknown if Stone and Trump in fact met.

[1682] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018.

[1683] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 11/1/2018.

[1684] (U) *See, e.g.*, *Stone* indictment, ¶¶ 11–39.

[1685] (U) FBI, FD-302, Corsi 9/21/2018. On November 15, 2019, following trial, Stone was convicted of obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and false statements for conduct relating to these events. He was sentenced to 40 months in prison.

[1686] (U) *See, e.g.*, Tweet, @wikileaks, October 12, 2016 ("As we have already stated clearly: WikiLeaks has had no contact wiith [sic] Roger Stone.").

rexamine [sic] the strategy of attacking me."[1687] WikiLeaks responded: "We appreciate that. However, the false claims of association are being used by the democrats to undermine the impact of our publications. Don't go there if you don't want us to correct you."[1688] Stone then replied: "Ha! The more you 'correct' me the more people think you're lying. Your operation leaks like a sieve. You need to figure out who you friends are."[1689]

(U) Following the October 7 release, WikiLeaks released thirty-three more sets of stolen materials before Election Day, amounting to over 50,000 documents, advertising the materials on Twitter each time.[1690]

iii. (U) Trump Campaign's Continued Use of WikiLeaks After October 7

(U) Despite the contemporaneous statement by the U.S. Government warning of Russian responsibility for the hacking and leaking of the DNC, DCCC, and Clinton Campaign documents and emails, the Trump Campaign considered the release of these materials to be its "October surprise."[1691] The Trump Campaign's press team first found out about the WikiLeaks release when it "hit the press" on October 7,[1692] and the Campaign quickly turned to capitalize on the Podesta emails: the following morning, October 8, the communications team began compiling information from the release that it could use to attack Clinton.[1693] WikiLeaks information was

---

[1687] **(U)** *See* Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant, Case 1:17-mj-00661, September 11, 2017, ¶ 31 (documenting October 13, 2016 messages)..

[1688] **(U)** *Ibid.*, ¶ 32 (documenting October 13, 2016 messages).

[1689] **(U)** *Ibid.*, ¶ 33 (documenting October 16, 2016 messages). On November 9, 2016, the day after the U.S. presidential election, WikiLeaks messaged Stone, "Happy?" and "We are now more free to communicate." *Ibid.*, ¶ 34 (documenting November 9, 2016 messages). They corresponded further on June 4, 2017, when Stone messaged a Twitter account associated with Assange, @JulianAssange, that among other things, "If the U.S. government moves on you I will bring down the entire house of cards." *Ibid.*, ¶ 35 (documenting June 4, 2017 messages). On June 10, 2017, Stone added: "I am doing everything possible to address the issues at the highest level of Government. Fed treatment of you and WikiLeaks is an outrage. Must be circumspect in this forum as experience demonstrates it is monitored." *Ibid.*, ¶ 36 (documenting June 10, 2017 messages).

[1690] **(U)** *Netyksho* indictment, ¶ 49; *see also* Tweets, @wikleaks, October 7, 2016 to November 7, 2016.

[1691] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/19/2018.

[1692] **(U)** Epshteyn Tr., p. 212.

[1693] **(U)** *See, e.g.*, Email, Shah to Ditto, Cheung, J. Miller, and Hicks, October 8, 2016 (DJTFP00019278) (attaching document titled "Wikileaks October 7, 2016 John Podesta Email Release"); Email, Epshteyn to Ellis, October 8, 2016 (DJTFP00019302–19304) (requesting "talkers on this asap" in reference to leaked speech excerpts). In his testimony, Bannon downplayed the relative importance of the WikiLeaks release in light of the *Access Hollywood* tape. Bannon recalled that the Campaign learned of the tape approximately 60 minutes before it was released, in the middle of debate preparation with Trump. *See* Bannon Tr., p. 206. According to Bannon, the tape was an "extinction level event," and precipitated Republican Party efforts to "remove the candidate" the following day. *Ibid.*, pp. 207–208. Bannon claimed that he not recall finding out about the WikiLeaks release or speaking about it with Trump until the evening after the debate. *Ibid.*, pp. 206–207.

later integrated with Trump's tweets,[1694] into his speeches,[1695] and into his press releases.[1696] Other members of the Trump family also scrutinized the news.[1697] And, the Campaign tracked WikiLeaks releases in order to populate a fake Clinton Campaign website, clintonkaine.com.[1698]

(U) Witnesses did not describe a formalized process for integrating WikiLeaks materials into the Campaign. Rather, the Campaign would "look to see what's the most newsworthy" when emails were released.[1699] Gates described this as a "wait-and-see" approach.[1700] When asked what steps the Campaign took to promote WikiLeaks releases, Jared Kushner explained:

> *[W]hen [the hacked emails] would come out, we'd get them – the Internet would crowdsource them and we'd kind of see which ones were hot. And then we would kind of debate ways to try to get them out further, whether it be having the candidate read them at rallies, or tweet about them, or whatever it is.*[1701]

Kushner said the discussions were "not like a traditional command and control structure," but rather "a bunch of people who were helping figure it out."[1702] Participants included Trump and his senior Campaign officials, such as Dan Scavino, Hope Hicks, Bannon, Kushner, Stephen Miller, and Jason Miller.[1703]

(U) While the Campaign was using the WikiLeaks documents, Trump cast doubt on the assessment that Russian government hackers were responsible for the hack-and-leak campaign. At the second presidential debate on October 9, Trump asserted: "maybe there is no hacking."[1704]

[1694] (U) Email, J. Miller to Giuliani, Hicks, Scavino, and S. Miller, October 11, 2016 (DJTFP00019376) (linking to WikiLeaks story in the *LA Times*).
[1695] (U) Email, Gabriel to S. Miller and Ditto, October 27, 2016 (DJTFP00020051) (providing teleprompter script for Springfield, Ohio speech referencing WikiLeaks).
[1696] (U) Email, Gates to Bannon, October 27, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001369-1370) (stating "This is good and exactly what we need," and forwarding written Trump statement using WikiLeaks releases to attack Clinton under the subject line, "FW: Donald J. Trump Statement.").
[1697] (U) Email, J. Miller to Shah, et al., October 9, 2016 (DJTFP00024165) (discussing Eric Trump's question about the WikiLeaks release, "Are we discussing Hillary selling weapons to Isls [sic] as per WikiLeaks email dump?").
[1698] (U) Email, Hemming to Parscale, Bannon, and Hall, "Re: Top Twenty-Five Wikileaks Revelations," October 15, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001528–1530).
[1699] (U) S. Miller Tr., p. 110.
[1700] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/19/2018.
[1701] (U) Kushner II Tr., p. 69.
[1702] (U) *Ibid.*
[1703] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 70; *see, e.g.*, Email, J. Miller to Bannon, Conway, Bossie, S. Miller, and Hicks, October 12, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001615) (commenting "More!" and forwarding a GOP communications alert noting a WikiLeaks tweet announcing "The Podesta Emails, Part 4"); Email, Burgess to "Team Press," Conway, Bannon, and Bossie, October 12, 2016 (SKB_SSCI-0001616) (forwarding the same and commenting "Flagging – more wikileaks documents. Wanted to make sure everyone saw them.").
[1704] (U) "Full Video: Second Presidential Debate," *The New York Times*, October 9, 2016.

In testimony to the Committee, Stephen Miller claimed that the Campaign did not know who was responsible for the hacks "one way or the other."[1705] But this uncertainty did not stop Trump or Campaign officials from minimizing Russian involvement at other times, suggesting that it was an "absurd claim" to say that the Kremlin was promoting the Trump Campaign[1706]; that "the DNC did the 'hacking'" as a distraction[1707]; that the Democrats were "putting [it] out" that the Russians were responsible; and that it was "unlikely" that the Russians did it[1708] or that nobody knew it was Russia, and it "could also be China" or "lots of other people."[1709] According to Gates, the Campaign was "not concerned with how or who hacked" the documents, but just sought to release emails as quickly as possible.[1710]

(U) Among the theories espoused by Trump Campaign officials, Manafort expressed a belief that the Ukrainians were responsible, not the Russians.[1711] Gates said that this "parroted a narrative [Konstantin] Kilimnik often supported."[1712] According to Gates, Kilimnik also asserted that the hack could have been done by "Russian operatives in Ukraine."[1713] Gates was not aware of Manafort asking Kilimnik "to reach out to his Russian contacts" about the source of the leaked materials, and was not himself asked to contact Kilimnik about it.[1714] The Committee has determined that this theory espoused by Kilimnik and Manafort has no factual basis.[1715] Gates and others also decided to promote the story that a DNC insider had been involved in the hacks.[1716]

(U) Within the Campaign, there was no policy that governed using materials released by WikiLeaks.[1717] To the contrary, the Campaign treated the releases as just another form of

---

[1705] **(U)** S. Miller Tr., p. 95.
[1706] **(U)** Email, Abboud to J. Miller, Hicks, and Lanza, July 25, 2016 (DJTFP00012984).
[1707] **(U)** Eric Bradner, "Trump: DNC hacked itself," *CNN*, June 15, 2016.
[1708] **(U)** Trump made the statement to Larry King on *RT America* on September 9, 2016. Theodore Schleifer, "On Russian TV, Trump says it's 'unlikely' Putin trying to sway election," *CNN*, September 9, 2016. On September 2, 2016, Putin similarly deflected questions about Russia's involvement in an interview, stating: "Is it really important who hacked this information from Clinton's election campaign? What's important is the content of what was made public." Laura Mills, "Putin Denies Kremlin Hand in DNC Hacking Breach," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 2, 2016.
[1709] **(U)** "Full Video: First Presidential Debate," *The New York Times*, September 26, 2016. Statements by Trump casting doubt on attribution for Russia's election interference campaign continued following the election.
[1710] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 2/12/2018.
[1711] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/10/2018.
[1712] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1713] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/11/2018.
[1714] **(U)** *Ibid.*
[1715] [redacted] Further information relating to Kilimnik and Manafort's role in the Campaign and matters related to this disinformation campaign is provided *infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.A.7.vi.
[1716] **(U)** FBI, FD-302, Gates 3/1/2018; FBI, FD-302, Gates 4/10/2018.
[1717] **(U)** Bannon Tr., p. 177; S. Miller Tr., p. 110.

opposition research.[1718] Bannon's view was that "anything negative that comes out [against an opponent] is clearly helpful to a campaign."[1719] According to Stephen Miller, "[i]t would have been political malpractice not to use the WikiLeaks material once it became public."[1720] Gates described a "growing belief" within the Campaign that Assange was, in fact, assisting their effort."[1721]

(U) Rather than regulating the Campaign's use of WikiLeaks materials, Trump praised and promoted WikiLeaks repeatedly in the closing month of the campaign[1722]:

- (U) October 10, 2016: "This just came out. WikiLeaks, I love WikiLeaks."
- (U) October 12, 2016: "This WikiLeaks stuff is unbelievable. It tells you the inner heart, you gotta read it."
- (U) October 13, 2016: "It's been amazing what's coming out on WikiLeaks."
- (U) October 31, 2016: "Another one came in today. This WikiLeaks is like a treasure trove."
- (U) November 2, 2016: "WikiLeaks, it sounds like, is going to be dropping some more. If we met tomorrow I'd tell you about it tomorrow."
- (U) November 4, 2016: "Getting off the plane, they were just announcing new WikiLeaks, and I wanted to stay there, but I didn't want to keep you waiting. Boy, I love reading those WikiLeaks."

(U) Using Trump to promote WikiLeaks was a deliberate strategy employed by the Campaign, not only in his remarks, but also on social media. In mid-October, Ivanka Trump tasked the Campaign's senior officials (including Bannon, Scavino, Stephen Miller and Jason

---

[1718] (U) For example, Hope Hicks told the Committee: "[E]veryone has opposition research, and this just happened to be available to everyone." Hicks Tr., pp. 66–67. Kushner described the releases as a "popular topic" that "everyone was talking about." Kushner II Tr., pp. 52–54.

[1719] (U) Bannon Tr., p. 171–172.

[1720] (U) S. Miller Tr., p. 91.

[1721] (U) FBI, FD-302, Gates 3/1/2018.

[1722] (U) Some of these are reproduced in a video by *The Washington Post*. "Watch Trump Praise WikiLeaks," *The Washington Post*, April 11, 2019. Public tabulations of the number of references in speeches, interviews, rallies, and debates vary, but place it in excess of 100 mentions. *See, e.g.*, Gabrielle Healy, "Did Trump really mention WikiLeaks over 160 times in the last month of the election cycle?" *PolitiFact*, April 21, 2017; David Choi and John Haltiwanger, "5 times Trump praised WikiLeaks during his 2016 election campaign," *Business Insider*, April 11, 2019.

Miller) with preparing two Trump tweets every day linking to WikiLeaks content, which, she said, would help "refocus the narrative."[1723] Trump tweeted direct references to WikiLeaks throughout October and November 2016, including on October 11, 12, 16, 17, 21 (twice), 22, 24, 27 and November 1.[1724]

(U) WikiLeaks contacted the Trump Campaign directly, through Donald Trump Jr., on several occasions. On September 21, WikiLeaks used a direct message on Twitter to reach out to Trump Jr. for a comment about a website, "putintrump.org," and provided Trump Jr. a password to access the website before it launched.[1725] Trump Jr. responded, "Off the record I don't know who that is, but I'll ask around."[1726] He then forwarded the message to senior Campaign officials in an email, and asked for their thoughts, indicating that he had visited the website:

> *Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it works and the about section they reference contains the next pic in terms of who is behind it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it's a fully built out page claiming to be a PAC let me know your thoughts and if we want to look into it.*[1727]

Trump Jr. expressed concern about the webpage, though not about WikiLeaks itself: "The way they asked the question it almost seemed like there was some connection we should be aware of though. Do any of the political people recognize the names there?"[1728] Some members of the Campaign responded to Trump Jr., but he did not communicate further with WikiLeaks on the topic.[1729]

[1723] (U) Email, I. Trump to Bannon, S. Miller, et al., October 15, 2016 (TRUMPORG_69_010687).
[1724] (U) Tweets, @realDonaldTrump, October 11–November 1, 2016.
[1725] (U) Twitter direct message, @wikileaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr, September 21, 2016.
[1726] (U) Twitter direct message, @DonaldJTrumpJr to @wikileaks, September 21, 2016.
[1727] (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Conway, Bannon, Kushner, Bossie, and Parscale, September 21, 2016 (DJTFP00023909–23911) (attaching screenshots of Twitter direct message from WikiLeaks). The email garnered some responses. Brad Parscale suggested setting up a competing website so that "searches come to us." Email, Parscale to Trump Jr. et al., September 21, 2016 (DJTFP00023912). Jared Kushner forwarded the email to Hope Hicks without comment. Email, Kushner to Hicks, September 21, 2016 (DJTFP00023916–23918). The SCO declined to charge Trump Jr. for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act based on his unauthorized use of the password to access the website. *See SCO Report*, Vol. I, p. 179.
[1728] (U) Email, Trump Jr. to Parscale, Bannon, Conway, Kushner, and Bossie, September 21, 2016, (DJTFP00023919).
[1729] (U) When asked about Trump Jr.'s communications with WikiLeaks on this topic, Bannon said: "I'd describe Don Junior, who I think very highly of, as a guy who believes everything on Breitbart is true." Bannon Tr., p. 88.

(U) WikiLeaks also sought to coordinate its distribution of stolen documents with the Campaign. After Trump proclaimed at an October 10 rally, "I love WikiLeaks" and then posted about it on Twitter,[1730] WikiLeaks resumed messaging with Trump Jr. On October 12, it said: "Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us . . . there's many great stories the press are missing and we're sure some of your follows [sic] will find it. btw we just released Podesta Emails Part 4."[1731] Shortly afterward, Trump tweeted: "Very little pick-up by the dishonest media of incredible information provided by WikiLeaks. So dishonest! Rigged System!"[1732] Two days later, Donald Trump Jr. tweeted the link himself: "For those who have the time to read about all the corruption and hypocrisy all the @wikileaks emails are right here: wlsearch.tk."[1733] Trump Jr. admitted that this may have been in response to the request from WikiLeaks, but also suggested that it could have been part of a general practice of retweeting the WikiLeaks releases when they came out.[1734]

(U) According to public information, Trump Jr. retweeted WikiLeaks content numerous times in October and November 2016, frequently encouraging others to go to WikiLeaks or elsewhere to review the hacked emails.[1735] Trump Jr. defended his treatment of WikiLeaks as "a media organization," asserting that "they're reaching out to me to essentially promote what they had put out."[1736] He considered the emails "relevant" and said that "other people should see it."[1737] He admitted, however, that he did not think about whether WikiLeaks was acting as a pass-through for Russia or otherwise consider WikiLeaks's history of hostile actions against the United States.[1738]

[1730] (U) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, October 11, 2016.
[1731] (U) Twitter direct messages, @wikileaks and @DonaldJTrumpJr, October 12, 2016.
[1732] (U) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, October 12, 2016.
[1733] (U) Tweet, @DonaldJTrumpJr, October 14, 2016.
[1734] (U) Trump Jr. Tr., pp. 195–196, 198–199.
[1735] (U) *See ibid.*, p. 202; *see generally* Tweets, @DonaldJTrumpJr, October 1–November 8, 2016. A publicly accessible database purporting to have archived, in close to real time, tweets by Trump Jr., indicates at least 70 tweets responding to or retweeting WikiLeaks, and many others referencing its releases. *See* Trump Twitter Archive, @donaldjtrumpjr, October 1–November 8, 2016. Twitter's search function at the time of this writing revealed a lower number; it is unclear what caused the discrepancy, but tweets can be deleted after they are posted.
[1736] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 164–166.
[1737] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 202.
[1738] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 164–166. WikiLeaks continued to interact with Trump Jr. after the general election on November 8, 2016. On November 9, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote to Trump Jr.: "Wow. Obama people will surely try to delete records on the way out. Just a heads up." In December 2016, WikiLeaks contacted Trump Jr. again to ask that Trump issue a statement in support of Assange. In July 2017, following initial public reporting, WikiLeaks requested that Trump Jr. provide WikiLeaks with his emails about the June 9, 2016 meeting for publication, through Margaret Kunstler. Trump Jr. did not respond to these messages. *See* Twitter direct messages, @wikileaks and @DonaldJTrumpJr, November 9, 2016–July 11, 2017.

(U) The Campaign's preoccupation with WikiLeaks continued until the general election. As the general election approached, Scavino, a member of the communications team who also had a role in administering Trump's Twitter account during the campaign,[1739] increasingly forwarded updates relating to WikiLeaks to other Campaign officials, using subject lines like "WIKI ABOUT TO DROP SOME BOMBS … 4 pmE" and "The WikiLeaks BOMB!" and linking to the latest WikiLeaks twitter post or its website.[1740] To one, Donald Trump Jr. responded: "Blow it out."[1741]

[1739] **(U)** Epshteyn Tr., p. 135.

[1740] **(U)** Email, Scavino to Bannon, E. Trump, Trump Jr., Kushner, S. Miller, and Hicks, October 31, 2016 (TRUMPORG_69_016159); Email, Scavino to Bannon, Hicks, Kushner, S. Miller, Trump Jr., and E. Trump, (TRUMPORG_69_016934). *See also* Email, Scavino to Bannon, Hicks, Conway, and S. Miller, November 4, 2016 (TRUMPORG_69_017232) ("Tweet by WikiLeaks on Twitter"); Email, Scavino to Scavino, November 6, 2016 (TRUMPORG_69_017455) ("8,263 DNC EMAILS RELEASED" and linking to WikiLeaks tweet); Email, Scavino to Bannon, S. Miller, Kushner, E. Trump, Trump Jr., November 7, 2016 (TRUMPORG_69_017463) (subject "Wiki – CHICAGO PROTESTS COSTS" and linking to WikiLeaks documents).

[1741] **(U)** Email, Trump Jr. to Scavino, Bannon, E. Trump, Kushner, S. Miller, and Hicks, October 31, 2016 (TRUMPORG_69_016164).

C. (U) The Agalarovs and the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting

1. (U) Introduction and Findings

(U) Aras Agalarov, a prominent Russian oligarch originally from Azerbaijan, and his son Emin Agalarov, a musician and real estate executive, have since 2013 maintained both a business and personal relationship with Donald Trump. That relationship began with the planning of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and subsequently included negotiations over a Trump Tower Moscow in 2014. Aras and Emin Agalarov were later involved in arranging a June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya, a Russian lawyer with government connections, several of her associates, and Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort. That meeting was arranged based on an offer of derogatory information on Hillary Clinton, which was ultimately not delivered.

(U) The Committee sought to understand the relationship between Donald Trump and the Agalarov family in Russia, as well as the relationship between the Trump Organization and the Agalarovs' company, the Crocus Group, more broadly. The Committee also sought to understand the nature of the Agalarovs' and Veselnitskaya's connections to the Russian government and Russian intelligence services.

(U) In this effort, the Committee interviewed a number of individuals with direct insight regarding the Agalarovs and non-public awareness of the Trump-Agalarov relationship's history or specific events. Nevertheless, the Committee faced significant limitations in its efforts to fully understand the relationship with the Agalarovs. In particular, events related to the Agalarovs often occurred in Russia, which significantly limited the availability of documents and witnesses that the Committee sought. Additionally, the passage of time complicated the collection of documents and reliable testimony regarding some aspects of the relationship. Witness testimony, while helpful, was often incomplete or contradicted other testimony or documents. The Committee was often not able to reconcile some of these challenges. The absence of cooperation from several individuals hindered the Committee's ability to fully address some aspects of the relationship.

(U) The relationship between Donald Trump and the Agalarovs, which began in 2013, continued through the 2016 U.S. election. This relationship included both business and personal communications, and was composed of in-person visits both in Russia and in the United States, as well as written correspondence, text messages, calls, social media, and gifts. The relationship also extended to Agalarov associates and family members, and to Trump associates and family members, who in some cases were in frequent contact. The Agalarovs, who have ties to the Russian government, may have been aware of Trump's intention to run for president prior to the Campaign's public announcement.

(U) Aras Agalarov was personally involved in pushing for the meeting between Veselnitskaya and the Trump Campaign, and also pushed for a second meeting for Veselnitskaya following the election, which did not take place. The Committee found that Agalarov likely sought to arrange these meetings on behalf of individuals affiliated with the Russian government.

(U) The Committee found that it was the intent of the Campaign participants in the meeting, particularly Donald Trump Jr., to receive derogatory information that would be of benefit to the Campaign from a source known, at least by Trump Jr., to have connections to the Russian government. Actions were taken by Campaign participants to operationalize that intent. The Committee found no reliable evidence that information of benefit to the Trump Campaign was transmitted at the June 9, 2016 meeting, or that Trump had foreknowledge of the June 9, 2016 meeting.

(U) The information that Natalia Veselnitskaya, the Russian lawyer, offered during the June 9, 2016 meeting, and planned to offer again at the follow up meeting requested by Aras Agalarov, was part of a broader influence operation targeting the United States that was coordinated, at least in part, with elements of the Russian government. That Russian effort was focused on U.S. sanctions against Russia. Some of the same information used by Veselnitskaya at the meeting was also used [redacted] The Committee found no evidence that the meeting participants from the Campaign were aware of this Russian influence operation when accepting the meeting or participating in it. Participants on both sides of the meeting were ultimately disappointed with how it transpired.

(U) The Committee assesses that at least two participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting, Veselnitskaya and Rinat Akhmetshin, have significant connections to the Russian government, including the Russian intelligence services. Those connections, particularly regarding Veselnitskaya, were far more extensive and concerning than what had been publicly known, and neither Veselnitskaya nor Akhmetshin were forthcoming with the Committee regarding those connections. Both Veselnitskaya and Akhmetshin may have sought, in some cases, to obfuscate the true intent of their work in the United States.

[redacted]

(U) Around the time of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow, the Agalarovs employed Artem Klyushin to help promote Emin Agalarov on social media. In that capacity, Klyushin and his then-wife spent some time with Trump during the pageant weekend. Klyushin is a Kremlin-linked bot developer who has supported Russian social media influence operations in other countries. The Committee did not find information indicating that Trump had awareness of this at the time, or any subsequent communication with Klyushin.

2. (U) Background on the Agalarovs

[redacted] Aras Agalarov is a Russian oligarch, originally from Azerbaijan, and is the head of the Crocus Group. Crocus is involved in construction and real estate development, as well as ownership and operation of shopping centers and other businesses in Russia. Agalarov is based in Moscow and his net worth is approximately $1.7 billion.[1743] The Agalarovs have significant ties to Russian organized crime and have been closely affiliated with individuals involved in murder, prostitution, weapons trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, narcotics trafficking, money laundering and other significant criminal enterprises. Some of those activities have extended outside of Russia, including to the United States.[1744] Agalarov and his associates have also, for years, participated in a variety of large-volume [redacted].[1745]

(U) Aras Agalarov also has significant ties to the Russian government, including to individuals involved in influence operations targeting the 2016 U.S. election. He has access to President Putin and to Putin's close aide Dimitry Peskov.[1746] Agalarov is also an associate of Yuri Chaika, who until 2020 was the Russian Prosecutor General, a position which is similar to that of the U.S. Attorney General.[1747] Agalarov may have a connection to First Deputy Premier

---

[1742] [redacted]
[1743] **(U)** Forbes, "#1227 Aras Agalarov," September 11, 2019.
[1744] [redacted]
[1745] [redacted]
[1746] [redacted] Email, Shugart to Graff, October 28, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000095).
[1747] **(U)** *SCO Report*, Vol. I p. 110. Chaika stepped down in January 2020.

Igor Shuvalov,[1748] and is also connected to Mikhail Mishustin, the now-Prime Minister of Russia.[1749]

[redacted]

[1748] [redacted] SSCI Transcript of the interview with Emin Agalarov, February 27, 2020, p. 72; Andrew Roth, "The man who drives Trump's Russia connection," *The Washington Post*, July 22, 2017. [redacted]

[1749] (U) E. Agalarov Tr., pp. 70-71.

[1750] [redacted]

[1751] [redacted]

[1752] [redacted]

[1753] [redacted]

[1754] [redacted]



[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) According to a Russian press report, in October 2010 when Russian intelligence held a celebration for the 60th anniversary of the GRU's special missions department, the event was hosted at Agalarov's Crocus City Hall.[1775]

[redacted]

(U) Aras Agalarov is an associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya, a Russian lawyer who has connections to Russian intelligence and security services.[1776]

(U) Agalarov has also been a longtime employer of Irakli Kaveladze, who has been involved in probable money laundering activity on behalf of Agalarov in the United States.

(U) Kaveladze is a Georgian-American businessman who immigrated to the United States in 1991. He has been employed by Aras Agalarov and the Crocus Group since 1989. At times in his work for the Crocus Group, Kaveladze would travel frequently to Moscow, sometimes for extended periods.[1777]

- (U) According to a report by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) in October 2000, Kaveladze has been involved in a range of activities in the United States that raise serious concerns regarding Russian money laundering.[1778] According to GAO, companies created by Kaveladze established approximately 2,000 corporations, some of which had made up names, for Russian brokers. Kaveladze's companies moved more than $1 billion in wire transfer transactions into 236 accounts at two U.S. banks, most of which was then transferred back to accounts in Eastern Europe again for Russian brokers. Kaveladze has insisted that he had no involvement in any wrongdoing, calling the GAO investigation a "witch hunt." [redacted][1779]

(U) Emin Agalarov is the son of Aras Agalarov. He is Executive Vice President of Crocus group and is also a musician. Emin Agalarov is connected to Grigoriy Lepsveridze, who has been sanctioned by the United States for his role in Russian organized crime.[1780] Emin

---

[1776] [redacted]; SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Natalia Veselnitskaya, March 26, 2018, pp. 69-70. For interactions with the Committee, the Agalarovs retained Scott Balber, an attorney who has also represented Donald Trump. Dylan Stableford, "Trump releases birth certificate to Bill Maher, demands $5 million," *Yahoo News*, January 9, 2013. Early 2017 text messages between Veselnitskaya and Agalarov employee Irakli Kaveladze indicate that Balber may have worked on a "government task" or "state assignment." The Committee has no further information on the nature of this work. [redacted] For Veselnitskaya's involvement in the June 9, 2016 meeting, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.C.5.

[1777] (U) FBI, FD-302, Kaveladze 11/16/2017; SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Irakli Kaveladze, October 18, 2017, pp. 4, 28.

[1778] (U) GAO, "Suspicious Banking Activities: Possible Money Laundering by U.S. Corporations Formed for Russian Entities," October 2000, p. 11; Raymond Bonner, "Laundering of Money Seen as 'Easy,'" *The New York Times*, November 29, 2000.

[1779] [redacted] Raymond Bonner, "Laundering of Money Seen as 'Easy,'" *The New York Times*, November 29, 2000; [redacted]

[1780] (U) Treasury, "Treasury Designates Associate of Key Brothers' Circle Members," October 30, 2013.

Agalarov previously employed Artem Klyushin, a Kremlin-linked bot developer who has supported Russian influence operations, to help promote Agalarov on social media. Emin Agalarov grew up, in part, in New Jersey, but is currently based in Moscow.[1781]

[redacted]

(U) According to Michael Cohen, around the time of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow, a friend, Giorgi Rtskhiladze, cautioned that he "did not care for the Agalarovs, thought they were gangsters and didn't do business with them." According to Cohen, when Rtskhiladze heard that Donald Trump Jr. was considering a real estate development project with the Agalarovs, Rtskhiladze again warned Cohen that the Agalarovs, and particularly Aras Agalarov, "are really rough."[1786] Rtskhiladze's description to the Committee of his limited relationship with the Agalarovs did not include this information.[1787]

3. (U) Origins of the Trump-Agalarov Relationship

[1781] (U) In February 2020, Agalarov produced documents and testified pursuant to a Committee subpoena served in January 2020.

[1782] [redacted]

[1783] [redacted]

[1784] [redacted]

[1785] [redacted]

[1786] [redacted]

[1787] (U) Written Responses, Rtskhiladze, August 23, 2019; Written Responses, Rtskhiladze, September 16, 2019.

(U) Donald Trump first met the Agalarovs in 2013 in an effort to bring the annual Miss Universe pageant to Moscow.[1788] The Miss Universe Organization had been co-owned by Trump since 1996.[1789]

(U) There was at least one previous attempt to bring the pageant to Moscow prior to 2013. In 2005, Paula Shugart, the president of the Miss Universe Organization, took an exploratory visit to Moscow to determine its suitability for hosting the event. After Shugart's trip, Trump wrote a letter to Mikhail Kusnirovich, a Russian businessman whom Shugart met on the trip. In his letter, Trump praised Moscow as a "spectacular venue" for the Miss Universe pageant.[1790]

[1788] **(U)** *See* RG000010–000031 (hereinafter Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr.).
[1789] **(U)** The Miss Universe Organization includes Miss USA and Miss Teen USA.
[1790] **(U)** Letter, Trump to Kusnirovich, October 25, 2005 (TRUMPORG_18_10).

TRUMP

October 25, 2005

Mr. Mikhail Kusnirovich
Bosco di Ciliegi/Articoli
9, Krymsky Val
Moscow, 119049 Russia

Dear Mikhail,

Paula Shugart informed me of her recent trip to Moscow and how impressed she was by you and your organization.

There is no doubt Moscow would be a spectacular venue for the Miss Universe pageant. Moscow has everything it takes to make it a destination city—it's a newly vibrant city along with a magnificent and fabled history. The millions of international viewers of Miss Universe would surely appreciate that combination. I sincerely hope we are able to make it work, and I thank you for all of your efforts and interest in the pageant.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Donald J. Trump

(U) Shugart recalled only meeting with Kusnirovich, not with any Russian government officials, while she was in Moscow. Efforts to bring the pageant to Moscow at that time were unsuccessful.[1791] According to Rob Goldstone, who later served as Emin Agalarov's promoter and aide, there was "too much red tape," making bringing the Miss Universe pageant to Moscow "too difficult to do."[1792]

i. (U) Planning Miss Universe Moscow

[1791] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Paula Shugart, April 30, 2018, pp. 10-11, 17–23.
[1792] (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 41.

(U) The first correspondence the Committee is aware of regarding Miss Universe Moscow occurred on January 7, 2013, when Emel Kiral emailed Emin Agalarov and wrote that she enjoyed meeting him, suggested that they meet with her "contact" at Miss Universe, and suggested that Agalarov could perform at a Miss Universe pageant that was hosted in Moscow. Kiral also attached a slide presentation on the potential benefits of hosting a Miss Universe pageant in Russia.[1793] Agalarov responded, thanking her and saying that he would look at the slides.[1794] It does not appear that any further involvement with Kiral took place.

(U) Separately, also in early 2013, Rob Goldstone reached out to a previous winner of the Miss Universe pageant regarding a potential role for the woman in an upcoming Emin Agalarov music video.[1795] Although the woman was unavailable, she connected Goldstone with Shugart, the president of the Miss Universe Organization, as someone who might be able to make another recommendation for the music video.[1796] In March 2013, Shugart offered to meet with Goldstone and Emin Agalarov. During the meeting, Goldstone suggested that Agalarov could perform at a future Miss Universe pageant.[1797]

(U) According to Goldstone, Emin Agalarov asked about hosting the pageant in Moscow. Shugart explained that she had previously hoped to host the pageant there, but those efforts were unsuccessful. Shugart identified Crocus City Hall as a potential location, and was impressed to learn that Emin Agalarov's father owned the venue.[1798]

(U) Emin Agalarov then asked Shugart about Miss Universe's fee structure and about what would be involved in bringing the pageant to Russia. Goldstone said that Agalarov was optimistic that he would be able to perform at the pageant if it were held at Crocus City Hall, and believed that it would generate international exposure for his music career. In part to foster this new relationship, Shugart offered Miss Universe 2012 for Agalarov's music video.[1799]

(U) Kaveladze recalled that Aras Agalarov was initially very skeptical about hosting the pageant, but Emin Agalarov was excited and lobbied his father.[1800] Kaveladze believed that

---

[1793] (U) Email, Kiral to E. Agalarov, January 7, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00001). Shugart told the Committee that Kiral had been introduced to the Miss Universe Organization by Rhona Graff, but that neither Shugart nor Agalarov had any meaningful connection to her. Shugart Tr., pp. 41-42; Krial has also gone by the name Emel Dilek.
[1794] (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Kiral, January 7, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000998).
[1795] (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 45–47.
[1796] (U) *Ibid.*
[1797] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 46–48.
[1798] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48.
[1799] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.
[1800] (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 14-15.

Crocus would lose a substantial amount of money and repeatedly advised against hosting the event.[1801]

(U) On April 18, Goldstone emailed Agalarov to tell him that Trump and the Miss Universe Organization had met and were willing to "pull out all the stops to get this to Moscow."[1802] In May 2013, the Miss Universe Organization was under increasing pressure to secure a location for the upcoming pageant.[1803] At that time, Emin Agalarov invited Shugart and several other Miss Universe representatives to Moscow to visit the venue and other related facilities such as hotels.[1804] During that visit to Moscow, Aras Agalarov agreed to pay to host the pageant.[1805] Despite Shugart providing recommendations regarding financing structures that might involve governments or tourism departments as well as private entities, the Agalarovs indicated that the financing for the Moscow pageant would be strictly private.[1806]

(U) Ultimately, Crocus Group paid approximately $6 million for a licensing fee and incurred an additional $6 million in expenses. The Agalarovs only recouped about $2 million in sales, resulting in an approximately $10 million loss for the event.[1807] According to Shugart, Moscow was one of the most lucrative deals that the Miss Universe Organization had ever participated in.[1808]

(U) Following the commitment from Agalarov to finance the pageant, Shugart notified Donald Trump. Shugart recalled that Trump was "very happy" and believed the Agalarovs were "the real deal." Shugart recalled that Trump told her she was "finally introducing him to the people he needed to be meeting."[1809]

(U) At the conclusion of the Russia trip, a Letter of Intent was signed.[1810] Goldstone recalled that Trump wanted to announce the locations of the upcoming Miss Universe pageant during the awards ceremony for the Miss USA pageant in Las Vegas, Nevada, in June 2013.

[1801] [redacted]

[1802] (U) Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov, April 18, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00057). According the same email from Goldstone, Shugart had also "asked if there was any word back from the Government folks your father emailed etc."

[1803] (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 14, 24.

[1804] (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 45–50. This account is generally consistent with testimony to the Committee from Paula Shugart. Shugart Tr., pp. 17–23.

[1805] (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 17-23, 50–51; Goldstone Tr., pp. 53–54.

[1806] (U) Shugart Tr., p. 22.

[1807] (U) Attorney Proffer, Kaveladze, September 28, 2017.

[1808] (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 32-33.

[1809] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48.

[1810] (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 53–54.

Goldstone recalled that the groups were "very much under pressure to get that all agreed, so a contract could be signed in Vegas."[1811]

(U) Shugart told the Committee that "once Aras decided it was happening, we moved very quickly," and the two sides drafted a contract.[1812] Kaveladze, who served as Crocus's lead on the contract, told the Committee that he worked with representatives from the Miss Universe organization for a month and a half to prepare the documents and final contract that needed to be signed to finalize the deal.[1813] Shugart told the Committee that Trump made no input on the details of the deal.[1814]

ii. (U) The First Meeting: Las Vegas

(U) In June 2013, the Miss Universe Organization invited the Agalarovs to Las Vegas to sign the contract and make the announcement alongside Trump during the Miss USA pageant.[1815] Arriving on June 15, 2013, the day before the pageant, Trump and the Agalarovs met for the first time in the lobby of the Trump Hotel in Las Vegas.

(U) Following their initial introduction, Trump and the Agalarovs went upstairs to a suite to sign the final contract for Miss Universe Moscow. Shugart and Aras Agalarov were the signatories.[1816] Roman Beniaminov, a close friend and aide to Emin Agalarov, recalled that at the signing the Miss Universe Organization group presented Aras Agalarov with a bottle of tequila to celebrate the occasion.[1817]

(U) The same day, Goldstone recalled receiving a phone call from Keith Schiller, Donald Trump's head of security. According to Goldstone, Schiller said, "I hear from Paula that you guys are going to dinner tonight. Mr. Trump would like to join." Goldstone continued, "I hung up. I called Emin and said: You have a guest tonight; Mr. Trump's now coming to dinner. And he goes: Very funny. I said: No, no; he is coming to dinner."[1818]

[1811] (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 50–51.
[1812] (U) Shugart Tr., p. 44.
[1813] (U) Kaveladze Tr., p. 14.
[1814] (U) Shugart Tr., p. 51–53.
[1815] (U) *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[1816] (U) *Ibid.*, pp. 56-58, 67; Itinerary for Donald Trump, et al. (TRUMPORG_18_000028); SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Roman Beniaminov, February 23, 2018, pp. 77-79.
[1817] (U) Beniaminov Tr., p. 79.
[1818] (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 61–62.

(U) The dinner that night ultimately included members of the Agalarov family, Trump Organization, Miss Universe Organization, and a number of Emin Agalarov's friends.[1819] Michael Cohen attended with Trump and Schiller.[1820] During the meal, Goldstone recalled being approached by Schiller, who asked Goldstone if the Agalarov group had plans after the meal. Goldstone recalled telling Schiller that one of Emin Agalarov's associates, Murtaza Akbar, was an investor in a club called The Act and that the group planned to go. According to Goldstone, Schiller responded by telling Goldstone that "Mr. Trump wants to come."[1821]

(U) Following dinner, the group, which included the Agalarovs, their associates, and the Trump Organization group, went to The Act. Goldstone described The Act as, "a bit Cirque du Soleil and a bit burlesquey thrown into one."[1822] Cohen recalled that the club was "more than a burlesque club" and was a "wild place."[1823]

(U) The group, including Trump, stayed at The Act for several hours.[1824]

[1819] (U) According to Beniaminov, attendees at the dinner included Aras Agalarov, Donald Trump, Aras Agalarov's wife and daughter, Emin Agalarov, Emin Agalarov's friends Murad and Timur Beniaminov, Roman Beniaminov (no relation), Rob Goldstone, Goldstone and Agalarov's associate Murtaza Akbar, Trump Organization employees Keith Schiller and Michael Cohen, Miss Universe employee Esther Swan, former-Miss Universe Olivia Culpo, and others. Beniaminov Tr., pp. 71–75. Lawrence Glick from the Trump Organization may have also attended. Shugart Tr., p. 56-58.

[1820] (U) Cohen served as a board member of the Miss Universe Organization, which he described as a "perk" of his job at the Trump Organization. Cohen Tr. II, p. 108.

[1821] (U) Goldstone Tr., pp. 63–64.

[1822] (U) Goldstone Tr., p. 64.

[1823] (U) Cohen Tr. II, pp. 109–110 ("It's a club that puts on shows, and you never really know what the show is going to be. In this specific case they brought out a young man who was in a leotard body suit, who, to me, I would diagnose him as a thalidomide baby. And he was blind as well, but he sang like Pavarotti. And while he was singing—I forget the song, it was like a 'God Bless America'-type song—there was a woman who was in a thong bikini, who was large, performing sex acts on him while he was singing. Interesting, because I was with Mr. Trump at the time. It was not really a place I expected to be with him at. He looked over to me when he was finished, and I'll never forget this, he looked me right in the face. He goes, 'That's a tough way to make a living.'"); Cohen told the Committee he did not remember the name of the club. Based on testimony from other witnesses, the club was The Act. Shugart Tr., pp. 62. Goldstone Tr., pp. 63–66; Tim O'Reiley, "Curtain comes down on nearly half of edgy skits at The Act nightclub," *Las Vegas Review-Journal*, September 13, 2013.

[1824] (U) A series of late night and early morning text messages between Beniaminov and Goldstone indicate Trump's presence at the club with the Agalarovs. Text message, Goldstone to Beniaminov, June 15, 2013 (RB001136–1137). Goldstone told the Committee that, at some point, Emin Agalarov asked him, "How do we get rid of him? When does he go? How long will he stay?" Sometime after that, Schiller approached Goldstone. Goldstone told the Committee, "Then Keith came up and said: 'Mr. Trump's going to leave.' And he made an interesting comment. He goes: 'By the way, you've hosted him really well; he must really like you guys, because he doesn't do this kind of thing and he doesn't stay. Thank you very much.'" Goldstone Tr., pp. 63–66. Beniaminov recalled going to the club after dinner, and that it was a late night, but his memory of the details were vague or non-existent. He recalled that there had been someone dancing on stage in a "mirror type of suit outfit." Beniaminov Tr., p. 81. Shugart recalled hearing the next morning that it had been a late night at the club and that everyone got

(U) The following day there was a dress rehearsal and the Miss USA pageant at which Aras and Emin Agalarov sat beside Trump. The pageant was followed by the official Miss Universe Moscow announcement, a ceremonial signing of the contract and a press conference.[1825]

(U) On June 17, 2013, Emin Agalarov instructed that a Crocus Group and Agalarov Estate brochure be sent by messenger to Trump.[1826]

(U) On June 18, 2013, Donald Trump wrote on Twitter, "Do you think Putin will be going to the Miss Universe pageant in November in Moscow? If so, will he become my new best friend?" The same day, Emin Agalarov responded on Twitter, "Mr. @realDonaldTrump anyone you meet becomes your best friend – so I'm sure Mr. Putin will not be an exception in Moscow @crocuscityhall."[1827]

iii. (U) Planning Miss Universe Moscow

(U) Following the contract signing in Las Vegas in June, planning began for the November 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow. In addition to arranging the pageant itself, Trump and Aras Agalarov repeatedly contacted President Putin and his staff, both to invite Putin to the event, and to offer a personal meeting with Trump.

(U) On June 21, 2013, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject line "Putin" to inform him that, "He [Trump] has a personal email [address] for VP" but had asked for a mailing address for the letter.[1828] On June 22, 2013, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov the text of a draft letter from Trump inviting Putin to attend the Miss Universe pageant and requesting a personal private meeting in Moscow. The email included the subject line, "Draft of Putin letter for Donald Trump - please show to Aras and let me know before I send to Trump." Emin Agalarov approved.[1829]

(U) On June 24, 2013, Rhona Graff, Trump's assistant, wrote to Shugart, informing her that, "DT wants to send a letter to Putin inviting him to Miss Universe. I asked Rob G. to draft something we could tweak. If you see the letter below, he references a trip to Moscow by DT in

---

along. She believed the club was called The Act. Shugart Tr., pp. 61–64. Schiller said he had no recollection of going to any club. SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Keith Schiller, February 7, 2018, pp. 43–45.

[1825] (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 65–66; Goldstone Tr., p. 66.

[1826] (U) Agalarov Estate brochure (DJTJR00502–607); Crocus Group brochure (DJTJR00610–849); Email, Goldstone to Graff, June 18, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000999).

[1827] (U) Tweet, @realDonaldTrump, June 18, 2013; Tweet, @eminofficial, June 18, 2013.

[1828] (U) Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov, June 21, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00466).

[1829] (U) Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov and Beniaminov, June 22, 2013 (RB-000858).

advance of the actual pageant. What is he talking about?"[1830] Graff included a version of the draft letter from Trump to President Putin, written by Rob Goldstone, which stated: "I have always valued your kind offer for me to visit Moscow, and I will be doing so later this year prior to the contest. I want to personally invite you as my guest of honor to the November 9th Miss Universe Pageant, and would also hope to meet privately with you during my stay in Moscow."[1831]

(U) Later on June 24, Shugart responded to Graff's email, writing, "I have no idea, I'm finding out now."[1832] Shugart told the Committee that she found out that Trump had said to the Agalarovs that he would come a few days earlier to "facilitate a meeting" with Putin.[1833]

(U) On June 27, 2013, Goldstone wrote to Emin Agalarov stating that Trump's assistant wanted to know where to send "the letter for Putin." Emin Agalarov wrote back, "On it."[1834] Later that day Goldstone sent Graff and Shugart the address and email of "who to forward letter from Mr. Trump to President Putin" and included the mailing address, title, and email address of Dmitry Peskov.[1835] In an email Goldstone explained that this individual "is in direct daily contact with the President and has been briefed to expect an email and physical letter."[1836]

(U) On June 27, 2013, Graff emailed a draft letter titled "Dear President Putin.docx" to an assistant, writing, "Please print this out for me on DT's heavy letterhead (with envelope)."[1837] On June 28, 2013, Graff emailed Shugart and Goldstone and attached a final signed copy of the letter. The signed copy had several changes to Goldstone's draft, including the omission of the extended stay in Moscow and the personal meeting request.[1838]

[1830] **(U)** Email, Graff to Shugart, June 24, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000016–17).
[1831] **(U)** Email, Goldstone to Graff, June 24, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000016–17).
[1832] **(U)** Email, Shugart to Graff, June 24, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_001016).
[1833] **(U)** Shugart Tr., pp. 76–77.
[1834] **(U)** Email, Emin to Goldstone and Beniaminov, June 27, 2013 (RB-000856).
[1835] **(U)** For more on Dmitry Peskov, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.C.5.i.b.
[1836] **(U)** Email, Goldstone to Graff and Shugart, June 27, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000015).
[1837] **(U)** Email, Graff to Kelly, June 27, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_001022).
[1838] **(U)** Letter, Trump to Putin, June 26, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000031).



TRUMP
THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION

June 26, 2013

President Vladimir Putin
c/o Dmitiri Sergeevich Peskov
Press Secretary of President Vladimir Putin
Staraya Ploshad 10/4, 3rd floor, Office 304
Moscow
Russia, 10132

Dear Mr. President:

I hope you have heard by now the exciting news that we are bringing the Miss Universe 2013 Pageant to Russia for the first time in the 62 year history of the Pageant.

We will partner with Crocus Group and Aras Agalarov to stage the event on November 9th at Crocus City Hall. The Miss Universe Pageant is watched by over 1 billion people worldwide and is one of the most watched TV shows anywhere in the world.

I know that our Moscow pageant will be our biggest and best Miss Universe ever, and we are already overwhelmed with a very positive and extensive response from both international and Russian media. We turned down many other competing countries in favor of Russia.

I want to take this opportunity to personally invite you to be my guest of honor in Moscow on November 9th. I know you will have a great time

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Donald J. Trump

THE WORLD'S MOST BEAUTIFUL WOMEN!

(U) Several months later, on September 9, 2013, planning efforts were focused on securing hotel rooms for the pageant leadership and judges. Goldstone wrote several emails to Kaveladze, Emin Agalarov, Beniaminov, and three Russian employees of Crocus Group

regarding hotel options for the pageant.[1839] Goldstone wrote that he would like to visit the "Intercontinental Hotel and check out their top suites for Donald Trump to stay as it is our sponsor hotel group. At the moment we have him in an $11k a night suite at Ritz Carlton - and I am assured by Trump's office that he is happy to stay at Intercontinental in a top suite and it should save us a lot of money."[1840] However, later that day, Emin Agalarov wrote to Roman Beniaminov and Crocus employee Katia Kosenkova, directing them to arrange for Trump to stay at the Ritz Carlton. He wrote, "trump will stay at the ritz comply with me [sic]," and requested that room options be sent to him.[1841]

(U) Roman Beniaminov told the Committee that guests of Aras Agalarov had previously had reservations made for them at the Ritz Carlton for Crocus business.[1842]

(U) On September 12, 2013, Agalarov and Trump efforts turned back to outreach to Putin. Goldstone wrote to Graff and Shugart with a follow up request for another signed letter from Trump. Goldstone's request mentioned asking for a personal meeting between Trump and Putin, "as discussed." Goldstone wrote: [1843]

[1839] (U) Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze, E. Agalarov, et al., September 9, 2013 (RB-000388). The additional Crocus email recipients were Svetlana Bignova, Katia Kosenkova, and Sergey Sharov.
[1840] (U) Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze, E. Agalarov, et al., September 9, 2013 (RB-000388).
[1841] (U) Email, E. Agalarov to Kosenkova and Beniaminov, September 9, 2013 (RB-000020). Shugart told the Committee that she did not know who made the hotel reservations, but that it would have been someone on the Russian side of the planning for the event. Shugart said that the Miss Universe Organization would have approved the choice, but "we were just notified that they had the Ritz." Shugart Tr., p. 118.
[1842] (U) Beniaminov Tr., p. 185.
[1843] (U) Email, Goldstone to Graff and Shugart, September 12, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000034).

Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2013 4:29 PM
To: Rhona Graff
Cc: 'Paula Shugart'
Subject: Letter from Mr Trump to President Putin
Importance: High

Hi Ladies

I am off to Moscow tomorrow and might have an opportunity to meet with Putin's personal private secretary next week.
During the visit I would bring up the request for Mr. Trump to meet with President Putin during the Miss Universe week as discussed and requested in previous letter to him.
It has been suggested that I bring a hand signed copy of the letter with me in case it is asked for and also that we put some dates in there say Nov 5 to 9 for a meeting, so he could get it on Putin's calendar.
Do you think you could maybe add in those dates to the original letter and I could get an original hand signed copy? I was thinking maybe Rachel or Larry or even Olivia could bring it next week to Moscow and I could deliver it (possibly even with Olivia) to his personal secretary.

Rob Goldstone

(U) Shugart told the Committee that she understood Goldstone to be discussing meeting with Dmitry Peskov. Shugart said she took Goldstone's outreach regarding Peskov seriously because Goldstone was in close contact with the Agalarovs, and she believed that Aras Agalarov had that level of access to Putin.[1844]

(U) Graff responded to Goldstone's email, writing, "Not a bad idea. Let me talk to Mr. Trump about it and I will get back to you asap."[1845] Later on September 12, Graff replied, "He'll sign it in the morning and I'll let you know Paula when someone can come over to pick it up."[1846] Separately, also on September 12, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov, Kaveladze, and Beniaminov. He wrote, "I will have a hand signed letter from Donald Trump to President Putin asking to meet when he is in Moscow Nov 5 to 9th. Hopefully we can get this letter to Peskov or some other person next week in Moscow."[1847]

(U) The June 26 and September 13 letters to Putin are similar but not the same. Several small changes were made to the June 26 letter, including the re-addition of a line regarding

[1844] **(U)** Shugart Tr., pp. 84, 87.
[1845] **(U)** Email, Graff to Goldstone and Shugart, September 12, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000033).
[1846] **(U)** Email, Graff to Shugart, September 12, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000031).
[1847] **(U)** Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov, Kaveladze, and Beniaminov, September 12, 2013 (RB-000093).

Trump making an extended stay in Moscow and an offer for a personal meeting with Trump separate from the pageant.[1848] Shugart said that while she had asked Trump to write letters to heads of state on behalf of Miss Universe, "an invitation like this had never happened before" and that this was not typical of other foreign pageants they had done elsewhere.[1849]



September 13, 2013

President Vladimir Putin
c/o Dmitiri Sergeevich Peskov
Press Secretary of President Vladimir Putin
Staraya Ploshad 10/4, 3rd floor, Office 304
Moscow
Russia, 10132

Dear Mr. President:

I hope you have heard the exciting news that we are bringing the Miss Universe 2013 Pageant to Russia for the first time in the 62 year history of the Pageant. As you know, it is the biggest and important pageant in the world and has a television audience of over 1 billion people, making it one of the most watched TV shows worldwide. It will be a great tribute to Moscow and Russia!

We will be working with Crocus Group and Aras Agalarov to stage the event on November 9th at Crocus City Hall. We turned down many competing countries in favor of Russia.

I want to take this opportunity to personally invite you to be my Guest of Honor at the Pageant on November 9. Additionally, I will be arriving in Moscow a few days prior to the event and if for any reason you would like to meet with me, it would be my great honor.

I look forward to seeing you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Donald J. Trump

[1848] (U) Letter, Trump to Putin, September 13, 2013 (TRUMPORG_18_000033).
[1849] (U) Shugart Tr., p. 78, 85.

(U) On September 18, Emin Agalarov wrote to Goldstone, simply stating, "Trumps letter is with Peskov he will pass on to the president."[1850] On September 19, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov, writing that, "According to his [Trump's] office, he is keen to make himself available at any time to meet President Putin, and if necessary, would fly in earlier on Nov 6th."[1851] Emin Agalarov told the Committee, "Trump was always asking if Putin's coming or not."[1852]

(U) Shugart told the Committee that during this time period Trump discussed Putin with her specifically. She recalled, "Donald wanted to meet Putin," and that, "He wanted to make sure we arranged a meeting."[1853] Shugart told the Committee that, "When we would speak in the lead-up to the pageant, he [Trump] wanted to – he just would reiterate his desire to meet Putin," but he didn't explain why.[1854] Shugart told the Committee that Trump followed up on the Putin meeting whenever they spoke. She recalled, "that was the reason for a lot of these letters – we were all trying to ensure that this meeting happened for Donald with Mr. Putin, because that was the request whenever we spoke about it, whenever we spoke about the pageant and the event."[1855]

(U) In addition to the meeting, another topic of focus for pageant organizers and Trump Organization employees was the guests that Trump wanted to bring to the pageant in Moscow. On October 10, 2013, Graff wrote an email titled "DT's Guests on Trip to Moscow" to Shugart. Graff wrote that Trump "was bringing two guests with him other than Keith [Schiller] and Michael [Cohen]). Their names are Alex Sapir and Rotem Rosen."[1856] Additionally, in mid-October there was email correspondence regarding the hotel arrangements for Phil Ruffin, a close friend of Trump, and Ruffin's wife, Oleksandra Nikolayenko. In late October, Graff wrote to Shugart to notify her that Trump had invited a friend, Joe Cinque, to the pageant, and that Cinque would need a room at the Ritz Carlton and would be flying home with Trump.[1857] Despite planning for their attendance, neither Michael Cohen nor Cinque ultimately traveled to

---

[1850] **(U)** Email, E. Agalarov to Goldstone, September 18, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000192).
[1851] **(U)** Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov et al., September 19, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00637).
[1852] **(U)** E. Agalarov Tr., p. 36.
[1853] **(U)** Shugart Tr., p. 69.
[1854] **(U)** Shugart Tr., p. 69.
[1855] **(U)** Shugart Tr., p. 85.
[1856] [redacted] Email, Graff to Shugart, October 10, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000052). Rotem Rosen is linked to Putin associate Lev Leviev, who reportedly has ties to organized crime and a number of Russian oligarchs. [redacted]
[1857] **(U)** Email, Shugart to Graff, et al., October 30, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000100); Shugart Tr., pp. 106-109.

Moscow.[1858] However, the Ruffins, Alex Sapir, and Rotem Rosen did attend. Other information indicates that a Trump acquaintance, David Geovanis, may have attended the pageant.[1859]

(U) On October 18, Goldstone drafted an email that Emin Agalarov planned to send to Shugart. The draft email to Shugart stated that, "there is still a huge issue we need to resolve. We have just tabulated our final budget and income and project a shortfall of $8.9 million." Emin Agalarov and Goldstone sought a reduction in the $6.5 million licensing fee, and believed that Shugart would take the request to Trump.[1860]

(U) By October 18, a meeting with Putin still had not been secured, and Graff wrote to Shugart to inform her that Trump would no longer be arriving early in Moscow, but instead would arrive the day before the pageant. On October 28, Shugart responded:

> *Could we speak about Mr. Trump's schedule? Aras Agalarov, Emin's father, expressed concern that DT would only be in on November 8th. Apparently in Las Vegas Mr. Trump told him he would come in a day or two earlier than he normally does. Aras and SperBank [sic] wanted to arrange a breakfast or lunch with the business leaders of Russia with Mr. Trump as the guest of honor. This is the first time Aras has expressed disappointment about anything.*[1861]

(U) Securing Trump's attendance at the Sberbank event may have been particularly important to Aras Agalarov given his need for financing from the bank for a major upcoming construction project.[1862]

(U) Despite the change in travel schedule, Shugart told the Committee that as the pageant got closer Trump grew more emphatic about the need to secure the meeting with Putin.[1863]

(U) On October 23, Goldstone sent an email to Emin Agalarov with the subject line "Putin Trump meeting?" He wrote, "What is the status on a possible meeting between Trump And Mr Putin? Trump Office is asking." Later that day Emin Agalarov replied, "Roman

---

[1858] (U) Shugart Tr., p. 108; Cohen Tr. II, p. 108.
[1859] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Bob Foresman, January 9, 2019, p. 221; Written Responses, McFarren, January 18, 2019. For more on Geovanis, *see infra* Vol. 5, Sec. III.I.
[1860] (U) Email Goldstone to E. Agalarov, October 18, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00713-714), email Goldstone to E. Agalarov, October 18, 2013 (EA-SSCI-00707).
[1861] (U) Email, Shugart to Graff, October 28, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000095).
[1862] (U) Alexander Panin, "Sberbank Funds $2.4 Billion Construction at Crocus City," *The Moscow Times*, November 19, 2013.
[1863] (U) Shugart Tr., p. 90.

[Grachev] will find out."[1864] Grachev, the director of Crocus City Hall, was in touch with Dmitry Peskov and had been involved in the prior transmittal of the letter from Trump to Putin.[1865] On October 24, Goldstone emailed again, pushing for a response on the meeting. On Sunday, October 27, Svetlana Bignova, Grachev's deputy, sent an email to Goldstone, Emin Agalarov, Kaveladze, Grachev, and Beniaminov. She wrote, "Please let them know that on Tuesday Mr. Putin will make his decision."[1866]

(U) Aras Agalarov was personally involved in the effort to secure a meeting. Irakli Kaveladze recalled that, in approximately October, Aras Agalarov received a call from Dmitry Peskov, Putin's press secretary. Kaveladze was in Aras Agalarov's office and overheard Agalarov relay Trump's interest to meet with Putin. Kaveladze believes Peskov told Aras Agalarov that he would get back to Agalarov.[1867]

(U) According to Aras Agalarov, "when I told the Presidential Administration that Trump was coming, and I told them what kind of event we were hosting, and how it will be seen by many people all over the world, the Presidential Administration responded that Vladimir Putin would like to meet Mr. Trump."[1868]

(U) In an interview with Aras Agalarov that has only partially been published, Agalarov was asked why Putin wanted to meet with Trump. Agalarov replied:

> *Well, first of all, I convinced him to. You know the government here often pays visits to exhibitions, and we have a lot of national exhibitions taking place here. And I remember once when Putin was visiting one of the exhibition[s], I told him that we will have Donald Trump here for one of these events and we would have an audience of [many people]... Putin pays attention to events like the Olympic Games, Formula 1, FIFA World Cup. He is interested in global events, and of course he was interested in this event. He thought he should meet this person who brought this global event to Russia. That was the main reason.*[1869]

(U) In late October 2013, Aras Agalarov was scheduled to receive the Order of Honor, one of the highest civilian awards in Russia, from President Putin. In an October 28 email to

---

[1864] (U) Emails, Goldstone and E. Agalarov, October 23, 2013 (Beniaminov Production).
[1865] (U) Beniaminov Tr., p. 100.
[1866] (U) Email, Bignova to Goldstone, E. Agalarov, et al., October 27, 2013 (Beniaminov Production).
[1867] (U) FBI, FD-302, Kaveladze 11/16/2017.
[1868] (U) Agalarov *Washington Post* Tr.
[1869] (U) *Ibid.*

Graff, Shugart noted that "Aras is being awarded some sort of Medal of Freedom by Putin at the Kremlin tomorrow and he is hoping to set a meeting with Mr. Trump."[1870]

(U) On October 29, 2013, Shugart, who was in Moscow,[1871] emailed Graff a series of photos of Aras Agalarov receiving the award from Putin. She wrote, "This was just sent to me. They were discussing DJT while this was happening. Stay tuned."[1872] Later that day Graff responded, "Well, I think if this is a serious and substantial offer to meet Putin, DJT would reconsider his travel plans. Let's talk when you know more."[1873] Shugart replied, "I'll know more in the morning but it sounds serious. I told my contact it would be major reshuffling and it would need to be worth it. Did you give him [Donald Trump] a heads up?" Graff responded she had.[1874] The following day, October 30, Graff wrote to Shugart, "Any news on Putin?"[1875] Shugart replied, "No but at least I made Emin aware of the situation tonight at the event. We are following up in the AM. He said the meeting is definitely happening, he just isn't sure if Putin wants 7th, 8th or 9th. He was told 7th but hasn't received confirmation on information."[1876]

(U) On October 30, 2013, Roman Beniaminov and Goldstone, who both work for Emin Agalarov, exchanged an email titled "To do." The text of the email consists of a list of tasks, primarily related to Emin Agalarov. One item on the list was simply: "Trump-Putin."[1877]

(U) Shugart recalled, she "knew there was a desire" to meet with Putin and "they all felt that they were going to be able to make it happen."[1878] Shugart said she was working on arranging the meeting on a daily basis and that "every time I spoke to him [Trump] leading up to the pageant, he wanted to know if it was set."[1879]

[1870] (U) Email, Shugart to Graff, October 28, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000095).
[1871] (U) Several weeks prior to the pageant, staff working to organize the event, including Shugart and Goldstone, relocated to Moscow. Goldstone told the Committee, "I arrived in Moscow approximately three weeks before the event, and that was timed to coincide with when the main part of the final logistics took place, and including when the contestants arrived." According to Goldstone, those who arrived early primarily stayed at the Crown Plaza in Moscow, then moved to the Ritz Carlton shortly before the pageant. Goldstone Tr., pp. 73–74.
[1872] (U) Email, Shugart to Graff, October 29, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000081).
[1873] (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, October 29, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000081).
[1874] (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, October 30, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000072–73). Shugart told the Committee that she believed that her "contact" in this case was Irakli Kaveladze. Shugart Tr., p. 102.
[1875] (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, October 30, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000092).
[1876] (U) Email, Shugart to Graff, October 30, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000078; Shugart Tr., p. 110.
[1877] (U) Email, Beniaminov to Goldsone, October 30, 2013 (RB001988).
[1878] (U) Shugart told the Committee that she believed Emin Agalarov had told her that the meeting was definitely happening. Shugart Tr., p. 109-110.
[1879] (U) Shugart Tr., p. 111. Rhona Graff stated that she did not recall communications regarding Peskov or a meeting with Putin in Moscow. SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Rhona Graff, February 16, 2018, pp. 100–105.

(U) Kaveladze has said that a few days before the pageant, Kaveladze was in Aras Agalarov's office and Agalarov mentioned that he was trying to invite President Vladimir Putin to the pageant.[1880]

(U) Ultimately, a date for meeting with Putin prior to the pageant was not secured, and Trump did not arrive in Moscow early.[1881] Putin attending the pageant on short notice appeared unlikely, however the question of whether there would be a meeting with Putin while Trump was in Moscow remained unresolved.[1882]

iv. (U) The Miss Universe Pageant in Moscow

(U) On October 31, 2013, the Crocus Group and the Miss Universe Organization hosted a charity auction.[1883] The initial guest list for the event, which includes individuals with ties to the highest levels of the Russian government, military, intelligence services, organized crime, Russian banks, and Russian energy companies, among others, offers some insight into the Agalarovs' social and professional network in Moscow. Some of the individuals on the Agalarovs' guest list have participated in Russian influence operations targeting the United States and its allies, some have significant connections to the Russian intelligence services, and some are currently sanctioned by the United States.[1884]

(U) On Thursday, November 7, Donald Trump was scheduled to attend Billy Graham's birthday in North Carolina with Melania Trump. At 9:00 p.m. on November 7, Donald Trump

---

[1880] (U) FBI, FD-302, Kaveladze 11/16/2017.

[1881] (U) Shugart Tr., p. 97.

[1882] (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 169-170; Beniaminov Tr., pp. 102-104.

[1883] (U) Email, Goldstone to Shugart, et al., September 11, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000021). A letter from Roman Beniaminov's counsel indicates that the charity event took place "that weekend," indicating that it was the same weekend as the pageant. This is consistent with Rob Goldstone's interest, expressed over email, in scheduling the charity event while Donald Trump was in Moscow. Nevertheless, publicly available documents indicate that the auction took place on October 31, 2013. Letter, Yi to SSCI, March 14, 2019.

[1884] (U) The initial invite list obtained by the Committee is not a final list, nor does it necessarily reflect who ultimately attended. Nevertheless, it is informative as a preliminary reflection of the Agalarov's network. The list included Dmitry Medvedev, Sergey Shoygu, Sergei Stepashin, Vladislav Surkov, Vladimir Kozhin, Petr Aven, Vagit Alekperov, Valentina Matviyenko, Polina Deripaska,Vladimir Yakunin, Roman Abramovich, Vyacheslav Lebedev, Vasily Titov, Mikhail Mishustin, Igor Shuvalov, Arkady Dvorkovich, Kirill Androsov, Boris Gromov, Herman Gref, and others. Also on the Agalarov's invite list was Anatoly Kucherena, the Russian lawyer with reported links to the FSB who was representing Edward Snowden. Invitation, Crocus charity auction, (RB002671–2680). Snowden arrived in Moscow in July 2013, several months prior to the Miss Universe pageant being hosted there. Emin Agalarov told the Committee that he knows Kucherena and has been friends with Polina Deripaska since the early 2000s. E. Agalarov Tr., pp. 73, 69. Steven Lee Myers, "Snowden's Lawyer Comes with High Profile and Kremlin Ties," *The New York Times*, July 27, 2013.

and Keith Schiller were scheduled to board the private airplane of Phil Ruffin.[1885] Flight records indicate that the flight departed at 9:15 p.m. for Moscow.[1886]

a. (U) Friday, November 8

(U) Trump's flight from North Carolina was scheduled to arrive at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport at 2:45 p.m. on November 8.[1887]

(U) Schiller and Trump were scheduled to be met at the airport in Moscow by Nelson Feliciano, the head of security for the Miss Universe Organization.[1888] Trump was scheduled to be picked up by two cars, an armored Mercedes S550 for Trump and Schiller, and a second car that would include Feliciano and members of Emin Agalarov's security team. The cars were to be accompanied by a Russian police escort to the Ritz Carlton hotel.[1889] Shugart recalled that the police escort was provided by local authorities, and that Trump's driver in Moscow was hired by the Agalarovs specifically for the Miss Universe event.[1890] Roman Beniaminov told the Committee that he was "aware of people who work with Emin serving in the military and have some special training in the military" and that several private security firms were involved in the pageant in Moscow.[1891]

[1885] (U) Ruffin and his wife likely flew to Moscow for the pageant on a separate aircraft. (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–142).

[1886] (U) Vernon Silver, "Flight Records Illuminate Mystery of Trump's Moscow Nights," *Bloomberg Government*, April 23, 2018.

[1887] (U) Email, Graff to Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (PS-SEN-0000139–141). Shugart told the Committee that Trump "arrived early in the morning on Friday the 8th" and estimated that the flight arrived around 7:00 a.m. This is not consistent with other information obtained by the Committee. The Committee was not able to reconcile this discrepancy. Shugart Tr., pp.137–138;

[1888] (U) *Ibid.* Multiple people interviewed by the Committee expressed some concern about Feliciano. In 2015, Goldstone recommended in an email that Feliciano not be hired for a job because "MUO let him go for some shady activity." Text message, Goldstone to Beniaminov, November 2, 2015 (RB001148). Beniaminov told the Committee, "I'm aware of him being eventually let go from the Miss Universe Organization for something that had gone on internally." Beniaminov Tr., p. 143. Shugart said that Feliciano had been on bad terms with Schiller following the pageant and "had been charged with something, some sort of credit card sting," prior to the pageant. Shugart contended that Feliciano had not left the organization on bad terms. Shugart Tr., p. 122-123.

[1889] (U) Email, Feliciano to Bignova, Shugart, et al., November 7, 2013 (Beniaminov Production).

[1890] (U) Shugart Tr., pp. 128–134.

[1891] (U) Beniaminov recalled that one of the private security firms involved in the pageant was called Karat. In addition, the Crocus Group had its own security, which was provided by a different private security firm. There was consideration of Emin Agalarov's security team also providing security for Trump; however, the second unidentified private security firm was ultimately brought in for this purpose. Beniaminov Tr., pp. 136–140.